

**"DAS IRDISCH-ABSOLUTE": THE DEVELOPMENT
OF A THEORY IN THE WORK OF HERMANN BROCH**

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SUMMARY

This thesis is a chronological study of Broch's work from the early 1930's until his death in 1951. The former date is selected as the point of departure because, with the publication of "Der Zerfall der Werte" in Die Schlafwandler in 1932, Broch, for the first time, gave definitive expression to his theory of values, which he had been gradually formulating in years of research prior to that date. There are two main parts to this study. Broch's theoretical writings are first examined with a view to showing how and why the theory of "das Irdisch-Absolute" developed and to explaining exactly what it is. In the second part his novels are examined with the aim of establishing the extent to which the developing theory of "das Irdisch-Absolute" is reflected in them.

It can be shown that the basic development in question is a progression in Broch's thinking from reliance on the purely formal, abstract, transcendental Absolute of the Logos to the conviction that man, as the empirical, earthly Absolute, must be the final criterion by and against which all values must be judged. The main purpose of the thesis, as explained in the introduction, is to show how Broch, an intellectual and theoretician, was forced by historical circumstances continually to modify and revise his thinking on the basic question of ethics. This revision, of which Broch was never fully aware himself, is seen in the way he progressively abandoned a

highly abstract, theoretical and speculative conception of ethics, which seemed to have little immediate relevance to the problems of his own generation, in favour of a more practical morality of direct humanitarian commitment.

I. A GENERAL OUTLINE OF THE DEVELOPMENT OF BROCH'S THOUGHT

A preliminary explanation of the general lines along which Broch's thought evolved throughout his life and work will provide a useful introduction and frame of reference for the subsequent, more detailed investigation of the essays and novels.

The purpose of such an introduction is twofold. It serves to give an insight into the chronological development of Broch's thinking. This is important because it reveals how Broch reacted to the decisive historical events of his generation. Secondly, it demonstrates the astonishing unity and consistency which are one of the most characteristic features of Broch's work.

It must not be thought that the two facts of consistency and chronological development are incompatible; rather they are complementary. In this section Broch's correspondence will be used as the main source of reference; I wish to show, above all, his personal reactions to the history of his era. His letters confirm that his thought developed on two levels. There is a linear or temporal evolution, namely that which can be traced directly to the way in which Broch responded to the changing cultural and political atmosphere throughout his life. To this linear pattern corresponds a vertical or hierarchical development. The term "hierarchical" is used advisedly because Broch repeatedly uses this word to

describe his own scheme of thinking. It is in this dual pattern that the unity of Broch's thought becomes apparent. In his work he is always concerned with the problem of ethics; this guarantees the consistency of his work. A vertical or concentric approach is evident in the way he confronts this one problem from different angles and on different levels of human endeavour.

In the opening words of his "Autobiographie als Arbeitsprogramm" Broch succinctly delineates the central focus of his work: "es ist, ohne Umschweife herausgesagt, das Problem des Absolutheitsverlustes, das Problem des Relativismus, für den es keine absolute Wahrheit, keinen absoluten Wert und sohin auch keine absolute Ethik gibt, . . ." (GW 9: 37). The degree to which Broch was obsessed by this question can be judged by the intensity, variety and volume of work he dedicated to it in the course of his life. Indeed, if any uninitiated reader were to demand a single key to the comprehension of Broch's oeuvre as a whole he could be given no better advice than to approach it as a testimony to the single-minded dedication of a twentieth-century intellectual in seeking to face the challenge of the ethical crisis of his generation. Every aspect of Broch's work bears witness to this. In his novels, his theory of aesthetics, his research in logic, mathematics, epistemology, psychology and political theory the initial stimulus can always be traced back to his conviction that, unless a new, absolutely reliable Ethos were found, the European tradition of civilization and humanity would founder amidst a welter

of conflicting, relative values.

Broch's work reveals that he was aware of the dangers of such relativism at the very earliest stage of his intellectual development. In the "Autobiographie als Arbeitsprogramm" he looks back to 1906 when he enrolled as a part-time student at the university of Vienna, full of hope that his studies, especially those in philosophy, might provide answers to some of his questions. He goes on to record his disillusionment: "Als ich 1906 die Wiener Universität bezog, um Mathematik und Philosophie zu studieren, erfuhr ich - wie so viele andere - bestürzt und enttäuscht, dass ich nicht berechtigt sei, irgendeine all der metaphysischen Fragen zu stellen, mit denen beladen ich gekommen war; ich erfuhr, dass es keine Hoffnung auf irgendeine Beantwortung gab." (GW 9: 37).¹

Vienna was at that time the centre of the flourishing school of logical or scientific positivism, whose maxim can be summarized in the closing words of Wittgenstein's Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus: "Wovon man nicht sprechen kann, darüber muss man schweigen." This statement has been regularly misinterpreted. The logical positivists did not deny the existence of metaphysical problems, but they refused to classify their study under the category of knowledge. Any enquiry into the realms of metaphysics could, in their eyes, never be more than empty speculation. Their rigorous definition of knowledge was based on the application within every discipline of a strictly logical methodology, which, in its essence, was derived from the practice of the empirical

sciences. Thus ideal philosophy ceased to be regarded as a source of knowledge, and a distinct dichotomy developed between empirical and a priori reasoning; only the former was honoured by the positivists as the cognitive method which could attain knowledge.

Broch analyses this prevailing academic climate as follows: "es ging (eben wie in den empirischen Wissenschaften) um die Ausschaltung aller rein spekulativen, also auch aller rein aprioristischen Elemente aus dem philosophischen Bereich, insbesondere aus der Erkenntnistheorie, auf dass nach Beendigung solcher Purifizierung ein einwandfrei gesicherter Realitätsbestand der Philosophie übrigbliebe Immer klarer zeigte sich, dass eine Verständigung zwischen Apriorismus und Empirismus nicht mehr möglich war." (GW 9: 37-38).

For Broch this was not simply a question of "universitäre Schulstreitigkeiten" (GW 9: 38). He believed that it was symptomatic of the ethical crisis of his era.

According to Broch reality had dissolved into numerous, separate systems of values. There was no longer any central standard or absolute criterion against which every facet of human activity could be measured. The security and direction offered to life by a teleological orientation, which itself could be guaranteed only by a unitary religious faith, had been lost. Broch saw in the Catholic Middle Ages the last epoch in which all life had been united under such an Absolute, namely in the faith in the personal God of Christianity. During that

period, the intellectual atmosphere of which is embodied in the works of Scholasticism, God was the final axiom in every chain of enquiry. Where reason could proceed no further, the enquirer was nevertheless satisfied because he believed that ultimately all questions could be traced back to God the Creator, the ground of reality.

Once such a religious faith weakened, the absolute basis for life which it had guaranteed would be lost; there could no longer be found a final instance or central criterion to which all aspects of human experience could be submitted. As the spirit of rationalism became stronger so, Broch argued, logical validity came to be accepted as the only standard of knowledge and hence of reality. In Broch's eyes logical positivism represented the culmination of this development. No longer was each academic discipline, each profession and every sphere of human activity related to a central Absolute. Life dissolved into countless independent "realities", each being pursued and perpetuated as logically as possible, each with its own ethic, its own system of values. In the modern era these conflicting interests can frequently be identified with the steadily growing tally of "-isms": materialism, imperialism, communism, aestheticism, militarism, commercialism, etc.²

These then, in very general terms, were the processes which Broch saw leading up to the historical situation immediately prior to the Great War. It was in search for a solution to this crisis that he hopefully turned to the study of philosophy at the university of

Vienna, only to be forced to concede failure: "das erste Jahrzehnt des 20. Jahrhunderts war bereits von all der Spannung und Zerrissenheit erfüllt, die 1914 ihren blutigen Ausdruck finden sollten; nationale, ökonomische, staatliche, soziale Interessen überkreuzten sich allenthalben und standen allenthalben in gegenseitigem Widerspruche, jedes von ihnen mit der Forderung nach Alleingeltung seiner Wertsetzungen, und nirgends war eine Handhabe zu finden, um diesen Wertrelativismus unter eine objektiv ausgleichende höhere Instanz zu stellen. Und wenn die Jugend - dies war ja gerade ihre metaphysische und ethische Not - bei der Philosophie Rat einholen wollte, so erklärte sich die Philosophie selber in diesen Fragen als unzuständig." (GW 9: 38-39).

Before proceeding any further it should be noted that Broch was always very reticent about his personal life, except in as far as such comment might be relevant to his writings.

In 1948, replying to a student who wanted some personal information for a dissertation she was preparing on the work of Broch, Kafka and Musil, Broch wrote: "Etwas teile ich jedenfalls mit Kafka und Musil: wir haben alle drei keine eigentliche Biographie; wir haben gelebt und geschrieben, und das ist alles." (GW 8: 321). The following year the same student wrote again and asked for more details. Broch replied with the bare minimum of additional information and concluded his letter on much the same note as his first one: "Hätte ich eine

Autobiographie zu schreiben, ich hätte wegen Materialmangel allerlei Schwierigkeiten." (GW 8: 360). Perhaps not surprisingly the dissertation in question dealt largely with Kafka and Musil only. Nevertheless, the two letters mentioned provide one of the few sources of any comment by Broch on the earlier part of his life.³ For the greater part of our knowledge concerning Broch's life and work before he began his literary career we have to rely on the research embodied in secondary literature.⁴

This thesis does not purport to be a comprehensive biographical study and it is convenient to follow Broch's own example in concentrating only on those aspects of his life which he himself considered relevant to his writings.

Broch's "Autobiographie als Arbeitsprogramm" tends to mislead the reader because, under the first section, "Erste Erfahrungen (1905-1910)", it mentions only his studies at university and his disillusionment with the contemporary state of philosophy. No indication is given that by 1906 Broch, in accordance with the wishes of his father, had completed a professional training as a textile engineer. He entered the family business in 1908.

During the period 1908-1927 Broch was deeply involved in all aspects of the Austrian textile industry. When the Great War broke out he volunteered for military service but failed to pass the medical examination; he spent the first years of the war managing the family factory at Teesdorf. In the course of the war he was also entrusted with the supervision of military hospitals, first at Teesdorf and then in Baden, near Vienna. He

carried out his duties so well that, in the critical days just before the armistice when every available man was being called up, the Red Cross demanded that he be exempted because his services were vital to the efficient functioning of the hospital under his direction. At the same time he began to be increasingly involved with the problems of industrial relations within the Austrian textile business. In the closing years of the war and in the difficult years which followed Broch played an important role in the efforts to rebuild the ruined industry and improve relations between workers and management. Broch's own factories suffered in the general depression of the 1920's; after a long struggle to preserve the family business he eventually sold it in 1927 and dedicated himself entirely to his studies and writing.⁵

Wolfgang Rothe has suggested that Broch did not publish anything in the period 1919-1929 because it was the one time in his life when he found a degree of fulfilment in active social involvement.⁶ Although Rothe is correct to emphasize the importance of this practical work his facts are not accurate. Bibliographies compiled after the publication of his article reveal that Broch published a considerable number of articles and reviews during the period in question. These dealt largely with literary criticism or socio-political questions.⁷ Most important of all is the fact that it was during these very years, when he was participating so actively in current industrial and political affairs, that Broch formulated his theory of values. The complexity and volume of his

research into the theory of values prevented Broch from publishing any of it at the time, but he tells us that he amassed many thousands of pages of manuscript, many of which were later lost when he was arrested by the Nazis (GW 9: 44).

My aim here is to show that Broch knew from his own experience the practical difficulties of life. In the political and economic chaos which engulfed Europe during and after the Great War he did what he could to alleviate the suffering of his fellow-countrymen, but everything seemed coloured by desperate expediency. For Broch this was not enough: he was convinced that the problem had to be attacked at its root, which he saw in the loss of a unitary, absolute system of values. Before any lasting solution to the crisis could be found a sound theoretical basis of action had to be laid. This was what he sought to achieve with his theory of values.

"Nichtsdestoweniger konnte diese praktische Tätigkeit nicht genügen: gerade weil die praktischen Verantwortungen gewachsen waren und sich nun auch auf die Allgemeinheit erstreckten, hatte sich das Bedürfnis nach theoretischem Verständnis mit verdoppelter Stärke gemeldet. Der Krieg hatte sich als blutige Sinnlosigkeit entpuppt, und der Friede wurde - zumindest in Zentraleuropa - erst recht zum Kampf kontradiktorischer Wertsysteme, von denen jedes einzelne mit dem Anspruch auf absolute Alleingeltung auftrat; . . . angesichts solcher Wertzersplitterung (Wertzerrissenheit, Wertvernichtung) war es kein Wunder, dass das alte Problem der absoluten Werte sich aufs neue

und mit aller Intensität anmeldete.

Im Laufe der Jahre war mir - im Gegensatz zur enttäuschten Verblüffung meiner Studentenzeit - manches doch klar geworden und hatte einen konstruktiven Aspekt gewonnen." (GW 9: 39-40).

With the above words Broch describes his turn to research for a theory of values on which he worked intensively for the period 1918-1928. It is not my intention to analyse that theory here, but rather to show what stage it represents in the development of Broch's thought. Let it suffice to say at this point that such a theory, since it was formulated to solve the ethical problems caused by the loss of a central, absolute value in life, would obviously have to attempt to restore a new Absolute. This is what Broch tried to do.

Expressed in the simplest and briefest terms, Broch sought to demonstrate that all values, all experience, whether rational or irrational, and all forms of knowledge, whether a posteriori or a priori, are complementary facets of a single, ideal reality, the unity of which is guaranteed by the ego ("das Ich") which, as the subject of perception and cognition, has an invariable and absolute epistemological structure.

Behind this intention lies Broch's belief that all reality is one and that a universally binding code of ethics can be evolved only when the individual is in a position to understand his personal role within the overall context of such a reality. For Broch "die ethische Frage" is that which asks: "Wie verhalte ich mich zur

Welt und zu dem, was ich mein Leben nenne?" (GW 10: 302). It is Broch's assertion that no final answer can be given to this question until such a time as man can genuinely claim to comprehend all reality and hence his individual function within it. Throughout his work Broch never ceases to stress the correlation between reality, knowledge and ethics. Two passages from the correspondence of the later years confirm this. In July 1948 Broch wrote: "Realität ist Verlässlichkeit, und damit wird die Seins-Realität zum ethischen Faktor. Wo die Realität verlässlich ist, da werden auch die Werte, da wird auch der Mensch wieder verlässlich. Und darauf kommt es an." (GW 8: 292). In April 1951, just a few weeks before his death, he wrote to Karl August Horst: "jede neue Realitätsaufdeckung muss notwendigerweise auch moralische Konsequenzen in sich schliessen, denn es gibt nichts Isoliertes in dieser Welt; gelingt es mir also, im Leser eine neue Realitätsahnung zu erwecken, so helfe ich ihm auch, eine neue Moralitätsahnung zu gewinnen," (GW 8: 417).

The purpose of Broch's theory of values is twofold. He wants, firstly, to prove that there is a unitary reality and, secondly, to show that man can come to understand it in its totality and thus be able to establish a universally applicable code of ethics. In the modern, scientific era, so Broch argues, logical validity has become the only acceptable criterion of objective truth and knowledge. Consequently, if his theory of values is to gain general acknowledgement, and this is a necessary

prerequisite to its being of any practical use, it must be scientifically sound.

It is to this fact which Broch refers in "Autobiographie ⁹Als Arbeitsprogramm" when he says that the pessimism and disillusionment of his first studies at Vienna university have yielded to a new, more constructive insight. He now assents to the positivistic definition of knowledge, namely that it be scientifically or logically demonstrable but, and this is the crucial difference, he believes that the attempt can and must be made to apply this positivistic methodology to these fields of enquiry which are normally deemed to lie beyond the compass of objective knowledge. Above all he has in mind ideal philosophy and all metaphysical questions. He insists: "dass nochmals der Versuch unternommen werden musste, streng kritische Methoden, also eben die des kritischen Positivismus, im Gebiete der idealistischen Position anzuwenden, um solcherart den eigentlich philosophischen, den idealistischen Ausgangspunkt alles Philosophierens zu wahren und zu bewahren, andererseits diesem Philosophieren jene Strenge und Eindeutigkeit zu geben, deren auch die Philosophie bedarf, wenn sie, ihrem steten Ehrgeiz gemäss, Wissenschaft sein will." (GW 9: 40). Whether or not philosophy can or should be a science is a matter for subsequent discussion.

This was Broch's declared plan of action, and clearly his theory of values was to play a major part in it. This theory obviously required intensive research in the fields of logic, mathematics, epistemology and

psychology as well as in that of philosophy. Initially, during the period in question, the greatest emphasis lay on mathematical studies because Broch saw in mathematics the purest and most rigorous form of logical reasoning, and, as has been said, Broch wanted to ensure that his theory was logically valid. In this he acquiesced to the demands of positivistic methodology and throughout his entire life he saw in logic, and hence in mathematics, the only absolute guarantor of objective knowledge. "Wissenschaftlichkeit ist heute bloss im mathematischen Gewande zulässig." (GW 8: 85).

Broch's ideal would have been to reduce the world and man's experience of it to a single, mathematically comprehensible system. Only then would man be in a position to understand his individual function within the whole context of reality; only then, according to Broch's thesis, would a new, absolute code of ethics be feasible.

In all his work Broch recognizes the impossibility of establishing such a finite, absolute, mathematical formula, but he does not let this deter him from trying to realize his ideal as far as is possible within the currently obtaining state of mathematical research. His own studies are designed to extend the range of mathematical methodology into those fields such as psychology, sociology and even politics, which are not normally regarded as strictly scientific disciplines. Indeed, it is his insistence on the rigorously mathematical basis of objective knowledge which prevented him from publishing his theory of values. The frustration and

anguish resulting from the exacting demands he makes on his intellectual integrity reveal themselves repeatedly in his correspondence, as the following extracts show.

"Aber ich muss immer wieder dazu sagen, dass ich die werttheoretische Behandlung psychischer Fragen erst dann für erlaubt erachte, wenn es gelingen sollte, sie auf eine gesunde mathematische Basis zu stellen: dies ist ja auch der Grund ihrer Nicht-Veröffentlichung." (GW 8: 179).

"Mein Misstrauen gegen alles rein Spekulative und Dialektische ist turmhoch; das ist einer der Hauptgründe, um deretwillen ich philosophisch so wenig publiziert habe, obwohl meine erkenntnistheoretischen Aufzeichnungen bereits Tonnengewicht haben: ich versuche, sie zu mathematisieren, da mir dies, mangels anderweitigen Wissens, als der einzige Weg zur Erreichung halbwegs konsistenter Aussagen erscheinen will." (GW 8: 328).⁸

The decade 1918-1928 represents a period in Broch's life when intensive mathematical research accompanies his active involvement in the efforts to solve the economic, social and industrial problems of post-war Austria.

It must not be thought that Broch's interest in mathematics dates only from that period; the post-war years merely saw the re-awakening and intensification of a passion for this discipline which can be traced back to Broch's school days. His ambition was always to be a mathematician (GW 8: 322). At this point can be seen a parallel between what I have referred to as the temporal and hierarchical lines of development of Broch's thought;

mathematics remained the basic interest throughout Broch's life and work, but, under the pressure of changing historical circumstances and at various stages of his life other interests dominated his thought. His literary work represents an attempt to complement the mathematical studies by doing what logic and mathematics can never do in themselves, namely reveal the ideal unity of all reality. He felt that art could at least afford a visionary or intuitive glimpse of the goal towards which science and mathematics are condemned to move by an infinite series of progression.

Similarly, his work on psychology and political theory is linked to his mathematical studies in as far as he tried to set it on a firm logical basis. The strange fascination which mathematics held for Broch is characterized on his part by what can best be described as a love-hate relationship. In mathematics he saw the only source of security for objective knowledge in a world torn by relativism; and yet he was tormented because he realized the difficulty, if not the impossibility, of applying mathematical criteria to every sphere of human experience. His dilemma appears clearly in his description of a mathematical congress he once attended in Prague as "eine Orgie unglücklicher Liebe" (GW 8: 13).

In 1927 Broch sold the family textile business and decided to dedicate himself to a literary career. It is interesting to note that subsequent economic developments confirmed Broch's business acumen in selling when he did.

His decision to become a professional writer must be seen in the overall context of the way his thinking developed.

Firstly, in the years prior to his resolution, Broch had always shown a lively interest in the contemporary world of literature and had published a number of reviews in which he revealed himself as a critic of uncompromising integrity.⁹ Although the emphasis in those early years lay on literary criticism he nevertheless wrote and published some creative work of his own. Until comparatively recently this published material was thought to comprise only two works, a poem entitled "Mathematisches Mysterium" (1913) and a short story, "Eine methodologische Novelle" (1918).¹⁰ Some years ago Manfred Durzak brought to light what certainly seems to have been Broch's earliest published work. This is to be found in a rather superficial society novel, Sonja oder über unsere Kraft, which was published in 1909. Broch, his fiancée, Franziska von Rothermann, and seven of her friends collaborated in the production of the book. Each wrote a chapter and Broch contributed the final one.¹¹

Secondly, Broch's turn to literature must not be interpreted as a break with his mathematical studies. He explains in a letter that, having freed himself from his business responsibilities, he at last had the time, not only to pursue a literary career, but also to resume his formal studies at university. At the same time he is careful to state that he had been constantly preoccupied with logical and mathematical problems while trying to formulate his theory of values, i.e. during that period

when his business obligations prevented his attending formal courses at the university.

"Daneben freilich hatte ich begonnen, Mathematik zu studieren, konnte das aber erst 1929 wieder voll aufnehmen, als ich die Industrie verliess. Natürlich habe ich mich dazwischen unausgesetzt mit Mathematik beschäftigt, umsomehr als ich sie für meine erkenntnistheoretisch-philosophischen Studien brauchte, denn ohne Mathematik lässt sich kaum mehr philosophieren. Zugleich aber entdeckte ich etwas anderes: jene Gebiete der Philosophie, welche für die mathematische Behandlung unzugänglich sind, vor allem also die Ethik oder die Metaphysik, werden bloss im Theologischen 'objektiv' d.h. werden ansonsten relativistisch und im letzten 'subjektiv', und eben diese Subjektivität drängt mich dorthin, wo sie radikal legitim ist, nämlich ins Dichterische." (GW 8: 322).

The above passage broaches the question of why, at that particular stage in his life, Broch attributed such importance to literature. Unlike the logical positivists, Broch refused to ignore those fields of enquiry where the scientific criteria of truth and knowledge seemed inapplicable. In his eyes such a position was indefensible because it dogmatically declined to take account of subjective reality and the ethical and metaphysical problems which, as he believed, were grounded in the individual's inner experience of himself and the world.

Broch maintained that, until such a time as the logical criteria of objective knowledge could be extended

to encompass even the most subjective of human experiences within a single, comprehensive epistemological system, then art, in his own case literature, had to fulfil the function of a cognitive instrument. For Broch literature originally justified itself only in as far as it afforded a visionary insight into the ideal harmony of all reality and human experience. The scientific and mathematico-logical disciplines could only approach this goal of totality through an infinite series of progression; they could never attain it. Broch talks of "der unendliche logische Regress, der die Wissenschaft von Resultat zu Resultat vorwärtstreibt" (GW 7: 95). He sees the essential character of all science in its logical compulsion "zur Totalität der Welt in unendlich vielen, unendlich kleinen rationalen Schritten vorzudringen, ewig sich ihr anzunähern, niemals sie erreichend" (GW 7: 88).

Continual and intensive mathematical research is, in Broch's opinion, necessary in order constantly to expand the scope of the scientific disciplines and thus increasingly to unite all experience within a comprehensive logical system. At the same time he believed that a work of art can, by virtue of the heightened perceptive talents of the artist, grant an intuitive revelation of those planes of reality which, for the time being, are beyond such rational comprehension. Science and art are complementary, although the former will increasingly encroach upon the realm of the latter: "wissenschaftliche und künstlerische Erkenntnis sind Zweige eines einzigen Stammes, und der ist die Erkenntnis schlechthin." (GW 7:

88).¹² In the same passage Broch goes on to define his view of the role of art: "den von der Wissenschaft unerreichbaren 'Weltrest' ahnen zu lassen, jenen Weltrest, der doch vorhanden, der doch gewusst ist und der zu erfassen, die ewige Sehnsucht des Menschen ist, - immer ist Dichten solche Ungeduld der Erkenntnis, und jedes Kunstwerk ist ahnendes Symbol der geahnten Totalität."¹³

Whether pursuing his mathematical studies or writing his novels, Broch was primarily concerned with the ethical crisis of his generation. As has been stated, Broch envisaged a close relationship between the individual's ability to understand his reality and to act ethically. Broch turned to literature because at that period of his life he saw it as a valuable means of overcoming the limitations of scientific progress, which is necessarily slow. Art was to fulfil an ethical function by revealing the ideal unity of reality in which irrational, intuitive experience has the same validity as objectively verifiable, scientific knowledge. Broch believed that the time was ripe for such an endeavour: "Formulieren wir, dass die Zeit des ethischen Kunstwerks angebrochen . . . sei." (GW 6: 207).

In his "Autobiographie als Arbeitsprogramm", under the heading of "Literarische Tätigkeit (1928-1936)", Broch describes his two reasons for embarking on a literary career; it is to be noted that he emphasizes the practical results hoped for.

"Das metaphysische Bedürfnis lässt sich jedoch nicht zum Schweigen bringen; wäre dies möglich, so gäbe es keine

Philosophie, nicht einmal eine positivistische. Und wenn die religiöse Sphäre, in der es seine Allgemeingültigkeit besitzt, verschlossen ist, so muss es dort aufgespürt werden, wo es unauslöschlich und ewig verwurzelt ist, nämlich in der Seele des menschlichen Individuums: der Zugang hiezu war seit jeher die Dichtung gewesen, die Dichtung in ihrer gottsucherischen Mission.

Dichtung legitimiert sich an der metaphysischen Evidenz, die den Menschen erfüllt und zu der sie vorstösst, wenn die rationalen Mittel des Denkens hiezu nicht ausreichen; Dichtung ist stets Ungeduld der Erkenntnis gewesen, und zwar eine durchaus legitime Ungeduld.

Dies war wohl der erste Grund für meine Wendung zum ausserwissenschaftlichen, literarischen Ausdruck gewesen, doch daneben gab es noch einen zweiten und eigentlich rationaleren Grund, nämlich den der unmittelbaren ethischen Wirkung. Denn jede Philosophie zielt auf ethische Wirkung im praktischen Leben, ist also letztlich in einem reinsten Sinne auf Politik abgestellt Wer gehört werden wollte, musste sich kürzere und direktere Wege wählen als jene, welche durch die Philosophie gegeben waren. Ethische Wirkung ist zum grossen Teil in aufklärerischer Tätigkeit zu suchen, und für eine solche ist das Dichtwerk ein weitaus besseres Mittel als die Wissenschaft. Dies war der zweite Grund für meine Wendung zur Literatur.

In den Jahren 1928-1935 veröffentlichte ich also meine Romane, ebenso ein Schauspiel, welches in Zürich 1935 aufgeführt wurde sie bemühten sich um exoterische Wirkung mit Hilfe dichterischer Mittel

Meine Hoffnung bei alldem war: die erzieherische Wirkung ethischer Dichtung." (GW 9: 45-46).¹⁴

I have dealt with the reasons for Broch's decision to undertake a literary career in some detail because I intend to examine the novels in as far as they reflect the development of his approach to the basic ethical problem of his era. He believed that the current ethical crisis could be resolved only once a new, absolute code of human conduct had been devised; this alone would liberate man from the chaos and insecurity of relativism which dominated all aspects of modern life.

At this juncture, before the next stage in the development of Broch's work is presented, one seeming anomaly must be clarified. In retrospect Broch set his literary activity in the years 1928-1936, and yet three of his major novels appeared after that date: Der Tod des Vergil (1945), Die Schuldlosen (1949) and Der Versucher (1953). The last of these was published posthumously, but Broch was working on the final version of the novel when he died in 1951.

During the period 1928-1936 Broch published numerous theoretical essays on literature and aesthetics, five short stories, four of which were later included in Die Schuldlosen, translations of poems by Edwin Muir, James Joyce and T.S. Eliot, the two novels, Die Schlafwandler and Die unbekannte Grösse, and a play, Die Totenklage, which was performed in a much altered form in March 1934 under the title of Denn sie wissen nicht, was sie tun.

He also wrote a short story, Die Heimkehr des Vergil, for a radio broadcast in the spring of 1935. These same years also saw the production of a considerable quantity of fragmentary work and unpublished material. This included two novels, a film script adapted from Die unbekannte Grösse and a comedy entitled Aus der Luft gegriffen oder die Geschäfte des Baron Laborde.¹⁵

The disparity between the dates of publication of Broch's last three novels and his claim that his literary activity was concentrated in the years 1928-1936 can be explained as follows. Until 1936 Broch genuinely believed that literature as he conceived of it, namely in a cognitive and ethical function, was morally and socially justifiable even in a world threatened by imminent political disaster. By 1936, however, the Nazi threat to peace and humanity in Europe had become so powerful that Broch decided that some more direct and immediate action was necessary on his part. The consequence of this decision was that Broch abandoned his literary career and dedicated himself to research in the fields of mass psychology and political theory. Why then, we may ask, were three of his major novels published after that date?

There were important personal factors relevant to the genesis of each of these three novels; these will now be briefly enumerated. It is not my purpose to analyse the origins of these works in detail; I wish to show how they came to be written and published despite Broch's growing doubts as to the moral justification of any form of art. Such an examination also serves to illuminate

the integrity of Broch's personality, both as an artist and a moralist, and the conflicts which sometimes arose from the high demands he made on himself in both these spheres of his work.

Broch wrote Der Tod des Vergil primarily as an expression of his personal confrontation with death.

"Ich hatte meine dichterische Tätigkeit, soweit sie exoterisch an das Publikum gerichtet gewesen war, zugunsten der Völkerbundarbeit aufgegeben gehabt, weil ich einsehen gelernt hatte, dass man sich keine Hoffnungen mehr machen durfte, durch eine literarische Publikumsbeeinflussung dem historischen Ablauf eine andere Richtung geben zu können oder auch nur das Geringste zu solcher Richtungsänderung beizutragen. Aber die innern metaphysischen Impulse zur Dichtung waren trotzdem geblieben, und je unentrinnbarer sich das Äussere Geschehen gestaltete - 1937 gab es über die verhängnisvolle Richtung dieses Geschehens keinen Zweifel mehr - desto stärker wurden jene innern Impulse: der Tod war uns, die wir nun gewissermassen am Rande des Konzentrationslagers lebten, plötzlich so handgreiflich nahe gerückt, dass die metaphysische Auseinandersetzung mit ihm schlechterdings nicht mehr aufschiebbar war. Und so begann ich 1937, beinahe gegen meinen eigenen Willen, sozusagen als Privatangelegenheit des eigenen Seelenheiles, mit einem strikt esoterischen Buche, dem Vergil." (GW 9: 51).

The figure of Vergil had attracted Broch's interest even before 1937. In the spring of 1935 he had written a short story for radio, Die Heimkehr des Vergil. At

that time he was particularly interested in the medieval legend that Vergil had prophesied the advent of Christianity in his fourth Eclogue. Broch saw certain parallels between the situation of the poet at the end of the Golden Age of classical antiquity and that of the creative writer of his own generation. He wrote Die Heimkehr des Vergil specifically on the theme of "Kultur-Ende und Literatur" (GW 8: 243). As the Nazi threat became increasingly evident so the emphasis of Broch's interest in the legend of Vergil's death, according to which Vergil is supposed to have demanded that the unfinished Aeneid be burnt, changed: he was attracted more and more by the theme of death itself.

In March 1938 this fascination with the phenomenon of death received dramatic stimulus: Broch was arrested by the Gestapo. Fortunately none of his political research had yet been published and his friends succeeded in destroying large quantities of compromising letters and manuscripts before these could be confiscated. Broch was eventually released after two and a half weeks in detention; in July of the same year he fled to London, never to return to Austria again. In later correspondence he regularly describes his arrest as a traumatic experience, a trauma which gave birth to Der Tod des Vergil as we know it to-day. At the time of his imprisonment Broch seems to have believed that he faced death at the hands of the Gestapo or in a concentration camp. While in prison he resumed work on his interpretation of the

Vergil legend as a form of private preparation for death. All Broch's correspondence confirms that, whatever themes and motifs there may be in the novel, and there is a great variety of them, the central question is that of the individual's personal confrontation with death.

"Es ist mir also um die nackte Todeserkenntnis gegangen." (GW 8: 192).

"The theme of Virgil came to me only by chance, but during the work I came to a time in which I was really threatened by death - the Nazis -, and from this moment on I wrote this book exclusively for myself (partly in prison) and in a sense as a private preparation for death and with no thought of a public." (GW 8: 213-214).

"Wenn ich von Nicht-Veröffentlichung spreche, so hat das einen für mich sehr guten Grund Denn unter der Hitler-Bedrohung, die einem ja den Tod recht nahe gerückt hat - einige der Passagen waren im Gefängnis geschrieben - war ich nicht nur sicher, nichts mehr veröffentlichen zu können, sondern wollte mich, solange es noch möglich war, privat mit dem Todeserlebnis vertraut machen." (GW 8: 271).

"The Virgil was not written as a 'book', but (under Hitler's threat) as my private discussion with death." (GW 8: 376).¹⁶

The above quotations reveal the importance attached by Broch to Der Tod des Vergil as a personal document. In the third of the quoted passages, taken from a letter written in September 1947 to Egon Vietta, i.e. some two years after the novel had appeared, Broch claims that at one time he contemplated not publishing the novel at all.

This statement is confirmed by another letter written even before the first manuscript of the book had been completed (GW 8: 172).

Why then was the novel ever published? Again it is to personal factors we must turn if Broch's decision is to be fully understood.

Although on one occasion, in a mood of despair, Broch referred to Der Tod des Vergil as "ein Dreck" (GW 8: 176), there is no doubt that he set a very high value on the literary quality of the book and on his own talents in writing it. He believed that it represented a significant experiment in the formal structure of the modern novel and a genuine extension of the range of expression of the German language.¹⁷ At the same time Broch felt that it was wrong, for two basic reasons, to publish this novel. In the first place he questioned the moral justification of a work of art which owed its conception to the horrors of Nazi persecution and the threat of the gas chamber.¹⁸ Secondly, although the novel had an almost irresistible attraction for the artist in Broch, he resented the time spent on it, time which, in his opinion, could have been better employed for his political and psychological research.¹⁹

Despite such doubts the novel was published, curiously enough also on moral grounds. The conflict of Broch's interests can be seen here, but it will be noted that, whatever his final decision, he was always guided by a sense of moral responsibility. When Broch arrived in America in October 1938 he was almost completely

destitute and had to rely on the good will and charity of friends. In the period 1939-1942 he received financial support from various sources to enable him to conclude his work on Der Tod des Vergil. The most important of these grants were from the Guggenheim Foundation and the American Academy of Arts and Letters. Having accepted such financial help Broch felt morally bound to complete and publish the work for which the grants had been made.²⁰ There was one other reason for Broch's decision to publish Der Tod des Vergil and this was connected with his political and psychological studies. He wanted to achieve public recognition in America with his novel, not for personal or financial advancement, but because he hoped that such a success might influence the public favourably towards the massive, three volume work on mass psychology which he was preparing at that time. At the same time he hoped that the favourable reception of Der Tod des Vergil by the reading public would guarantee the continued interest and confidence of his American publisher, Kurt Wolff, on whom he was dependent for the publication of his research findings.²¹

In 1942 Broch was awarded a fellowship from the Rockefeller Foundation for his psychological research, and this brought further pressure to bear on him. He felt he had to publish the novel as quickly as possible in order to be free to dedicate himself wholly to his research, which he believed to be of immediate and practical relevance to the current political situation, and thus prove himself worthy of the trust and confidence which the

Foundation had displayed in making him such an award.

Although the first manuscript of the novel was completed in 1940 (GW 10: 379) the novel did not appear until 1945. The reason for the delay was that Kurt Wolff and Broch wanted it to appear in a German and English edition simultaneously. Jean Starr Untermeyer and Broch worked together intensively on the translation for over four years.²² When Broch finished the first version of the novel in 1940 he stated that he would not undertake any revision of it because that would involve him in at least three further years of work. He did not believe that he was morally justified in spending so much time on a work of art when the world was being devastated by war. It was also his view that any revision could only lead to the novel becoming increasingly esoteric, perhaps even to the point of becoming totally incomprehensible.²³

Nevertheless, Broch could not deny the artist within himself and, during the period when he was collaborating with Mrs. Untermeyer on the English translation, he regularly introduced extensive alterations to the novel. Despite this he always regarded this novel as a work which he never completed to his personal satisfaction because he had to sacrifice it to the moral demands for active involvement in the world crisis of his generation.²⁴

With the publication of Der Tod des Vergil he believed that his literary career was at an end. He emphasized that the decision was not an easy one, especially for a person with any real creative talent.

"Ich habe verzichtet, das Buch wahrhaft künstlerisch zu

vollenden, weil ich in dieser Schreckenszeit nicht noch ein paar Jahre an ein Werk setzen durfte, das mit jedem weiteren Schritt zunehmend esoterischer geworden wäre, und ich glaube damit meine dichterische Laufbahn endgültig abgeschlossen zu haben: es scheint mir, dass ich für mein Gewissen nicht mehr tun konnte. Das war nämlich gar kein so leichter Entschluss. Denn wer einmal ins Künstlerische geraten ist - und ausserdem (wie ich von mir zu behaupten wage) gründlich gelernt hat -, der muss für einen solchen Abschied schon einigen Mut aufbringen. Es ist ein ziemlich schmerzlicher Abschied. Zudem ist es nicht ganz einfach, sich mit Sechzig nochmals beruflich umzustellen; bliebe ich ein 'Erzähler', so würde sich mein Leben jedenfalls leichter und erfolgssicherer gestalten." (GW 8: 247).

The genesis of the two subsequent novels can be presented in considerably less detail. It is to be noted that in both cases the original conception of the books involved, Die Schuldlosen and what we know to-day as Der Versucher, dates back to the early 1930's, i.e. to the days when Broch still believed in the cognitive and ethical mission of literature.

In 1948, at a time when Broch was already heavily committed to his research in epistemology and political theory, the Munich publisher, Willi Weismann, wrote to Broch asking for permission to publish his early Novellen in a single volume.²⁵ Broch, who seemed to have forgotten most of the works involved, agreed but demanded

to see the proofs of the texts before any further action was taken. His first reaction was essentially one of disappointment; these early works did not satisfy the standards he applied to himself as an artist. It is clear, however, that his interest was aroused; almost against his will and better judgment he became increasingly involved in the creation of a new novel. Rather than rewrite the existing Novellen entirely Broch contented himself with minor alterations and wrote six more Novellen and the introductory "Parabel von der Stimme". All the stories were then linked together by a lyrical framework. The final product was the novel Die Schuldlosen - Roman in elf Erzählungen, which first appeared in the Weismann-Verlag in 1949. What stands out from this is that Broch, despite his reluctance to commit himself to further literary work, was unable fully to suppress his talent and love for writing. His artistic integrity is seen in the fact that he was unwilling to accept anything but the highest possible standard of work from himself; his moral integrity is seen in the fact that, if necessary, he was prepared to sacrifice the cause of art to the demands of humanity. The result of this was necessarily a conflict within himself.

This same dilemma is also evident in the origins of Der Versucher, which, in its present form in the Collected Works, was edited posthumously by Felix Stössinger and represents his own arbitrary blending of three versions of the novel written over a period of almost twenty years.²⁶ One of the difficulties in tracing

the genesis of this novel is that Broch rarely discusses it in any detail in his essays or letters.²⁷ There is still controversy concerning Broch's reasons for altering his conception of the novel with each new version and I shall comment on this when discussing the novel in the third part of this thesis.²⁸ At present I wish to comment only on the personal factors responsible for Broch's resuming work on the book in 1949 although he had forsworn literature because he believed it to be morally unjustifiable aestheticism. For this purpose a brief summary of the development of the three versions is sufficient.

Broch probably started work on the first version some time in 1933 (GW 8: 84). Originally he conceived of it as the first volume of a great religious trilogy (GW 8: 144-145, 146), and he generally referred to this first version as "das grosse religiöse Buch" (GW 8: 84) or simply as "der grosse Roman" (GW 10: 360). The first draft of the book was completed in January 1936 and Broch at once began to revise it (GW 8: 144-145, 146). From this time on the novel is usually referred to as "der Bergroman" (GW 8: 186, 232, 348, 367, 386) and it is this title which I shall subsequently use.²⁹

In the course of this revision Broch came to have an entirely new conception of the novel and began to rewrite it with an added emphasis on the mythical factors which underlie the workings of the unconscious mind. He worked intensively on this version until the end of 1936, when he abandoned it. His correspondence reveals a

growing dissatisfaction with his ability to cope with the new form of the novel (GW 8: 156-157, 186, 301-302). The political developments of 1936 also served to heighten his personal doubts about the moral validity of any form of art in the face of the growing threat of war. When he broke off work on this second version he had reached a point some two-thirds of the way through the eighth chapter. There is some evidence that as late as 1938 Broch still contemplated finishing the book in its second version (GW 8: 169; GW 10: 377).

For some years after this Broch's interest in the Bergroman lapsed; for reasons already explained his efforts were directed to completing Der Tod des Vergil and to pursuing his political and psychological researches. On the few occasions that Broch mentions the novel during the next ten years it is usually with a note of despair as to his ever being able to complete it (GW 8: 173-174, 186, 232, 283).

In 1948 Alfred Knopf, the American publisher on whom Broch was then relying for the publication of his political book, began to press Broch to produce another novel. Finally Knopf insisted that Broch give him a new novel before he would accept the political book with its more limited public appeal (GW 8: 297, 305, 326, 351-352). Once again Broch was forced to compromise: for the sake of his political and psychological work, which he considered to be of real practical value, he was forced to return to literature.

Under such pressure Broch offered Knopf his

Bergroman (GW 8: 297). Broch had considerable doubts as to his ability to resume where he had left off in the second version of the novel; he felt that another revision would be necessary (GW 8: 301-302, 305; BB: 497, 501). When he finally set to work on the novel he in fact began a third version, incorporating major stylistic changes. By the time Broch died in 1951 work on this version had progressed into the fifth chapter.

The aim of this lengthy digression on the novels has been to show the conflicting demands of the artist and moralist within the personality of Broch. Whether in his capacity as a creative writer, a philosopher or a writer of political and psychological theory Broch's main concern was ethical. When he felt that art could no longer serve his purpose he did not hesitate to renounce it. It was due largely to external pressures, which also took the form of moral obligations, that Der Tod des Vergil and Die Schuldlosen were eventually published. The third version of the Bergroman was also begun under similar circumstances. Once forced to work on these novels, Broch felt compelled to give of his very best in them. It is my view that Broch's personal integrity was not compromised by his return to literature after he had decided to renounce it. Behind all he did there lay a strict sense of moral responsibility, both to himself and to others.

Bearing in mind that at various points in Broch's career after 1936 pressure was brought upon him to resume his literary work, we can now continue to pursue the gen-

eral development of his thought and interests.

Broch explains in his "Autobiographie als Arbeitsprogramm", under the section entitled "Völkerbundtheorie (1936-1937)", how current historical events influenced his final decision to reject literature. "So sehr diese dichterische Betätigung meinen innern Wünschen und Bedürfnissen entsprach, sie wurde neuerdings von den Ereignissen überholt. Hitler hatte die Macht in Deutschland ergriffen, die Nazipropaganda begann mit unwiderstehlicher Präzision in sämtlichen Grenzländern zu arbeiten, und dahinter stand die Aufrüstung sowie die täglich deutlicher werdende Kriegsdrohung: das waren Mächte, gegen welche mit Beeinflussung eines Lesepublikums nichts mehr auszurichten war.

Wer in diesem Augenblick noch etwas gegen Barbarei, Blutwahnsinn und Krieg tun wollte, durfte keine Umwege mehr gehen, sondern hatte sich zu bemühen, sich unmittelbar in den Dienst jener Kräfte zu stellen, welche noch in der Lage waren, sich dem kommenden Unheil zu widersetzen. Wer dies in jenen Tagen nicht tat, der setzte die Sünde der geistigen Arbeiter und Intellektuellen fort, die Sünde des ivory tower und seiner Verantwortungslosigkeit; gerade das Deutschland des Jahres 1933 zeigte, welche Folgen aus der politischen Gleichgültigkeit des geistigen Arbeiters entstehen konnten: hätte Deutschland mehr Männer von der politischen Leidenschaft eines Max Weber gehabt, hätte der deutsche Intellektuelle sich nicht jahrzehntelang vom politischen Geschehen ausgeschaltet,

es wäre um die deutsche Demokratie besser bestellt gewesen." (GW 9: 46-47).³⁰

In the year 1936-1937 Broch worked intensively on a theory for a viable League of Nations, a theory to be based on the principle of the essential dignity of the individual. The political developments of 1937 outstripped Broch's research and it was not published.³¹ He refused to publish it after the events which it had been designed to prevent because he felt that this would be a form of hypocritical self-justification. As it happened, it was perhaps fortunate for him, in view of his subsequent arrest by the Gestapo, that this work remained unpublished.

"Während der Jahre 1936/37 stand ich mit einer Reihe bedeutender europäischer Persönlichkeiten in Korrespondenz, um diese Arbeit zu einem kollektiven Dokument zu machen, welches in einem repräsentativen Schritt beim Völkerbund einzubringen gewesen wäre. Die politische Entwicklung des Jahres 1937 zwang zur Aufgabe dieses Vorhabens; es war sinnlos geworden.

Im Widerspruch zur Meinung mancher meiner Freunde habe ich die Völkerbundarbeit nicht veröffentlicht. Derartige Arbeiten sind an den Augenblick ihrer Verwirklichbarkeit gebunden; nehmen sie hierauf nicht Rücksicht, so sinken sie zur Utopie eines wishful thinking herab. Und diese Weigerung gegen die Veröffentlichung wurde überdies für mich persönlich zu einem Glücksfall: wäre die Veröffentlichung erfolgt, so hätte ich das Nazige-fängnis, in dem ich mich einige Wochen befunden habe, kaum

mehr verlassen." (GW 9: 51).

From Broch's correspondence it is evident that, even before he formally renounced literature in 1936, he was experiencing considerable doubts as to its moral validity in an era when more direct, practical intervention in human affairs seemed necessary. Throughout the following years these misgivings grew to be a firm conviction on Broch's part that art, despite its potential as a cognitive and ethical instrument, was no longer morally justifiable in his time. The following quotations are all taken from letters written during the period 1933-1936, a time in Broch's life when he self-avowedly attributed great value to the cognitive and ethical role of his literary work. They reveal not only his growing discontent with literature, but also the increasing urgency of his need to make a practical contribution towards solving the ethical crisis of his generation.

"Im Grunde genommen weiss ich überhaupt nicht . . . , ob Dichten heute noch eine legitime Lebensäusserung ist, ob das, was man zu sagen hat, nicht auf ganz anderem Weg und viel lebendiger in die Zeit wirken müsste." (GW 8: 81-82).

Writing to his publisher, Dr. Daniel Brody, Broch describes himself as being: "von einem brennenden Ehrgeiz besessen, in diese Welt noch eingreifen zu können, gerade weil die Welt so scheusslich geworden ist, und beinahe ist es mir, als meldete sich in solchem Drang eine metaphysische Pflicht an." (GW 8: 127).

"Und doch erhebt sich da für mich wieder die Frage: ist der schriftstellerische Beruf als solcher heute noch legitim? hat der Lese-Ekel, der die heutige Welt erfasst hat, nicht seine tiefere (metaphysische) Berechtigung?" (GW 8: 131).

"Ich stehe mit meiner dichterischen und geistigen guten und vielleicht sogar sehr guten Mittelbegabung auf sozial unethischer Stelle." (GW 8: 149).

As Broch looked more and more askance at his literary work, so his interest in logic, mathematics and epistemology reasserted itself with increasing fervour. More and more he came to believe that any new, universally acceptable ethos could find a secure basis only in absolute logical validity. Although Broch admitted the value of art in affording an intuitive insight into those planes of experience and reality which lie beyond rational comprehension he felt that such art would need to become steadily more esoteric if it was to remain true to its cognitive principle. In these circumstances the artist could expect to appeal to an ever decreasing public, and the influence of his work would decline correspondingly. For these reasons Broch was drawn steadily back to his logical and mathematical studies, obsessed by the necessity of extending the range of their methodology to all other disciplines and thus accounting for every possible phenomenon of human experience, including those still regarded as irrational.

In November 1932, soon after the final volume of Die Schlafwandler had appeared, Broch wrote to his

publisher's wife, discussing this problem.

"Dichten heisst, Erkenntnis durch die Form gewinnen wollen, und neue Erkenntnis kann nur durch neue Form geschöpft werden. Das ist in diesem Zusammenhang logisch und folgerichtig, und ausserdem, was noch wichtiger ist, es wird durch mein inneres Wissen bestätigt Neue Form dagegen aber heisst zunehmende Publikumsfremdheit, Unverkäuflichkeit. . . . Es wird eigentlich erst jetzt klar, warum ich im letzten Jahr immer dringender zur mathematischen und wissenschaftlichen Erkenntnis zurück will: die Schlafwandler und das Drama sind erste Etappen auf dem Wege der irrationalen Erkenntnis, die eben Erkenntnis durch die Form ist, und ich fürchte mich eigentlich vor der nächsten Etappe. Vielleicht fürchte ich mich auch vor dem weiter aufbrechenden Irrationalen als solchem." (GW 8: 78-79).

Some four years later, at the time when he finally decided to renounce his literary work, Broch wrote to the same person that he was obsessed by the concept of knowledge and all that it implied: "der Begriff der Erkenntnis, von der ich derart besessen bin, dass ich unausgesetzt mit dem Gedanken einer Rückkehr zur Wissenschaft (die, wie ich glaube, mein stärkstes Begabungsgebiet ist) mich beschäftige." (GW 8: 155).

Further evidence of Broch's growing interest in the formal, scientifically defined category of knowledge is to be found in the essay, "Einheit wissenschaftlicher und dichterischer Erkenntnis", which was first published in July 1933.³² There Broch takes care to emphasize that

literature and science should ideally complement each other in the pursuit of knowledge, but this essay shows clearly that by this time his attention was focussing more closely on the formal disciplines of logic and mathematics.

Although Broch's personal inclination at this time would have been to return to these formal and abstract fields of research his first action after renouncing literature was, as has been said, to devote himself to the theory of politics. He felt strongly that any practical contribution towards the attainment of a new, absolute code of ethics would have to be made in this sphere of thought. And, in turn, he was convinced that no viable theory of humane politics could be evolved until man properly understood the phenomena of mass psychology, which play such an important part in practical politics. For Broch the study of politics and psychology always went hand in hand, and it is no coincidence that his first detailed studies in politics and psychology date from 1936, the year when he abandoned his literary career to seek more direct involvement in current affairs. The two works in question are the "Völkerbundtheorie" and the uncompleted essay, "Werttheoretische Bemerkungen zur Psychoanalyse".³³

Two important points must be made here. Firstly, Broch's political and psychological research was forced upon him by contemporary historical events. From his earliest days he had evinced a deep distrust of practical politics. In an open letter to Franz Blei, written in

the troubled days of December 1918, he contrasts the ideal conception of politics with the inevitably harsh realities of practical life.

"Der Begriff des Politischen deckt sich mit dem der Gerechtigkeit. Eine andere Politik als eine, die zur Gerechtigkeit strebt, gibt es nicht. Interessenpolitik ist nicht Politik, sondern einfach Geschäft, mehr oder weniger verhüllt Das reine Politische ist nichts sonst als Idee . . . Die reine Politik ist aus der Autonomie des Geistigen geboren . . . Reine Politik ist die zum formalen Gebilde gewordene reine sittliche Forderung Politik ist das Unabwendbare schlechthin. In ihr wird, was sich am Wesen des praktischen Politikers zeigt, . . . das Allererbärmlichste in die Welt getragen. Sie ist die letzte und böseste Verflachung des Menschen. Das radikale Böse als notwendige Folge der Dogmatisierung des Sittlichen schlechthin. Kurzum die Hölle." (GW 10: 259-260).

Broch never entirely lost these misgivings and they colour many of his despairing comments as to the practicability of his political theories, which he naturally regarded as "reine Politik". Although he regarded politics with distaste he maintained that the intellectual had to accept his moral responsibilities and face up to the challenge of the current political situation. Broch was never an advocate of the "innere Emigration". In the draft of a letter prepared in April 1950 he describes "das ganze Verhältnis des geistigen Arbeiters zur konkreten Politik" as "das für

uns heute vielleicht wichtigste Problem" (GW 8: 423).³⁴

It is in the letters written during Broch's years in America that we can most clearly see to what extent he felt compelled to suppress his primary interests and talents, which lay in the direction of literature and mathematics, in order to pursue his research in political theory. In July 1939 he wrote to Carl Seelig: "ich arbeite sehr viel wissenschaftlich, und im Grunde meines Herzens möchte ich ja immer mehr auf Mathematik, Logik und Physik übergehen. Wenn nur die Politik nicht wäre!" (GW 8: 171-172).

One of the most interesting letters with respect to this conflict of Broch's interests is that written to James Franck in February 1946, particularly the following passages.

"Ich . . . hatte mir vorgenommen, mit meinem 60. Jahr zur mathematischen Logik zurückzukehren, da ich mir stets eingeildet hatte, da etwas leisten zu können; doch statt dessen bin ich in die Massenpsychologie geraten, um wohl bis zu meinem Lebensende darin zu bleiben: denn es schien und scheint dies einer der wenigen Wege zu sein, auf denen ein theorieverhafteter Mensch zu politischer Wirksamkeit zu gelangen vermag Politik ist nicht nur Gesinnung, sondern eben auch Verantwortung, und diese kann sich bloss am praktischen Ziel, an praktischen Zielsetzungen bewähren; nur hiedurch wird Politik zur Konkretisierung von Ethik." (GW 8: 248).³⁵

The second point to be made is that on no account should Broch's political and psychological work be

dissociated from his research in logic, mathematics and epistemology. As has been said, he believed that a practical application of his political and psychological theories would be possible only if they could be shown to be logically sound.

Here we can turn from the chronological or linear development of Broch's thought to what I have called its hierarchical or vertical evolution. Again the later correspondence confirms that Broch's primary concern can always be traced back to the ethical question. His aim was always to construct a new, absolute code of ethics, absolute because it would be logically correct, scientifically verifiable and, as a result, universally acceptable. As a "theorieverhafteter Mensch" he believed that all practical action had to have a reliable theoretical foundation. It is possible to see that all his practical theories, as he believed them to be, in psychology and politics were built up from one single, dominating interest. This hierarchical unity of Broch's thinking is most strikingly illustrated in a letter of April 1950 to Dr. Daniel Brody: " 'Totale Humanität' ist ein Auszug meines politischen Buches, das ein Auszug meiner Massenpsychologie ist, die ein Auszug meiner Werttheorie ist, die ein Auszug meiner Erkenntniskritik ist, die ein Auszug meiner mathematischen Logik ist." (GW 8: 456).³⁶

The above extract not only reveals the single-mindedness of Broch's work but also shows how historical circumstances continually forced him to alter the emphasis

of his interests in the hope of being able to make some direct, practical contribution towards ameliorating the current crisis of humanity. Just as a moral obligation to his publisher and financial patrons had led Broch to publish Der Tod des Vergil, so this same sense of responsibility compelled him, in the closing years of his life, to sacrifice his personal inclinations in order to dedicate himself to research in politics and psychology. Once more his letters afford us a penetrating insight into the inner conflicts caused by the high ethical standards he set for himself. The correspondence reveals clearly that Broch's political and psychological work developed as a response to the moral challenge of his era.

In a letter to Egon Vietta of November 1948 Broch lists seven books on which he was currently working, including his "Psychologische Grundlagen der Demokratie. Mir im Augenblick das wichtigste Buch" (GW 8: 305)³⁷ Some six months later this programme has increased to eight books and the conflict of personal interest and moral commitment is even more apparent: "acht Bücher, von denen mir die Erkenntnistheorie am wichtigsten ist, während eine Theorie der Politik, eine Frucht der Massenpsychologie, am aktuellsten wäre." (GW 8: 345).³⁸

It must be conceded that Broch's final attitude to all his political research, in which he believed he could make practical suggestions for the preservation of a humanitarian civilization, was one of disillusionment and pessimistic resignation. He believed his political theory, in its definitive formulation, contained the

answer to the ethical problem of the loss of the Absolute, but he despaired of ever seeing it put into practice. Just a few months before his death he wrote the following words: "Da ich der Ansicht bin, dass ich mit meiner politischen Schreiberei, oder genauer mit meiner Theorie nicht den geringsten Einfluss werde ausüben können, trage ich mich sehr mit dem Gedanken, diesen ganzen Tätigkeitsteil stillzulegen. Es ist nur schade um die vielen Jahre, die ich darauf verwendet habe. Ich hätte lieber meine Erkenntnistheorie machen sollen, obwohl auch diese in den neuen Glauben nicht hineinpasst." (GW 8: 412).

The purpose of this outline of the development of Broch's thought and work has been to provide a general frame of reference for an enquiry into the way in which his theory of "das Irdisch-Absolute" evolved. This introduction has shown the essential consistency in all the diverse aspects of Broch's work, namely his concern with the question of ethics, while at the same time illustrating how his acute sense of moral responsibility led him to react to current historical events. Such a reaction is inevitably reflected in a certain chronological development and alteration of emphasis within his work. These changes can be largely seen as a desperate search on Broch's part for some means of active intervention to resolve the ethical crisis of his day. Broch's tragedy is that of the idealist and theoretician confronted with the contingencies and harsh realities of

practical politics and morality. The development of the theory of "das Irdisch-Absolute" closely follows Broch's attempts to find a scientific method of influencing the course of history for the better.

II. THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE THEORY OF "DAS IRDISCH-ABSOLUTE" IN THE THEORETICAL WRITINGS

1. INTRODUCTION

"Spiegel seiner selbst, in jedem Begriff und in jeder Einheit, die er setzt, leuchtet dem Menschen der Logos, leuchtet ihm das Wort Gottes als Mass aller Dinge entgegen." (GW 2: 598)¹.

"Die Entdeckung des Individuums vollzog sich für das christliche Europa in der Spätrenaissance, und zwar durch jene Geisteshaltung, die auch zum Protestantismus geführt hat: das ["]Über-Individuelle, das Platonische, vor allem das Kirchliche als geistige Gemeinschaft wurde plötzlich als etwas erkannt, das vom irdisch-sichtbaren Menschen getragen wird und daher von diesem aus nicht nur lebendig erhalten, sondern auch ständig erneuert werden muss. Ketzerhaft wurde der Einzelmensch mit seiner irdischen Einzelseele in den Mittelpunkt des Universums gestellt, auf dass er, das Mass aller Dinge, eben auch das aller göttlichen Gültigkeit werde." (GW 6: 44-45).²

The first of the above quotations is taken from "Der Zerfall der Werte", written in 1931. The second passage appears in "Hofmannsthal und seine Zeit", one of the last pieces of work which Broch completed before his death and parts of which were first published in 1949 and 1951.³ The ideas expressed in these two quotations represent the poles between which Broch's thought moved

in the years 1931-1951. In this part of the thesis Broch's theoretical writings on philosophy, epistemology, psychology and politics will be examined with the intention of showing how his thinking developed in such a way that he could turn from "der Logos . . . das Wort Gottes als Mass aller Dinge" to "der Einzelmensch mit seiner irdischen Einzelseele . . . das Mass aller Dinge". This important change of emphasis in Broch's thought, and it is a matter of emphasis rather than a radical alteration, can usefully be described as a move away from reliance in human affairs on the guiding power of a formal, transcendental, abstract Absolute towards the use of a qualitative, empirically confirmable or earthly Absolute as a standard for guiding and judging human behaviour.

No attempt is made here to give a comprehensive analysis or criticism of Broch's philosophy. This is a matter which must be left to the competent professional philosopher. Any critical analysis undertaken here is directed solely at isolating and clarifying the line of thought which led Broch to propound his theory of "das Irdisch-Absolute" in the last years of his life. Clarification is important here because Broch himself was not fully aware of the extent to which his theories changed over the years. This failure on Broch's part explains a number of important contradictions which appear in the theoretical writings when they are considered as a whole.

Some mention should be made of the current state

of research on Broch's theoretical writings. Until recently the dominating feature of what little research has been done in this field has been its lack of objectivity. The reason for this is that those people who first took an interest in Broch's work were friends and admirers who saw in Broch the prophet of the collapse of western civilization in the early part of the twentieth century. For such commentators, they can scarcely be called critics, Broch can say little that is wrong. He acquires almost the stature of a cult figure. His theories are reproduced with little or no attempt at critical analysis and any contradictions are ignored or explained away with a logic which defies any evidence to the contrary.⁴

Inevitably a reaction set in and in the past few years a book and several articles on Broch have appeared which have a declared iconoclastic intent. As a corrective to the previous trend this may be welcomed, but the iconoclasts seem to be no less extreme in their views than the idolators were in their's. Their main charge is that Broch reveals himself in his work as an arch-conservative, a crypto-fascist and the prophet of irrationalism. In him they see a representative of the social and intellectual type of person who made possible Hitler's rise to power.⁵ The weakness in these studies is that they isolate his thought entirely from his life, from the circumstances which prescribed the lines along which Broch's thinking developed. It is difficult to imagine how anyone familiar with the facts of Broch's

life and the evidence of his correspondence can describe him as a fascist. These critics have failed to appreciate Broch's dilemma, namely that of the theoretician and idealist who desperately sought for absolute values but was condemned to live in a world where such values clearly did not exist. It is the conflict of theory and practice which lies at the root of many inconsistencies and weaknesses in Broch's thinking. His concern with practical humanity throughout his whole life gives the lie to the charges brought against him by Osterle and Menges and similar critics. Strangely, such dedication on his part often exposes the futility of his efforts to re-establish rigorously demonstrable, absolute values for human conduct. Broch, no less than countless other people, acted in the belief that there were absolute values in life, even if they could not be scientifically proved. Reason and science play little part in such beliefs and decisions.

It is the intention of this present study to trace the evolution of Broch's theory of "das Irdisch-Absolute" with relation to his personal response to contemporary historical developments. Such an approach has much to offer. It helps us to understand why certain changes occur in Broch's thought and interests at certain times. They can usually be traced back, with the help of his letters, to some given political event of the history of the period. Such developments, sometimes even contradictions in Broch's thinking gain a new relevance when we remember that in different historical situations,



in widely differing fields of study Broch's primary concern was always ethical: how could and should man regulate his conduct in any given situation? What Broch refers to as the essential ethical question recurs frequently in his writings in implicit or explicit form: "Was sollen wir tun?" (GW 6: 313); "Wie verhalte ich mich zur Welt und zu dem, was ich mein Leben nenne?" (GW 10: 302); "das ethische 'was soll ich tun?'" ("Trotzdem", NR: 9). Variations in Broch's answer to this question do not indicate a change in his basic interest, but rather that he is seeking or adapting an answer to fit a changing world-situation.

Clearly the following examination of the development of the theory of "das Irdisch-Absolute" will proceed chronologically. In order to achieve the clearest possible presentation of a very complex development a certain schematic simplification has been undertaken: the three most important stages in the development of the theory will be examined. Broch's original position, as seen in "Der Zerfall der Werte" (1932),⁶ is that in which he relies exclusively on a formal, abstract, transcendental Absolute. The point at which, almost despite himself, Broch turns increasingly towards empirical reality in his search for the Absolute is marked by "Werttheoretische Bemerkungen zur Psychoanalyse" (1936).⁷ The final stage is to be found in "Über syntaktische und kognitive Einheiten" (c. 1946), "Politik: Ein Kondensat" (c. 1949) and "Trotzdem: Humane Politik" (1950): in the first of these three studies Broch proves, to his own

satisfaction at least, the existence of an Earthly Absolute; in the last two he sets out the possible practical application of this new discovery in the fields of politics and legislation.⁸

This chronological development follows the outline, given in Part I, of Broch's change of interests. From 1936 until the mid-1940's Broch worked on psychological and political research for his Massenpsychologie. He abandoned this in despair when he realized that the crisis of the war against fascist Germany had simply been replaced by the political tensions of the Cold War. In the mid-1940's he returned to his first love of mathematics and epistemology. It was here that he believed he found a scientifically demonstrable Earthly Absolute which, at the end of his life, he then tried to apply in practical terms to the problems of politics and legislation.

Such a simplified schematization of the development of the theory is necessary because it evolved over a long period of years and evidence of its evolution can be found in numerous essays on a wide variety of subjects. Broch himself never traced this line of development through the years of his work; he concentrated solely on the final discovery of "das Irdisch-Absolute" in the last years of his life. Where necessary, relevant material from other essays will be considered, but the three stages described above provide the basic structure of the following study. It should be noted at this point that Broch himself was not fully aware of the extent to which

the main emphasis in his thinking altered. In much of his later work there appear inconsistencies and even contradictions which clearly did not register as such with him.

It is in relation to some of these changes that a second methodological approach is used in this part of the thesis. The general trend of Broch's research interests in psychology, epistemology and politics can be seen as a progressive movement away from formal, abstract theory in search of some means of practical intervention in world affairs for the general benefit of mankind. Corresponding to the unresolved conflict in Broch's work of theory and practice there recur in his writings pairs of concepts which, depending on the specific context, may be used as dialectical opposites or mutual complements. In general terms these concepts can all be subsumed under the relationship which exists between "Form" and "Inhalt", formal, abstract criteria and qualitative criteria of content, as follows:

Form	Inhalt
Ethik	Moral
Freiheit	Limitation
Gesinnungsethik	Verantwortungsethik
das reine Ich	das psychologische Ich
das erkenntnistheoretische Ich	das empirische Ich
Gott	Mensch

The first group of terms refers to aspects of formal, intellectual experience and abstract theory; the

second refers to the qualitative factor of empirical experience. The above pairs of concepts will be discussed in due course. It can be shown that over the years, as Broch came closer to formulating his theory of "das Irdisch-Absolute", the second group of concepts became progressively more important for him and assumed an increasingly positive value in his scheme of thought. Although the explicit juxtaposition of the two terms is never found in Broch's work, there is every justification for suggesting that the most important pair of terms in such a list has still to be added, namely that of "das Transzendental-Absolute" and "das Irdisch-Absolute". The full significance of the dialectical relationship between these pairs of concepts and of the progressive change of emphasis in Broch's thought from the first to the second term of each pair will become evident in what follows. This change of emphasis regularly provides strong evidence of the progressive development of the theory of "das Irdisch-Absolute". The two quotations which introduce this chapter reveal clearly that over a period of years Broch, in his search for an absolutely reliable criterion of value-judgments, abandoned "Gott" and "Logos" in favour of "der Einzelmensch mit seiner irdischen Einzelseele".

2. "DER ZERFALL DER WERTE" AND THE CONSEQUENCES OF THIS THEORY FOR BROCH'S THINKING.

a) Broch's Conception of Value.

Until recently Broch's theory of values has normally been discussed in the context of critical studies of Die Schlafwandler, of which it is part.⁹ Such studies rarely make any attempt at a critical analysis of the theory itself. Of these commentators who deal specifically with Broch's philosophical writings, most restrict themselves to the informative role of collating facts and presenting the theory in a compact and easily understood form. They can be said to popularize Broch's theory of values, but they do not try to criticize it. For such a general presentation of the theory of values the reader is referred to the works of Erich Kahler, Ernestine Schlant and Hermann Krapoth. For a genuinely critical study of Broch's philosophy the only book which can be recommended is the very provocative work by Karl Menges.¹⁰

In the following analysis of "Der Zerfall der Werte" it will be shown that, as a result of his original theory, Broch was forced to assume that the only absolute standard on which man could rely in the modern world was that of reason, which he understood solely in terms of formal logic. As will become evident, Broch regularly equates this absolutely invariable logic with the

transcendental Absolute of the Logos; according to Broch human reason can be understood only as a derivative of the latter.

Before discussing the dissolution of values, it is necessary to explain briefly what Broch understands by "value". Basic to this understanding is Broch's conception of the dualistic structure of the human self ("das Ich"). Throughout Broch's work the word "Ich" has a wide range of meaning which, depending on the context, varies from the psychological ego to the epistemological subject of perception and cognition. It is more convenient to retain the German word and define it more closely in English when the need arises. For Broch the "Ich" consists of two indissolubly combined complementary components or functions which he regularly subsumes under the Cartesian terms of "cogito - sum".¹¹ The former is man in his function as a rational, thinking being, subject to the formal dictates of logic. The latter is man as a physical creature. As such he is subject to time and must die; as a thinking being he knows of the inevitability of approaching death but cannot imagine the cessation of existence because temporal experience is wholly foreign to the purely formal relationships of logic with which the rational being operates. The result of this knowledge, this tension between the two indissoluble functions of the "Ich" is fear: fear of time, fear of death and fear of the unknown which lies beyond death.¹² The following quotations clarify the relationship postulated by Broch between this fear and

the phenomenon of value.

"Der Mensch befindet sich nicht nur stets im Zustand des Totalerlebens, sondern er weiss auch davon; er weiss, dass sein Ich unteilbar ist, zeitlos von der Geburt bis zum Tode, und sein letzter metaphysischer Wunsch geht nach Aufhebung des Todes in dieser Zeitlosigkeit, geht nach Erreichung dieses Zieles kraft seines geistigen Wissens um seine Totalität." (GW 10: 189).

"Alles, was Wert genannt wird und Wert genannt zu werden verdient, zielt auf Aufhebung und Überwindung des Todes. Der Tod ist der eigentliche Unwert, der Unwert an sich." (GW 6: 317).

"Hinter dem cogitare, hinter dem sum, hinter jeder Intuition steht, als letztes menschliches Wissen, das Wissen um die Einsamkeit, das Wissen um die Brückenlosigkeit und die Einsamkeit des Todes, hinter allem Denken steht die Angst, - so steht der Unwert des Todes hinter allen Werten, der Unwert als ein Absolutes, das stets vorhanden ist, weil es das Nichts ist, von dem wir umflossen sind und in dem 'Gott trauernd thront'." (GW 7: 48).

"Vom negativen Pol, von dem Tode her erfahren wir was 'Wert' bedeutet: er bedeutet Todesüberwindung, oder genauer Hinwegtäuschung über das Todesbewusstsein, ohne dessen ständige Anwesenheit der Mensch wahrscheinlich nicht Mensch wäre, so dass er es sich trotz Überwindung erhalten muss." (GW 7: 233).

The first and last of the above quotations reveal the essential nature of Broch's conception of value.

The human reaction to the fear of time and death is to try to arrest, even if only symbolically, the relentless passing of time, by understanding the world in terms of formal, spatial and consequently timeless relationships instead of experiencing it as a dynamic, temporal process. Broch describes this reaction as: "das Bemühen um die Umwandlung des eilenden Lebenslaufes in einen statischen Zustand und in eine Ruhe, die als Annäherung an das Endgültige die Illusion der Zeitaufhebung und der Aufhebung des Todes zu geben vermag." (GW 7: 98).

The most important factor in these formal structures is that they are rational. As a rational being man, so Broch believes, has inherited the divine spark of reason which enables him to try to comprehend the world as a unitary, objective reality. Man creates his reality, indeed creates the world as he knows it, by projecting the formal, logical structures of his own thought processes into what would be, without such a formative principle, merely an amorphous mass of irrational and unrelated experience. Broch's debt to Kant here is obvious. He is clearly thinking of the Kantian "Bedingung der möglichen Erfahrung". Kant's formulation of this proposition is: "dass die oberste Gesetzgebung der Natur in uns selbst, d.i. in unserem Verstande, liegen müsse, und dass wir die allgemeinen Gesetze derselben nicht von der Natur vermittelt der Erfahrung, sondern umgekehrt die Natur ihrer allgemeinen Gesetzmässigkeit nach bloß aus dem in unserer Sinnlichkeit und dem Verstande

liegenden Bedingungen der Möglichkeit der Erfahrung suchen müssen . . . der Verstand schöpft seine Gesetze (a priori) nicht aus der Natur, sondern schreibt sie dieser vor."¹³

In this application of the formative, creative principle of reason to experience Broch sees the characteristic feature which raises humanity above the animal condition; it is "der Akt der Humanität schlechthin" (GW 6: 317), which Broch further defines as follows:

"Indem es die Welt, sie aus der Dunkelheit heraushebend, sie aus der Dunkelheit schöpfend, im wahrsten Sinne als Wert 'erschafft', wird das wertvollende Handeln zu dem, was es ist: 'Wert schaffen' heisst, sich dem Schöpfertum Gottes annähern, und sich dieser humansten aller Aufgaben entziehen, heisst Versinken in der 'nolitio' des Nicht-tun-Wollens, heisst in den 'Mangel' an gutem Willen geraten, in jene privatio boni, die für die Kirche, wie für Spinoza die Abkehr von Gott bedeutete und dem Humanen an sich entgegengesetzt ist." (GW 6: 319-320). For Broch knowledge ("Erkenntnis") and value are identical.¹⁴ It is Broch's belief that man must act rationally and logically. Even in his most irrational behaviour man will try to provide logical motivation for his actions which, formally at least, will be valid (GW 2: 401, 403, 443, 661).¹⁵ The contradictions and dangerous results which arise from such a view will be discussed later.

This formative principle which is central to human reality is identical with the creation of values. The stimulus to the creation of values is fear of death.

Death is feared not only because it is inevitable, but because it is and will always remain unknown. It is something man must experience, but which can never, in the strictly scientific use of the word demanded by Broch, be known. The following passage, in which Broch talks of death, makes this very point.

"Seine Realität ist die der Grenze, und durch die Dunkelheit seines Tores strömt die metaphysische Angst als psychische Realität in das menschliche Leben. Vor dem Feindlichen fürchtet man sich, vor der Dunkelheit hat man Angst. Ein Mittler zwischen psychischer und metaphysischer Realität, steht der Tod an der Grenzscheide zwischen der hellen Welt des Bewusstseins, in der alle Dinge bekannt sind, in der sie ihre Namen tragen und definiert werden können, und der Welt der Dunkelheit, in der nichts zu definieren ist, aus der alles Unheil kommt, auch hier im wahren Wortsinn 'namenloses Unheil' - es ist jenes Unheil, das auf die Erlösung durch den definierenden Namen wartet, auf dass es erkannt und man dagegen gefeit sei." (GW 6: 231-232).

For Broch knowledge and reality are essentially rational and logical: "Das Unwirkliche ist das Unlogische." (GW 2: 401). Whatever man does, he acts rationally, imposing a formal, spatial relationship on his experience of the world and thus symbolically at least halting the inexorable progress of time which culminates for him in death: "was immer der Mensch tut, er tut es, um die Zeit zu vernichten, um sie aufzuheben, und diese Aufhebung heisst Raum." (GW 2: 426). Any

rational process or logical development which extends the body of knowledge, which contributes to man's knowledge of himself or his world and thus pushes back the border of the unknown or irrational encroaches symbolically on the realm of death, the greatest unknown of all, and helps to remove some of its fearful threat. Broch summarizes this in the following passage.

"Alles Handeln ist Formen, es gibt kein Handeln, empirisches oder ideelles, das nicht auf Formung oder Umformung von Gegebenheiten hinzielte. Jede Tätigkeit des Menschen ist ein Formen, und die Welt, die er schafft, damit sie Welt werde und den Tod aufhebe, entsteht immer wieder aus dem Apeiron Anaximanders, aus dem 'Urgrund' des Amorphen, aus diesem Irrationalen schlechthin, in dessen Qualitätslosigkeit das Leben und der Tod, das Nichtsein und das Sein noch ungeformt vereinigt sind." (GW 6: 320).

It is Broch's belief that all such rational creation of values, and it is his view that all rational action or thought creates values (GW 7: 91), has an ethical function, ethical because it is dictated solely by an absolutely autonomous reason which is subject only to its formal laws. Again the debt to Kant is obvious. Broch talks of "'die Wertrichtung', die ethische Forderung an das Tun" (GW 2: 515). He regularly interprets this according to the Kantian definition of what is good, namely actions carried out for their own sakes according to the dictates of autonomous reason (GW 2: 595; GW 7: 50, 59).

We may ask with Broch: "Wie aber verwirklicht sich diese ethische Forderung?". His answer reveals the very close relationship he envisages between ethics and aesthetics: "immer durch gewisse Formungen, die dem Weltbild aufgeprägt werden . . . das Resultat ist immer ein Akt der Formung und Formgebung, ist also, im weitesten Sinne gesprochen ein ästhetisches Resultat. Ethischer Akt und ästhetisches Resultat!" (GW 6: 212).

This is what Broch refers to as "das Doppelgesicht des Wertes" (GW 7: 49), or "die ethisch-ästhetische Doppelansicht des Wertes" (GW 6: 319). He concludes: "es spaltet sich der Wertbegriff in die komplementären Kategorien: in den ethischen Wert des Tuns und den ästhetischen Wert des Getanen, Avers- und Reversseite der gleichen Medaille." (GW 2: 593).

The full significance of this relationship between ethical, formative action and aesthetic, formed result becomes evident when we remember the primary stimulus to the creation of values, namely fear of time and death. The aesthetic results of ethical action can be seen in all monuments throughout history to human thought and endeavour. Such monuments may be of an abstract nature, such as histories of civilizations or institutions, systems of philosophy or religion, or the more familiar and obvious examples of the plastic arts, especially architecture, in which Broch sees the most concrete example of man's attempt to reduce his experience of the world to a formal, spatial structure.

"Die Prävalenz des Baustils innerhalb der Charakteristika

einer Epoche ist eine der sonderbarsten Angelegenheiten. "Überhaupt diese ganz merkwürdige Vorzugsstellung, die die bildende Kunst innerhalb der Historie erhalten hat! Sie ist gewiss nur ein sehr geringer Ausschnitt aus der Fülle der menschlichen Tätigkeiten, von denen eine Epoche erfüllt ist, sicherlich nicht einmal ein sehr geistiger Ausschnitt und doch überragt sie an Charakterisierungskraft alle anderen geistigen Gebiete, überragt die Dichtung, überragt sogar die Wissenschaft, überragt sogar die Religion. Was durch die Jahrtausende hin dauert, ist das bildende Kunstwerk, es bleibt der Exponent der Epoche und ihres Stils." (GW 2: 425)

Such monuments, whether of an abstract or concrete nature, have outlived those who created them. They are a lasting witness to the efforts of their creators to understand the total significance of life by imposing a rational order on their experience of the world. Thus ethical action, which Broch sees as an attempt to create values and symbolically remove fear of death by imposing a formal, spatial structure on temporal experience, produces an aesthetic result which, in a sense, defeats death by testifying to the humanity of those who produced it long after they have died. "So darf . . . von den ästhetischen Residuen der Historie auf die ethischen Taten geschlossen werden, die allein sich im ästhetisch Bleibenden für die Ewigkeit erhalten." (GW 6: 321-322)

At first sight it may seem difficult to reconcile Broch's conception of ethics with what one normally understands by this word. This becomes more comprehen-

sible when it is remembered that in Broch's thinking the aesthetic result of ethical action is not the primary goal of such action, but merely its indirect product.¹⁶ The main purpose of rational, ethical action is to impose, as far as possible, a coherent order on life, thus creating a unitary, objective reality within the overall context of which the individual can understand his personal role and regulate his conduct accordingly. Clearly this is closer to the generally accepted concept of ethics.

Death is the greatest unknown factor in life. Any attempt to come to terms with life inevitably involves the individual in a confrontation with what death means for him: "der Tod, ein Mahner, das Leben mit letzterreichbarem Sinn zu erfüllen, auf dass es nicht umsonst gelebt sei." (GW 6: 205). Fear of death can only be removed if the individual can understand and accept it as an integral part of human experience within the context of some higher, ideal reality which lies beyond the limitations of human perception. We thus return again to fear of death as the great stimulus to ethical action and the creation of values.

"Es ist jene einzige und wahre metaphysische Angst, jene grosse unbezähmbare und unbezwingbare Lebensangst, die den Menschen mit dem gleichen Augenblick befällt, in dem sein Bewusstsein zum ersten Male die Augen aufschlägt und die Einsamkeit seines Todes vor sich sieht, - es ist jene Angst, die bloss zum Schweigen gebracht wird, wenn der Mensch den Zusammenhang seiner erschreckenden Endlichkeit

mit der Unendlichkeit des Kosmos zu ahnen beginnt."

(GW 6: 231)

The two above quotations make clear the relevance of Broch's definition of values to his concern with what the layman would probably regard as more practical ethics, as expressed in the question as to how one should take decisions about one's own personal behaviour. By creating values, by increasing the field of knowledge, by attempting to reduce his experience of the world to a unitary, objective reality, man is laying the foundations on which a reliable code of ethics may be constructed. It would seem, however, that no absolute, definitive formulation of ethical standards is possible because man, subject as he is to the limitations of empirical reality, can never expect to know or understand his individual role in the context of infinity and eternity. This question is central to Broch's work.

b) The Dissolution of Values.

With Broch's conceptions of value and ethics in mind we can now proceed to examine his theory of the dissolution of values. The two main sources of reference are the two essays, "Der Zerfall der Werte" in Die Schlafwandler and "Logik einer zerfallenden Welt". The latter was also written in 1931 and was published in a collection of essays, entitled Wiedergeburt der Liebe, edited by Frank Thiess.¹⁷ This second essay deals with exactly the same subject as "der Zerfall der Werte", but its style suggests that it was written with the intention of popularizing Broch's theory of values. In it Broch presents the theory in a simpler and less abstruse way than in the former work.

Obviously the aesthetic results of ethical action, as seen through centuries of history and exemplified most clearly in the plastic arts, reveal many varying styles. If, as Broch maintains, all such formal structures are created by the projection into experience of the absolutely invariable, formal relationships of logic or reason, "die absolute Logik des Ichs, die absolute Logik Gottes (GW 2: 451), why do we find such a variety of styles in art, architecture, thought and civilizations? Broch bases his discussion of the dissolution of values on an analysis of the reasons for the progressive changes of style.

He argues that in one very important respect the application of formal logic is influenced by qualitative

("inhaltlich") factors. Stated simply, this factor can be seen as the currently obtaining stage of development of the human intellect which, at any given time, dictates what people living in that era are prepared to believe and accept as truth.

"Die absolute formale Logik bleibt ja bestehen, ist auch für die menschlichen Gehirne unabänderlich, - es ändern sich bloss die Denkinhalte, es ändern sich die Einsichten in das Wesen der Welt, es ist also bestenfalls eine erkenntnistheoretische, nie und nimmer eine logische Frage. Die Logik bleibt 'stillos' wie die Mathematik."
(GW 2: 451)

Broch goes on to exemplify his argument by briefly explaining why, as he sees it, the intellect of Western European man has developed as it has.¹⁸ He suggests that the style of thought, the understanding of the world in any period of history, is dictated not by formal logic, but by what is accepted as and believed to be a plausible explanation of what constitutes the Ground of Being. This is not a question of logic: theoretically, there is no reason to assume that any ontological enquiry pursued on strictly logical lines should ever come to a definitive end. The relevant factor in determining what the final "Plausibilitätsschranke" (GW 2: 451) or "Plausibilitätspunkt" (GW 2: 452) in such an enquiry should be, or if there should be one at all, is the current level of intellectual attainment, which regulates what is accepted as axiomatic in the obtaining system of thought.

To illustrate his theory Broch quotes the example of the first Greek philosopher, Thales of Miletus, who lived about 600 B.C. In his philosophical system Thales "proved" that water is the basic matter of the universe. Thales' argument is formally valid. His conclusion, which we now know to be wrong, was the result of lack of information. This is a qualitative factor of which Thales could not be aware and which we can appreciate only from our historical perspective with our much more advanced understanding of Nature.

"An welcher Stelle eine derartige Fragekette abgebrochen wird, ist nun Angelegenheit des Wahrheits- und Evidenzgefühls, also Angelegenheit der in Kraft stehenden Axiomatik. Wenn nach der Lehre des Thales dieser Plausibilitätspunkt für die ontische Fragekette mit der Substanz 'Wasser' zu setzen war, so deutet dies daraufhin, dass für Thales ein Axiomensystem in Geltung stand, innerhalb dessen die Wasser-Qualität der Materie 'beweisbar' erschien. Hier sind es inhaltliche und nicht formal-logische Axiome, die die Fragekette abstoppen, es sind Axiome der geltenden Kosmogonie." (GW 2: 452)

The ontologies of primitive, polytheistic societies must be, according to Broch, extremely complex. In such a society, where every animate or inanimate object has its own god, demon or spirit, any ontological enquiry into the nature of the world will very soon reach its final axiom. A tree exists because it has its own spirit or god, and any question into the reason for the tree's existence

can be pursued no further. Compared to this system of philosophy, Thales' theory represents a considerable advance. Broch maintains that up to the Catholic Middle Ages this process of simplification continued until it reached the point where the God of Christianity was seen as the sole Ground of Being. Every ontological investigation logically led to God and this intellectual argument coincided with man's belief and his experience of the world. The formal logical structures of all ontologies postulated throughout history remain invariable and identical. What alters is the style of thought and this is determined by the final axiom obtaining in any given historical era. Broch uses an example from geometry to illustrate his thesis.

"Bei gewissen geometrischen Konstruktionen wird der unendlich ferne Punkt willkürlich innerhalb der endlichen Zeichenebene angenommen, und dann wird so konstruiert, als würde dieser fiktive Unendlichkeitsspunkt wirklich der unendlich weit entfernte sein. Die Lage der einzelnen Konstruktionsglieder zueinander bleibt in einer solchen Konstruktion die gleiche, als würde jener Punkt wirklich unendlich weit entfernt sein; bloss haben sich alle Masse verzerrt und zusammengeschoben. Und so ähnlich darf man sich die Veränderungen vorstellen, welche die logischen Konstruktionen erleiden, wenn der logische Plausibilitätsspunkt aus dem Unendlichen ins Endliche und Irdische gerückt wird: die formale Logik als solche, ihre Schlussweise, ja sogar ihre inhaltlichen Assoziationsnachbarschaften bleiben bestehen, - was sich ändert, sind

ihre 'Masse', ist ihr 'Stil'." (GW 2: 454)

Broch's understanding of the system of values created by Christianity and the Scholastic philosophy of the Roman Catholic Church in medieval Europe is central to his analysis of the dissolution of values. In his interpretation the Middle Ages had a perfect or absolute value-system: one which subordinated every aspect of daily life and thought to a single guiding principle, namely belief in the Christian God. The Neo-Platonic Scholasticism of the period could even logically deduce the existence of the whole cosmos from God. Belief in this God was the obtaining "Plausibilitätspunkt" (GW 2: 476). In such a context of thought all life, every facet of human activity and self-expression could be seen to have its individual significant function within the general coherence of the divine will. Even death lost much of its fearful threat because it was seen to play a meaningful role in the individual's relationship to God. "Das Mittelalter besass das ideale Wertzentrum, auf das es ankommt, besass einen obersten Wert, dem alle anderen Werte untertan waren: den Glauben an den christlichen Gott. Sowohl die Kosmogonie war von diesem Zentralwert abhängig (ja noch mehr, sie konnte aus ihm scholastisch deduziert werden) als auch der Mensch selber, der Mensch mitsamt seinem ganzen Tun, bildete einen Teil jener Weltordnung, die bloss Spiegelbild einer ekklesiastischen Hierarchie war, in sich geschlossenes und endliches Abbild einer ewigen und unendlichen Harmonie." (GW 2: 475).

To illustrate this point Broch regularly uses the same examples. He maintains that in the Middle Ages all work, all human activity was undertaken, not primarily for its own sake, but in service of God. God could best be served, however, if the individual produced the best possible results in his work by concentrating entirely on it and constantly applying his mind to improving the techniques involved. In Broch's eyes this was essentially the ethical action of applying creative, formative reason to life which in turn produced aesthetic results.

"Der Mensch hatte wohl den Dogmen gemäss zu leben, er hatte sich, wie wir sagen dürfen, der Technik der Kirche zu unterwerfen, aber darüber hinaus hatte er seiner ethischen Pflicht als Christ zu genügen, d.h. Gott ausschliesslich dadurch zu dienen, dass er seine irdische Arbeit um der Arbeit selbst willen ausführte. Erst im Zusammenhalt all dieser Einstellungen handelte er wahrhaft ethisch, erst durch die Aneinanderreihung aller ethischen Akte, von denen jeder, wie wir sagten, ein ästhetisches Resultat . . . zeitigte, gelangte er zum endgültigen ästhetischen Effekt, der im Unendlichen lag, zum über-ästhetischen Ziel, zum Effekt der Gnade und der ewigen Seligkeit." (GW 6: 215)¹⁹

The aesthetic result, the experience of grace, was never the aim of ethical action; it was the result of the rigorous application of logic and reason to perfecting one's god-given talents, an exercise which allowed one to feel that one was fulfilling one's part in the divine

plan.²⁰

The scholastic view of reality did not, however, represent the ultimate development in ontology. Inevitably there came a time when scientific and philosophical thought could no longer be subject to the dictates of religious belief. There was a growing disparity between belief and knowledge. For the scientist and philosopher, especially for the former, it became increasingly evident that the personal God of Christianity could no longer be regarded as the final axiom in any logical enquiry into the nature of the universe. The pursuit of the ontological question no longer culminated in a single final axiom which united and explained all facets of reality. All that remained was the invariable formal structure of rational investigation which had to be pursued into infinity. There was no longer any generally accepted interpretation of reality to give a common direction to such questions. The qualitative factor vanished and there remained only the absolutely invariable, formal structure of logic, which could be applied to the practice of any human activity. Such a development led to the loss of a characteristic, unifying style of civilization. The only typical feature of the modern era which was ushered in by this development, is its complete lack of a distinct, unifying style. Broch sees this crucial development taking place in the Reformation and Renaissance.²¹ The clearest statement of his view is to be found in "Der Zerfall der Werte".

"Der Schritt, der über die monotheistische Kosmogonie hinaus noch zu tun blieb, war ein fast unmerklicher, und war doch von grösserer Bedeutung als alle vorhergegangenen: der Urgrund wird aus der 'endlichen' Unendlichkeit eines immerhin noch anthropomorphen Gottes in die wahre abstrakte Unendlichkeit hinausgeschoben, die Frageketten münden nicht mehr in dieser Gottesidee, sondern laufen tatsächlich in die Unendlichkeit (sie streben sozusagen nicht mehr nach einem Punkt, sondern haben sich parallelisiert), die Kosmogonie ruht nicht mehr auf Gott, sondern auf der ewigen Fortsetzbarkeit der Frage, auf dem Bewusstsein, dass nirgends ein Ruhepunkt gegeben ist, dass immer weiter gefragt werden kann, gefragt werden muss, dass weder ein Urstoff noch ein Urgrund aufzuweisen ist, dass hinter jeder Logik noch eine Metalogik steht, dass jede Lösung bloss als Zwischenlösung gilt und dass nichts übrigbleibt als der Akt des Fragens als solcher: die Kosmogonie ist radikal wissenschaftlich geworden und ihre Sprache und ihre Syntax haben ihren 'Stil' abgestreift, haben sich zum mathematischen Ausdruck gewandelt." (GW 2: 454-455)

In this process, which he describes as "die Entfesselung des Logischen" (GW 2: 476) and "die Radikalisierung der Logik" (GW 7: 56) Broch sees the dissolution of the absolute value-system of the Catholic Middle Ages. Reality could no longer be comprehended as a harmonious, meaningful unity and it gradually disintegrated into the countless "-isms" which are such a distinctive feature of modern life: militarism,

pacifism, communism, fascism, materialism, aestheticism etc. Common to them all is a "brutale und aggressive Logik" (GW 2: 475) with which each of these independent value-systems seeks to assert itself.

"Zur Logik des bürgerlichen Faiseurs gehört es, mit absoluter Konsequenz und Radikalität den Leitspruch des Enrichissez-vous in Geltung zu setzen: auf diese Weise, in solch absoluter Konsequenz und Radikalität entstand die Weltleistung des Abendlandes - um an dieser Absolutheit, die sich selbst aufhebt, ad absurdum geführt zu werden: Krieg ist Krieg, l'art pour l'art, in der Politik gibt es keine Bedenken, Geschäft ist Geschäft -, dies alles besagt das nämliche, dies ist alles von der nämlichen aggressiven Radikalität, ist von jener unheimlichen, ich möchte fast sagen, metaphysischen Rücksichtslosigkeit, ist von jener auf die Sache und nur auf die Sache gerichteten grausamen Logizität, die nicht nach rechts, nicht nach links schaut, - oh, dies alles ist der Denkstil dieser Zeit." (GW 2: 475)

The most obvious result of this "Atomisierung der einstigen Ganzheit" (GW 2: 513) is that all the separate value-systems born of the dissolution of the absolute system of the Middle Ages become, relatively, equally important. Each system concentrates on achieving its own ends, on strengthening and propagating itself without regard for the standards or needs of any other value-system. This is "Wertautonomie" (GW 6: 334), which inevitably leads to "Wertanarchie". The picture of the modern world painted here by Broch seems to be one of

total chaos. He shows us a world torn apart by conflicting systems of values, each concentrating on ruthlessly pursuing its aims, regardless of external considerations. But, and here Broch's conception of ethics is important, each value-system functions ethically by actively pursuing these goals as logically as possible. "Eben in der 'Tat', in dieser 'Tatsächlichkeit' liegt auch hier die Strenge, die kategorisch-imperative Pflichterfüllung, die Absperrung gegen alle anderen Wertgebiete . . . Die 'Wertrichtung', die ethische Forderung an das Tun, hatte sich gegenüber dem Mittelalter nicht geändert und hätte sich auch nicht ändern dürfen, denn nur in dem handelnden Willen zum Wert and zu seiner Absolutheit konstituiert sich der Wert, - andere als absolute Werte gibt es nicht. Was sich geändert hat, war die Abgrenzung der wertsetzenden Tat: während sich bisher die Intensität der Absolutierung auf den Gesamtwert des christlichen Organons bezogen hatte, wurde nun die Radikalität der auf sich selbst gestellten Logik, wurde die Strenge ihrer Autonomie jedem Einzelgebiet separat zugeordnet, wurde jedes dieser Einzelgebiete zum eigenen Wertgebiet absolutiert, wurde jene Vehemenz in die Welt gebracht, mit der die absolutierten Wertgebiete brückenlos und beziehungslos nebeneinander bestehen sollen, jene Vehemenz, die der Renaissance ihre eigentümliche Färbung verliehen hat." (GW 2: 515-516)

Despite such assurances from Broch it is hard to see what comfort this knowledge can be since the only absolute standard left in life seems to be the purely

formal one of reason or logic, "die autonom gewordene Vernunft" (GW 2: 663) or "die zum Absoluten durchbrechende Ratio" (GW 2: 684), with no qualifying criteria as to how it should be applied. With Broch we are compelled to ask: "Bedeutet dies Relativierung aller Werte?" (GW 2: 595).

He answers this question very emphatically in the negative. According to this argument reality and all value-systems are products or creations of the intelligible self, the subject of cognition. "Die Welt ist Setzung des intelligiblen Ichs." (GW 2: 596) All value-systems are formally identical and absolutely invariable because they reflect the structures and formal relationships of human thought and perception which are projected into the world by man in order that he might experience it as a unitary and objective reality. Value-systems can be created by an individual subject, "ein effektives Wertsubjekt". They can also be posited by some supra-personal entity such as a state, a nation, a culture or any institution, "ein fiktives Wertsubjekt", but even these higher value-positing ("wertsetzend") subjects reflect in their formal organization the invariable logical structure of the function of the human mind.

"Jedes Wertsystem versucht, die Welt nach gewissen Prinzipien zu formen, sich selber in die Welt zu projizieren. Das Wertsystem, oder richtiger, das fiktive oder effektive Wertsubjekt, das ihm zugeordnet wird,

vollzieht in der Wirklichkeit genau das, was jede idealistische Philosophie vom theoretischen Ich fordert: es projiziert sich selber in diese Wirklichkeit, solcherart die Identität von Sein und Wirklichkeit nicht nur theoretisch, sondern in aller praktischen Lebensfülle durchzuführen.

Eine derartige Formung der Wirklichkeit, ihre 'Umformung zu einer Wertwirklichkeit', wird nicht nur von jedem einzelnen Menschen mit mehr or minder grossem Erfolg unentwegt versucht, sie ist bei überpersönlichen Wertgebieten noch viel deutlicher sichtbar: Staaten, Völker, Kulturen sind solche Wertkreise, die sich um fiktive, überpersönliche Wertsubjekte legen, und je deutlicher die Wertbezogenheit hervortritt, desto deutlicher wird dieses fiktive Wertsubjekt zum 'Kulturgeist', wird der Wertkreis zum 'Kulturkreis', um mit höchstem Wertziel in den weitesten Kulturkreis einer Religion zu münden." (GW 7: 46)

Broch describes this formal organization of experience as "Setzungen von Setzungen" (GW 2: 596; GW 7: 46).²² In it he sees the only hope for a world torn by conflicting values. This hope is based on the fact that every system of values is formally invariable and that within each there functions the same formal, ethical Absolute which operates through man and is guaranteed by the transcendental Absolute of the Logos. The importance of Broch's identification of ethics with the function of reason or logic is at once evident. It leads to "die Unterordnung des Ethischen unter die Absolutheit des

Logos" (GW 7: 49).

The optimistic conclusion which Broch draws from his theory of the dissolution of values and with which he offers reassurance to his generation and its successors is contained in the following passages, although it is hard to imagine what comfort the reader is expected to derive from his words. These two quotations give definitive expression to the position adopted by Broch in the early 1930's. At that time he was convinced that he had proved that the only reliable Absolute left to man in the modern world was the purely formal, abstract one of logic. Not only is such an Absolute purely formal in its application and thus incapable of providing qualitative criteria for human conduct, but it is essentially transcendental and impersonal because through it there functions the Logos, the formal creative principle underlying all reality.

"Die Welt ist Setzung des intelligiblen Ichs, denn unverloren und unverlierbar bleibt die platonische Idee. Doch die Setzung ist nicht 'aus der Pistole geschossen', es können nur immer wieder Wertsubjekte gesetzt werden, Wertsubjekte, die ihrerseits die Struktur des intelligiblen Ichs widerspiegeln und die ihrerseits ihre eigenen Wertsetzungen, ihre eigenen Weltformungen vornehmen: die Welt ist nicht unmittelbare Setzung des Ichs, sondern dessen mittelbare Setzung, sie ist 'Setzung von Setzungen', 'Setzung von Setzungen von Setzungen' usf. in unendlicher Iteration. In dieser 'Setzung von Setzungen' erhält die Welt ihre methodologische Organisierung und Hierarchie,

sicherlich eine relativistische Organisierung, trotzdem - der Form nach - eine absolute, denn die ethische Forderung, die an die effektiven oder fiktiven Wertsubjekte gestellt wird, bleibt ungemindert bestehen, mit ihr aber auch die immanente Geltung des Logos innerhalb des getanen Werkes: es bleibt die Logik der Dinge bestehen." (GW 2: 596)²³

"Spiegel seiner selbst, in jedem Begriff und in jeder Einheit, die er setzt, leuchtet dem Menschen der Logos, leuchtet ihm das Wort Gottes als Mass aller Dinge entgegen. Und mag das Ruhende dieser Welt, mag ihr ästhetischer Wert aufgehoben und zur Funktion aufgelöst sein, aufgelöst in den Zweifel an aller Gesetzlichkeit, mehr noch, aufgelöst in die Pflicht zur Frage und zum Zweifel, unangetastet bleibt die Einheit des Begriffes, unangetastet die ethische Forderung, unangetastet bleibt die Rigorosität des ethischen Wertes als reine Funktion, Pflichtwirklichkeit strengster Observanz und als solche immer noch Einheit der Welt, Einheit des Menschen, aufscheinend in allen Dingen, unverloren und unverlierbar über Räume und Zeiten hinweg." (GW 2: 598)

The second of the above passages contains the words quoted at the start of this part of the thesis as evidence of Broch's adherence in the early 1930's to a formal, transcendental Absolute. It has now been shown how he came to such a conclusion. The last section of this chapter examines some of the problems, contradictions, even dangers, inherent in such a philosophy.

c) The Results of Broch's Theory of the Dissolution of Values.

Broch can be seen very much as a victim of his own theory of the dissolution of values. According to this theory formal logic is the only demonstrable Absolute in modern life. Because Broch was convinced of the validity of his argument he was inevitably obsessed with the need to provide scientifically verifiable evidence for many phenomena in life which are simply not susceptible to such proofs. The example which recurs most frequently in his work is his desperate attempt to formulate a universally applicable code of ethics, a set of criteria which would be absolutely reliable because they would be scientifically irrefutable. The desperation and contradictions evident in Broch's efforts are one of the most striking aspects of his theoretical writings when they are viewed as a whole. As yet very few critics have commented on this.²⁴

There can be no doubt that Broch was aware of the contradictions inherent in his reliance on logic and scientific method. Throughout his essays and correspondence there recurs the doubt that all his theoretical work consists of ultimately futile efforts to provide objective confirmation for what could never be more than passionately held personal beliefs. In August 1933 Broch wrote to Egon Vietta describing his work on the theory of values: "Es ist dies eine Art Ungeduld, und selbstverständlich bemühe ich mich seit Jahren, die

präzise logistische Fundierung für meine philosophische Arbeit nachzutragen, freilich wissend - obwohl ich in mancher Einzelheit ein gutes Stück damit vorwärts gekommen bin, - dass dies, im ganzen, ein zum Scheitern verdammt Versuch bleiben muss. Denn das Ethische, um das es sich schliesslich dreht, ist bei aller Logisierung des Ausdrucks ohne den 'Glauben' niemals zu fassen." (GW 8:

85).²⁵ It is significant that such doubts appear more frequently as Broch grows older. His tenacious adherence, despite all such reservations, to formal logic as the only demonstrably reliable Absolute in modern life merely serves to emphasize the extent to which he was a prisoner of his own system of thought.

Broch pursued his research with such rigorous logic because he believed that in a world of relative values only scientifically irrefutable evidence as to the necessity for any course of action could gain universal acceptance for that action. This seems to reveal a naively optimistic and simplistic view of the rôle played by reason in human affairs. If Broch's theoretical writings are studied as a whole in their chronological order it is evident that as he grew older, so he became increasingly pessimistic about the chances of his theories, no matter how logically convincing, ever having any practical results. His "Autobiographie als Arbeitsprogramm" frequently reveals his misgivings. When describing his research on the phenomenon of mass hysteria in the years 1939-1941 he states: "mit

„
rationalen Überredungen, Predigten oder Beweisen ist
gegenüber einer feststehenden und gar wahnhaften
„Überzeugung nichts auszurichten.“ (GW 9: 180).²⁶ Such
words in the mouth of a prophet of reason are clearly
paradoxical and reveal Broch's personal dilemma, he was
convinced that he had to rely on reason and logic, but
he doubted their appeal to the greater mass of his
public.

Such explicit comments made by Broch with
reference to his attempts to prove the validity of personal
beliefs are of special relevance to his conception of the
Logos. "Logos" is one of the most widely and vaguely
used words in Broch's vocabulary. Although he uses it
regularly he admits that it is a concept constantly
requiring examination and definition (GW 10: 299).
Unfortunately he contributes little to any definitive
interpretation of the concept.²⁷ On several occasions
Broch identifies the Logos with God, the Word of God or
the divine creative function. There are clear parallels
here to the biblical Logos of St. John I, 1, but Broch
never envisages a personal God as does Christianity.²⁸

He conceives of God as the abstract, formal,
unifying principle underlying the unitary, systematic
reality of Creation, even if this reality is not all
currently accessible to human experience and understanding.
Although Broch talks of the creative power of the Logos
he clearly does not imagine an individual, historical
act of Creation as such. The problem of how the

Creation came into being is never explained. Broch conceives of the Creation as an abstract, unitary, formal structure reflecting the ideal, formal, organizational principle of the Logos and containing all potential reality. This potential reality, or such parts of it that can be rationally accommodated within the systematic unity of the currently obtaining style of thought, is then given concrete expression through human experience and apperception, which in turn depends on the functioning of the divine spark of reason or logic in man. Broch never explains how the divine spark comes to be in man: this is another example of belief rather than knowledge on his part. It is clear that the creative function, as we normally understand the word, is performed by man and not God. The most important result of Broch's argument is his conclusion that in human experience the Logos is completely identified with the function of formal logic and rational thought-processes.²⁹

In Broch's thinking the absolutely invariable structures of formal logic are guaranteed by the transcendental Absolute of the Logos. His attempts to prove this again reveal a certain naivety scarcely in keeping with his usual insistence on logical validity as the criterion of objective knowledge. An analysis of his argument also reveals the point where Broch, whose epistemology owes so much to that of Kant, as formulated in Die Kritik der reinen Vernunft, attempts to go beyond the latter's findings. Before proceeding any further it must be emphasized that Broch understands the Logos in

two ways. Firstly, it is a function which reveals itself in man's ability to reason logically. Secondly, it is a state or condition, namely that of the ideal, unitary, formal structure of all potential reality. By applying the function of the Logos to his experience of the world man contributes to the revelation or concrete realization of the potential reality guaranteed by the Logos. For Broch the creative function and the attainment of knowledge are identical and reflect the Platonic concept of anamnesis.³⁰

Broch uses two variations of a single argument to prove, to his satisfaction at least, the existence of the Logos. The first is based on the assumption that the pursuit of objective, scientific knowledge is paradigmatic for the structure of all value-systems in that it projects the formal relationships of logical thought into experience. He argues that the constant progression of scientific enquiry necessarily implies a final goal or condition of total or absolute knowledge where all potential reality would be understood by man: it would then be actual and no longer merely potential reality. A summary of this argument is to be found in the essay, "Gedanken zum Problem der Erkenntnis in der Musik".

"Nirgends ist das Logische so eindeutig wirksam wie im bewussten Erkenntnisprozess, nirgends ist es so eindeutig auf das unendliche Ziel der im Logos ruhenden Wahrheit gerichtet, nirgends hat das Ergebnis der irdisch-endlichen

Schritte so sehr den Charakter des Provisorischen wie hier. Der unendliche, ewig unabgeschlossene Prozess der Wissenschaft, fortschreitend von Teilresultat zu Teilresultat, Konkretisierung der rationalen bewussten Erkenntnis und ihres Fortschrittes, zeigt mit aller Deutlichkeit, wie unmittelbar dieser Fortschritt aus dem Wesen des Logos und des Logischen selber stammt. Die Vermutung liegt nahe, dass das, was für dieses speziellste und doch sichtbarste und lichteste Wertgebiet und seinen Fortschritt gilt, auch für den Fortschritt der übrigen Wertgebiete gelte, dass in diesem verallgemeinerten und allgemeinen Fortschreiten gleichfalls dem Logos und der Erkenntnis die führende Rolle zufalle . . . Die 'Logik der Dinge', die alles menschliche Geschehen scheinbar ohne Zutun des Menschen vorwärtstreibt, wird in eine supra-humane spirituelle Sphäre zurückverlegt." (GW 7: 92-93)

The last sentence of the above quotation reveals beyond all doubt that Broch, at the time in question, namely the early 1930's, relied on an impersonal, transcendental Absolute as the determining factor in history. On occasion he even equates "Logos" with "Schicksal" (GW 6: 252-253; GW 10: 297). In support of the above argument Broch regularly asserts that no epistemological system could ever be developed unless man had some intuitive awareness of a possible final goal of absolute knowledge. At a later point in the above quoted essay he writes as follows:

"Könnte überhaupt das bewusste Erkennen in Funktion

treten, könnte das Logische in Funktion bleiben, wenn das apriorische Wissen um den Logos erlösche? Hier rührt das Wissen um das Supra-Humane, das Wissen um die Totalität der Welt und des Geistes, hier rührt das Wissen an den Glauben, und die erkenntnistheoretische Notwendigkeit wird gleichzeitig zur geschichtsphilosophischen Wahrheit: wenn das Wissen um den irrationalen Geist, der der Anfang, der Weg und das Ziel des Logos ist, verlorengeht und die leere Rationalität übrigbleibt, in diesem Augenblick tritt der Umbruch des Fortschritts ein, - entblösst seiner Humanität, führt er zum Tode und ins Böse." (GW 7: 95)

Only the first sentence of the above passage is strictly relevant here. The implications of the rest of the quotation will be discussed later. Its main purpose here is to show a typical and disturbing stylistic feature of Broch's philosophical writings. It illustrates how quickly Broch's thinking can cross the border between rational argument or justified conjecture into the realms of mystical speculation. A comparison of Broch's conception of the Logos with Kant's epistemology as expounded in Die Kritik der reinen Vernunft helps to clarify the weakness of Broch's argument. Kant's critical philosophy remains strictly within the rational limits which he originally set himself: as a result he refuses to look beyond the autonomous, intelligible self as the bearer or source of the rational free will. To do otherwise would be to indulge in uncritical speculation

about matters beyond human experience. Broch, however, demands a higher, transcendental guarantee of the rational law. If rigorously logical reasoning cannot furnish such a guarantee he turns to mysticism and intuitive speculation.

Kant stresses the distinction between the logical maxim of reason and the fundamental principle of reason. The former compels man to try to establish a systematic unity of judgment by pursuing the course of knowledge in a rigorously logical fashion to the point where the final condition, the ground of all knowledge is reached in the Absolute or God. Such a maxim, useful, indeed essential as it is in daily life and thought, does not imply that there is any such ultimate ground of knowledge. The fundamental principle of reason assumes that there is such an Absolute and consequently a systematic unity of knowledge and reality. Kant takes care to emphasize that there is no logically valid transition from the maxim to the fundamental principle of reason.³¹ Where Kant sees "die Bedingung der möglichen Erfahrung" in the invariable formal relationships of the functioning of the rational mind, Broch sees it in the transcendental Absolute of the Logos (GW 2: 598; GW 7: 59).

One of the most important results of Broch's conception of the Logos and his theory of values is to be seen in his interpretation of history as a cyclical or dialectical process. As has been shown, Broch relates the creation of values in any historical era to the

contemporary style of thought which, in turn, is determined by the final axiom or axioms ("Plausibilitätspunkt") of the currently accepted ontology. He postulates a progressive simplification of these ontologies and a corresponding reduction in the number of value-systems in any historical period. The culmination of such a development is seen in the Catholic Middle Ages, when a single, comprehensive system of values subordinated every aspect of life and thought to the Absolute of belief in the Christian God. Such a development could not halt there. Man's intellect, his insight into the nature of the universe continued to develop and could no longer be subject to the restrictions imposed by religious belief. At this point the cycle of the creation of values is reversed. From the historical perspective it can be seen that after the Middle Ages and over a period of centuries reality, as lived and understood by man, progressively disintegrated into a welter of independent, conflicting value-systems.

According to Broch this dissolution reached its climax in the Great War. In its chaos and brutality he sees the "Nullpunkt der Wertatomisierung" (GW 2: 683). The characteristic feature of this period is what Broch calls "'die irrationale Ratio': der heutige Zustand der Welt" (GW 10: 281). He uses these words to describe the seemingly paradoxical situation in which the individual acts rationally within a state of complete chaos which is clearly dominated by the irrational. For Broch the explanation lies in the fact that the dissolution of

values has reached the stage where the individual has become the centre of his own value-system, where he can recognize no general code of conduct or values as a criterion for his own behaviour and is therefore subject to every whim of self-interest, no matter how irrational it may be. The crucial factor, however, is that the individual will act logically to attain any end suggested to him by any irrational impulse. Broch's analysis of Huguenau's position at the end of Die Schlafwandler summarizes the above explanation.

"Letzte Zerspaltungseinheit im Wertzerfall ist das menschliche Individuum. Und je weniger dieses Individuum an einem Übergeordneten System beteiligt und je mehr es auf seine eigene empirische Autonomie gestellt ist . . . , desto schmaler und bescheidener wird seine 'Privattheologie', desto unfähiger wird diese, irgendwelche Werte ausserhalb ihres engsten individuellen Bereiches zu erfassen: was ausserhalb des engsten Wertkreises vor sich geht, kann nur noch unverarbeitet, ungeformt, m.a.W. dogmatisch hingenommen werden, - es entsteht jenes leere und dogmatische Spiel von Konventionen, also von ["]Überrationalitäten kleinster Dimensionen, die für das Wesen des philiströsen Menschen typisch sind . . . , es entsteht das konfliktlose Neben- und Ineinanderwirken einer dem Irrationalen verhafteten Lebendigkeit und eines ["]Überrationalen, das in gespenstisch totem Leerlauf nur noch diesem Irrationalen dient, stillos und ungebündelt sie beide, vereinigt in einer Disparatheit, die keinen Wert mehr zu bilden vermag. Der Mensch, der, aus jedem

Wertverband entlassen, zum ausschliesslichen Träger des Individualwertes geworden ist, der metaphysisch 'ausgestossene' Mensch, ausgestossen, weil sich der Verband zu Individuen aufgelöst und zerstäubt hat, ist wertfrei, stillfrei und nur noch vom Irrationalen her bestimmbar." (GW 2: 664-665)

In this situation reason ceases to perform any formative, creative function. It no longer tries to create a progressively more comprehensive system of values by imposing a systematic unity of experience on reality. It has become autonomous and dissociated from the irrational, amorphous mass of life into which, ideally, it should project its unifying, formal structure. The rational and irrational elements in life, which should be complementary, the former providing the systematic framework which renders the material or content of the latter comprehensible, have become independent, absolute functions. The result is chaos which man cannot understand even although he always acts rationally.

"Es ist eine Zerspaltung des Gesamtlebens und -Erlebens, die viel tiefer reicht als eine Scheidung nach Einzelindividuen, eine Zerspaltung, die in das Einzelindividuum und in seine einheitliche Wirklichkeit selber hinablangt.

Ach, wir wissen von unserer eigenen Zerspaltung und wir vermögen doch nicht, sie zu deuten, wir wollen die Zeit, in der wir leben, dafür verantwortlich machen, doch übermächtig ist die Zeit, und wir können sie nicht begreifen, sondern nennen sie wahnsinnig oder gross. Wir selbst, wir halten uns für normal, weil ungeachtet der

Zerspaltung unserer Seele, alles in uns nach logischen Motiven abläuft." (GW 2: 403)³²

The above passage and those indicated in the accompanying note reveal the optimistic note in Broch's theory of the dissolution of values. The functioning of an invariable Absolute, namely that of logic, can be demonstrated throughout history, even in the most catastrophic situations. This purely formal Absolute is guaranteed by the Logos.

Broch's optimism clearly needs some explanation. The cycle of the creation and dissolution of values illustrates the history of man's efforts to reduce reality to a systematic unity and thus to understand his meaningful role within such a context and to be able to act accordingly. In this respect the creation of values is an ethical act. According to Broch all creation of values represents the attempt to give concrete expression to the abstract, pre-ordained structure of all potential reality contained in the Logos. If the Logos could be fully and definitively realized, and Broch knew this to be impossible,³³ then man would achieve the divine state of timelessness and absolute knowledge. Man would become God. Fear of time, death and the unknown would vanish: "Wem es gelingt, alles zu erkennen, der hat die Zeit und damit auch den Tod aufgehoben."³⁴ The hypothetical nature of Broch's argument is evident in the following passage.

"Könnten tatsächlich sämtliche Weltinhalte zum Gleichgewicht erhoben werden, könnte die Welt tatsächlich zu

einem Totalitätssystem geformt und umgeformt werden, zu einem System, in dem jeder Teil den andern bedingt und trägt, könnte dieser Zustand - der von der Wissenschaft in streng Rationalem gesucht wird - tatsächlich eintreten, dann wäre auch die endgültige Befriedung des Seins eingetreten, die Erlösung der Welt, in die jedwedes metaphysisch religiöse Streben der Menschheit münden will." (GW 7: 98)

Clearly the ideal of a system of absolute knowledge with its concomitant absolute system of values, which the former necessarily implies, will never be realized. Nevertheless any progressive realization of the ideal, no matter how imperfect or incomplete, is itself an ethical action and to be welcomed as such. In the different styles of thought which succeed each other throughout history there can be seen the progressive development of the human intellect and its growing understanding of the nature of the universe. The abandonment of any outdated style of thought, the invalidation of any ontology no longer corresponding to man's experience of his world is an ethical act because it furthers man's attempts to understand his reality as a systematic unity.

Any attempt to hinder this dynamic progression by subordinating reason to the dictates of dogma, belief or convention is essentially evil ("böse"). Such adherence to dogmatically asserted values and the refusal to acknowledge the ethical dynamism of reason and logic are, in Broch's view, characteristic of all morality and moral

systems. Virtually all of Broch's theoretical writings up to the mid-1930's reveal this distinction in terminology between ethics and morals. Ethical systems are essentially dynamic, their dynamism being that of logical development. Moral systems are to be rejected as dogmatic and reactionary because they stand in the way of the formal, ethical dynamism of reason which is leading progressively closer to the unattainable ideal of full realization of the Logos. The clearest presentation of Broch's argument is to be found in the essay, "Das Böse im Wertsystem der Kunst" (GW 6: 311-350).³⁵

An important point which will be amplified later is the fact that as Broch grew older, as he became more desperate in his search for a means of practical, humanitarian intervention in world affairs, so his criticism of morality, as he understood it, became less rigorous as did his insistence on the unrestricted dynamism of the ethic of logical development. In the latter years of his life he frequently used the words "ethisch" and "moralisch" virtually as synonyms. This identification is never found in the earlier theoretical writings.³⁶

The result of Broch's particular conception of ethics and his theory of values would seem to be to postulate the progressive liberation of the rational function from any qualitative restrictions as to its application. This is exactly the situation described and welcomed in the last two chapters of "Der Zerfall der Werte" in Die Schlafwandler. There we see Huguenau, "der wertfreie Mensch", as the representative of the

modern era in which the individual is the centre of his own value-system. In the concluding chapter of the novel, "Zerfall der Werte: Epilog", Huguenau commits rape, murder, robbery and fraud without scruple and without retribution. This ending is regularly referred to by Broch as "das ethische happy ending" (GW 8: 57; BB: 117, 153). He also repeatedly describes his theory of values and its conclusions, which are most clearly expressed in the last chapter of Die Schlafwandler, as his "ethisches Credo".³⁷ According to Broch the end of his novel is ethically satisfying and the conclusions drawn from his analysis of the dissolution of values are optimistic because they show that by 1918 reason and logic had finally and irrevocably freed themselves from the restraint imposed on them by dogmatic prejudices and ignorance. The results were admittedly catastrophic for humanity but at least reason and logic were now fully autonomous and free to try again to express the systematic unity of all reality, as guaranteed by the Logos, without being limited or distorted by qualitative factors.³⁸

It is clear that at the time of writing this novel Broch relied on the purely formal Absolute of the function of logic, hoping that in time it would progressively evolve a new unitary system of values just as happened in the centuries of intellectual development which culminated in the Scholasticism of the Catholic Middle Ages. At no time does Broch suggest how this might happen.³⁹ He can only assume that in the future a time will come when once again faith in, and knowledge of the systematic unity of

reality will coincide as it did in medieval Catholicism, thus creating an absolute system of values and restoring the security and purpose in life which this offers the individual (GW2: 676-677, 685). For Broch this was more than simply a pious hope: it was a logical necessity following upon his proof, as he saw it, of the existence of the transcendental Absolute of the Logos as the guarantor of the systematic unity of reality. Broch could say of the end of Die Schlafwandler: "der eigentliche Sieg liegt in der neuen Ethik, die rationell im Werden ist." (GW 8: 28).⁴⁰ Nowhere in the writings of this period can Broch be more specific, other than to suggest that the new ethos might initially have to develop at the simplest, most basic level of human relationships.

Thus Bertrand Müller, in Huguenau, tries to analyse a faint hope for the prospects of humanity after the war: "Ist es die plötzlich erwachte Überzeugung, dass die Einheit von Denken und Sein nur im bescheidensten Rahmen zu verwirklichen ist? Denken und Sein beides auf ein Minimum Reduziert!" (GW 2: 609). In the same novel Dr. Flurschütz expresses the same philosophical insight in more practical terms: "'Eigentlich würde ich mich nicht wundern, wenn jetzt eine Periode käme, in der die Menschen es überhaupt bloss darauf anlegen würden, zu vergessen, nur zu vergessen: Schlafen, Essen, Schlafen, Essen . . .'" (GW 2: 621). Such statements are not restricted to characters in novels. They recur in the essays and correspondence, where Broch is obviously expressing his personal convictions and hopes for the future (GW 7: 60;

GW 8: 106, 131).

It cannot be strongly enough emphasized that the conclusions expressed in "Der Zerfall der Werte" and exemplified in the action and characters of Die Schlafwandler are a direct result of Broch's adherence to his theory of the dissolution of values. This theory proves beyond doubt, so Broch believed, that the only Absolute functioning in modern life and on which man must therefore necessarily rely is the formal one of autonomous reason, which must be free to follow its dictates without the distorting influence of qualitative limitations.⁴¹ This is made particularly clear in an important letter where Broch describes the "ethische Konstruktion in den 'Schlafwandlern'" (GW 8: 24-27).⁴² Here the distinction he makes between ethics and morals is very evident. "Die 'Freiheit', auf die es letzten Endes in allem wahrhaft Ethischen immer ankommt, nimmt auf überkommene Werte keine Rücksicht, der Begriff der Autonomie, in dem die Freiheit ihre logische Begründung erfährt, hat mit moralischen Haltungen nichts zu tun: gewiss ist diese Autonomie noch nicht die Erfüllung des letzten göttlichen Wertes, aber sie ist die alleinige Form, in der er sich erfüllen kann . . . In den Schlafwandlern: Pasenow und Esch, beide moralische Typen, wenn auch verschiedenen Moral-Dogmen unterworfen. Moral-Dogmen, die aber in dieser Zeit des Wertverfalles eben absterbend sind, zur 'Romantik' werden . . . Bloss Huguenau ist der wahrhaft 'wertfreie' Mensch und damit das adäquate Kind seiner Zeit. Er allein kann daher fortbestehen, er allein ist in der

'Autonomie dieser Zeit', in der sich ein revolutionäres Ringen nach Freiheit ausdrückt. Er ist der passive Revolutionär, wie eben die Masse der Revolutionäre jede Revolution passiv mitmacht und doch macht. Sicherlich hat er - bloss der Form des Autonomen nach ethisch, sonst aber völlig amoralisch - noch keineswegs die Freiheit der neuen Göttlichkeit, des neuen Glaubens errungen. . . . Aber es ist die Lebensform, die 'Form der Freiheit', in der allein einmal der neue Inhalt erstehen kann; er steht am Beginn des Weges." (GW 8: 26)

From the above letter it is clear that Broch is taking care not to pass any comment of approval or criticism about Huguenau's behaviour. Within the context of the dissolution of values any such comment is irrelevant because Huguenau is "bloss der Exponent eines grösseren Geschehens, er ist Exponent des europäischen Geistes schlechthin" (GW 2: 674). Despite this assertion Broch seems to feel compelled to pass judgment on Huguenau in the closing pages of Die Schlafwandler while at the same time trying to reconcile this critical judgment with the conclusions of the theory of the dissolution of values. "Mord bleibt Mord, Bösheit bleibt Bösheit, und die Philistrosität eines auf das Individuum und seine irrationalen Triebe eingeschränkten Wertgebietes, dieses letzte Produkt eines jeden Wertzerfalls, bleibt der Punkt der absoluten Verworfenheit, bleibt gewissermassen der invariant absolute Nullpunkt, der allen Wertskalen und allen Wertsystemen ungeachtet ihrer gegenseitigen Relativität ^{gemeinsam 166} gemeinsam zu sein hat, weil kein Wertsystem aufge-

stellt werden kann, das in seiner Idee und in seiner logischen Wesenheit nicht der 'Bedingung möglicher Erfahrung' unterworfen wäre, empirische Abschattung einer allen Systemen gemeinsamen logischen Struktur und einer an den Logos gebundenen apriorischen Unwandelbarkeit." (GW 2: 683) The transition from what is clearly a moral judgment to its supposedly epistemological justification is both confused and logically unacceptable. Two pages later Broch describes Huguenau as "schicksalhaft unethisch, ausgestossen aus der Epoche, ausgestossen aus der Zeit" (GW 2: 685).

These passages directly contradict the point made by Broch in the above quoted letter and in the ninth chapter of "Der Zerfall der Werte", namely that the final stage of the dissolution of values, as embodied in Huguenau and exemplified by his behaviour, has a positive ethical value because the formal Absolute of the Logos can be seen to function through reason and logic. A possible explanation of this contradiction is that Broch himself was horrified by the logical conclusion of his theories. He could not reject his findings, precisely because he believed them to be logically irrefutable, but he felt compelled to add a note of hopeful, if not entirely convincing optimism at the end of the novel in which he had exemplified in practical terms the consequences of his abstract theory.

It is obvious that the last five pages of Die Schlafwandler contain ideas and hopes which do not follow

logically from Broch's arguments on the preceding pages. From the paragraph on p.683 introduced by the words "Unerreichbar für jeden!" Broch leaves the realm of logical argument and indulges in an outpouring of mystical speculation and pious hope for which there is no rational justification. Even the language and sentence structure change perceptibly and become noticeably similar to that associated with mystical writings.⁴³ The contradiction can further be seen in a comparison of two brief but important phrases which occur in the closing pages of the novel. On p.681 Broch describes the culmination of the dissolution of values as "schmerzliche Pflicht zur Freiheit". Five pages later Broch suggests that the new ethos he hopes to see develop will grow out of "die schmerzliche Freiheit der Pflicht" (GW 2: 686), and here "Pflicht" seems to be understood as moral duty or commitment to one's fellow-men. "Die schmerzliche Pflicht zur Freiheit" is the logically inevitable result of the theory of the dissolution of values: "die schmerzliche Freiheit der Pflicht" is a laudable ideal, expressed in hope. But the latter cannot be deduced from the former.

Broch's theory of the dissolution of values not only postulates the liberation from the external influence of qualitative factors, but it also postulates absolute freedom of action as the necessary complement to the autonomy of reason. This all follows from reliance on the impersonal, transcendental Absolute of the Logos. As will be shown later, when Broch finally came to formulate his theory of "das Irdisch-Absolute" he sought to re-

introduce the qualitative factor into thought and action and tried to prove that humanitarian conditions were a logically necessary restriction which must limit extreme freedom of thought and behaviour.

Broch criticism is generally divided upon the interpretation of whether his work, particularly his theoretical writings, reveal him as an optimist or pessimist in his view of the historical development of civilization. More specifically, there is radical disagreement between those critics who see Die Schlafwandler ending on a note of optimistic prophecy and those who read the novel as the exemplification of a pessimistic, even nihilistic theory of history.

The former seem to be at fault because they accept Broch's theory of values and interpretation of history uncritically. They accept that Broch believed his theory to be optimistic and interpret the novel accordingly. They fail to see that Broch was a prisoner of his own logic and do not appreciate the change of tone in the closing pages of the novel. Furthermore they fail or refuse to analyse the implications of using such a cyclical theory of history as a prognostic instrument for determining human reactions to future historical developments. That Broch intended his theory to be used for just such a purpose will be discussed in due course. Of these critics the two most representative are Leo Kreutzer, in his book, Erkenntnistheorie und Prophetie. Hermann Brochs Romantrilogie 'Die Schlafwandler', and Manfred Durzak, who enlarges on Kreutzer's interpretation in his article,

"Apokalypse oder Utopie? Bemerkungen zu Hermann Brochs
 44
Schlafwandlern".

Other critics have spoken out against what they see as the inherent pessimism and latent nihilism of Die Schlafwandler. Those that do so generally emphasize, correctly in my view, that the optimistic conclusion cannot be logically derived from Broch's premises. This is a serious weakness in an argument which is supposed to demonstrate the logical inevitability of the growth of a new humanitarian ethos out of the catastrophe of war. These critics suggest that the optimistic prophecy at the end of the novel was grafted on as a desperate, instinctive reaction against the inevitable apocalypse postulated by the theory of the dissolution of values. This criticism is argued most closely by Heinz D. Osterle in two articles, "Hermann Broch: Die Schlafwandler. Kritik der zentralen Metapher" and "Hermann Broch. Die Schlafwandler: Revolution and Apocalypse".⁴⁵

The fault in Osterle's criticism is that he then proceeds to denounce Broch as a nihilist and crypto-fascist without relating Die Schlafwandler and "Der Zerfall der Werte" to the rest of Broch's life and work. He fails to see Broch's personal dilemma, a dilemma revealed by viewing his life and work as a whole from a chronological perspective. Broch could not deny the irrefutable logic, as he saw it, of his theory of values, no matter how apocalyptic the results might be. At the same time he hoped and believed that his cyclical interpretation of history prophesied the growth of a new, humanitarian ethos out of the "Nullpunkt" of the Great War. Having proved

to his own satisfaction that the only reliable Absolute of his era was that of reason and logic he tried to use them to make some direct, practical contribution, on a scientific basis, to further the development of the new ethos. From the mid-1930's onwards Broch worked against time, trying to formulate what can only be described as a scientifically valid theory of humanity. Anything less nihilistic is hard to imagine. This is not to say that Broch's position was not paradoxical. His analysis of the dissolution of values does much to discredit reason and reveal the dangers of uncontrolled, ruthlessly applied logic. Yet because he believed that he had proved that reason was the only Absolute left to modern man, he was forced to have recourse to it in his search for a new absolute ethos.

At this point it is relevant to ask in greater detail why the charges of pessimism and nihilism are brought against Broch. The reasons can be traced directly to his belief in the transcendental Absolute, and its functioning through the processes of logic, as the guiding principle behind all historical development. In his analysis of the dissolution of values Broch reveals his conviction that the cycle of the creation and disintegration which characterizes the evolution of the human intellect and its progressive attempts to realize the Logos is logically inevitable. At all stages in the cycle the function of the Logos or logic remains absolute

and invariable.

"Es bleibt die Logik der Dinge bestehen. Und muss auch der logische Fortschritt der Geschichte immer wieder umbrechen, sobald die Unendlichkeitsgrenze ihrer metaphysischen Konstruktion erreicht ist, und muss auch das platonische Weltbild immer wieder einer positivistischen Schau weichen, unbezwingbar bleibt die Wirksamkeit der platonischen Idee, die in jedem Positivismus stets aufs neue die mütterliche Erde berührt, um, getragen vom Pathos der Erfahrung, stets aufs neue das Haupt zu erheben."

(GW 2: 596-597)

"Das Absolute aber ist immer Konstruktion, gibt bloss die Richtung des unendlichen Weges an und ist selber als solches unerreichbar. Selbst dort, wo die Verwirklichung bereits weitgehend erreicht war, wie im christlich-platonischen Weltbild des Mittelalters, musste das Gesamtwertsystem aus eben diesen logischen Gründen wieder zerbrechen, musste sich in die Teilwertssysteme auflösen."

(GW 6: 212)⁴⁶

This is obviously a mechanistic interpretation of history. On at least three occasions Broch even uses the word "Wertmechanik".⁴⁷ The Collected Works alone contain three schematic summaries of the stages of historical development in the cycle.⁴⁸ This historical cycle is formulated in terms of man's psychological reactions to the cyclical creation and dissolution of values. The latter cycle is essentially an epistemological one governing man's knowledge of reality. The laws of historical development parallel this exactly in the field of human

psychology and govern man's reactions to this reality. According to Broch such a cyclical law can be used to anticipate and prepare for man's psychological reactions to the foreseeable stages in the rise and fall of value-systems and their concomitant interpretations of reality. Wolfgang Rothe provides a useful summary of Broch's theories.

"Der Massenpsychologie Brochs liegt eine wertheoretisch unterbaute Geschichtsphilosophie (oder geschichtsphilosophisch gefasste Werttheorie) zugrunde, die Geschichte wird als Abfolge von 'Zentralwertsystemen' begriffen, die jeweils mit gesetzmässiger Zwangsläufigkeit vier Stadien durchlaufen: zwei Normalitäts- und zwei Wahnperioden. Die erste, zeitlich längste und sozusagen wertvollste Epoche ist gekennzeichnet durch die uneingeschränkte Herrschaft des zentralen Wertes (etwa Gottes im christlichen Mittelalter), die zweite, negative Epoche ist die des 'Hypertrophiewahns' nach der dogmatischen Erstarrung der rationalen Werttheologie (etwa das 'finstere Mittelalter' des Hexenwahns, für Broch bereits Nachmittelalter), die dritte Epoch ist wieder eine 'Normalitätsperiode', in der aufs neue ein angemessenes Verhältnis zur Realität gefunden wird (Aufklärung und Beginn des naturwissenschaftlichen Zeitalters), während das letzte Stadium die endgültige Auflösung der Werthierarchie in die einander bekriegenden Wertsysteme von Partialbereichen und damit den 'Zerrissenheitswahn' mit sich bringt, aus welchem Chaos unter grässlichen Opfern ein Prozess der 'Wertvereinheitlichung' zum nächsten 'Zentralwertsystem' führt."⁴⁹

It is at once evident why such an interpretation of history provokes accusations of pessimism and nihilism. If it is correct, and Broch always insisted that his theory was logically irrefutable and confirmed by verification against past history, then man is clearly helpless in the face of an impersonal power beyond his control and can make no significant contribution towards altering the course of history. That this is a very real danger inherent in Broch's theory is confirmed by his own repeatedly stated opinion that the rise of Hitler and Nazism was a historical necessity to be accepted in the cyclical progress towards a better world.⁵⁰ Such an assertion is in keeping with his cyclical interpretation of history. His personal dilemma is seen when he argues, with evident signs of embarrassment at trying to manipulate his own theory accordingly, that Hitler and all he represents must be resisted as vigorously as possible (GW 8: 201). The conflict Broch felt between adherence to logical theory and his belief in practical humanitarian needs is revealed in the letters to Willa Muir, written when Hitler's power was increasing steadily. In a letter of May 1934 Broch points out that he had correctly prophesied the rise of Nazism, but he adds the revealing comment: "Aber vielleicht habe ich nicht ganz recht; und das wünsche ich mir natürlich insgeheim." (GW 10: 358). Another letter, written soon after his emigration to the United States in 1938, shows the conflict between abstract, logical theory and the needs of practical humanity even more clearly. Broch states that war is now inevitable and

continues as follows. "Die Frage ist nur, ob man überhaupt noch etwas gegen den Zeitgeist tun kann oder ob man die Pest über sich ergehen lassen muss. Nun ist die Weltgeschichte zweifelsohne eine Kette derartiger Pestseuchen, und alles, was wir Wahrheit nennen, ist Produkt dieser Wahnsinnskette, die noch lange nicht abgeschlossen ist und niemals abgeschlossen sein wird. Nichtsdestoweniger gibt es hinter allem eine absolute Wahrheit (wenn auch das Absolutum nicht übersetzbar ist), und weil es diese Wahrheit gibt, können wir den Wahnsinn als das erkennen, was er ist, nämlich als verbrecherischen Irrsinn, und ebendeshalb muss er, genau so wie jede andere Seuche, bekämpft werden." (GW 10: 366) Broch is here condemning as criminal insanity what, according to his own theories, he should welcome as a necessary stage in the cyclical development of history towards a better world.

Why does Broch take such an optimistic view of his theory of history? It was his belief that since the theory demonstrates invariable laws of historical development it could be used as an instrument of prognosis to forecast future developments and allow man to prepare for them accordingly. The obvious flaw here, of which Broch was well aware, is that if there are such laws then no human intervention can affect them - otherwise they would not be valid laws. Broch deals with this problem in great detail in a treatise which he wrote as part of his studies in mass psychology in the early 1940's. When found among his papers after his death this piece of work had no definitive title, but Wolfgang Rothe, editor of

volume nine of the Collected Works, has given it, on the grounds of its subject-matter, the very apt title of "Geschichtsgesetz und Willensfreiheit".⁵¹

At no time does Broch ever resolve the conflict between his belief in historical laws, whose validity he claims to have demonstrated, and his belief in the ability of the human will to influence history. We see again that he is the reluctant victim of reason and logic, clinging to them because in them he sees the only logically demonstrable Absolute in modern life. An interesting attempt of Broch's to achieve a reconciliation between free will and historical determinism is to be seen in his "Massenwahntheorie" of 1939-1941. There he suggests that the cyclical model of history might be reformulated in terms of a pendulum rather than a circular movement. He advances the idea that although human will and reason cannot halt the cyclical progression of history through the rise and fall of civilization and culture, which is all the cycle of values basically means in historical terms, they might nevertheless slow down or somehow restrict the swing of the pendulum of historical development between one period of dissolution and the next.⁵²

One possible criticism of Broch's cyclical interpretation of history has, as yet, received little or no attention, perhaps because it is so obvious. Broch maintained that his theory was formally, logically valid. He also asserted that the abstract theory could be tested empirically and verified by the evidence of past history. By thus using the scientific method of testing a theory

against reality he believed he could demonstrate the absolute reliability of his theory of history and the conclusions he drew from it. Unfortunately, the very question of empirical verification is here open to question. We know from his writings that Broch thought that at least two full cycles of the progressive creation and dissolution of values had taken place in the history of Western Europe. The first culminated in the culture of classical antiquity; the second cycle, which rose out of the disintegration of that civilization, reached its harmonious climax in the absolute value-system of medieval Catholicism.⁵³ Broch saw his own era in the first half of the twentieth century as the last stage in the progressive dissolution of the medieval value-system, a stage of complete chaos out of which a new unified system of values and understanding of reality must necessarily arise.

The empirical verification claimed by Broch for his theory rests therefore on two repetitions of the cycle; this would scarcely seem to constitute scientific grounds for assuming its general validity. One can ask if Broch even succeeds in demonstrating this double repetition of his cycle. He regularly analyses the cycle which centres on the Middle Ages, but he never describes the cycle leading up to classical antiquity and fails to explain satisfactorily why this period should be regarded as having an absolute system of values. A further objection is possible. In "Der Zerfall der Werte" Broch states explicitly that the Great War represents the nadir of the

current dissolution of values. Years later, however, he maintains that the rise of Hitler and Nazism are to be welcomed because this represents the last crisis to be passed through before the development of a new humanitarian ethos can begin. Such a criticism may seem trivial when it is remembered that the cycle envisaged by Broch covers a period of centuries. Nevertheless, throughout his writings Broch regularly insists that his theory of history offers hope of a better future to his generation; the individual living in that period which is supposed to show an improvement in human affairs is entitled to ask for some evidence of such a development. If, as Broch might have conceivably replied, the time-scale of his cycle is too vast to show any improvement within the span of one generation, then he can scarcely expect the individual to accept his theory of history as relevant to his way of life.

The purpose of this analysis of Broch's theory of values with particular reference to the dissolution of values has been to show that by the mid-1930's Broch was convinced that the only demonstrably reliable Absolute in modern life was that of formal logic, which was guaranteed by the transcendental Absolute of the Logos. Such is the conclusion drawn from years of research and given definitive expression in "Der Zerfall der Werte" and a number of essays written in that period: "Logik einer zerfallenden Welt" (1931), "Leben ohne platonische Idee" (1932), "Das Weltbild des Romans" (1933), "Das Böse im Wertsystem der

Kunst" (1933), "Geist und Zeitgeist" (1934).⁵⁴

Convinced as he was by the logic of his own argument, Broch was forced to accept a mechanistic view of history in which the individual is at the mercy of an abstract, impersonal, transcendental power. At the same time Broch personally believed that this power was essentially beneficial in its function because it guaranteed the systematic unity of reality within which man had a meaningful role to play. Broch's problem at this time was twofold. He had to convince the general public that the Logos, as he conceived of it, existed, because this would guarantee the ultimate security and purpose of life amidst the chaos of the modern world. Secondly, he had to show that such knowledge had any practical value in contributing to the improvement of the human condition. The former problem is a purely abstract one of epistemology; the latter, so Broch felt, could be best approached through research in mass psychology and political theory. These two fields of study proved to be the principal areas of Broch's work from 1935 until his death in 1951. His varying degrees of interest in these subjects and the fluctuation of his mood between optimism and pessimism concerning the practical application of his political and psychological theories have been described in the first part of this thesis.

In all these fields of research Broch insisted upon applying a strictly rational, scientific methodology. This was the logical consequence of his own theory of the dissolution of values. He felt that people would not

accept or respond to a suggested course of action unless it could be shown to be logically necessary and scientifically valid in its formulation. Such a naive faith in man's response to reason seems even more questionable when it is remembered that Broch postulated scientific certainty in disciplines such as psychology and political and legislative theory which are notoriously inaccessible to rigorous scientific enquiry.

This insistence on the scientific pursuit of objective knowledge no matter how fragmentary or incomplete is evident in the two essays, "Einheit wissenschaftlicher und dichterischer Erkenntnis" (1933) and "Gedanken zum Problem der Erkenntnis in der Musik" (1934).⁵⁵ Both these essays expand on the conclusion drawn from the analysis of the dissolution of values: Broch acknowledges the subjective value of intuitive knowledge, but in his search for a means of practical intervention in human affairs he feels he must rely solely on the logical pursuit of objective knowledge if his theories are to achieve any general recognition and be put into practice. These essays, especially the former, suggest that any contribution to the sum of human knowledge is to be welcomed as an ethical act. Inevitably this conjures up visions of a relentless pursuit of knowledge for its own sake, regardless of its consequences for man and without any qualitative factors to impose a limiting or directing influence on such activity. Such, however, is the inevitable result of Broch's reliance on the formal, impersonal and transcendental Absolute of the Logos.

From 1935 he concentrated increasingly on his scientific research in epistemology, its related discipline of mathematics, and psychology and political theory. It was only considerably later, as he grew increasingly desperate in his search for some demonstrably reliable means of practical intervention in human affairs, that Broch revised his reliance on the Logos as the abstract, formal principle directing all human activity. He then formulated his theory of "das Irdisch-Absolute", with which he sought to re-establish humanitarian considerations as the absolute, qualitative criterion by which all thought and activity should be judged. This implied imposing a limitation on the absolute autonomy of reason and opened the way for the practical intervention of the human factor in determining the course of history.

3. THE POLITICAL AND PSYCHOLOGICAL STUDIES OF 1936-1947

The reasons for Broch's abandonment of his literary career in favour of his self-imposed task of research into mass psychology and political theory have been described in the first part of this thesis. His correspondence from this particular period, 1935-1936, reveals clearly that his personal preference would have been to pursue his studies in mathematics and epistemology, i.e. in disciplines of an essentially formal and abstract nature. This preference is obviously influenced by the conclusions drawn from the analysis of the dissolution of values, namely that reason and logic are the only absolutes in modern life. At the same time Broch realized that abstract theory and the pursuit of formal knowledge were of little direct or immediate use to the cause of humanity. As a result he reluctantly turned his interest to the more concrete and empirical disciplines of psychology and political theory.⁵⁶

Broch's obsession with logic and formally valid, objective knowledge is a direct result of his belief that the Logos can be seen to operate through human reason. Until the mid-1930's Broch's research dealt primarily with man as a rational being, a purely abstract, formal, rational function: "das mathematische Ich",⁵⁷ "das intelligible Ich" (GW 2: 596; GW 7: 67), "das autonome Ich" (GW 6: 322), "das erkennende Ich" (GW 10: 169), "das bewusstseinsstragende Ich" (GW 7: 62), "das reine Ich" (GW 7: 67).⁵⁸ This emphasis in Broch's work at this

stage was determined by his desire to prove that, despite the dissolution of values, there was a systematic unity of reality guaranteed by the Logos: it is only through the formally invariable logical relationships of the thought processes, themselves a reflection of the Logos, that man can experience the world as a systematic unity of objective reality. This is not to say that Broch ignored the other aspects of life, particularly the physical and psychological factors, but he believed that they could be understood and experienced only in terms of man's relationship to reality, which in turn could be explained only by man's function as a rational being.

Any enquiry into this function necessarily takes place on an abstract, hypothetical plane and produces purely theoretical conclusions. Broch acknowledged this problem and admitted that any attempt to make a practical contribution to the improvement of the current human condition demanded a study of empirical reality and man's role in it. The first result of this somewhat reluctant decision on Broch's part can be seen in the essay, "Werttheoretische Bemerkungen zur Psychoanalyse" (1936), in which he states: "Zum Heilen braucht man nämlich Empirie." (GW 7: 65).⁵⁹ The greater part of this essay is concerned with translating Broch's purely abstract, epistemological theories of the pursuit of truth by man in his function as a rational being into the psychological terms of the creation of values by man in his function as an empirical being in whom are united rational and irrational elements of behaviour, physical and intellectual

or spiritual qualities. Broch refers to man in this latter role as "das psychologische Ich" or "das empirische Ich": "Tritt man aus dem Bereich der (erkenntnistheoretisch hypostasierten) Inhaltlosigkeit in den der 'Inhalte' (der empirischen Weltinhalte) so verwandelt sich das Non-Ich in die konkrete Aussenwelt, und statt des reinen Ich erscheint das psychologische auf dem Plan, freilich ohne - wie sollte es auch - hierbei die Züge seines erkenntnistheoretischen Kernes zu verlieren." (GW 7: 71-72).

This "psychologische Ich" is man as we normally think of him. According to Broch all psychological reactions are conditioned by the fact that each individual is aware of a conflict within himself. In his function as a rational being man knows only the abstract, purely formal relationships of logic and has no conception of time. As a physical being he experiences temporal progression, decay and finally death. The "psychologische Ich" is the area in which this conflict is expressed: "Das psychologische Ich ist dem konkreten Menschen der Inbegriff seines Selbstbewusstseins und ist daher auch der Exponent seines erkenntnistheoretischen Ich-Kerns wie seines Körper-Ich. Was immer im Ich-Kern oder im Körper-Ich vor sich geht, es gelangt (soweit es überhaupt bewusst wird) ins psychologische Ich des Menschen." (GW 7: 77).

The main relevance of this essay to an examination of the development of the theory of "das Irdisch-Absolute" is that it marks the point where Broch, however reluctantly, abandoned his abstract, epistemological

theories in order to study the immediate human problems of empirical reality. In the current world-situation of the late 1930's and early 1940's he felt that he could best make some direct, practical contribution to the advancement of humanity by devising a reliable plan for the ideological defeat of totalitarianism and the restoration of a healthy democracy on a sound theoretical basis. The first major attempts to do this which are relevant to the study of "das Irdisch-Absolute" can be seen in three excursions he made into the fields of mass psychology and political theory before 1947. They are his "Massenwahntheorie" and its accompanying summary, "A Study of Mass Hysteria - Preliminary Table of Contents", "Geschichtsgesetz und Willensfreiheit" and "Gibt es noch Demokratie?".⁶⁰

Some comment must be made here on the dating of these three pieces of work. With the "Massenwahntheorie" there are no difficulties. Broch himself gives the dates of composition as 1939 and 1941 (GW 9: 77). This is confirmed by internal evidence: the war is already in progress, but America has not yet become involved (GW 9: 149-150). "Geschichtsgesetz und Willensfreiheit" is thematically very closely related to the "Massenwahntheorie". It is a specific and detailed examination of the major problem thrown up by the "Massenwahntheorie", namely the question of how or if the cycle of periods of normality and mass hysteria can be controlled. This suggests that it was written after the earlier work, i.e. after 1941. From his study of the original manuscripts

Wolfgang Rothe suggests simply the early 1940's (GW 9: 14). Manfred Durzak puts forward the probable date of 1940.⁶¹ These two suggestions are tenable, although, for the reasons already given, a date soon after 1941 would seem to be more accurate. In his bibliography in the Collected Works Harald Binde gives 1949 as the approximate date (GW 10: 417). It can be shown that this is not tenable.

"Gibt es noch Demokratie?" was certainly written after 1945 as it discusses the war as a past event, expressing Broch's disillusionment at the Western Allies' failure to exploit their victory and formulate a democratic ideology to challenge the expansion of Russian Communism. It is generally agreed that it was probably written about 1948.⁶² Without giving any firm reason for doing so, Rothe suggests that it was probably written slightly earlier than that (GW 9: 15). As will be shown, his tentative suggestion can be confirmed by internal evidence gained from examining the development of the theory of "das Irdisch-Absolute". This evidence, which is presented in part below and partly in the following chapter, reveals that "Geschichtsgesetz und Willensfreiheit" and "Gibt es noch Demokratie?" must have been written before another study, entitled "Zur politischen Situation unserer Zeit" (GW 9: 361-441). It can be shown from internal evidence that this was written at the very earliest in 1948. To anticipate one of the conclusions drawn from this evidence, it can be assumed that "Gibt es noch Demokratie?" was probably written in 1947.

Broch believed that in his cyclical interpretation of history he had found the instrument with which he could implement his programme of action. Using the findings of "Werttheoretische Bemerkungen zur Psychoanalyse" he constructed "ein Gesetz psychischer Zyklen" (GW 7: 269-271; GW 9: 93-99) which is structurally identical with the epistemological cycle of the rise and fall of value-systems described in "Der Zerfall der Werte". It was Broch's belief that this cycle could be used to forecast historical developments and the individual's psychological reaction to them. On the basis of such predictions corrective action could then be taken to prevent such crises arising or at least to help people cope with them. The essential contradiction inherent in such a theory has already been discussed: if the cyclical law is valid it cannot be altered; if it is not valid it is not a reliable instrument of prediction.

One of the distinguishing features of the political and psychological writings of this period is the way in which Broch vacillates between optimism and pessimism as to the practicability of his theory. His "Massenwahntheorie" in particular reveals this dilemma. At one point he suggests that the relentless cycle of historical development cannot be halted or altered (GW 9: 92); then he suggests hopefully that perhaps man can take active steps to prevent the crises predicted by the cycle (GW 9: 97, 132). Broch was convinced that if any such course of action was to be generally accepted and implemented then

people must be rationally persuaded of its logical necessity. In the "Massenwahntheorie" he regularly claims that reason and the human will can be used to control the cycle of history and convert man to a permanent state of humanitarian democracy.⁶³ Just as frequently he despairs of reason ever achieving this.⁶⁴ His predicament can be summarized in two comments about the rise of Nazism and the outbreak of the war. "Was also kann einer solchen Entwicklung der Massenseele entgegengesetzt werden? Nichts und doch alles." (GW 9: 98) "Das Grauen wurde mutwillig entfesselt. Es war nicht notwendig gewesen. Oder doch, es war notwendig gewesen, weil Politik immer Ausnützung der Schwächen des anderen gewesen ist." (GW 9: 136)

"Geschichtsgesetz und Willensfreiheit" makes a more detailed, but no more conclusive study of the dilemma caused by reliance on a mechanistic cycle of history. Both in this study and in his "Massenwahntheorie" Broch maintains a note of optimism which the reader cannot really share. Again, as at the end of Die Schlafwandler in the last chapter of "Der Zerfall der Werte", he seems to challenge his own rational and essentially pessimistic conclusions with an irrational and hopeful faith in humanity. "Gibt es noch Demokratie?" is entirely pessimistic. Written soon after the war it reveals Broch's disillusionment that the cause of humanitarian democracy seems hardly more advanced after the defeat of fascism than before. In a large part of the world communist totalitarianism then appeared as a greater threat

than fascism and the Western Allies could only meet its challenge with the threat of force. Broch believed that a scientifically sound theory of democracy was the only answer, because only then would the peoples of the world be rationally convinced of the benefits of genuine democracy. Again a naive trust in the power of reason is evident.

The correspondence of the early 1940's confirms this fluctuation of Broch's mood between optimism and pessimism.⁶⁵ Two of these letters contain references of special relevance to "das Irdisch-Absolute". One mentions the research in psychology. Broch writes as follows. "Aber ich muss immer wieder dazu sagen, dass ich die werttheoretische Behandlung psychischer Fragen erst dann für erlaubt erachte, wenn es gelingen sollte, sie auf eine gesunde mathematische Basis zu stellen." (GW 8: 179) This insistence on the need to establish the study of psychology and its application in political theory as rigorously scientific disciplines on a sound logical basis appears in another letter of the period, written to Dr. Brody. Referring once more to his psychological studies Broch writes: "Was man da alles an Soziologie, Geschichte, Psychologie, aber auch überdies an Methodologie und Logik wissen müsste, geht in einen einzelnen Kopf überhaupt nicht hinein." (GW 8: 189). These quotations reveal Broch's predicament. He wanted to formulate a scientific theory of humanity in which it could be logically demonstrated that respect for human life and dignity were necessarily the final qualitative criterion for all thought

and behaviour. This qualitative principle was to be introduced to control, or at least modify the purely formal, logically inevitable development of the historical cycle. It will be remembered that this formally invariable cycle, as explained in "Der Zerfall der Werte" and other essays of that period, is grounded in Broch's belief in the transcendental Absolute of the Logos and in man's function as a rational being through which the Logos is progressively realized. In these earlier writings Broch welcomed the successive rise and fall of civilizations and culture and approved the ruthless pursuit of knowledge as ethical actions because he saw all this as part of the dynamic process through which man came to understand more and more of the potential reality inherent in the Logos. The dangerous consequences of such a conception of ethics have already been discussed.

In his political and psychological writings Broch does not discard his theory of a formally invariable cycle of history, but he tries to introduce a qualitative factor which would subordinate all developments, in as far as they are subject to any control, to the dominant needs of humanity. Here he is clearly no longer thinking of man as an abstract logical function but in terms of his total personality as a flesh-and-blood, thinking creature living in empirical reality. Using Broch's own terminology from his argument in "Der Zerfall der Werte" we can say that he wants to re-introduce into modern ontological thinking a final axiom, an absolute qualitative criterion which would re-unify the many disparate systems of values which grew

out of the progressive dissolution of the absolute value-system of the Catholic Middle Ages. There would then necessarily develop a single style of life and thought. If the qualitative criterion could be shown to be that of respect for humanity then the new style of life and thought would be a humanitarian one. Basically Broch's idea in the writings of the period in question is to re-unite belief and knowledge; many people believe in the standards of humanity, but their logical necessity must be scientifically proved. Even as early as "Der Zerfall der Werte" Broch postulated the unity of belief and knowledge as the necessary pre-condition for a unitary or absolute value-system, but at the time he could offer no suggestions as to how this ideal might be realized in the modern world. In that essay the ideal is expressed as follows. "Es ist jene Einheit, die das Wesen jeder Theologie ausmacht und die bestehen muss, selbst wenn versucht wird, das Denken aus der Welt wegzuleugnen, die aber auch bestehen kann, wenn der wissenschaftliche Plausibilitätspunkt des 'Für-wahr-haltens' zusammenfällt mit dem Plausibilitätspunkt des 'Glaubens' und die doppelte Wahrheit wieder zur eindeutigen Wahrheit wird." (GW 2: 676)

The absolute system of values obtaining in medieval Europe was possible, according to Broch, because people not only believed in the personal God as the ground of all life, but the obtaining style of thought, exemplified in Scholastic philosophy, could prove it: faith and belief were identical. In his "Massenwahntheorie" Broch attempts to formulate this same ideal in political terms relevant to

the modern situation when he says that the political conviction of the need to fight outbursts of mass hysteria can be shown to be logically necessary for the preservation of humanitarian values: "die politische Überzeugung wird zur wissenschaftlichen Überzeugung." (GW 9: 141).

In his "Massenwahntheorie", "Geschichtsgesetz und Willensfreiheit" and "Gibt es noch Demokratie?" Broch outlines the case for establishing a generally acceptable humanitarian criterion for modern life and thought, but he can offer no scientific proof as to why it should be regarded as absolutely binding. Nevertheless, in the three above expositions of Broch's thought at this time there can be seen the seeds of the idea which he was to develop later.

He appeals in the "Massenwahntheorie" to "die regulativen Prinzipien der Freiheit, Gleichheit und Brüderlichkeit, kurzum die Prinzipien der Menschenwürde und des Schutzes der menschlichen Persönlichkeit" (GW 9: 161). He talks further of "die Heiligkeit und Unantastbarkeit alles menschlichen Lebens" (GW 9: 214), and regularly pleads for common human decency ("Anständigkeit").⁶⁶ One of the passages central to "Geschichtsgesetz und Willensfreiheit" deals with the familiar problem of the pursuit of knowledge. Broch's conclusions in "Der Zerfall der Werte" and the related essays of that period, especially "Einheit wissenschaftlicher und dichterischer Erkenntnis" and "Gedanken zum Problem der Erkenntnis in der Musik", indicate that at that time he favoured the acquisition of knowledge for its own sake because the only reliable

absolute he could see in life was the purely formal one of the invariable logical structures of the thought-processes. At this later stage here in question he qualifies his earlier opinion, suggesting that a new, regulative principle should be applied to ensure that the demands of formal logic in the pursuit of knowledge should be subordinated to the needs of humanity. He talks of "ein neues Prinzip . . . , nämlich das einer 'Erkenntnishierarchisierung', welche die Fülle des akzeptierten Erkenntnismaterials um den humanen Zentralwert anordnet, oder richtiger, ihm unterordnet, hierarchisch einordnet" (GW 9: 305-306).

All of this reveals a radical change from the views expressed in the last chapter of Die Schlafwandler. There Broch ascribed a positive ethical value to the inhumanity and chaos of the Great War and the revolution which followed it. "Doch nie und nirgends ist der Geist der Epoche so stark, so wahrhaft ethisch und historisch wie in jenem letzten und zugleich ersten Aufflackern, das die Revolution ist, - Tat der Selbstaufhebung und der Selbsterneuerung, letzte und grösste ethische Tat des zerfallenden, erste des neuen Wertsystems, Augenblick der radikal geschichtsbildenden Zeitaufhebung im Pathos des absoluten Nullpunktes." (GW 2: 685)

A further characteristic of the political and psychological writings, and even more so of the correspondence of the late 1930's and early 1940's is the growing

importance attributed by Broch to practical morality and commitment to helping his fellow-men as directly as possible. There is a clear contrast here with his position in the early 1930's when he formulated his highly theoretical concept of ethics in terms of the logical dynamism of the pursuit of objective knowledge and the progressive realization of the Logos. At that time he condemned moral precepts as reactionary dogmas which stood in the way of ethical development, which in turn, as he believed, was dependent on the acquisition of knowledge and man's progressively widening understanding of reality. During the period now in question this distinction between ethics and morality is frequently blurred. On occasion Broch even uses the two words synonymously. Where he continues to differentiate between the two he attributes greater importance to morality than to ethics.

Basic to this change in emphasis is Broch's suggestion as to how the historical cycle might be modified. In the preliminary table of contents of his study on mass hysteria he suggests that the cycle of development in which man's psychological condition moves from one period of mass hysteria through normality to the next period of mass hysteria could perhaps be accelerated. "The law of 'system cycles' shows that there are phases with dangerous tendencies toward mass aberration (as, for instance, our present epoch) alternating with phases, in which these tendencies are fading away. Is there no

possibility to accelerate the forthcoming change of phases? The answer can only be found in the formal structure of the law, i.e. in the model of the ego, and it is an affirmative answer because in principle the twilight state of the mind can be submitted to rational guidance." (GW 7: 271) We must assume that Broch's plan was to accelerate the critical phase of the cycle and somehow slow it down when a period of normality was reached.

Such an assumption is confirmed by the more detailed treatment of the same problem in the "Massenwahntheorie". There he suggests that the cyclical model of history can be usefully seen in terms of a pendulum movement. In his description of this model it is at once evident that he envisages a deliberate prolongation of the periods of normality. This of course implies a retardation of the dynamic progression of the cycle.

"Der psychische Geschichtsablauf, insonderlich soweit er die sogenannte Massenseele betrifft, stellt sich nunmehr als eine Pendelbewegung dar . . . Eine Pendelbewegung ist ebenso 'unentrinnbar' wie eine Kreisbahn . . .; doch gerade an einer Pendelbewegung wird es auch ersichtlich, dass man den Ausschlag zu verkürzen oder die Mittellage zu verlängern vermag: einen freien Willen im Gebrauch der Vernunft für die Menschheit vorausgesetzt, müsste also diese in der Lage sein, nach Erkenntnis der Gesetzmäßigkeit die Wahnabstürze zu vermeiden oder zumindest zu mildern. Dies ist eine optimistische Ansicht, und sofern sie zutrifft, würde sie den 'dialektischen Fatalismus', mit

dem man sonst die Ereignisse hinnehmen müsste, vielfach entkräften." (GW 9: 97)⁶⁷

In terms of his theory of values as expounded in "Der Zerfall der Werte" Broch is here obviously attaching far less importance to the ethical dynamism of the logically necessary development of history than to practical morality which is concerned with preserving a status quo conducive to the general benefit of a balanced humanitarian society. This is even more evident in "Geschichtsgesetz und Willensfreiheit" where Broch talks of history specifically in terms of the progressive expansion of the sum of human knowledge and the development of man's intellect. This is of course the epistemological cycle of values described in "Der Zerfall der Werte". There Broch regarded the pursuit of knowledge and the application of a rigorously logical methodology in all value-systems as the ideal form of ethical behaviour. In "Geschichtsgesetz und Willensfreiheit" he explicitly qualifies this unconditional commitment to such a conception of ethics by admitting that the uncontrolled acquisition of knowledge is at least partly responsible for the insecurity of modern life, caused by man's inability to understand life as a coherent unity.

"Hier mag es gestattet sein, der Erkenntnis, insonderheit in ihrer gegenwärtigen hyperrationalen Gestalt, doch ein Stück Verantwortung anzulasten. . . . Hiezu kommt, dass die Menge der Erkenntnisvorstöße, welche das Abänderungs- und Vervollkommnungsvolumen der heutigen Zivilisation geformt haben und weiter formen, zu einer glattwegs

unübersehbaren Komplexheit angewachsen ist, in allen Lebensgebieten und insbesondere in dem der Technik mit schwindelnd zunehmender Geschwindigkeit weiter und weiter anwachsend. Sogar derjenige, welcher am unmittelbarsten an dieser Erkenntnis und ihrem Fortschritt beteiligt ist, nämlich der wissenschaftliche Forscher, vermag solchem Ausdehnungstempo heute kaum mehr zu folgen." (GW 9: 291-292)

His growing interest in practical morality at the expense of his own original conception of ethics is further emphasized in this same piece of work. He concedes that a deceleration of the progressive development of the intellect, which he sees as a series of "Erkenntnisvorstöße", may be detrimental to the rigorous pursuit of knowledge, but at the same time it will create a period of stability and social security.

"Für die Erkenntnis als solche sind diese Stabilisierungsperioden ein Verlust, für das 'Leben' des Menschen sind sie ein Gewinn: sie sind jene Ruhestrecken grösseren oder kleineren Ausmasses, durch die jeder menschliche Geschehens- und Lebenslauf, der des Individuums ebensowohl wie der einer Sozialgemeinschaft, in deutlich voneinander geschiedene Zeitabschnitte geteilt wird, und in dieser Eigenschaft dürfen sie ohneweiters als Kulturabschnitte, als Kulturperioden, als Kulturepochen erkannt und demnach auch so benannt werden." (GW 9: 265-266)

Broch's correspondence of this period provides a most useful personal commentary on his growing interest in the morality of practical commitment to his fellow-men and

the cause of humanity. The letters to be studied show that pressure of circumstances, above all the rise of Nazism and the crisis of the war, forced him to acknowledge that his cyclical theory of history and, associated with it, his purely formal, abstract, epistemological conception of ethics could offer no direct, practical aid or guidance to his own generation or its immediate successors. Such hope as his theory did offer lay so far in the future as to be largely irrelevant to contemporary problems.

Several of the letters in question reveal that at that time Broch no longer regularly maintained his original distinction between the dynamic ethic of the logical pursuit of knowledge and the reactionary dogmas of morality which, according to the original theories, prevented the former ethical developments. In 1936 he wrote to Frau Brody: "ich stehe mit meiner dichterischen und geistigen guten und vielleicht sogar sehr guten Mittelbegabung auf sozial unethischer Stelle." (GW 8: 149).⁶⁸ Less than two years later he wrote to Frank Thiess and referred to the same question, namely that of the moral justification of a literary career at a time of political crisis: "Du hast völlig recht, dass sich das Herabberzählen einer erfundenen Fabel schlechterdings nicht mehr verlohnt; es ist eben angesichts der Zeit und ihres Grauens einfach unmoralisch geworden, und mag der Leser es auch verlangen, es ekelt einem zu sehr, sich zu solcher Unmoral herzugeben." (GW 161).⁶⁹ In a letter written to Aldous Huxley in 1945 Broch explained why he did not revise and improve Der Tod des Vergil as much as

he would have liked: "The decision was not an easy one, and was taken only for moral reasons. It is my belief that in this time the ivory tower has become immoral."

(GW 8: 216).⁷⁰ These three passages suggest that at the time of writing Broch regarded "ethics" and "morality" as synonymous terms.⁷¹

Where Broch continues in his writings to differentiate between the two he obviously attributes a greater positive value to morality. In another letter of 1936 Broch expressed his desire to abandon his literary career and return to his mathematical and epistemological studies ("eine Rückkehr zur Wissenschaft"). The letter continues: "Allerdings ist dazu zu fragen . . . ob die heutige Menschheit überhaupt noch Erkenntnisse braucht, ob sie nicht mit Erkenntnissen übersättigt ist, m.a.W., ob nicht über der Erkenntnis eben jene schlicht menschliche Haltung und Gesinnung steht, deren Anstrebung mich im tiefsten Grund in die Dichterei getrieben hat." (GW 8: 155).⁷² Apart from the fact that Broch's doubts as to the value of knowledge are in direct contradiction with his original conception of ethics, the most important word in this passage is "Gesinnung". Here and elsewhere in his writings Broch uses it to imply a form of dogmatic idealism. The full significance of this word in the particular development of Broch's thinking which is being examined here is to be found in a letter to Hans Sahl written early in 1945 (GW 8: 204f). There Broch discusses his formal conception of ethics as a progressive

expansion and constant revision of man's insight into the systematic unity of reality which is potentially inherent in and guaranteed by the transcendental Absolute of the Logos. He points out that any progressively revised understanding of reality brings with it revised demands as to how the individual should conduct himself: "Wo immer Wahrheiten im Geisteswissenschaftlichen gewonnen werden, da werden sie zu ethischen Aussagen, zu moralischen Forderungen, werden sie letztlich politisch." (GW 8: 207). It is a natural tendency for these new moral precepts to become increasingly dogmatic as man seeks security in the face of the inevitable changes caused by the irresistible progress of knowledge. Broch goes on to suggest that even if this is so, the moral code of any given era has a positive value. It provides a generally recognized code of conduct and it also reflects the extent to which the people of that age have been able to understand their lives as part of a systematic unity of reality. The relevant passages are quoted below.

"Jede Wahrheit innerhalb der empirischen Welt hat die Tendenz, sich zu 'absolutieren'; sie vergisst, dass sie bloss Teilwahrheit und Annäherung ist, und wird zum Dogma. Die materialistische Geschichtsauffassung ist bereits ein Akt absolutierender Dogmatisierung, ist nicht mehr erkenntnistheoretische Geschichtsphilosophie, sondern Geschichtsausdeutung und muss daher einen absoluten Endzustand phantasieren.

Das menschliche Viech verlangt nach Dogmen, weil

es daran seine 'Gesinnungen' heften kann. Ethik ist in sich selbst Gesinnung, kennt aber keine Gesinnungen, weil sie keine Bequemlichkeit duldet. . .

Die Realitätsrichtung wird von von den 'Erkenntnisvorstößen' festgelegt, . . . Christentum, Liberalismus, Sozialismus - all dies liegt, nachweisbar, in solcher Realitätsrichtung. Und wenn auch immer wieder zur 'Gesinnung' degradiert, wenn auch immer wieder absolutiert und dogmatisiert, es bleibt ein Stück der moralischen Erbschaft, es bleibt etwas, an dem sich zumindest Verantwortungsethik anknüpfen lässt, es bleibt ein Stück echter Erkenntnis und ethischer Realität." (GW 8: 207)⁷³

From the above quotation we can see that Broch differentiated between what he elsewhere referred to as "Gesinnungsethik" and "Verantwortungsethik" (GW 9: 48). The former is the belief in and reliance on the cycle of history and the development of the intellect to bring about a progressively more comprehensive understanding of the systematic unity of experience. The latter refers to those immediate moral responsibilities to one's fellow-men which are necessary to create and maintain a humanitarian society at any given time. As has been shown, over the years Broch's interests moved noticeably from the former to the latter conception of ethics, the latter being synonymous with the practical morality of humanitarian commitment.⁷⁴

The final important evidence in the political and

psychological writings of this period that Broch was then coming closer to formulating his theory of "das Irdisch-Absolute" is to be found in three passages where he discusses the reform of the legal systems of the Western world, with special reference to the abolition of the death penalty and all forms of slavery.⁷⁵ It is significant that he analyses the current situation, explains his ideal of a democracy founded on a humanitarian ideology, but explicitly states that, at the time of writing, there is no sound theoretical foundation on which to construct such a new legal and political system.

In his "Massenwahntheorie" he writes: "Es liesse sich einwenden, dass von diesem neuen Gerechtigkeitstypus - ausser seiner Abneigung gegen die Todesstrafe - noch kaum etwas bekannt sei und dass daher im Zusammenhang mit ihm noch lange nicht von Konkretheit gesprochen werden dürfe, da Konkretheit stets genaue Bekanntheit und Aufweisbarkeit innerhalb der empirischen Welt voraussetzt." (GW 9: 233-234). He emphasises in "Gibt es noch Demokratie?" that his purpose at this time is "wohlgemerkt eine analysierende Untersuchung, die vorderhand noch keinerlei Forderungen aufstellen will" (GW 9: 315).

Just a few years later, in "Politik: Ein Kondensat" (1949), Broch was able to give a detailed description of how such a new political and legal system could be established on the scientific basis of his theory of "das Irdisch-Absolute". It is to the work of these last years of Broch's life that we now turn our attention.

4. THE FORMULATION OF THE THEORY OF "DAS IRDISCH-ABSOLUTE"

a) Introduction

Broch's correspondence of the second half of 1948 reveals that much of his work in that year was dedicated to research in epistemology, almost certainly with the specific intention of providing a sound theoretical basis for his new, humanitarian democracy. In November 1948 he wrote to Egon Vietta of his "Erkenntnistheorie, an der ich mich im ersten Halbjahr totgerackert habe" (GW 8: 305). In the same letter he talks of a book he is currently working on, entitled Psychologische Grundlagen der Demokratie, and adds the comment "mir im Augenblick das wichtigste Buch". The importance so clearly attributed by Broch to his political and psychological studies and the repeated mention of a period of intensive research in epistemological research in 1948⁷⁶ suggest that he finally succeeded in formulating his theory of "das Irdisch-Absolute" at this time.

Two further letters of this year would seem to confirm this. In October 1948 he mentions seven books on which he is working and emphasizes that they represent complementary attempts to approach the same problem from different sides: "zwar im Grunde alle das gleiche Thema behandelnd, dennoch von der Erkenntnistheorie bis zur Politik reichend." (GW 8: 300). It is significant that the two poles of his work, the abstractly theoretical and the empirically practical are mentioned together here.

Another letter to Egon Vietta in November 1948 contains the following words: "Meine erkenntnistheoretische Studie, die ich bis zum Sommer fertig zu haben hoffe, soll Wirkung haben." (GW 8: 310). The importance of this comment and Broch's own emphasis in it is the insistence on practical results. It was Broch's conviction that a practical contribution to the improvement of the human condition could only be made in the field of politics. The epistemological studies were to provide the theoretical basis for a new, humanitarian democracy.

The findings of the epistemological research of 1948 are to be found in "Über syntaktische und kognitive Einheiten" (GW 7: 152-202). Harald Binde, in his bibliography in volume ten of the Collected Works, suggests 1946 as the date of this work (GW 10: 417). This date, which Binde admits is only approximate, must be revised. The editor of Broch's correspondence in volume eight of the Collected Works maintains, correctly in my opinion, that the frequent references in the letters of 1948 to epistemological research relate to "Über syntaktische und kognitive Einheiten".⁷⁷ This dating is further confirmed by the fact that this study presents certain important aspects of the theory of "das Irdisch-Absolute" which are then applied to political theory in "Politik: Ein Kondensat" (1949). As early as February 1949 Broch discussed his new theory of politics in an exchange of letters with Hannah Arendt (GW 8: 323-324, 328-332). Knowing Broch's impatience for practical results, there is every reason to assume that, once he had formulated what

he considered to be an irrefutable argument that humanity should be the absolute qualitative criterion in making any value-judgment, he would immediately apply this knowledge to his study of politics and psychology.⁷⁸ The results of this practical application of abstract theory are to be seen in "Politik: Ein Kondensat", hereafter referred to as "Politik", "Trotzdem: Humane Politik" (1950), hereafter referred to as "Trotzdem", and in "Zur politischen Situation unserer Zeit" (1948-1950).

b) The Epistemological Research.

First of all we must briefly examine the epistemological foundation of the theory of "das Irdisch-Absolute" as found in "Über syntaktische und kognitive Einheiten". Much of this lengthy and detailed study, especially the first half, is not directly relevant to such an examination. A comprehensive evaluation of this essay must be left to the trained linguist and mathematician. Where the need for clarity makes it necessary, reference is also made to "Politik" and "Trotzdem", where aspects of the same problems are dealt with more simply.

Stated briefly, Broch's intention in this essay is to prove the basic philosophical principle of Protagoras, "Man is the measure of all things". Broch was convinced that if he could show that a determining human factor could not be excluded even from the most formal and abstract discipline of mathematics, then this would necessarily hold true for all less abstract disciplines and particularly for those of the social sciences. Whether or not Broch's proof is valid must be decided by experts in the fields of logic and mathematics. What matters for the purposes of this study is the fact that Broch believed his proof to be correct.

It should be remembered from the outset that Broch's argument is a development of the conclusions reached in the ninth chapter of "Der Zerfall der Werte (GW 2: 592-598). There he concluded that the creation or understanding of reality, which for him are identical processes, must be

seen as the projection into experience of the formal structures of the transcendental Absolute of the Logos through man's rational function ("Setzung der Setzung"). As a result of this he postulated that every value-system must have its real or hypothetical value-positing subject ("Wertsubjekt"), whose function it is to select and assimilate such aspects of reality as contribute to the logical extension of that system of values.

It has already been shown that Broch's writings up to the mid-1930's point to his reliance on the purely formal absolute of logic as seen in man's abstract function as a rational being. After that period he became increasingly interested in man as he is generally thought of, namely a physical being endowed with certain intellectual and spiritual attributes. This new emphasis is particularly evident in the political and psychological writings of the later years of his life: "Das Ich ist ein physisch-psychisches Aggregat" (GW 9: 407); "Das Ich ist mit dem Leben identisch und sogar im medizinischen Sinn" (GW 7: 233). Such statements would be wholly out of place in "Der Zerfall der Werte" with its repeated insistence on the purely formal and abstract function of man as a rational being. As will now be shown, this change of emphasis clearly influenced the epistemological research in the last years of Broch's life.

Even at that time, however, Broch adhered to his conception of the transcendental Logos as the formal principle underlying the systematic unity of reality. In

"Über syntaktische und kognitive Einheiten" he asserts that man must necessarily have some sort of intuitive, eidetic awareness of the possible forms of empirical reality inherent in the potential reality of the Logos. Without such intuition the simplest decisions of daily life would be impossible. He argues "dass ohne ein unaufhörlich wirkendes Wissen um Eigenschaftsganzheiten und Eigenschaftszusammenhänge das menschliche Individuum seinen Alltag nicht einmal im Rationalsten, geschweige denn im Irrationalen auch nur für eine halbe Stunde zu bewältigen vermöchte" (GW 7: 164). Broch insists that intuition and inductive reasoning, which he sees as the function of "die erkenntnistheoretische Unbewusstseins-Sphäre" (GW 7: 167), are a necessary complement to the normal rational processes of deductive thinking in every sphere of life. Broch summarizes his theory of intuition, which closely resembles the Platonic concept of anamnesis, as follows.

"Gleichgültig jedoch, wie weit die rationale Erfassbarkeit je reichen mag, der Mensch verdankt der erkenntnistheoretischen Unbewusstseins-Sphäre, in der er (genau so wie in der psychologischen) lebt, sein eidetisches Vor-Wissen um die Vielfalt der in der Welt möglichen Ding- oder Eigenschaftskombinationen und darüber hinaus auch das Wissen um die in der Welt unmöglichen (und nur im Traume möglichen) Konstellationen. Und nur weil er dieses Wissen besitzt, vermag er sich in seinem Alltag 'intuitiv' zurechtzufinden, vermag er aus der Fülle der jeweiligen Handlungsmöglichkeiten 'instinktiv' die 'richtigen' auszuwählen." (GW 7: 166-167)⁷⁹

From a general discussion of inductive reasoning Broch turns to the particular example of mathematics, which he defines as "die Wissenschaft von der Gesamtmasse aller möglichen Beziehungen zwischen 'eigenschaftslosen Dingen'". He then adds the important qualification: "diese Definition bliebe unerfüllt, wenn nicht, gemäß der positiv^cistisch-intuition^Aonistischen Forderung, zu jeder neu-entdeckten Beziehung auch das zugehörige Bezug-Ding, das ist eine empirisch sichtbare oder zumindest potential sichtbar zu machende, reale Zahlform aufgewiesen werden würde." (GW 7: 163). He suggests that the characteristic feature of mathematics is the way in which the systematic unity of the formal relationships is either revised or extended by research into mathematical problems, research which progressively produces new categories of numbers as a concrete expression of these newly discovered relationships, e.g. natural numbers, rational numbers, irrational numbers right up to transfinite numbers (GW 7: 163).

Here again, according to Broch, intuition plays a necessary role. How else, he asks, can problems be set, "denn ohne Vor-Wissen um ein Unbekanntes gäbe es nirgends Problemstellungen, und die Mathematik ist hievon nicht ausgenommen; es ist das Vor-Wissen um das Unendliche und das Kontinuum, von dem sie zum zunehmend komplexer werdenden Aufbau der infinit-dimensionalen Vielfalt im Eigenschaftslosen getrieben wird" (GW 7: 165-166). Broch concludes that deductive reasoning receives its initial stimulus from some intuitive perception: "Das Deduktions-

System braucht den induktivischen Bewegungsanstoss, ohne selber ihn erzeugen zu können." (GW 7: 178). At this point Broch develops his theory of intuition to the point where he introduces the human factor, "das Irdisch-Absolute", into the discipline of mathematics. He points out that in mathematical research a decision has to be made as to which problems should be investigated. Given the currently obtaining developments in mathematical thinking at any given time, only certain problems will be of any use in leading to the extension or revision of the existing system. The human factor involved in this selective process cannot be excluded from mathematics, even although it is the most objective and formal of all scientific disciplines. "Denn ungeachtet und unbeschadet der in der Mathematik wirkenden strengen Objektgebundenheit, die dem Forscher sozusagen nicht eine Spur freien Willens zugesteht. . . , es lassen sich ohne eine gewisse Entscheidungsfreiheit nie und nimmer Exempel erstellen, und so ist sogar auch das 'inner-mathematische' Exempel von einem willkürlichen (oder zufälligen) menschlichen Akt, eben dem der Exempel-Wahl bedingt, ist von einer 'Freiheits-Bedingung' gefärbt." (GW 7: 187)⁸⁰

It is precisely in this selective principle that Broch sees the function of "die mathematische Person". He deliberately introduces the personification because he believed that an unavoidable degree of anthropomorphism is present in every discipline, no matter how formal or abstract it might be.

"Es lässt sich die anthropomorphierende Metapher überhaupt

aus keiner Menschengesprache (und vielleicht nicht einmal aus einer rein logischen) je völlig ausmerzen, und fast scheint es dringlicher zu sein, sich um eine präzise Absteckung des anthropomorphen Geltungsbereiches denn um seine Ausmerzung zu bemühen. Nach dem Durchbruch der Relativitätstheorie, welche mit der Einführung des abstrakten Seh-Aktes, d.h. der Lichtgeschwindigkeit, erstmalig gezeigt hat, dass der abstrakt ideale (dennoch anthropomorphe) Beobachter nie aus dem Beobachtungsfeld ausgeschaltet werden kann, hat die ^Pphysik dieser abstrakten 'physikalischen Person' (wie man sie nach dem Muster der juristischen wohl nennen dürfte) in zunehmendem Masse Einlass gewährt, und vieles spricht dafür, dass es sich in der Mathematik, soll sie in allen ihren Zweigen logisch verstanden werden, ganz ähnlich verhalten wird, d.h. dass der Bedarf nach der abstrakten 'mathematischen Person' vorliegt." (GW 7: 180-181)⁸¹

Broch regularly uses Einstein's theory of relativity as an example of a principle which he thought could probably be generally applied to all disciplines. One of the basic tenets of the theory of relativity is that the very act of observation introduces an unavoidable disturbance factor into the field of observation. Thus the human factor, even if only in its most abstract function as the observer, limits and qualifies the purely formal pursuit of knowledge in physics. This human element is the standard by and against which empirically confirmable absolutes such as the speed of light and absolute zero temperature are measured. As will be shown

later there is a regular inconsistency in Broch's terminology in this respect. Sometimes man is referred to as the earthly absolute, i.e. the constant and invariable criterion against which all else is necessarily and unavoidably measured. At other times Broch describes as earthly absolutes those phenomena which have been shown to be absolute by measurement by and against the human standard, e.g. the speed of light or absolute zero temperature. In general terms, and this applies to both of the above cases, an earthly absolute is one which is open to empirical confirmation. This is simply the principle of "das Irdisch-Absolute der Empirie" (GW 7: 241). There is no logical reason why measurements of speed, temperature or space should have an upper or lower limit. That there are such absolutes, earthly absolutes, is determined solely by the limitations of the invariable human factor in any act of observation or measurement. Broch expresses this much more clearly in "Politik" as follows.

"Es ist damit doch die Menschengestalt in die exakten Wissenschaften eingeführt, allerdings nicht als Ebenbild Gottes und nicht als biologisches oder ökonomisches Wesen, sondern als ein abstraktes Gebilde, dem ausser den Eigenschaften einer präzis bestimmbaren, präzis messbaren physikalischen Beobachtungsgabe nichts Menschliches belassen worden ist und das daher als 'physikalische Person an sich' bezeichnet werden könnte. Indes, man täusche sich nicht, die Abstraktionsbasis bleibt trotz alledem das Leben und der lebendige Mensch, und so ist er es auch, der

im letzten als Träger der neuen 'irdischen Absolutheiten' zu gelten hat." (GW 7: 216-217)⁸²

Here it must be said that even to a layman the parallels Broch draws between his "mathematische Person" and the function of the observer in the theory of relativity seem very dubious. Of all those critics who have written on this aspect of Broch's work only Karl Menges has been prepared to question Broch's argument, although even he does not go into any great detail.⁸³ As Broch's argument stands, he regularly assumes that in the theory of relativity and in physics in general the human factor is present as an invariable constant in every calculation simply through the act of observation. This is an unavoidable physical limitation and does not imply any intuitive act of selecting what is to be observed, which is the function Broch attributes to his "mathematische Person". Broch suggests, however, that his "mathematische Person" represents, as it were, that discipline's own awareness of its current level of achievement and the possibilities of development open to it at any given time. As such it is a variable, progressively developing function. He refers to it as "ein 'ideal-mathematisches Wissen', eine Art 'Wissen der Mathematik um sich selbst' oder gar ein Wissensträger in Gestalt einer 'mathematischen Person'" (GW 7: 183). Broch's indulgence in "die anthropomorphierende Metapher" is all too evident here. The most important point about this "mathematische Person" is that even in its abstract function and despite its progressive development it represents the absolute limitations of

human knowledge in the study of mathematics at any given time. Above all, this limitation, the existence of "die mathematische Person" is, according to Broch, empirically demonstrable. It will be remembered that his definition of mathematics implies that any extension or revision of the existing system by the discovery of new mathematical relationships must be capable of expression in a new numerical formula or category of numbers. In mathematics therefore and, as Broch believed, in any discipline the earthly absolute or human limitations of that discipline can be constituted from and confirmed by empirical research.

When discussing this, Broch characteristically digresses from a technical analysis of mathematical problems into quasi mystical speculations about the relationship of God and man. If one remembers that he identifies God with the impersonal formal structure of the Logos these speculations become somewhat clearer.

"Im mathematischen Bereich deckt sich das Erkenntnisgebilde der 'Empirie an sich' mit der Real-Empirie und zeigt, dass zu ihren Konstituanten die 'mathematische Person' gehört, und zwar - fern vom konkreten Menschen und seinen subjektiven Geistesmängeln - als exaktes und kraft Objektivität absolutes 'Ignoramus', als eine inhärente 'Erkenntnisbegrenzung', deren 'finite Abstraktheit' allem irdischen Denken die (kategoriale) Norm gibt und es vom hypothetisch-göttlichen unterscheidet: nicht nur dass Gott zeitlos der Schöpfung Anfang und Ende in einem ist, also in solcher Seins-Simultaneität keiner Problematik und keiner Erkenntnis-Systematik bedarf, geschweige denn einer,

die sich mühselig von Lücke zu Lücke vorwärtsbewegt und dabei unabgeschlossen bleiben muss, Er benötigt zu seinem Denken auch keine 'Konstanten', weder physikalische nach Art der Lichtgeschwindigkeit, noch mathematische nach Art der logischen Operatoren und Axiome." (GW 7: 194-195)

"The closing chapter of "Über syntaktische und kognitive Einheiten" makes it quite clear that at that stage Broch's thinking had reached the point where he was convinced that the qualitative human factor played a determining role as an absolute factor in the pursuit of all formal knowledge. The statement of this view in this essay is both confused and confusing.

"Gott, kraft des reinen Wissens, das seine Schöpfungstat ist, über alles Denken, über alle Induktion and Deduktion erhaben, muss die Welt (im wahrsten Doppelsinn des Wortes) 'sich selbst' überlassen, kann in ihr nichts entscheiden, vielmehr hat er hiezu, auf dass sie stets aufs neue antinomie-frei werde und ethische Schöpfung bleibe, den menschenhaft denkenden, empirischen 'Sohn' zu delegieren: genau das nämliche trifft für die Philosophie zu, d.h. sie hat den Wissenschaftsbereich sich selbst zu überlassen, umsomehr als sie - die hier vollgültige positivistische Vorschrift befolgend - allein hiedurch analogen Wissenschaftsrang zu erwerben vermag; denn die methodologische Notwendigkeit, der sich Gott - als Logos - unterworfen hat, da er dem Sohn die irdische Mutter gab, gilt erst recht für das deifizierete transzendente Bewusstsein und zwingt es nicht nur einen ebenso irdischen Vermittler als die 'ideale Person an sich' zu erzeugen, sondern bindet diese

auch unabnabelbar an ihren empirischen Ursprung, an die einzelnen Wissenschaften, von denen sie (z.B. als die zum Sehakt abstrahierte 'physikalische Person') qualitativ 'disziplin-adäquat' konstituiert wird, und denen sie umgekehrt Wissenschafts-Konstitution verleiht, indem sie (wie eben die Relativitätstheorie zeigt) scheinbare Antinomien als lösbare Exampel entlarvt." (GW 7: 201-202)

What Broch intends to say here is clear enough: the human element cannot be excluded from any discipline and represents an inherent, qualitative, absolute limiting factor imposed on the pursuit of knowledge by man's physical limitations. Again we see the confusing mixture of scientific terminology and mystical speculation. The difficulty Broch has in expressing his ideas is emphasized by the frequency with which he resorts to personification and the use of quotation marks to enclose the more unusual terms found in his argument. This impression of uncertainty and confusion is heightened by his use of the phrase "das deifizierete transzendente Bewusstsein". This is the only occasion on which these words occur in the published body of his work, and the term seems to be wholly redundant here since the "ideale Person" is clearly envisaged as the intermediary between the Logos and empirical reality.

The full implications of Broch's conclusions are much more briefly and simply expressed in "Trotzdem" as follows. "Das Universum ist Ganzheit und Einheit, weil und nur weil es von der irdischen Absolutheit des Menschen

her erfasst wird." (NR: 31) Obviously the emphasis is very much more on the human factor than on the Logos, as was the case in the earlier writings. Having proved to his satisfaction that man is present as "der Limitierungs-Mechanismus" (GW 7: 241) even in the most formal and abstract discipline of mathematics, Broch set about with some optimism to applying this principle to the social sciences and particularly to political and legislative theory.

In conclusion to this section and with reference to the doubts raised above concerning the parallels drawn by Broch between his "ideale Person" and the function of the observer in the theory of relativity it should be mentioned that in the political studies, "Politik", "Trotzdem" and "Zur politischen Situation unserer Zeit" he makes very sparing use of his theory of the "ideale Person" and concentrates almost entirely on using the theory of relativity as his model.⁸⁴

c) The Practical Application of the Theory of "das Irdisch-Absolute" to Politics and Legislation.

The declared purpose of Broch's research in politics and legislative theory at this time was to formulate a scientifically valid democratic ideology based on respect for, and preservation of human rights and dignity.⁸⁵ In the writings to be studied he attempts to prove that totalitarian dictatorships whose basis of power is the denial of human rights have no legal status. His thinking is clearly influenced by recent events in Nazi Germany, which had just been defeated, and by the predominant atmosphere of the Cold War. In his letters and essays he regularly emphasizes that the strength of Communism lies in its claim to offer a definitive interpretation of history which points conclusively to the ultimate success of the socialist revolution. Such an ideology provides its adherents with a unifying bond and a general feeling of security as to the purpose of their lives. Broch argues that the crucial error in Marxist theory is that it regards the individual merely as an economic factor and ignores his specifically human qualities, above all his desire for, and right to freedom. Nevertheless, if any democratic ideology is successfully to challenge Marxism or any other totalitarian system which subordinates humanity to some abstract principle, it must prove beyond all doubt that humanity is indeed the central value in life. If such an ideology is to supersede

Marxism in its appeal to the world masses then it must be shown to be scientifically ("wissenschaftlich") accurate and logically valid.⁸⁶

In order to prove that totalitarian states are illegal Broch proceeds to examine the concepts of law and justice, the formal structure of a legal system and above all the relationship between a law and the punishment designed to protect it and ensure its enforcement. The simplest presentation of his case is to be found in "Trotzdem", probably because this was written specifically for publication, with a view to gaining as wide a hearing as possible for his ideas. Where relevant, details will also be drawn from "Politik" and the correspondence of those years in question. His intention in these writings is to prove that in any legal system the basic human rights, as expressed in the American Declaration of Independence, of freedom, equality and the pursuit of happiness must be respected. Again it is evident that Broch's thinking at this time was conditioned by his personal situation, namely that of a European refugee who had found sanctuary from Nazi persecution in the United States of America.

Broch correctly suggests that in the modern, secular world the concept of a divinely ordained law is simply not accepted and cannot be recognized as the basis of a generally binding legal system. The emotionally coloured concept of a natural law according to which all men are free and equal is too vague and cannot account for or regulate the conflicts which arise when different groups,

individuals or institutions try to assert their freedom at the expense of others. Clearly a new absolute and demonstrably reliable foundation for humanitarian legislation is needed.

"Dass die Menschen allesamt als gleich und frei geboren sind, ist eine zwar plausible, dennoch mystische Annahme, zu deren Stützung man sich noch wahrlich am besten auf die göttliche Ebenbildhaftigkeit des Menschen und somit auf ein Gottesrecht berief, während das an seine Stelle getretene Naturrecht (ganz zu schweigen von der Farce mit der 'Göttin der Vernunft' in der Französischen Revolution) ein eher dürftiger Abklatsch davon ist, wenn es nicht gelingt, es auf eine völlig neue Basis zu stellen."

(GW 9: 392)

Of all the traditional legislative systems the only factor which is generally acknowledged is the abstract concept of justice, which is open to abuse. Apart from that, Broch claims, man as a political creature responds only to such dictates as can be shown to be logically necessary, formally valid.

"Vom einstigen auf dem lieben Gott basierten Moral-Glauben der Menschheit ist bloss der an die Gerechtigkeit übriggeblieben, weil sich unter deren Flagge (berechtigte) Ressentiments ausleben lassen.

Ansonsten glaubt der Mensch nur das, was ihm in Gestalt wissenschaftlicher, also sozusagen 'beweisbarer' Überlegungen gebracht wird." (GW 8: 402)⁸⁷

In the introduction to "Trotzdem" Broch explains the historical and sociological factors determining the

need for an absolute criterion as the basis of political power and legislative systems and traces the development down to the modern era where a voting majority is invested with the power previously attributed only to God or absolute monarchs.

"Macht, welche innerhalb einer sozialen Gemeinschaft ausgeübt wird und nicht nur auf brutaler Gewalt beruhen soll, sondern eine dauernde, das heisst von der Gemeinschaft hingenommene, ja sogar von ihr bestellte sein will, muss eine den Gemeinschaftsmitgliedern einleuchtende, ihnen 'natürliche' Legitimation besitzen. Das mag unter Umständen wie eine 'freie', einfach auf Vernunft gegründete "Übereinkunft ausschauen, doch selbst noch in der banalsten "Übereinkunft wirkt eine bestimmte Vertragsmoral: wenn die Vertragspartner keine sie gemeinsam bindende 'absolute' Moral besitzen, wenn sie nicht 'eidfähig' sind, gibt es keinen contrat social, gibt es weder eine haltbare soziale Gemeinschaft noch irgend eine verlässliche Funktion in ihr. Wäre dem nicht so, der Eid wäre niemals als 'heilig' erklärt und unter schwersten Strafschutz gestellt worden. Eid, Macht und Machtübertragung berufen sich letztlich auf ein 'Absolutes'.

Je mehr eine Gemeinschaft auf Dauer (oder gar für die 'Ewigkeit') berechnet ist, desto mehr bedarf sie solcher Fundierung im Absoluten, und desto mehr ist sie bemüssigt, dieses ins Über-Irdische zu verlegen, denn im Irdischen schient sich ja alles fortwährend zu ändern, so dass sich da nichts Absolutes auffinden lässt. Aus

diesem Bedürfnis nach Überirdischer Absolutheit entstand die Vergottung der orientalischen und römischen Monarchen, entstand im Mittelalter die Theorie des Gottesgnadentums. Aber auch die Theorie der modernen Demokratie stammt aus dieser Quelle, da der von Rousseau verkündete Glaube an die *volonté générale* und an deren unbedingte Vernunft nichts anderes als eine Übertragung des Gottesgnadentums (und damit der göttlichen Vernunft) auf die zum Machtträger gewordene Volksgemeinschaft darstellt, zu deren Repräsentanten später die Volksmajorität gemacht wurde: die mittelalterliche Staatsmystik hat eine göttliche Selektion in der Verleihung des Herrscheramtes angenommen, die moderne zieht die Wahrscheinlichkeitsrechnung heran und nimmt an, dass die Ebenbildhaftigkeit, kraft der die Menschen allesamt zur 'Freiheit' und 'Gleichheit' geboren werden, sich am deutlichsten in der grossen Zahl ausdrückt, und dass daher diese, und zwar als Majorität, mit dem göttlichen Recht der Machtausübung betraut werden muss." (NR: 1-2)

Broch repeatedly points out how fallible or gullible that majority may be and how it can infringe drastically on the basic human rights.⁸⁸

Having shown that the traditional legislative systems are unable, in the modern context, to provide an absolute guarantee for human rights Broch then begins to formulate his own system for this purpose. He believed he could prove that the human values of freedom and equality had necessarily to be the central criteria in any legal system. To this end he first examines the

abstract, formal structure of a legal system and the relationship within it of the functions of law and punishment. The most detailed presentation of the argument is found in "Politik" (GW 7: 219-224). He argues that there exists a formal logical relationship between a law and the sanction protecting it: "Die Begriffe Gesetz, gesetzesverletzende Tathandlung und gesetzesschützende Strafe sind korrelativ; sie bilden ein logisches Deduktiv-System und sind als solches in einer abstrakten Sphäre, der des 'Rechts an sich' beheimatet." (GW 7: 219). The court of law is the intermediary institution which attempts, as far as possible, to relate the formal, abstract relationships necessarily inherent in any legal system to the realities of the empirical world in such a way that it passes judgment only on those who have broken the relevant law. The absolute ideal or abstract concept of justice ("das Recht an sich") is and can be concerned only with the formal logical relationships of law, crime and punishment which are implied by the very concept of justice. Wherever a legal system is created it must, if it wishes to be recognized as such, comply with the three essential formal criteria logically implied in the abstract concept of justice: no one can be punished who has not broken a law; all are equal in the eyes of the law; ignorance of the law is no protection against punishment (NR: 10; GW 7: 220). Broch concludes: "Das sind nicht Forderungen, die an das 'Recht an sich' gestellt werden, sondern die Ergebnisse der von ihm vorgenommenen Sinngebungen: wo Recht gesetzt wird, da hat es die Struktur des 'Rechts an sich' und akzeptiert

seine formalen Sinngebungen." (GW 7: 220).

Such a formal definition of justice and the relationship of law, crime and punishment within a legal system can offer no criteria for deciding on the nature of the punishments to be used as legal sanctions. The abstract concept of justice can provide no moral basis for rejecting such punishments as the death penalty, slavery or the use of concentration camps. As long as the formal relationships of law, crime and punishment are preserved within a legal or political system then that system is itself legally valid. "Das 'Recht an sich' verhält sich 'inhalts-neutral', d.h. es ist imstande zu jeglicher, nicht in sich selber widerspruchsvollen, also zu jeder nicht formal sinnlosen Gesetzgebung des Staates die ihr nötige Rechtsstruktur beizustellen." (GW7: 243)

Broch points out that, formally at least, a political regime is acting in a legal fashion if it uses imprisonment in concentration camps as a sanction to protect its laws (GW 7: 220). If a regime decides to declare that any part of its population is to be enslaved or set beyond the law there is nothing within the formal definition of justice which can prevent this: "Wenn der absolute Herrscher oder Diktator seine Untertanen als absolut rechtlos erklärt - und das ist ein Zustand, der oft genug eingetreten ist - , so kann dies vom 'Recht an sich' bloss akzeptiert werden. . . wer absolut rechtlos ist, steht ausserhalb jeglichen Rechtes, also auch ausserhalb des 'Rechts an sich', und was immer mit dem Rechtlosen geschieht, es bleibt rechts-gleichgültig." (GW 7: 224). To support

his argument Broch quotes the examples of the Jews in Nazi Germany and the Negroes in North America before the Civil War.

It would seem therefore that the protection of human rights cannot be founded on the absolute ideal or abstract concept of justice: "der Missbrauch ist möglich, weil Justitia ihre Augen verbunden hält. Ihre Blindheit ist nicht die des Propheten, nicht die des Dichters, nicht die der grossen und zornigen Güte, sondern die der willentlichen Abstraktion; sowohl dem Bereich des unmittelbaren Lebens wie dem der absoluten Idee angehörend, verquickt sie - niemand tut dies ausser ihr - unaufhörlich das eine mit dem andern, greift mit dem Abstrakten ins Leben ein, verwandelt das Leben ins Abstrakte, und das gibt ihr einen dämonischen Aspekt, den keine andere Sozialsphäre neben ihr hat." (GW 7: 221).

Clearly a new law of human rights is needed and Broch goes on to argue that it can be based not on any abstract or absolute concept of justice but on man as the object of the law. He was convinced that he could demonstrate the logical necessity of this and also the fallacy of the "Inhalts-Neutralität" (GW 7: 244) of the purely formal relationships of law, crime and punishment postulated by the absolute ideal of justice. No matter how invariable or abstract these relationships might be they are nevertheless applied to man as the object of the law: "so bleibt das Recht noch immer auf den Menschen bezogen: ohne Kenntnis der physischen und psychischen

Leistungsfähigkeit des Menschen können an ihn keine sinnvollen Gesetzesforderungen gestellt werden, und ohne Kenntnis seiner Furcht-Komplexe lassen sich keine wirksamen Strafandrohungen an ihn richten; der Mensch ist für das Recht 'irdische Absolutheit' und damit stete inhaltliche Bedingung." (NR: 9-10).⁸⁹ The qualitative limitations imposed on the purely abstract concept of justice and the formal relationships of law and punishment by this human factor become particularly evident when one considers the practical problems of finding sanctions to protect the laws in any legal system. The abstract concept or absolute ideal of justice can only determine the formal relationships of law, crime and punishment in a logical way. In doing this it takes no account of man's specifically human qualities, especially his physical nature. In the eyes of such a legal system man is reduced to an abstract function, "eine juristische Person" (GW 7: 247).

"Denn das 'Recht an sich' hat mit ~~mit~~ der lebendigen Rechtsprechung und ebendeswegen auch mit dem Menschen als solchem kaum mehr etwas zu schaffen; es will das logische System, den logischen Mechanismus darlegen, nach deren Vorschriften Recht gesprochen wird, und demzufolge operiert es vor allem mit juristischen Allgemeinbegriffen wie 'Gesetz' und 'Strafe', die ihrerseits so weit abstrahiert werden, dass sie ohneweiters durch logische Symbole A, B usw. ersetzt werden könnten. Solcherart baut sich das Gesamtsystem aus funktionalen Beziehungen zwischen den Systemteilen auf, und darunter finden sich

auch-nach Festsetzung gewisser, manchmal axiomatischer Definitionen-gewisse Skalen-Beziehungen und in letzter Simplifizierung solche von der Form: 'Je grösser X, desto grösser Y', also etwa unter anderem 'Je schwerer das Verbrechen, desto schwerer die Strafe'." (GW 7: 247)⁹⁰

On a purely formal and theoretical basis there is no logical reason why such a progressive scale of crimes and corresponding punishments should not be capable of infinite extension. The human factor, however, at once imposes an obvious and absolute limitation to such a scale in the form of murder and the death penalty respectively.

Before proceeding any further, two points must be made which suggest that the basic premises of Broch's subsequent arguments are not as sound as he might have liked to think. Firstly, he assumes that death, whether in the form of murder or legal execution, is the worst thing which can happen to a man as it means, according to Broch, the extinction of the conscious self. As "der negative Pol alles Lebens schlechthin" or "der Unwert an sich" (GW 7: 232) death represents the ultimate sanction available to the law and the worst crime a man can commit against his fellow. This seems a rather naive assumption in view of the extreme forms of physical or psychological torture to which a person may be subjected.⁹¹ It is quite conceivable, and history has frequently confirmed this, that a person faced with such torments or forced to choose between death and some passionately held belief may well prefer death as the lesser of two evils. Broch twice mentions such objections in passing but dismisses them

casually and unconvincingly (GW 8: 330; GW 7: 232-233).

Secondly, Broch asserts that all forms of punishment, particularly any form of imprisonment, are to a greater or lesser degree symbolic of the death penalty. In "Trotzdem" he states this as a self-evident fact and makes no attempt to explain it further (NR: 10-11). A more detailed presentation of the reasoning behind this assertion can be found in "Zur politischen situation unserer Zeit" (GW 9: 406-410) and "Politik" (GW 7: 232-241); it is in fact simply an extension of the psychological theory of values formulated more than ten years previously in "Werttheoretische Bemerkungen zur Psychoanalyse" (GW 7: 61-81). When death destroys the conscious self it destroys the distinguishing characteristic of the human individual, namely his function as a rational creature within the limitations of empirical reality. It is from his experience of the autonomy of reason that man inherits an intuitive or eidetic awareness of the phenomenon of freedom. That is why, according to Broch, any infringement on human freedom is unconsciously experienced and feared as a partial or symbolic form of death. Death is the ultimate deprivation of freedom, the extinction of the conscious self and the autonomous function of reason from which man derives his ideal or abstract concept of absolute freedom.⁹²

This argument allows Broch to equate absolute forms of slavery, as seen in the concentration camps of Nazi Germany and other totalitarian states with death. Just as death reduces man to a literally inanimate object, so

too does such a form of slavery because it deprives him of all freedom and reduces him to the status of a mere object, "ein lebender Leichnam" (NR: 10), "eine am Leben gebliebene Leiche, die wie jede Leiche ein blosser Gegenstand ist" (GW 7: 225), "eine am Leben gelassene Leiche" (GW 7: 230). The importance of the equation Broch makes between death and slavery is emphasized by the frequency with which he repeats variations of the above argument.⁹³ Two objections can be made against Broch's identification of slavery and death. Broch seems to assume that a slave necessarily accepts and conforms to the value placed upon him by his master, namely that of an object. Again historical evidence is against Broch: there are numerous examples of people who have kept alive their freedom of mind and spirit in the most oppressive circumstances. A second obvious flaw in Broch's thinking is the way in which he argues from the epistemological phenomenon of the autonomy of reason to the political freedom under the law of any individual. There seems to be no possible logical transition from the former to the latter, and if Broch is trying to argue by analogy then he stands condemned out of his own mouth: "wer keine Analogien in der Welt sieht, ist blind, doch wer mit ihnen zu operieren versucht, ist es erst recht." (GW 7: 217).⁹⁴

We can now return to Broch's definition of man as "die irdische Absolutheit" for legislative and political theory and practice. Such an assertion applies to all the

social sciences, which, by definition, are concerned with studying and, where necessary, attempting to regulate human relationships. In his attempt to set these studies on a genuinely scientific basis Broch again draws attention to modern developments in epistemology and especially that seen in the theory of relativity.

"Die Denk- und Erkenntnisrevolution, in der wir uns befinden, zeigt unzweideutig - und gerade die Naturwissenschaften gehen darin wegweisend voraus - , dass zur Gewinnung präziser Erkenntnisse fortan stets die reale Erkenntnisfunktion als solche, nämlich die abstrakte Gestalt eines 'Beobachters an sich' (trotzdem, bei aller Abstraktheit, die Menschengestalt) in das Beobachtungsfeld einprojiziert werden muss; hieraus ergibt sich ein neuer Absolutheitsbegriff, den ich als den der 'irdischen Absolutheiten' bezeichnen will," (GW 8: 355-356)

Just as in physics the introduction of the human factor led to the discovery and empirical confirmation of certain absolutes such as the speed of light and absolute zero temperature, so, according to Broch, the recognition of the unavoidable human factor in all social sciences will confirm that the absolute zero of human behaviour lies in enslaving or killing one's fellow-men.

"Im Gegensatz zum alten, rein logisch fundierten Absolutheitsbegriff ist der neue vornehmlich der einer 'untern Grenze', hat also 'Negativ-Charakter'; im Gebiet des Rechtes - also dem Formalgebiet kat'exochen der Sozialwissenschaften und der Sozialerkenntnis - wird ganz offensichtlich die Introduktion der (abstrakten) Menschen-

gestalt gleichfalls unvermeidbar werden; hiebei ist die 'irdische Absolutheit', die als Pegel der Sozialbeziehungen zu gelten hat, im Phänomen der 'Totalversklavung' (konkretisiert durch das Konzentrationslager) nur allzudeutlich sichtbar." (GW 8: 356)

These absolute limitations imposed by the human factor on the formal structure of a legislative system are particularly evident when any attempt is made to codify laws in such a way that punishments should correspond to the seriousness of the crime. In theory, according to the formal relationship of crime, law and punishment, it is possible to construct an infinite scale of progressively serious crimes incurring correspondingly serious sanctions. In practice no such scale is possible.

"Doch mit einem Male ist das Irdisch-Absolute auf dem Plan und 'limitiert', hier einerseits als Mord, andererseits als Todesstrafe, das an sich grenzenlose deduktive Spiel. Die 'Limitation' liegt also an der Menschengestalt als solcher, an der menschlichen Qualität des Sterbenmüssens, und diese Qualität wird keineswegs nur als mechanisches Skalen-Ende in das deduktive System projiziert, sondern affiziert es durch und durch, jedenfalls weit mehr als das juristische Menschenbild, mit dem die praktische Rechtsprechung sich beschäftigt: bei aller Reduzierung auf nackteste Abstraktheit, es ist ein inhaltlicher Faktor, der da, wie überall mit dem Irdisch-Absoluten, in einen rein formalen Bereich introduziert wird - der Vergleich mit der relativitäts-theoretischen Introduction des Sehakts in das physikalische Beobachtungsfeld ist nicht unerlaubt."

(GW 7: 247-248)

The lack of precision in Broch's use of terms referring to the earthly Absolute is evident. The general principle of the existence of earthly Absolutes, i.e. absolute values which can be empirically confirmed, is usually referred to as "das Irdisch-Absolute". The invariable standard of measurement, what Broch elsewhere calls "das tertium comparationis" (GW 6: 277; GW 7: 252), against which such absolutes are evaluated is man himself, "die irdische Absolutheit, welche die seiner spezifisch menschlichen Eigenstruktur ist" (NR: 30). Measured against this criterion the lowest absolute of human conduct is to dehumanize one's fellow-men by killing or enslaving them. In scientific terms death or slavery represent merely "ein irdisches Absolutum" (NR: 10).⁹⁵ In the narrower field of the social sciences they represent "das 'irdische Absolutum'" (GW 9: 421), "die irdische Absolutheit" (GW 9: 424), "das 'irdisch Absolute'" (NR: 12), "das irdisch Absolute schlechthin" (GW 7: 232), "das Irdisch-Absolute" (GW 7: 247). Clearly Broch is not consistent in his use of terminology, but the context generally leaves no doubt as to what he means.

Broch concludes that any genuinely humanitarian legislation or political regime must be founded on the formula which he expresses in three different ways as follows. "Du sollst nicht töten." (NR: 10) "Der Mensch darf niemals als Sache behandelt werden." (GW 7: 222) "Der Mensch darf den Menschen nicht versklaven." (GW 9: 366) For Broch these three statements are synonymous

because they all prohibit the reduction of the individual to an inanimate object. Clearly these principles must be embodied in his new legislative system, and just as clearly they imply the abolition of the death penalty and the use of concentration camps or any other form of total enslavement. The next step in Broch's argument is to prove the logical necessity of such humanitarian legislation and thus rebut the charges of subjective emotionalism in his thinking, "es handelt sich hierbei um Formalkonstatierungen, nicht um inhaltliche oder gar gefühlsmässige, und weil es Formalkonstatierungen sind, ergibt sich aus ihnen eine Neufundierung des an sich legendären Menschenrechtes, ohne das es keine soziale Humanität gäbe." (GW 8: 356).

Broch bases his proof on a hypothetical situation where a government passes a law stating that every citizen over the age of fifty should be executed (GW 7: 243f.; NR: 10f.). He admits that such an idea is "karnavalesk" (GW: 7: 243), but points out first of all that, formally at least, such legislation would be valid because it maintains the formal relationship of law and punishment. Secondly, he adds that his hypothesis is not as strange as it seems since it illustrates a form of legislation characteristic of certain dictatorships, specifically that of Nazi Germany. He takes care to comment that such legislation is not limited exclusively to dictatorships and cites as an example the condition of the negroes in North America prior to the Civil War. By virtue of their colour negroes were set beyond the law and condemned to

lifelong slavery (NR: 11-12).

In a practical context the hypothetical legislation envisaged by Broch would produce chaos because everyone reaching the age of fifty would, in the knowledge that he is condemned to die anyway, feel free to commit any crime he wanted without incurring a more severe punishment. Here the problems raised by Broch's view of the death penalty as the ultimate legal sanction are at once evident. But the crux of his argument lies in the fact that any such legislation is self-contradictory, logically invalid and demonstrably illegal. All of this can be deduced from a logical analysis of the necessary formal relationship which must exist between a law and the sanction designed to protect it.

"Denn wie soll sich der Begriff 'Gesetz' von dem der 'Strafe' unterscheiden, wenn beide das nämliche meinen dürfen?"

(NR: 12)

"Da liegt überhaupt kein Gesetz vor. Denn eine strafrechtlich nicht schützbare Bestimmung verdient gerade im Sinne des 'Rechts an sich' nicht den Namen 'Gesetz'. Und der Strafschutz entfällt, weil den Gesetzesübertreter, der sich nach Erreichung der Altersgrenze nicht freiwillig der Hinrichtung stellt, keine verschärfte Strafe, sondern eben nur wieder der Galgen erwartet. . . . Mögen daher die Bestimmungen, die seine Hinrichtung verlangen, formal noch so korrekt ausgebaut werden, das 'Recht an sich' ist trotz seiner 'Inhalts-Neutralität' nicht befugt, ihnen Gesetzcharakter zuzuerkennen. Es handelt sich hiebei um

keinerlei Rechts-Antinomie; nein, es handelt sich lediglich darum, dass die 'Inhalts-Neutralität' unter gewissen Umständen durchbrochen werden muss." (GW 7: 244)

The necessity of avoiding such an anomalous situation and preserving the formal validity of all legal systems leads to the following logical conclusion: "Der Inhalt eines Gesetzes darf mit der Strafe, die es zu seinem Schutz verfügt, nie identisch sein." (GW 7: 245). Broch emphasizes that this is a purely formal deduction and seems self-evident. The real value of such a postulate is seen only in the extreme cases, "wo die absolute Grenze der Strafbemessung, ihr Irdisch-Absolutes erreicht wird; und es um die Todesstrafe und ihre Nicht-verschärfbarkeit geht." (GW 7: 245).⁹⁶ He admits that his hypothetical example of the death penalty for all people who attain the age of fifty is an extreme one, but adds that it illustrates the formal structure of legislation which has already been seen in those dictatorships which are ruled by terror. The great value of the formally demonstrable principle that the content of a law should never be identical with the sanction designed to protect it is that it provides a logically infallible formula for deciding whether any legislation is technically or formally correct and legal.

"Das Beispiel von den Fünfzigjährigen ist ein . . . Extremfall, und es tut dar, dass der Hinrichtungsbefehl, obwohl aus der Autonomie der Gesetzgebung erfließend und offenbar mit keiner andern Regierungsverordnung oder gesetzlichen Bestimmung in Widerspruch stehend, trotz

dieser Formalkorrektheit formal - wohlgemerkt formal - inkorrekt ist, weil eben an den Extremgrenzen die Inhalts-Strukturen ihre innern Formal-Widersprüche sehen lassen, und dass infolgedessen jene Hinrichtungs-Verfügung infolge ihres Gegensatzes zum 'Recht an sich' nie und nimmer rechtlich-gesetzlichen Charakter zu erwerben vermag. Und eine ungesetzliche, lediglich titular-gesetzliche Lebensberaubung ist Mord. Es muss kaum unterstrichen werden, dass das Beispiel von den Fünfzigjährigen ein Schattenriss der Terror-Diktaturen ist." (GW 7: 245)

On purely formal grounds, therefore, one is entitled to examine the qualitative content of a legislative system and the sanctions it uses and decide if they are legal (GW 7: 245-256).

This must necessarily apply not only to the extreme case of the death penalty, but also to every form of punishment. Here the abstract formal relationship of law and punishment can offer no criteria for judgment. The types of punishment can be determined only by an analysis of what acts as a deterrent to man. As has been said, Broch believed that all punishments were to a greater or lesser extent symbolic of the death penalty because they all represented the partial reduction of the individual to the condition of an inanimate object by depriving him of some of the freedom which is the distinguishing characteristic and right of man. The practical corollary of the abstract formula that no law should be identical with the sanction protecting it is a declaration of human

rights which states that no man may be deprived of these rights if he has not committed any crime. Such a declaration is not merely a pious hope, but is logically valid and legally binding because it is the concrete expression in the human context of the necessary formal relationship existing between law and punishment.

"'Gesetzesbestimmungen dürfen mit den für ihre ^aÜbertretung festgesetzten Strafen nie identisch sein.'

Zu dieser formalen Bestimmung muss aber - eben wegen des inhaltlichen Charakters des Rechts - noch eine inhaltliche treten, und diese ist aus der Definition der Strafe als 'Versachlichung' zu gewinnen, so dass sich der Satz folgendermassen erweitert:

'Gesetze dürfen dem Bürger keinen straf-ähnlichen Zustand auferlegen, das heisst ihn seiner spezifisch menschlichen Attribute der Freiheit, Gleichheit und des Rechts auf Streben nach Glück berauben, vielmehr ist eine solche Versachlichung des Menschen ausschliesslich der Strafe bei Gesetzesübertretungen vorbehalten.'" (NR: 12)⁹⁷

Broch thus claims to have proved that a humanitarian form of legislation based on respect for, and preservation of the basic human rights of freedom, equality and the pursuit of happiness is not only morally desirable but a logical necessity if the absolute ideal or abstract concept of justice is to be given concrete expression in society. The political implications of this are immediately evident. Such a law of human rights provides a logically valid and legally binding criterion for deciding if a political regime is legal or illegal in

its constitution. Clearly any government which, like Nazi Germany, declares certain groups of its population to be beyond the law is demonstrably illegal.

"Das ist ein immerhin bemerkenswertes, ja vielleicht eben sogar überraschendes Ergebnis, denn es besagt, dass das rein auf formalen Überlegungen gestützte 'Recht an sich' unter gewissen Umständen fähig und befugt ist, inhaltliche Gesetzgebungsmassnahmen zu überprüfen und zu beurteilen, und dass es sie bei abfälliger Beurteilung, genau so wie bei formalen Unstimmigkeiten, als unrechtlich verwerfen kann, verwerfen darf, verwerfen muss. . . Mit andern Worten, soweit der Staat ein Rechtssystem repräsentiert und es sein will, darf es keine rechtlosen Enklaven geben; es können zur Not Gruppen-Unterscheidungen gemacht werden - das Militärrecht war stets strenger als das für die Zivilbevölkerung geltende gewesen -, und Hitler wäre es unbenommen gewesen, für Juden besonders drakonische Strafen einzuführen; aber zwischen Drakonismus und völliger Rechtlosigkeit besteht kein gradueller Unterschied, nein, das ist der Gegensatz schlechthin, und völlig rechtlos, völlig vogelfrei darf niemand gemacht werden. Und ebendarum zerstört Sklaverei, sei es nun die des Privat- oder die des modernen Staatssklaventums, die Komplettheit jeglichen Rechtssystems." (GW 7: 245-246)

The above quotation makes clear why Broch goes to such lengths to prove, as he thinks, that the absolute form of slavery embodied in the use of concentration camps is synonymous with death. The inmate of a concentration camp, like the person automatically condemned to death on

reaching the age of fifty, is beyond the law. Both stand beyond the law because the formal relationship between law and punishment, which is logically implied by the ideal concept of justice, has not been preserved. As a result they cannot be said to have been legally condemned to death: both are murdered.

We must pause here and ask what practical results Broch envisaged for his politico-legislative theories. He clearly not only believed them to be correct, but was convinced that they represented important new advances in this field of study (GW 8: 356, 387). Nevertheless, he regularly admitted that governments were unlikely to act according to his theories, no matter how logically correct they might be, if they believed that their own interests would be thereby endangered. This would be particularly true of fascist dictatorships (GW 7: 252-253). Nor could Broch envisage any effective form of international executive which could be empowered to take steps against any government proved to be illegal (NR: 25f.; GW 7: 253-254). At the most, his theories could provide illegally oppressed groups of people with a legal justification for revolution.

Inevitably such doubts helped to heighten the general pessimism he felt in the last years of his life about the prospects for the development of a more humanitarian civilization. This note of increasing despair is very evident in the letters of this period. More and more he gives up any hope of making a practical contribution

to the improvement of the human condition and expresses the desire to abandon his wasted political studies in favour of his first love of mathematics and epistemology. It must be emphasized that he believed his political research wasted, not because the conclusions were wrong, but because there seemed no way of having them put into action. Broch seems never fully to have realized how his pessimism reflected a basic flaw in all his research. All his theories were constructed on a rigorously logical basis in the belief that man will respond to, and act upon a clear rational motivation. Finally he was forced to concede, even if only implicitly, that reason alone cannot provide a sufficiently strong stimulus for human action. This implicit admission of failure is succinctly expressed in a letter written to his publisher in 1950 in which he describes his political theories as "praktisch" but "leider so unpraktikabel" (GW 8: 456). He further admits defeat when he says that he has produced a scientific theory of humanity and can do no more; the implementation of the theory is not the responsibility of the theoretician. In a letter of March 1950 he claims that his conclusions have "die Kraft zur 'konkreten Utopie'" and continues, "ob dann diese sich verwirklicht oder nicht, geht mich nichts mehr an" (GW 8: 387). His pessimism is seen even more clearly in a letter written in January 1951, just a few months before his death, where the following passage occurs.

"Da ich der Ansicht bin, dass ich mit meiner politischen Schreiberei, oder genauer mit meiner Theorie nicht den

geringsten Einfluss werde ausüben können, trage ich mich sehr mit dem Gedanken, diesen ganzen Tätigkeitsteil stillzulegen. Es ist nur schade um die vielen Jahre, die ich darauf verwendet habe. Ich hätte lieber meine Erkenntnistheorie machen sollen, obwohl auch diese in den neuen Glauben nicht hineinpasst." (GW 8: 412)⁹⁸

It is clear that Broch's formulation of a practical, if not practicable theory of humanitarian politics is based not on any abstract concept or absolute ideal of freedom, justice and equality, but on the phenomenon of slavery or death as the empirically confirmable negative or lower absolute of human experience. He regularly refers to death or slavery as the lower or negative pole, the earthly or empirical absolute of human experience.⁹⁹ The abstract ideal of absolute freedom is the upper or positive pole and as such can only be the subject of logical speculation. Absolute freedom is a transcendental ideal which cannot be definitively expressed or realized in the empirical limitations of human society. The absolute freedom of any individual, group or institution necessarily implies the subjugation of all others. If everyone tries to attain such freedom the result is anarchy. If such freedom could be realized this would represent the state of "Ebenbildhaftigkeit" where human society would have achieved the divine perfection of the freedom and order of the Logos. "Ebenbildhaftigkeit und Anarchie, in dem einen der positive, im andern der negative Pol des Weltgetriebes, sie spiegeln beide den Schöpfungs-

vorgang, jene wie er am siebenten, hingegen diese wie er vor dem ersten Tag, also im Zustand des Tohuwabohu ausgeschaut hat. Im Phänomen der Politik hat sich offenbar ein Rest der Vor-Schöpfung erhalten." (GW 7: 210)

Broch's argument leaves no doubt that he now rejects the thesis expressed in "Der Zerfall der Werte" in Huguenau where he postulated the absolute freedom of the Logos and the resultant anarchy in the social context as a necessary ethical factor in the progressive cycle of history. The pressure of circumstances, the lessons taught by the horrors of the Second World War, and the need for some immediate, practical contribution to the restoration of humanitarian principles in politics forced Broch to abandon his formal concept of ethics founded on the transcendental Absolute of the Logos and turn to a more concrete, practical morality grounded on man as the earthly Absolute. Broch himself describes this change in several ways. His law of human rights is based not on the ethical question, "Was soll ich tun?" (NR: 19), but on the negative moral command, "Du sollst nicht" (NR: 12). In his earlier writings Broch had been highly critical of precisely this negative aspect of morality as opposed to the positive, progressive nature of his conception of ethics.¹⁰⁰ His law of human rights is founded not on the positive principle of what man should be, but on the negative command that man must never be deprived of his humanity by being reduced to the status of an inanimate object.

"Die Menschenrechte sind moralische Forderung, sind

moralisches Gebot und sollen politisches werden, und wie hinter jedem moralischen Gebot steht auch hier die Form 'Du sollst nicht.' Das heisst, sie richten sich gegen das radikal Böse, und als solches enthüllt sich die 'Versklavung', die 'Versachlichung' des Menschen. Das ist das 'irdisch Absolute', an dem die Menschenrechte sich fundieren und definieren: es ist eine Wendung vom Über-Irdischen (der Ebenbildhaftigkeit) zum Irdischen (des Konzentrationslager-Grauens) eine Wendung von der bloss logischen Spekulation zum inhaltlichen, dennoch nicht minder absoluten Faktum, und die Notwendigkeit dieser Wendung hat sich aus der Erfahrung der totalitären Schrecknisse ergeben." (NR: 12-13)¹⁰¹

It is very evident that Broch associates his concept of "das Irdisch-Absolute" with practical morality rather than with his original definition of ethics. On the rare occasions when he discusses "das Irdisch-Absolute" in terms of ethics the word "ethisch" is used as a synonym of "moralisch", an identification which is never found in the earlier theoretical writings.¹⁰²

Broch's increased interest in the need for an immediate moral commitment to humanity is also seen in his explicit rejection of political revolution in favour of evolution. This is a direct contradiction of the views expressed in the last chapter of "Der Zerfall der Werte" (GW 2: 661f.). There revolution is seen as the necessary ethical instrument of the cyclical development of history towards a better civilization. In an obvious contrast to this Broch states in "Zur politischen Situation unserer

Zeit" that the first principle of any humanitarian policy must be "das Prinzip der unmittelbaren Wohlfahrt, besagend, dass den Menschen und der Menschheit nicht für einen chimärischen künftigen Glückszustand inhumane oder gar . . . barbarische Opfer auferlegt werden dürfen" (GW 9: 440).¹⁰³

In "Der Zerfall der Werte" Broch had postulated the absolute, anarchic freedom of the individual, and hence the dissolution of any social order, as a necessary if unpleasant stage in the regular cycle of history. In the formulation of his law of human rights this earlier theory is radically and explicitly revised. As a result of his analysis of the function of the death penalty as a limiting factor in any formally correct legal system Broch believed that he had proved the guarantee of human rights to be a logical necessity in any formally valid legislation. Such legislation must guarantee the maximum possible freedom for the individual in the current social and political situation. Direct empirical examination of that situation would reveal if the actions of any group or individual were infringing on the rights and freedom of others and new legislation could be drawn up accordingly to protect those rights with legal sanctions. All such legislation, in order to be formally correct and legally valid, would have to preserve the formal relationship of law and punishment as implied in the abstract concept of justice. According to Broch this necessarily implies the abolition of the death penalty.

In theory at least, such legislation would

progressively define and guarantee the maximum possible freedom under the law of the individual within the social context at any given time. This process would necessarily be one of the progressive realization of the concept of freedom. Any legislation which was retrogressive in that it attempted to encroach on the freedom already guaranteed under the law could be shown to be formally illegal if it did not conform to the principle, already proved to be formally and legally binding, that no person may be deprived of any freedom if he has not committed a criminal act (GW 7: 245-246; GW 9: 410). Clearly, according to the above theory, freedom is not postulated as an absolute but is progressively realized and defined within the limitations of empirical reality.

"Gewiss wird sich auch aus den Sätzen dieses Menschenrechtes letztlich ein Bild des Menschen entwickeln, und gewiss wird es - gerade weil es unter der Kontrolle des 'Rechts an sich' zustande kommt - sich letztlich mehr und mehr der Ebenbildhaftigkeit annähern, indes die ihr zugehörige menschliche Freiheit wird statt dogmatisch am Anfang nunmehr erst am Ende der Definitionsreihe stehen, ein Definitionsziel der unendlichen Annäherung, ohne je völlig erreicht werden zu können: sukzessive aus Rechtsätzen entstehend, von denen jeder einzelne vom empirischen Anlass ausgeht und empirisch aussagt, was dem Menschen, sofern er Mensch bleiben soll, nicht angetan werden darf, wird sich von ihm ein juristisch-empirisches, also ein abstraktes Gesamtbild ergeben, etwa das einer abstrakten

'Recht-erzeugenden Person an sich' (einer Recht-schaffenden und eben - wie die Sprache so schön vorwegnimmt - einer rechtschaffenen Person, nicht verwechselbar mit der 'juristischen Person'), und gleich der analog konstruierten 'physikalischen Person' wird sie, ungeachtet aller Abstraktheit, den Vorzug konkreter Irdischkeit, den Vorzug der fruchtbaren Empirie für sich in Anspruch nehmen können, denn gleich jener ist sie die Trägerin des 'irdisch Absoluten'." (GW 7: 218-219)

According to Broch this "Recht-erzeugende Person an sich" fulfils the same function in the field of jurisprudence as does "die mathematische Person" in the discipline of mathematics. Here it is impossible to avoid the anthropomorphic metaphor. The "Recht-erzeugende Person" represents a humanitarian legislation's self-awareness of its own formal, legal structure based on the preservation of the maximum human freedom within the limitations of empirical reality at any given time. As such it has a selective role and can approve the extension of the legal system by the incorporation of only these statutes which further help to guarantee and define human freedom. All the doubts expressed earlier about Broch's "mathematische Person" apply equally here. What is of greater relevance here is the explicit statement that absolute freedom is unattainable in the context of human society and that such freedom as man can achieve must be progressively defined and realized by the expediences and limitations of empirical reality. The creation of a humanitarian civilization is envisaged in terms of a

progressive, linear development, that of "eine wachsende Absolutheit" (GW 9: 141) or "eine wachsende Humanität" (GW 9: 234). Such a development, controlled by the principle of the earthly Absolute, contrasts very obviously with Broch's original, cyclical interpretation of history which, based on the transcendental Absolute of the Logos, postulated regularly alternating periods of civilization and chaos.

The radical nature of Broch's rejection of the transcendental Absolute of the Logos as the determining factor in life in favour of the earthly Absolute is further emphasized by his description of this decision as "die kopernikanische Wendung" (NR: 13; GW 7: 242-249). Broch borrowed this expression from Kant and uses it in much the same way.¹⁰⁴ Neither Kant nor Broch was interested primarily in Copernicus's discovery that the universe is heliocentric and not geocentric. For both of them the significance of the Copernican revolution in astronomy lay in the method of the proof rather than in its conclusion. Copernicus abandoned the abstract speculation of the Ptolemaic cosmology and refused to distort observable facts to conform to a patently untenable theory. He proved that the universe is heliocentric by a process of empirical observation. Similarly, Kant's epistemology and ethics are founded with rigorous logic on the observable phenomenon of the autonomy of reason and not on abstract speculation about God or some transcendental Absolute. In exactly the same way, so Broch maintains, his theory of politics is built up from the empirical fact

of death as the lower absolute of human experience and not on the basis of abstract, undefinable ideals of justice or freedom. The Copernican revolution in scientific methodology is mentioned in "Der Zerfall der Werte".

There Broch describes it as "die-wahrhafte-kopernikanische Wendung zum unmittelbaren Objekt", and continues: "Oder mit andern Worten, es ist die Wendung vom Platonismus zum Positivismus, von der Sprache Gottes zu der Sprache der Dinge." (GW 2: 513). Only in the closing years of his life did Broch apply this principle consistently in his own thinking and the result is to be seen in his theory of "das Irdisch-Absolute".

Nevertheless, in his reliance on the earthly Absolute Broch could not, indeed did not want entirely to abandon the transcendental Absolute of the Logos. Copernicus's cosmology, Kant's ethics and epistemology, and, as Broch maintained, his own theory of politics are all logically valid even if based on empirical observation, and the absolutely invariable formal relationships of logic are the reflection in human reality of the Logos.

"Deshalb darf aber doch nicht vergessen werden, dass dies alles mit Hilfe des Logos geschieht, dass daher ein oberes Absolutum als ständiges Vehikel benutzt wird, das man höchstens verheimlichen, aber nicht ausschalten kann." (GW 8: 391-392)

Broch's analysis of the dissolution of values had led him to the conclusion that the only demonstrably reliable absolute in modern life is the purely formal and abstract one of reason. The last chapters of Huguenau,

and particularly the concluding section of "Der Zerfall der Werte" accurately describe the chaos and anarchy caused by the absolute autonomy of reason and logic. The whole purpose of the theory of "das Irdisch-Absolute" is to prove the necessity for the re-introduction of the human factor into every realm of activity and thought in order to impose qualitative limitations on the autonomy of logic which, as a purely formal absolute, is so abstract and impersonal that it can provide no such qualitative criterion of conduct. "Die logische Spekulation ist für die menschliche Erkenntnis zwar das 'absolut' unerlässliche Vehikel, aber was sie inhaltlich zutage fördert, ist verdächtig, ist trotz 'richtiger' Deduktion noch keineswegs absolut, muss vielmehr unaufhörlich vom Empirischen her überprüft und eingeschränkt werden."

(NR: 13)

With specific reference to his theory of humanitarian politics, Broch believed that he had shown that the legislative system he envisaged was logically correct and legally valid as long as it preserved the formal relationship between law and punishment which is logically implied in the abstract ideal of justice. He had also demonstrated that in the context of any human society such a formally correct legal system necessarily implied the protection of the basic human rights of freedom and equality. Absolute freedom can never be realized because the result would be chaos and the loss of freedom for many people. A law of human rights cannot therefore be

founded on the abstract ideal of freedom but must proceed from the empirically confirmable statement that if man is to retain his characteristic human status he may never be wholly deprived of freedom. This imposes a limitation or qualification on the abstract concept of ideal or absolute freedom.

"Mit andern Worten, die unendliche Deduzierbarkeit aus dem Ideal-Absoluten benötigt eine 'Limitation', und die wird ihr vom Irdisch-Absoluten der Empirie geliefert, während umgekehrt die empirische Erkenntnis in erster Linie eine Limitierungs-Funktion hat, d.h. als solche an den Absolutheits-Deduktionen ausgeübt wird, um ebenhiedurch zur Erkenntnis zu werden. Demzufolge ist auch auf die Begriffe 'Freiheit' und 'Gleichheit' nicht zu verzichten; sie sind legitime Deduktionen aus dem Apriorisch-Absoluten; und ihre Fruchtbarkeit liegt in ihrer Limitierungsfähigkeit, ihrer Limitierungsbedürftigkeit: wird dieser durch das Irdisch-Absolute Genüge getan, so entsteht das System von Sätzen, das wir als das des 'irdischen Menschenrechtes' bezeichnen durften.

Da der Limitierungs-Mechanismus die Erkenntnis allüberall und allzeit begleitet, wird er gewöhnlich nicht bemerkt; er wird erst bemerkt, wenn seine konstanten Wendungen vom Deduktiven zum Empirischen (und umgekehrt) besonders einschneidend werden: dann wird er kopernikanische Wendung genannt." (GW 7: 241)

It is interesting to note that Broch's theory of humanitarian politics based on a law of human rights is the closest he ever comes to proving that in the social

context man's "Pflicht zur Freiheit" (GW 2: 681; GW 7: 208) necessarily implies "die schmerzliche Freiheit der Pflicht" (GW 2: 686). Maximum freedom for every individual in society, the greatest possible realization of the ideal of freedom can be attained only when everyone accepts his responsibility to respect the freedom and human dignity of his fellow-men and willingly recognizes the moral obligation of self-control which this imposes on him. In "Der Zerfall der Werte" Broch stated with more hope than conviction that "die Pflicht zur Freiheit" must eventually yield to "die schmerzliche Freiheit der Pflicht" (GW 2: 681-686). It is significant that he could offer no proof of this until he turned from the transcendental Absolute of the Logos to the earthly Absolute of man as the determining factor in life.

In another interesting respect the theory of "das Irdisch-Absolute" represents the logical culmination of Broch's speculations in "Der Zerfall der Werte" as to when and in what form a new, universally binding ethos would develop out of the total disintegration of values in the Great War. At the time he suggested vaguely that such an ethos could evolve only once faith and knowledge again coincided as they had done in the Scholasticism of the Catholic Middle Ages and the individual could once more enjoy the security of understanding his function within a coherent, systematic unity of reality (GW 2: 676). The theory of "das Irdisch-Absolute" realizes this ideal by restoring man as the central qualitative value in reality. This is an ideal everyone might like to believe in, but

Broch's theory actually proved it scientifically, or so he claimed. Thus faith and knowledge again coincide, but only through the theory of "das Irdisch-Absolute".

A final confirmation of Broch's rejection of the transcendental for the earthly Absolute is to be seen in the way he describes this as a process of secularization. His use of this word is best understood if it is remembered that, although he did not believe in a personal Deity, he identified God with the Logos or absolute formal principle which guarantees the systematic unity of reality. For Broch this secularization is synonymous with "die kopernikanische Wendung". Man can no longer rely only on logical speculation with abstract concepts or absolute ideals. Every discipline must recognize the inevitable, absolute, empirical limitations imposed on it by the human factor which can never be excluded from the process of observation or thought. As is so often the case when he discusses aspects of "das Irdisch-Absolute" Broch again cites the example of the theory of relativity and its influence on the development of physics as an example of what he means by secularization. He writes to Günther Anders of "die Säkularisation der oberen Instanz, resp. ihre Übertragung auf eine empirische Absolutheit", and continues: "Bei mir folgert das alles aus methodologischen Erwägungen, die sich am Gang der Wissenschaftsforschung, nicht zuletzt der physikalischen, illustrieren lassen." (GW 8: 391).¹⁰⁵ Broch's application of the word "Säkularisation" to the principle of "das Irdisch-Absolute" can be best seen in references to his theory of politics.

Writing to the editor of the Neue Rundschau after the publication in it of "Trotzdem: Humane Politik", he explains that one of the most important findings in that article is "die Säkularisation der Absolutheitsgrundlagen für die Menschenrechte" (GW 8: 385).¹⁰⁶ The relevance of such a secularization is made even clearer in another letter written just a week later, in English, to Alvin Johnson.

"A democratic ideology has . . . to be based on a theory of human rights. However, though we have histories of the development of human rights, there does not exist a real scientific theory, quite simply because the human rights are still a religious concept deriving from the idea that man is an image of God. What we need is secularization. We have to bring back to earth the absolute that as yet was only in Heaven, and I think that the time is ripe for it. Everywhere in scientific thinking you see that the dialectical absolute had to yield to an empirical and earthly one." (GW 8: 389-390)

The findings of the second part of this thesis can be summarized as follows. An examination of the theoretical writings of the period between the early 1930's and Broch's death in 1951 reveals a progressive change in the emphasis of Broch's thinking. During these years he gradually abandoned his reliance on the purely formal, transcendental Absolute of the Logos and turned to the earthly Absolute of man as the central value in life. This necessitated a revaluation of the conclusions of "Der

Zerfall der Werte" and especially of the mechanistic, cyclical interpretation of history deduced from these conclusions.¹⁰⁷ It has been shown that the formulation of the theory of "das Irdisch-Absolute" was an attempt to re-introduce the qualitative human factor into the formal discipline of logic and into all disciplines. By doing this Broch rejected his original formal, dynamic and epistemological conception of ethics in favour of a more pragmatic moral commitment to one's fellow-men. This revision of Broch's ideas was directly conditioned by historical and personal circumstances which convinced him of the need to prove that humanity and not the abstract Absolute of the Logos was the determining criterion for all value-judgments. The seeds of the theory of "das Irdisch-Absolute" were already present in Broch's original theory of values and, despite the change in emphasis from the transcendental to the earthly Absolute and the re-introduction of the human factor as a qualitative limitation on knowledge, logical validity always remained for Broch the final criterion of objective knowledge. It has also been shown that Broch's personal dilemma of the theoretician in a world demanding immediate, active involvement, which is seen above all in his frequent vacillations between optimism and pessimism, is reflected in the development of the theory of "das Irdisch-Absolute".

In the next part of this thesis certain aspects of Broch's novels will be studied with a view to establishing the extent to which they reflect the change of emphasis seen in the theoretical writings.

Before this part of the thesis is concluded some comment should be made on the current state of research into the theory "das Irdisch-Absolute" in Broch's work. Very little research has been dedicated specifically to the theory of "das Irdisch-Absolute", either in its epistemological or political application. The term is sometimes cursorily mentioned in publications on other aspects of Broch's work, but in such cases the reference is often impossibly vague or, not infrequently, based on a complete misinterpretation. A few examples must suffice.

Hermann Kann describes "das Irdisch-Absolute" as "der originellste Gedanke Brochs im Bereich der Geshichtsphilosophie", but in the course of a very vaguely written and eulogistic essay he fails to define the concept in any detail.¹⁰⁸ In his very confused and confusing introduction to the anthology, Hermann Broch. Die Heimkehr, Harald Binde finally concludes that Broch's concept of "das Irdisch-Absolute" is identical with his philosophical concept of simultaneity and timelessness: "so ist das 'Irdisch-Absolute', 'dieser Einheitsraum der Zeit und der Zeiten, das Ziel und die Aufgabe der historischen Dichtung . . . Der Einheitsraum, nach dem die Seele sich sehnt und in den sie eingehen will, weil in ihm das Zeitlose und daher sie selber ruht ...'".¹⁰⁹ Helmut Arntzen completely misinterprets the concept when he applies it to Pasenow in the first novel of Die Schlafwandler and makes the following statement. "Joachim v. Pasenow ist insofern Schlafwandler, als sein Wirklich-

keitsverhältnis von dogmatischen Vorstellungen geprägt ist, die nicht mehr von einer Transzendenz bestätigt werden.

Er ist darum Romantiker, und das meint bei Broch die unerlaubte Steigerung des Irdischen zum Absoluten. . .

Er ist Offizier, und die Uniform ist ihm der Ausdruck des 'irdisch Absoluten', sie wird ihm zur zweiten Haut."¹¹⁰

The term "das irdisch Absolute" never appears in the novel and there is no justification at all for using these words, which have such a specialized meaning in Broch's work, to refer to Broch's definition of Romanticism: "Romantik: wenn Irdisches zum Absoluten erhoben wird" (GW 2: 19).

Timothy Casey, in his article on the Bergroman, maintains that the distinction which Broch makes between his own particular conception of Romanticism and "das Irdisch-Absolute" is problematical. While acknowledging that in theory the distinction may be valid, Casey suggests that in practice, and particularly as exemplified in the context of that novel, there is little to choose between these two concepts.¹¹¹ Harry Pross wrongly describes "das Irdisch-Absolute" as "die Pflicht zur Freiheit".¹¹² This is all the more surprising because the article in question is otherwise quite helpful in understanding Broch's thinking on the subject. Finally a more understandable misinterpretation, but nevertheless a surprising one because it comes from Manfred Durzak, probably the leading scholar in the field of Broch studies. Durzak suggests that death is the earthly Absolute ("das irdische Absolute"),¹¹³ failing to realize that death is simply one of many earthly Absolutes which can be established by measurement against

the absolute, invariable human factor. It happens to be the earthly Absolute in the social sciences.

The most useful piece of work done in this field of research is almost certainly the earliest, namely Hannah Arendt's introduction to the sixth volume of the *Collected Works* (1955).¹¹⁴ Other helpful contributions, although they tend to be expository rather than critical in nature, can be found in works by Erich Kahler, Ernestine Schlant, Joseph Strelka and Wolfgang Rothe.¹¹⁵

In conclusion it is interesting to note that another famous Austrian novelist, whose extreme political conservatism would certainly never have appealed to Broch, expressed opinions similar to those found in "Politik". At one point in his diary, Tangenten, Heimito von Doderer describes his distrust of the masses and claims that a new humanitarian political solution must lie in "diese Rückverweisung des Menschen auf sich selbst".¹¹⁶ In "Politik" Broch sums up the situation of modern man as a political animal as follows. "Der Mensch ist . . . auf sich selbst zurückverwiesen worden, vielleicht sogar um die Erde zu retten." (GW 7: 218)

III. THE THEORY OF "DAS IRDISCH-ABSOLUTE" AS REFLECTED IN THE NOVELS.

1. INTRODUCTION.

Broch's novels will be examined in chronological order in an attempt to show that the progressive development of the theory of "das Irdisch-Absolute" in his theoretical works is also reflected in his creative writing. Such a chronological study presents certain obvious problems. Broch's Bergroman consists of three different versions, two of them uncompleted, which were written between 1933 and 1951. His last completed novel, Die Schuldlosen, comprises a lyrical framework, an introductory parable and eleven Novellen written at various times between 1918 and 1949. For the sake of clarity these two novels will be examined after Die Schlafwandler, Die unbekannte Grösse and Der Tod des Vergil; attention will then be drawn, where relevant and necessary, to the chronological complications of their geneses.

In form and intention this study of the novels is exactly parallel to the previous examination of the theoretical writings. No general analysis of the novels is intended. Specific passages and certain common themes will be studied with the aim of showing that the progressive development of the theory of "das Irdisch-Absolute" can also be seen in the novels. Walter Baumann describes the results of Broch's application of "das Irdisch-Absolute" in political and legislative theory as

"logisch-positivistisch definierte Humanität", saying:

"Zur dichterischen Gestaltung dieser logisch-positivistisch definierten Humanität kam es eigentlich nicht mehr."¹

This is true in as far as Broch wrote no single novel specially to exemplify this particular form of humanity, but aspects of the developing theory of such a humanity can be traced through all the novels. This part of the thesis concentrates on showing that the novels reveal a progressively increasing concern with a practical, humanitarian morality at the expense of Broch's original epistemological conception of ethics. Such a development in the course of the novels has been briefly hinted at by a number of critics. It is frequently suggested that Die Schlafwandler represents Broch's pessimistic analysis of the early twentieth century and that in the subsequent novels, especially Der Tod des Vergil and the Bergroman, he attempts to offer possible solutions to the crisis depicted in his first novel, usually in the form of an appeal for a direct humanitarian commitment to one's fellow-men. To my knowledge, this argument has not been developed at length by any critic.² The following study of the novels, and particularly of Esch oder die Anarchie, confirms one point of special interest that has already been mentioned, namely the suggestion that Broch himself was not perhaps fully aware of the extent to which his thinking changed over the years.

2. DIE SCHLAFWANDLER - ESCH ODER DIE ANARCHIE

a) Current Criticism.

The concluding part of Esch (GW 2: 328-366), which follows the hero's meeting with Bertrand at Badenweiler, is one of the most problematical sections of the whole Schlafwandler trilogy. This is confirmed by the fact that although numerous critics have attempted to interpret the three important sleepwalking chapters which deal with the confrontation between Esch and Bertrand (GW 2: 314-328) few have gone on to analyse Esch's reaction to that meeting in any detail.

A brief summary of the most important studies of these passages will reveal the general confusion still surrounding the sleepwalking episodes and Esch's subsequent reactions. It is generally agreed that Bertrand represents "der Typus des 'rationalen Menschen'" (GW 8: 18) or "der spezifisch ästhetische Mensch" (GW 8: 26) who correctly analyses the problem of the dissolution of values but withdraws into aesthetic isolation rather than help his fellow-men cope with what he sees as an inevitable catastrophe.³ Bertrand stands in the same relationship to Esch as he does to Pasenow in the first novel of the trilogy. He inspires fear, insecurity and hatred because he understands the dissolution of values and lives his life accordingly, refusing to be bound by outdated conventions. At the same time both Esch and Pasenow hope

that Bertrand, by virtue of his heightened perception of the disintegrating reality of life, will be able to offer them guidance as to how they might come to terms with the fear and insecurity caused by a situation they themselves do not fully understand. This is precisely what Bertrand cannot do. It is significant that in the first two novels of the trilogy Bertrand is repeatedly referred to as a doctor, but he is a physician who can only diagnose, but not cure the ills of his generation.⁴

The meeting of Esch and Bertrand can only be fully understood if it is realized that Esch approaches Bertrand both as an accuser and as a suppliant. Bertrand cannot help Esch. He merely promulgates Broch's theory of the cyclical rise and fall of value-systems, saying that Esch, like everyone else, must simply await the coming catastrophe in the hope that a new and secure system of values will eventually grow out of the chaos. Bertrand makes it quite clear that although some attempt may be made to prevent the threatening disaster he personally does not intend to become involved. "'Ja, Lieber, es wird sonst immer ärger werden, und wir wollen es zu verhüten trachten. Ich habe ja von uns beiden den leichteren Teil; ich brauche bloss wegzugehen. Der Fremde leidet nie, er ist losgelöst, - es leidet bloss der, der verstrickt bleibt.'" (GW 2: 324)

After the meeting Esch eventually returns to Cologne and marries Mutter Hentjen. There he learns that Bertrand has committed suicide, presumably as a result of the confrontation with him. Only once Esch's plans to

emigrate to America have been frustrated by financial disaster does he fully resign himself to the human and social responsibilities he has taken upon himself in his marriage. This is a very brief summary of the end of the novel, provided simply as a necessary background for the following interpretations of these scenes. Esch's reactions to the Badenweiler episode will be examined in detail in due course.

Karl Robert Mandelkow emphasizes the fairy-tale (Snow White) and religious symbolism of the meeting. He suggests that Esch plays the prince to Bertrand's Snow White, wakening the latter to the guilt incurred by his selfish withdrawal into aestheticism. Mandelkow sees Bertrand failing Esch by refusing to help him. Despite a relatively detailed examination of this episode Mandelkow makes no attempt to explain Esch's reactions to his meeting with Bertrand.⁵

Dorrit Cohn expands on Mandelkow's analysis, but interprets the scene almost entirely in religious terms with Esch seeking salvation from Bertrand in whom he sees attributes of both God and Christ. Like Mandelkow, she suggests that Bertrand fails to help Esch and she sees the former's suicide as a symbol of failure and sterility. Also like Mandelkow, she makes no attempt to explain Esch's subsequent behaviour.⁶

Heinz D. Osterle stresses the religious symbolism but adds a more unlikely interpretation by suggesting that the erotic element plays an important function. He says that Esch asks for help and friendship from Bertrand in

homosexual terms, challenging him to create a secure relationship which he (Esch) cannot enjoy with women. By implication at least Osterle agrees that Bertrand fails Esch, although on a different plane from that usually read into the confrontation.⁷

Ernestine Schlant stands apart from the majority of critics in that she attributes a positive value to the role played by Bertrand in this episode. She too stresses the religious symbolism, but envisages Esch playing Judas to Bertrand's Christ. She sees the latter's suicide as a sacrifice which brings peace to Esch. As will be shown later, such an interpretation simply does not conform to the given facts in the novel. Strangely enough, when Schlant goes on to discuss Esch's reactions to the meeting she comes to what, in my opinion, is the correct conclusion but for the wrong reasons. She sees Esch's commitment to Mutter Hentjen in a very positive light and suggests that the improvement in his moral character is the natural result of Bertrand's sacrificial suicide. I hope to show that Esch's moral insights at the end of the novel are attained despite ~~of~~, rather than because of Bertrand's influence on Esch.⁸

All the critics mentioned, and especially Dorrit Cohn, emphasize the religious nature of the meeting. In doing so they overlook the fact that Broch regularly uses the language of religious symbolism and mysticism to express the essentially epistemological or cognitive problems of man's understanding of his reality. This is particularly evident in the use of the symbolism of the

Apocalypse in the last chapter of Huguenau and that of Mariology and the biblical Creation myth in the last chapter of Der Tod des Vergil. In these passages, as in the Badenweiler episode, the religious symbolism must be interpreted as such and not taken literally as the statement of any particular religious doctrine.

The true meaning of the Badenweiler episode is best approached by those critics who see Esch seeking out Bertrand as the person who can offer him the knowledge and advice as to how he can find a new security and direction in life amidst the developing chaos of dissolving values. Bertrand's failure lies in his refusal or inability to take active steps to help his fellow-men in the crisis which he has correctly analysed.

Helmut Arntzen makes exactly this point and goes on to attribute a positive value to Esch's reaction to the meeting. He claims that Esch at least tries to find an answer to the problem of a disintegrating reality whereas Bertrand takes refuge in aestheticism and ultimately in suicide.⁹

The two most detailed interpretations are provided by Leo Kreutzer and Hartmut Steinecke. Kreutzer correctly states that Esch undergoes a change of heart as a result of the meeting with Bertrand, a meeting which he sees as a failure for Esch because he fails to kill Bertrand as originally intended. According to Kreutzer, Esch's final position in the novel must be criticized because his resigned commitment to the responsibilities and limitations of empirical reality confirm his inability to

realize in his own life the doctrines of extreme alienation, isolation and absolute freedom which Bertrand, and also Broch, postulate as the necessary nadir of human experience out of which alone a new, unified, humanitarian system of values might evolve.¹⁰

Steinecke's interpretation of the passages in question is that Bertrand fails to help Esch and that the latter returns disillusioned from the meeting. Unlike Kreutzer, Steinecke, correctly in my opinion, assigns a certain positive value to Esch's final commitment to human love and responsibility.¹¹ Kreutzer sees Esch taking refuge from the insecurity of a disintegrating reality in a conventional and outdated concept of romantic love. Steinecke maintains that Esch accepts the limitations of empirical reality and eventually sees human love and moral commitment to a fellow-being as the only practical, even if partial and symbolic realization of the unattainable ideal of perfect love which is the complete unity and identification of two individuals.¹² Broch gives this definition of love as an unattainable absolute in his theoretical writings (GW 6: 155; GW 7: 235-236). In Die Schlafwandler such a view of love is always expressed by Bertrand or people who, consciously or unconsciously, have adopted his belief.¹³ Clearly such love can never be fully realized in empirical reality, but only in the transcendental reality of the spiritual world, a reality which man can experience completely only once he has shed his physical limitations in death.

It is obvious that a number of relatively detailed studies of the sleepwalking episodes in Esch have led to differing conclusions. Nevertheless, with the exception of Ernestine Schlant's interpretation, there is general agreement that Esch leaves Badenweiler as a disappointed and disillusioned man. He went there seeking help and found none. The disagreement among the critics concerns the kind of aid he was seeking.

No such detailed interpretations have been made of Esch's reaction to the Badenweiler meeting and, above all, the "Schlaflose" episode (GW 2: 334-340). As has been mentioned, a number of critics read a positive interpretation into the end of Esch, but, apart from Hartmut Steinecke, few attempt to justify their conclusions from a close study of the text. Their decision in favour of Esch often seems to be emotionally rather than rationally determined; they simply cannot accept Broch's explicit condemnation of Esch's position at the end of the novel. Esch seems after all to have undergone a genuine moral regeneration.

Broch's criticism of Esch is precisely that a moral commitment is involved. By taking a firm moral stand, by accepting the responsibilities of marriage and seeking security in human fellowship and love Esch, according to Broch's theory of the inevitable cyclical development and dissolution of value-systems, acts unethically. He is refusing to face up to the fear, isolation and alienation which accompany the progressive dissolution of a unitary system of values and out of which

alone, according to Broch, a new secure, humanitarian value-system may arise. Broch explicitly draws an unfavourable comparison between Esch's position at the end of the second novel of the trilogy and that of Huguenau in the last chapter of Die Schlafwandler. The two following passages occur in letters written to his publishers while he was still working on the novel.

"Wenn Pasenow die Lösung in der traditionellen Religiosität sucht, Esch in einen erotischen Mystizismus sich 'rettet', so sind dies Halblösungen, die keine Befreiung aus dem Traumhaften bringen, sondern viel eher das Ethische in die Sphäre des Dunkeln und Triebhaften ziehen - Urtypus der tragischen Schuld. Der Rächer für solche Schuld entsteht, ausserlich begünstigt durch die Krise 1918, notwendig in dem 'wertfreien' sachlichen Menschen (symbolisiert durch einen fast verbrecherischen Typus, der seinen Kindheitstraum in der Wirklichkeit einfach naiv zu Ende lebt): Huguenau, für den im Epilog die Möglichkeit des wiederkehrenden Ethos angedeutet wird, im Blick auf die platonische Freiheit, auf die alleine es ankommt." (GW 8: 18)

"In den Schlafwandlern: Pasenow und Esch, beide moralische Typen, wenn auch verschiedenen Moral-Dogmen unterworfen. Moral-Dogmen, die aber in dieser Zeit des Wertverfalles eben absterbend sind, zur 'Romantik' werden. . . Bloss Huguenau ist der wahrhaft 'wertfreie' Mensch und damit das adäquate Kind seiner Zeit. Er allein kann daher fortbestehen, er allein ist in der 'Autonomie dieser Zeit', in der sich ein revolutionäres

Ringen nach Freiheit ausdrückt. Er ist der passive Revolutionär, wie eben die Masse der Revolutionäre jede Revolution passiv mitmacht und doch macht. Sicherlich hat er - bloss der Form des Autonomen nach ethisch, sonst aber völlig amoralisch - noch keineswegs die Freiheit der neuen Göttlichkeit, des neuen Glaubens errungen; er erstrebt dies auch gar nicht, ersehnt es auch nicht, obwohl hie und da ein Lichtblick kommender Möglichkeiten in ihm aufzuckt: genau so wie diese Zeit noch nicht ihre Gläubigkeit gefunden hat, noch lange nicht finden wird, sondern nur hie und da ahnt. Aber es ist die Lebensform, die 'Form der Freiheit', in der allein einmal der neue Inhalt erstehen kann; er steht am Beginn des Weges (eines Weges, den Esch in der Anarchie der Werte - am Schluss des II. Teiles - nach der Berührung mit Bertrand vorgeahnt hat, ohne allerdings die Möglichkeit zu haben, ihn je gehen zu können)." (GW 8: 26)¹⁴

It will be noted that Broch, although criticizing the morality of Esch's decision, acknowledges that the latter does achieve a degree of insight into the ethical problems of his generation, namely the need to achieve absolute freedom from moribund conventions in order to clear the ground for the growth of a new system of values. Similarly, in the résumé of the novel entitled "Der Roman Die Schlafwandler", Broch's criticism of Esch is qualified by a certain conciliatory tone which acknowledges that Esch achieves at least "eine Kompromisslösung".¹⁵

Those critics who condemn Esch's resigned commitment to Mutter Hentjen at the end of the novel do so because they

accept Broch's judgment which, in turn, is conditioned by his own theory of values, his cyclical interpretation of history and his highly specialized conception of ethics. The following examination of Esch's reactions to his meeting with Bertrand sets out to show that the insights attributed to Esch at the end of this novel, and above all his understanding, vague though it is, of the relationship of empirical and transcendental reality, namely that the ~~former~~ ^{latter} can never be more than a limited and symbolic realization of the ~~former~~ ^{latter}, anticipate numerous similar statements in the later novels. Broch explicitly criticizes Esch's position as unethical although, in the later novels, he no less explicitly approves exactly the same attitude to reality as the only basis for the development of a healthy social reality built upon respect for every individual's human dignity. It can be argued that the change in Broch's opinion was conditioned by a progressively growing interest in practical morality, a realization of the dangers inherent in his conception of ethics, and the awareness that a new, humanitarian ethos must be based not on the transcendental Absolute of the Logos, but on the earthly Absolute of man with all the limitations this implies.

b) Esch's Reactions to his Meeting with Bertrand.

Esch meets Bertrand in the trance-like state of a sleepwalker. The sleepwalking phenomenon has been best analysed by Steinecke.¹⁶ He correctly emphasizes that sleepwalking and the associated dream condition are basically forms of heightened perception which combine fear and hope, which look to the past and future. The sleepwalker is aware of the dissolution of values and the loss of security which comes from the disintegration of a familiar although moribund reality. He wishes to free himself from this past, but at the same time he fears the freedom, insecurity and isolation to which he would be exposed if he should succeed in breaking with his past. In this freedom lies the hope and possibility, in theory at least, of attaining a new understanding of reality, a new form of life and human community based on respect for both the vulnerability and inherent human dignity common to all individuals. Such freedom may hold hope for the future, but it necessarily implies a radical severance of all connections with the past. This in turn implies a rejection of all existing duties and responsibilities in this life, a rejection which provokes justified feelings of guilt in the mind of the sleepwalker. These distinguishing characteristics of the phenomenon of sleepwalking in this novel are most clearly expressed in three important passages (GW 2: 239-242, 314-319, 326-328).

When Esch meets Bertrand (GW 2: 319-326) he hopes that the latter can advise him how to act in the above

situation. As has been mentioned, Bertrand merely says that the cycle of the dissolution and formation of values must take its course; others may try to prevent the catastrophe, but he intends to remain aloof from it all. Esch seems to understand what Bertrand means and attempts to imitate his characteristic gestures. "Das war einleuchtend wie alles, was Bertrand sagte, so einleuchtend und vertraut, dass das Wagnis, seine ironische Miene nachzuahmen, fast zur Verpflichtung, fast zum Einverständnis werden wollte." (GW 2: 324)

Bertrand warns Esch that he will forget what he has been told (GW 2: 325) and, as will be shown, Esch's subsequent behaviour reveals how he misunderstands and distorts Bertrand's message. Esch's first reaction to his meeting with Bertrand is an attempt to follow the latter's example of severing all connections with the demands of social reality (GW 2: 328-334). He fails to realize the full import of Bertrand's words: they imply a withdrawal into aesthetic isolation and in the final consequence, if carried to their logical conclusion, to suicide. Esch, however, tries to achieve such freedom and isolation within the limitations of empirical reality and the social context. He hurriedly tries to settle his affairs in Mannheim and break off all personal relationships there. It is noticeable that he comments upon his decisions and actions with Bertrand's words and gestures. "Es galt sich loszulösen aus der Verstrickung des Vergangenen, auf dass man nicht leide. . . Esch machte eine wegwerfende Bewegung mit seinen schlenkernden Händen,

und eine ironische Grimasse gelang ihm desgleichen."

(GW 2: 331)¹⁷

Esch's last meal with his Mannheim friends is described as "ein Fest der Loslösung aus dieser irdischen Gemeinschaft" (GW 2: 332). This section of the novel ends with the following words. "Solcherart endete der Tag seiner ersten Loslösung und die erste Nacht des ungewohnten, unangenehmen Verzichtes brach für ihn an." (GW 2: 334) "Diese irdische Gemeinschaft" is shown in two lights. Its negative aspect is embodied in the selfishness and hypocrisy of Erna Korn and in the brutal sexuality of her brother, Balthasar. Erna is described as "der Teufel der Vergangenheit selber, . . . Fratze des Irdischen, unbesiegbarer und höhnischer denn je, fordernd, dass man stets aufs neue hinabsteige in die Verstrickung des Gewesenen" (GW 2: 331). We read of "all das Irdische und Fleischliche von Korn's heisshungrigem Geben", and Broch continues: "es quoll über das Zimmer hinaus, drohte die ganze Welt übermächtig zu erfüllen, aufquoll das Vergangene und Unabänderliche, alles andere verdrängend, die Hoffnung erstickend." (GW 2: 332-333). However unpleasant empirical reality and the past may be, they cannot be simply obliterated. For better or worse the individual must come to terms with his own reality.

It is revealing, however, that Esch is more worried by the positive aspects of the reality he lives in, especially by the need for moral responsibility and duty to one's fellow-men. In Esch Martin Geyring, the crippled socialist and trade-unionist, stands for such a commitment.

Within the given possibilities of action, accepting the limitations imposed upon him by the current political climate, he does what he can to improve the lot of the working man.¹⁸ Esch's decision to break with the past, to seek absolute freedom from all commitments is overshadowed by Geyring's threat that he will end his friendship with Esch if he ever finds out that Esch has acted immorally or irresponsibly towards other people (GW 2: 330-331). In this passage Geyring is referring above all to Esch's earlier boast that he will kill Bertrand or at least denounce him to the police as a homosexual. He had already warned Esch against any such action before the latter left for Badenweiler (GW 2: 311-312). Geyring's threat, his reminder of the common decencies and human responsibilities in life hang over Esch and more than outweigh his delight at escaping, as he thinks, from the more unpleasant aspects of human society as embodied in Erna and Balthasar Korn.

We now come to the "Schlaflose" episode (GW 2: 334-340). There can be no doubt that Broch attached considerable significance to this part of the novel: apart from the sleepwalking passages, it is the only section of the novel to be given a separate sub-title. Steinecke suggests that Broch here merely presents a further variation of the sleepwalking phenomenon.¹⁹ The very choice of Broch's title would seem to speak against such an interpretation. The state of the sleepless person is exactly the opposite of that of the sleepwalker. Kreutzer

mentions this passage very briefly without commenting on the choice of title.²⁰ He reads a negative interpretation into this episode, suggesting that in it Esch makes the mistaken decision to try to find absolute security by committing himself totally to Mutter Hentjen and by raising human love to the level of an absolute value. According to Kreutzer, Esch is guilty of resorting to a "romantische Scheinlösung".²¹ Romanticism is here understood in the special definition formulated by Broch and used throughout all his writings: "Romantik . . ., wenn Irdisches zu Absolutem erhoben wird." (GW 2: 19). Kreutzer supports his conclusion with a quotation from the end of the "Schlaflose" episode: "die wahre Aufgabe der Liebe hatte er in einer vollkommenen Entscheidung auf sich genommen, da er sein irdisches Leben Mutter Hentjen unterwarf."²² Kreutzer's criticism must be called in question because he omits an extremely important quotation from the same page of the novel (GW 2: 340) which shows that Esch was well aware of the limited and merely symbolic value of his love for Mutter Hentjen. This passage will be quoted in due course. Manfred Lange and Manfred Sera both offer positive interpretations of the "Schlaflose" episode and Esch's commitment to Mutter Hentjen, seeing in it a reaction against Bertrand's aestheticism and nihilism.²³ Their views confirm the following analysis of that part of the novel.

As shown above, in the interval between the sleepwalking and the "Schlaflose" episodes Esch can be seen attempting a literal realization of Bertrand's prophecy

that the only way to avoid suffering in the dissolution of values is to attain absolute freedom from any involvement in the problems of empirical reality and social responsibility. Esch fails to understand that such a solution can only be achieved in death.

In "Der Schlaflose" we see Esch coming to a re-assessment of his previous decision, but not yet fully shaking off Bertrand's influence. One of the problems of interpreting this episode is that it deliberately reflects the confusion in Esch's mind of the various concepts of salvation and methods of restoring order to the world which he has unconsciously assimilated from his meetings with other people in the course of the novel. The most important are as follows: his belief, adopted from Bertrand, that the new utopia will be ushered in by the sacrificial death of a saviour and the birth of a new saviour; his conviction that he can begin a new, ordered existence only if he can obliterate the memory of Mutter Hentjen's first husband and father a child on her; his assumption that justice and order will, symbolically at least, be restored to the world only if he saves Ilona from Balthasar Korn's lust and from Teltscher's knife-throwing act. Common to all these views, which are deliberately intermingled with perplexing confusion, is Esch's conviction that a break must be made with the past through some sort of self-sacrifice before the new utopia can be realized.

This analysis of the passage concentrates on those aspects which illustrate Esch's reaction to the Badenweiler

meeting. Some comment must first be made on the phenomenon of sleeplessness. Like that of sleepwalking it clearly implies a degree of heightened perception. Commenting on some of Esch's more confused speculations, Broch states: "Dem Wachenden mag solches unlogisch erscheinen, aber er vergisst, dass er selber zumeist in einer Art Dämmerzustand sich befindet und dass bloss der Schlaflose in seiner Überwachtheit wahrhaft logisch denkt." (GW 2: 336-337). The sleepless person, like the sleepwalker, is endowed with a form of higher logic. In his dream-like state the sleepwalker envisages salvation and the establishment of a new utopia following upon the catastrophic dissolution of values and the necessary exposure of the individual to the terrifying isolation of absolute freedom. The sleepless person, however, whose condition is described as "Überwachtheit" and to whom can perhaps be ascribed a more conscious and rational form of perception, comes to a completely different conclusion. He decides that a new social order can be approached not by the irresponsible destruction of the old one and the abandonment of all responsibilities, but through a positive acceptance of the moral duties of life and a practical commitment to one's fellow-men in love and service.

At the start of "Der Schlaflose" Esch prepares himself for bed, successfully imitating Bertrand's grimace (GW 2: 334). He is thoroughly satisfied and convinced that he has followed Bertrand's advice and severed all ties with the past, freeing himself from all social and personal

responsibilities. His newly found sense of freedom and peace of mind are soon disturbed when he re-reads a letter from Mutter Hentjen in which she reminds him of her reliance on him and says that she will take him with her into the grave rather than lose him (GW 2: 334). He tries to banish such thoughts by deliberately conjuring up prurient pictures of the sexual initiation, just then taking place in a neighbouring room, of Lohberg by his own former lover, Erna Korn. He also does this to convince himself that he is now beyond such temptations (GW 2: 335). Again the memory of Mutter Hentjen intrudes: "Leicht wäre das Leben, wenn ihn dies alles bei Mutter Hentjen ebenso gleichgültig liesse." (GW 2: 335).

The new found freedom and the sexual abstinence put too great a strain on Esch. He would willingly give them up, abandon Bertrand's example and return to Erna's bed. An irrational fear prevents him from doing this, but he rationalizes it in accordance with Bertrand's prophecy that the new era will be heralded by the birth of a saviour. He imagines that this will be Erna's child and that it would be a fitting fulfilment of the prophecy if the child were to be fathered not by himself but by "ein keuscher Josef", as Lohberg is regularly referred to in the novel. Esch then angrily rejects any such literal realization of Bertrand's words, largely because he cannot imagine a saviour being born of Erna, "das kümmerliche irdische Gefäss" (GW 2: 336). This insight

is accompanied by an abortive attempt to imitate Bertrand's grimace. "Der Schlaflose versucht wieder, seine ironische Grimasse zu ziehen, aber es gelingt ihm nicht mehr." (GW 2: 336)

At this point Esch is beginning to realize that complete withdrawal from life is impossible except through death, but he still envisages some sort of literal fulfilment of Bertrand's prophecy. Esch, "der Schlaflose", then embarks on a new chain of thought in which Bertrand's ideas are modified to suit his own situation (GW 2: 336-337). Confused memories of the concept of sacrificial death and Mutter Hentjen's letter lead him to imagine that he and she might be united in death and thus inaugurate the new era. It is significant that Esch here departs radically from Bertrand's thinking. The latter had stated that the dissolution of values must lead to the absolute isolation and freedom of the individual and that the only way one could avoid the resultant chaos was by total withdrawal from all social contact and responsibility. Esch has not the courage to accept the consequences of such a step: even in his imagined death he seeks the comfort and security of human fellowship: "Der Schlaflose . . . will in aller Ernsthaftigkeit über die erreichbare Gemeinschaft nachdenken, über des Traumes Erfüllung, die zur Vollendung führen soll." (GW 2: 337). Still obsessed by the prophecy that a new saviour must be born after the sacrificial death, Esch is perplexed as to how he and Mutter Hentjen could produce a child if they were both dead. Broch here comments explicitly that Esch

himself cannot understand his own thoughts.

Esch's thoughts now approach even closer to the plane of familiar, empirical reality as he tries to rationalize his ideas of death, sacrifice and re-birth to correspond to his personal situation (GW 2: 338-339). He decides that Mutter Hentjen's infertility and her refusal to forget her dead husband in fact constitute a form of symbolic death since they prevent her living life to the full in the present. He concludes that if he takes this death upon himself by marrying her he will make the sacrifice necessary to restore order to the world and save Ilona from Teltscher's knives. Clearly Bertrand's words about the need for a single sacrificial death to redeem the world still influence Esch's thinking. Such a symbolic form of death satisfies Esch because his marriage to Mutter Hentjen would create the possibility of the fulfilment of the second part of Bertrand's prophecy, namely the birth of a new saviour. "Nun war kein Zweifel mehr, dass er, der Lebende, von dem die Frauen das Kind empfangen durften, dass er, sich hingebend an Mutter Hentjen und an ihren Tod, dass er durch diese aussergewöhnliche Massnahme nicht nur die Erlösung Ilonas vollendet, . . . sondern dass er notwendig damit auch Mutter Hentjen vom Tode errettet, lebend wieder ihr Schoss, jenen zu gebären, der die Zeit aufrichten wird." (GW 2: 339)

If the "Schlaflose" episode were to end here one could agree with Kreutzer's criticism that Esch deliberately refuses to accept the frightening implications of Bertrand's

prophecy of the dissolution of values. According to this criticism, Esch cannot face the isolation and alienation which the dissolution of values must bring. He therefore distorts and rationalizes Bertrand's message in such a way that he convinces himself that he is making a sacrifice for Mutter Hentjen, whereas he is really making an absolute of love in order to create a false haven of security in which to shelter from the increasing uncertainties of life.

Esch's decision is, however, qualified by the following passage which Kreutzer chooses to ignore. "Da ist es ihm nun, als käme er mit seinem Bett aus weitester Ferne angefahren, und als stünde es nun wieder an einer bestimmten Stelle in einem bestimmten Alkoven, und der Schlaflose, wiedergeboren in neuerwachtem Verlangen, weiss, dass er am Ziele ist, zwar noch nicht an jenem letzten, in dem Sinnbild und Urbild wieder zur Einheit werden, aber doch an jenem vorläufigen Ziel, mit dem der Irdische sich begnügen muss, Ziel, das er Liebe nennt und das wie ein letzterreichbarer fester Punkt der Küste vor dem Unerreichbaren steht." (GW 2: 339-340)

Here it is quite clear that Esch, with the heightened perception of "der Schlaflose", is aware of the limited and merely symbolic nature of his commitment to Mutter Hentjen. He does not raise it to the level of an absolute, but knows that within the limitations of daily reality this love is the closest he can come to realizing the unattainable of perfect union and identification

between two individuals. As a normal human being, Esch cannot face the logical consequences of Bertrand's analysis of the dissolution of values, namely that the individual should accept the complete disintegration of his familiar reality in the hope, and it is no more than that, that the fear and alienation born of the resulting chaos will unite people in love who, for the first time have been compelled to recognize their desperate need of each other and to acknowledge their identity in the fear and isolation which they share.²⁴

As will be shown, Esch's understanding of the symbolic significance of his love for Mutter Hentjen is initially clouded for a time when he returns from his "sleepless" condition to the pressures of daily life. The positive value we can assign to his decision to marry Mutter Hentjen is confirmed by a comparison between his marriage and that of Joachim v. Pasenow and Elizabeth v. Baddensen in the first novel of the trilogy. Pasenow's marriage is romantic in Broch's definition of the word. Pasenow consciously takes refuge in the conventions of Christian marriage, knowing these conventions to be irrelevant to the pressures, tensions and needs of the modern world. In his own mind he raises Elizabeth to the level of the Madonna and at the same time selfishly sacrifices her feelings by marrying her not out of love, but out of a desperate need for security. Pasenow makes an absolute of human love, failing to realize that it is only an earthly symbol of the unattainable ideal of man's perfect union and harmony with all Being. The cycle of

the creation and dissolution of values represents the progressive but never ending realization of that ideal as man continually revises and extends his understanding of reality. Pasenow is terrified of what such new reality might hold, above all the challenge of isolation and absolute freedom as moribund dogmas and conventions become increasingly irrelevant to the human situation and the individual is more and more thrown back upon himself.

Esch is better aware of the implications of the dissolutions of values although he does not see it in the philosophical terms of an existential crisis. For him the problem remains on the more concrete level of trying to rebuild a new ordered life from the anarchy of social values surrounding him. He decides to build his new life on the foundation of his commitment to Mutter Hentjen, but, unlike Pasenow, he has no illusions about the frailty or transience of his love. It represents a dogged decision on his part to make the most of the given possibilities of living a decent, ordered life, recognizing his own weaknesses and needs and, eventually, those of his wife. Such resignation does not blind him to the possible existence of a different, better life, symbolized in his case by his dream of emigrating to America. He comes to accept that in the given circumstances such an ideal is beyond his reach and that he must make the best of what he has.

His thoughts about his situation never receive articulate philosophical expression. The closest they come to this is in the passage already quoted from the

"Schlaflose" episode, and at the very end of the novel (GW 2: 363-365). Even here his ideas are coloured and distorted by his confused thoughts about salvation and his obsession with somehow attaining it literally in the context of a new life within a new, secure and harmonious social order.²⁵ The essence of these insights, which he does not and cannot express as such, is as follows. Like Pasenow, Esch is frightened by the dissolution of values, but his knowledge is such that he can honestly admit the limitations of love and all human relationships in the face of eternity and the transcendental reality of the Logos. He can see love as an imperfect and symbolic realization in empirical reality of the ideal harmony and order of all Being. By accepting his human responsibilities he helps to create a degree of harmonious order in the earthly context which mirrors, however imperfectly, the ideal unity of all reality which is guaranteed by the Logos.

Esch's solution in marrying Mutter Hentjen can thus in no way be equated with Pasenow's Romanticism.

The final episodes in Esch's story can be dealt with more briefly. He returns to Cologne and Mutter Hentjen. "Er hatte sich für Mutter Hentjen entschieden. Endgültig." (GW 2: 341) It is at once evident that the insights gained by him in his "sleepless" condition have been, at least temporarily, forgotten. He again thinks of making a complete break with the past and seeking out his new utopia by emigrating to America, if necessary with

Mutter Hentjen (GW 2: 345).²⁶ At one point he even feels that his self-sacrificial commitment to Mutter Hentjen has been wasted because it prevents him from attaining such freedom (GW 2: 344). As long as he thinks that he can accomplish the complete break with the past by emigrating to America and thus, as he thinks, follow Bertrand's advice of staying aloof from the threatening crisis of the dissolution of values in Europe he can still imitate Bertrand's grimace (GW 2: 349). Clearly Bertrand's influence has once again re-asserted itself.

At this point Broch introduces the meditation of the homosexual musician, Alfons, about the nature of human love and its seeming futility (GW 2: 349-350). Alfons repeats Bertrand's ideas about the impossibility of making an absolute of human love.

"Er wusste, dass man das Absolute noch lange nicht erreicht, indem man sich für eine Frau entscheidet. Und er entschuldigte auch die bössartige Wut der Männer, denn er wusste eben auch, dass sie aus der Angst und aus der Enttäuschung entspringt, wusste, dass jene leidenschaftlichen und bössartigen Männer hinter einem Stück Ewigkeit her sind, damit es sie vor der Angst beschütze, die in ihrem Rücken steht und ihnen den Tod verkündet. Ein dummer und gedankenloser Orchestergeiger war er, aber er konnte Sonaten auswendig spielen, und vielerlei wissend, durfte er trotz seiner Traurigkeit darüber lächeln, dass die Leute in ihrer angstvollen Sucht nach dem Absoluten sich ewig lieben wollen, vermeinend, ihr Leben werde dann

kein Ende nehmen und ewig währen. Mochten sie ihn geringschätzen, weil er auch Potpourris und Polka-Schnell spielen musste, er hatte trotzdem erkannt, dass diese Gehetzten, die das Unvergängliche und Absolute im Irdischen suchen, immer nur Sinnbild und Ersatz finden für das, was sie suchen, ohne dass sie es benennen könnten." (GW 2: 349-350)

Steinecke has suggested that these words must be read as a criticism of Esch's decision to marry Mutter Hentjen.²⁷ In the context of this novel such an interpretation can only have a limited application to Esch's behaviour immediately after his return from the "Schlaflose" episode in Mannheim at the time when he seems to have forgotten the insights he gained as "der Schlaflose". Alfons's words, and especially occurring where they do in the novel, raise certain difficulties. The problem is that they confirm, but criticize Esch's insight in the "Schlaflose" episode where he realizes that his love can only be a symbol and not an absolute in itself. As that passage, which has already been quoted above, stands, it leaves no doubt that a definite positive value is attributed to Esch's new found belief. Similarly, the last four pages of the novel (GW 2: 363-366), which will be quoted in due course, confirm that Esch after the brief period when he hopes that he can realize the new order by fleeing to America, returns to that original conclusion already reached in "Der Schlaflose" and which Alfons reiterates: all human life, all aspects of love, duty and

service are merely earthly symbols of a higher reality which, as is explained later in "Der Zerfall der Werte", is guaranteed by the Logos. The important difference between Alfons and Esch is that the former, speaking as he does for Bertrand and thus indirectly for Broch himself, can see no point in clinging to and perpetuating human relationships which, at the best, can be only an imperfect, symbolic realization of a higher, ideal reality and which, by their continued existence, temporarily hinder the dissolution of values which must precede the progressive revelation of that new reality, whether it be seen in purely social or existential terms. Alfons, like Bertrand, is prepared to sacrifice all human relationships because they can never have an absolute value. Esch, fully aware of his human weakness and his need for fellowship and security, cannot take such a step. He resigns himself to the limitations of current, empirical reality, acknowledges the imperfect, merely symbolic nature of human love and makes a virtue of it by seeing in it the best, indeed the only possible realization in the human context of the unattainable ideal of the perfect harmony, unity and identification of the individual with all Being. The difference is essentially one of perspective, namely between that of the idealist and the realist, and, one could add, between Broch as the author of Die Schlafwandler and as the writer of the later novels.

Any implied criticism of Esch in this novel is directly conditioned by Broch's theory of the dissolution

of values and his cyclical interpretation of history. According to that theory, Esch's "moral" behaviour must be condemned because it represents a refusal to accept the "ethical" progress of the inevitable dissolution of values. That is why Alfons describes human love as a false Absolute, as "nur Sinnbild und Ersatz".²⁸ It can be argued that in the context of the whole of Broch's work Esch's final decision must receive a much more positive evaluation. It can be shown that in Der Tod des Vergil and in the Bergroman Broch explicitly welcomes earthly life, human and social responsibilities, love and duty as the only possible means by which man can approach and realize, even if only partially and symbolically, the ideal harmony of transcendental reality. In these novels words such as "Sinnbild", "Echo", "Gleichnis" and "Spiegel" all represent positive qualities of human life and empirical reality in their relationship to transcendental reality.

We can now return to Esch. A financial crisis finally destroys all hope of escaping to America; "Mit Amerika war's also Essig. Endgültig." (GW 2: 356). Esch's dreams of attaining absolute freedom, of breaking with the past and reaching his utopia vanish; he is forced to accept the inevitable limitations of his situation: "Dem Unveränderlichen, dem Gewesenen, dem Irdischen ist nicht so leicht beizukommen." (GW 2: 358). Esch's first reaction to this disillusionment is to make Mutter Hentjen suffer for his bitterness and anger. Only

very slowly does he resign himself to his fate and fully accept his responsibilities to his wife. He does not forget his ideals of freedom, salvation and the creation of a utopian society, but he comes to accept that they represent unattainable absolutes which can at best be mirrored in the human community where each individual does his best by his fellow-man. The last four pages of the novel, which contain the statement of Esch's final position, are quoted at length below.

"Er erkannte, dass im Realen niemals Erfüllung sein könne, erkannte immer deutlicher, dass auch die weiteste Ferne im Realen lag, sinnlos jede Flucht, dort die Rettung vor dem Tod und die Erfüllung und die Freiheit zu suchen, - und sogar das Kind, kommt es auch lebendig aus dem Leib der Mutter, es bedeutet nicht mehr als der zufällige Schrei der Lust, in dem es empfangen wurde, verhallender und längst verwehter Schrei, der nichts für die Existenz des Liebenden beweist, dem er gegolten hat. Fremd das Kind, so fremd wie der vergangene Laut, fremd wie das Vergangene, fremd wie der Tote und der Tod, hölzern und ausgeleert. Denn unabänderlich ist das Irdische, mag es sich auch scheinbar verändern, und würde selbst die ganze Welt aufs neue geboren, sie würde trotz des Erlösers Tod den Stand der Unschuld im Irdischen nicht erlangen, nicht ehe das Ende der Zeit erreicht ist.

Zwar war solche Erkenntnis nicht sehr deutlich, allein sie genügte, um Esch zu veranlassen, dass er sich in seinem irdischen Kölner Leben einrichtete, eine

anständige Stellung suchte und seinem Geschäfte nachging. Dank der guten Zeugnisse, die er besass, fand er einen stolzeren und verantwortungsvolleren Posten als je vorher und erwarb nun wieder all den Stolz und die Bewunderung, die Mutter Hentjen für ihn bereitliegen hatte. Sie liess die Gaststube mit braunem Linoleum bespannen, und jetzt, da die Gefahr der Auswanderung wohl endgültig gebannt war, begann sie selber von den amerikanischen Luftschlössern zu sprechen. Er ging darauf ein, teils weil er fühlte, dass sie ihm mit solchen Gesprächen eine Freude zu machen glaubte, teils aus Pflichtgefühl: denn wird er Amerika auch kaum mehr zu Gesicht bekommen, er wird den Weg dorthin nicht mehr verlassen, wird sich nicht umwenden, trotz des Unsichtbaren, der mit der Lanze folgt, bereit zuzustossen, und ein Wissen, schwebend zwischen Wunsch und Ahnung, sagt ihm, dass der Weg nur mehr Symbol und Andeutung eines höheren Weges ist, den man in Wirklichkeit zu gehen hat und für den jener bloss das irdische Spiegelbild ist, schwankend und unsicher wie das Bild im dunklen Teich. Es war ihm dies alles nicht völlig klar, ja selbst das Wort vom Geistigen, in dem die Erfüllung und das Absolute zu suchen wäre, stand ihm nicht zu Gebote. Aber er erkannte, dass es blosser Zufall war, wenn die Addition der Kolonnen stimmte, und so durfte er das Irdische immerhin wie von einer höheren Stufe aus betrachten, wie von einem lichterem Schloss, das über der Ebene sich erhebt, abgeschlossen gegen die Welt und doch spiegelnd ihr geöffnet, und oft war es, als ob das Getane

und das Gesprochene und Geschehene nichts wäre als ein Vorgang auf mattbeleuchteter Bühne, eine Darbietung, die vergessen wird und nie vorhanden war, Gewesenes, an das niemand sich klammern kann, ohne das irdische Leid zu vergrößern. Denn immer versagt die Erfüllung im Realen, aber der Weg der Sehnsucht und der Freiheit ist unendlich und niemals ausschreitbar, ist schmal und abseitig wie der des Schlafwandlers, wenn es auch der Weg ist, der in die geöffneten Arme der Heimat führt und an ihre atmende Brust. So war Esch fremd in seiner Liebe und doch mit dem Irdischen vertrauter als früher, so dass es nichts verschlug und eigentlich im Unirdischen blieb, wenn um der Gerechtigkeit willen noch manches Irdische für Ilona zu erledigen war. Er sprach mit Mutter Hentjen von dem freien Amerika und von dem Verkauf der Wirtschaft und von der Heirat wie mit einem Kinde, dem man gern seinen Willen tut, und manchmal konnte er sie nun wieder Gertrud nennen, mochte sie auch in den Nächten, da er in sie versank, ihm namenlos sein. Sie gingen Hand in Hand, gleichwohl ein jeder auf seinem andern und unendlichen Weg. Als sie dann geheiratet hatten, und die Wirtschaft um einen viel zu billigen Preis verschleudert worden war, da waren es Stationen auf dem Wege des Sinnbilds, dennoch Stationen auf dem Wege der Annäherung an das Höhere und Ewige, das man, wäre Esch kein Freigeist gewesen, sogar das Göttliche hätte nennen können. Aber er wusste trotzdem, dass wir hier auf Erden alle auf Krücken unsern Pfad zu gehen haben.

Als das Theater in Duisburg Bankerott machte und Teltscher mit Ilona wieder brotlos zu werden drohte, steckten Esch und seine Frau fast den ganzen Rest ihres Vermögens in das Theatergeschäft, und bald hatten sie das Geld endgültig verloren. Doch Esch fand nun die Stelle eines Oberbuchhalters in einem grossen Industrieunternehmen seiner luxemburgischen Heimat, und seine Gattin bewunderte ihn darob nur um so mehr. Sie gingen Hand in Hand und liebten einander. Manchmal schlug er sie noch, aber immer weniger und schliesslich gar nicht mehr. (GW 2: 363-366).

The reference to crutches here is particularly interesting because Martin Geyring, the crippled trade-unionist who walks on crutches, is the only person in the whole novel who consistently speaks and acts according to the dictates of practical humanity. There is a suggestion that Esch, to some extent at least, concurs with Geyring's views of simply doing the best possible for his fellow-men in the given circumstances.²⁹ Further confirmation for a positive interpretation of the end of Esch can be found in the last chapter of the trilogy, the epilogue of "Der Zerfall der Werte". There Broch says that even in the final catastrophe of the dissolution of values and the collapse of social order man cannot and should not try to escape from his responsibilities. He must come to terms with the problems of life and not try to stand aloof from them. In the chaos which lies between the destruction of one absolute system of values and the gradual rebirth of

the next man can only seek "die endliche Furt, die sein Leben und seine Sicherheit sein soll" (GW 2: 678). A similar opinion is also expressed later: "die Idee der Freiheit ist es, in der die ewige Erneuerung des Humanen sich rechtfertigt, denn im Irdischen muss der Weg zu ihr stets von neuem beschritten werden." (GW 2: 681).³⁰

It should be remembered that in Huguenau Esch suffers, as it were, a relapse. He is still concerned with common decency, "Anständigkeit" (GW 2: 456, 562), but has taken refuge in Protestant sectarianism, seeking there a security he cannot find elsewhere. Broch's critical analysis of Protestantism in "Der Zerfall der Werte" (GW 2: 510-517, 554-559) leaves no doubt that, according to his theory of values, Esch's conversion represents a retrograde step in his perception of the problems caused by a disintegrating reality.

At this point part of the study of Der Tod des Vergil and the Bergroman can be usefully anticipated. Broch's explicit criticism of Esch's position at the end of the second novel of the trilogy, both in his correspondence and through the words of those characters who are used to express his theories of love and values, is that he clings to the existing conventions of behaviour in his search for meaning and security in life. In doing this Esch acts morally but, in Broch's definition of the word, unethically because he resists the dissolution of values which must occur before a new absolute system of values can develop. I have suggested earlier that a certain ambivalence can be seen in Broch's criticism of Esch. On

occasion he seems prepared to acknowledge that Esch's solution of accepting the limitations of empirical reality and his human responsibilities within the social community may have a certain value as a provisional compromise because he at least recognizes them as symbols, however imperfect, of a higher reality beyond his grasp.

In Der Tod des Vergil and the Bergroman all such reservations on Broch's part vanish. There he regularly emphasizes that although man may, indeed should know that his earthly life is but a shadow or symbol of the higher, Platonic reality, his first responsibility lies in living this earthly life to the full by finding fulfilment in the service of humanity. Only in this way can he, within his natural limitations, approach and realize, even if only partially and symbolically, the Platonic reality guaranteed by the Logos. Man can be fully integrated into this higher reality only through death, as are Vergil, Mutter Gisson and also Andreas in Die Schuldlosen, but until he dies he must accept his physical limitations and seek to recreate the ideal harmony of the transcendental plane within the context of human life and society.

It is possible to see in this change of emphasis a reflection of Broch's increasing interest in practical morality and humanity at the expense of his reliance on his dialectical theory of values. In the political application of the theory of "das Irdisch-Absolute" Broch rejects the idea of absolute freedom, which he had postulated in "Der Zerfall der Werte" as the necessary pre-condition for the growth of a new unitary value-system, and maintains that

in the social context man can attain only a limited degree of freedom which is nevertheless symbolic of the ideal, absolute freedom of the Logos.

The result of this change in Broch's thinking can be clearly seen by comparing the last four pages of Esch and the insights gained in the "Schlaflose" episode with numerous passages from Der Tod des Vergil and the Bergroman. In Esch words such as "Sinnbild", "Spiegelbild", "Symbol", "das Irdische", "das Reale" are all supposed to carry for the reader negative or pejorative implications. Broch deliberately uses them in a context which expresses failure and a tired resignation, a reluctant acceptance of the limitations of human life as a mere shadow of something higher. Whether the reader concurs with Broch's interpretation must depend on whether he can agree with the theory of the dissolution of values and the cyclical interpretation of history exemplified in the trilogy.

In the two later novels such words and others like them, especially "Echo", "Abbild", "Spiegel" and "Gleichnis" assume an unequivocally positive value for Broch. The following representative passages from the Bergroman have been chosen from all three versions, which were written in 1933-1936, 1936 and 1950-1951 respectively. This makes clear that Broch's revised and more positive evaluation of earthly life and human responsibilities as valid symbols of the ideal unity of transcendental reality can be traced back to the period immediately after the completion of Die Schlafwandler. I have suggested that at least indications of such a change can be seen in Esch. There

is no doubt that the passages to be quoted from the Bergroman and Der Tod des Vergil imply a radical revision of Broch's original criticisms of Esch's final insights and decisions at the end of the second novel of the trilogy.

All the quotations reveal a similarity in language and theme to the comparable passages in Esch.

Just before her death, Mutter Gisson speaks the following words to the narrator.

"Alle Sehnsucht gilt dem fernen Licht, dem unsichtbaren, immer nur erahnten, das bloss im Bild und Aberbild den Schein der Helle hinterlässt, so gross sein Glanz, dass keines Menschen Auge es je erspähen wird, kein künftiges Geschlecht . . .

Doch bildlos wäre deine Welt, wär's nicht ein Ruhen. Und all dein Schreiten wär' ⁴⁵ ein leeres Hasten vom Unerfassten zu dem Unerfassten, wär's es nicht ein Ruhen. Du schaust die Zeit, ihr Quell ist zeitenferne, und zeitenfern' kehrt sie zum Quell zurück, ein Himmelschacht, in dessen tiefster Erde, dir selber Quell und Mündung, deine Seele ist, und einer Mutter gleich, die ihrem Kinde ein Bild ums andere aufschlägt und ihm zeigt, so ahnt sie weisend dir das ferne Licht, dein Wissen, das Bild um Bild aus deinem Dunkel steigt. Denn nur im Bilde deiner Irdischkeiten siehst du das Licht, zu dem du heimwärts strebst, und wäre nicht dein irdisch ruhig Schreiten, der Himmel wäre nicht, in dem du ruhend schwebst. Und in der Mitte ruht dein fernstes Ziel." (Bergroman I: 428-429)

The impressive beauty of the Austrian Alps leads the narrator to contemplate: "Hohe Erde, in der das Echo klingt, spiegelnder Garten, der die Mitte des Seins umschliesst! Suchte nicht auch ich den Quell des eigenen Echos, da ich nach dem Blick fahndete, der aus mir hinausdringt, das Seiende umfassend, mich zu ihm hintragend?" (Bergroman I: 379).

One of the most important passages for our purpose is that describing how the narrator tries to forget the pain caused by the death of his lover by immersing himself in the duties of life and work.

"Er sehnt sich nach der befehlenden Stimme, die sein inneres Grauen übertönt, nach der Stimme, die ihn zur Pflicht ruft: sei treu, tue deine Arbeit, halte aus, . . . tue es um deiner Ewigkeit willen, denn ich, die Stimme deiner Pflicht, ich habe die Last deiner Entscheidungen und deiner Verantwortung auf mich genommen, ich bin die Stimme deines Gewissens, und ich führe dich! Es ist die Stimme der kleinen Erlösung, der irdischen Erlösung, sie ist nicht die der grossen, die aus den Sphären kommt und das Herz erheben macht, sie ist nicht die des erlösenden Wissens, aber sie wird dem Menschen eher zuteil, und auch in ihr schwingt die Ewigkeit, freilich nur die Ewigkeit des Irdischen, nichtsdestoweniger auch sie zum Unendlichen hintönend und es verheissend, unendlich wie der irdische Zeitablauf, nicht mehr, doch auch nicht weniger, ewig wie der Rhythmus der Arbeit, der die irdische Zeit erfüllt."

(Bergroman II: 519)³¹

It can be argued that in his commitment to Mutter Hentjen Esch achieves this "kleine Erlösung", which compares very favourably with the wildly impossible and confused dreams of salvation he has earlier in the novel. It is still, however, only "die kleine Erlösung". Final salvation, perfect peace and security, the ideal union with all Being can be attained only through death.

When the narrator makes fun of Mutter Gisson's seeming approval of certain local superstitions she reproves him with the following words.

"Herr Doktor . . . muss ich dir eigens sagen, dass aus dem Hinschauen und Hinlauschen immer nur das Echo zu gewinnen ist? Zeit um Zeit sind miteinander verschlungen, und jede gibt ihr Bild weiter, ein Echo ums andere, so dass wir nie das letzte kriegen und trotzdem damit zufrieden sein müssen, denn nicht einmal das Echo, nicht das leiseste, würde die Welt hergeben, wenn du keine Lieb für sie hast im Hinlauschen und Hinschauen und schon vorher, ja bevor das Lauschen und Schauen begonnen hat . . ."

(Bergroman III: 191-192)

The narrator accepts this reproof and concludes: "Sich mit dem Echo bescheiden und doch dabei seinen Reichtum suchen, das war Mutter Gissons Weisheit und das Wissen ihres Herzens."

The final quotation is from a lengthy meditation of the narrator's about the problematical relationship between man and the higher world of transcendental reality. Again, as so often in this novel, such thoughts are stimulated by

the contemplation of Nature.

"Aus den unbekannten Ordnungen, hinter denen, ihnen zugehörig und zugleich nicht-zugehörig, freiheits- und unfreiheitsträchtig zugleich, unser letzter gemeinsamer Ursprung sich verbirgt, sind wir, Raumschicht um Raumschicht durchquerend, unablässig unserer irdischen Wohnstatt zugewandert, und obzwar wir sie unablässig erreichen, nimmt die Wanderung kein Ende, denn so unerinnerbar die Landschaftslosigkeit auch ist, ihr Bild hat, wiewohl bewusstseins-stumm, unsern Blick erfüllt, ist unsere traumhafte Sehnsucht nach dem vollkommenen Abbild im Irdischen geworden und darum unsere Enttäuschung, da wir es in solcher Vollkommenheit hier kaum finden und noch viel weniger zu errichten vermögen, so dass wir, müde der Suche, ursprungswärts zurückstreben, gebannt an das Zwischenreich. Doch der Alternde, soferne es ihm beschieden worden ist, sein Auge mehr und mehr mit der Landschaftslosigkeit zu erfüllen, er, der solcherart mehr und mehr die grosse Gemeinsamkeit erahnt, er weiss, dass es kein vollkommenes Abbild gibt, dass aber dafür dem, der wirklich sucht, das vollkommene Sinnbild in der Seins-ganzheit sichtbar werden kann." (Bergroman III: 142-143)³²

One of the main themes of Der Tod des Vergil is man's need to understand the significance of his finite, temporal existence within the context of infinity and eternity. Only such an understanding can overcome fear of death; death should ideally be seen not as the ultimate

extinction, but as the gateway from a lower to a higher plane of reality. It is regularly emphasized that, except through death, man cannot escape the limitations imposed on him by empirical reality. Any knowledge he can gain of transcendental reality must necessarily be partial and limited, based as it is on human experience. Nevertheless, by extending the range of human knowledge, by using the divine gift of reason to attempt to understand all life as a meaningful unity, man symbolically recreates on earth the perfect harmony which is inherent in and guaranteed by the Logos, the formal Ground of all Being. Man fulfils his humanity specifically by the creative application of reason within the bounds of his temporal, finite existence. "Und mag die Erkenntnis-
aufgabe auch oft und oft bis ins Überirdische reichen, mag
ihr sogar die Vereinigung der getrennten All-Sphären
aufgetragen sein, es gibt keine echte Aufgabe ohne
irdischen Ausgangspunkt, keine, die nicht mit Möglich-
keiten ihrer Lösung irdisch verwurzelt wäre." (GW 3:
115)³³

One of the consequences for Vergil of the revelations granted to him in the "Schicksalselegien" (GW 3: 221-227) is a heightened perception of the positive value of earthly reality, a reality from which he had previously taken refuge in the ivory tower of aestheticism, as the complement of transcendental reality. He comes to realize that death is merely the border between the two planes of reality and is prepared to welcome it as such,

longing to hear "die neue Sprache, das neue Wort, die neue Stimme" (GW 3: 235), "die Stimme der Grenze" (GW 3: 236) which will explain and reveal this other reality to him. He even wishes he could reproduce this new knowledge in his poetry in order to communicate it to others. But it is made clear that this voice and its message, which come from beyond the barrier of death, are incomprehensible to man unless expressed in human terms and earthly symbols: transcendental reality is by definition beyond human comprehension and can only be approached and symbolically realized through empirical reality.

"Sie, Stimme der Stimmen, ausserhalb jeglicher Sprache, gewaltiger als jede, gewaltiger sogar als die der Musik, gewaltiger als jeglicher Sang, sie, die ein Herzschlag ist, ein einziger Herzschlag, weil sie nur so die Erkenntniseinheit des Seins herzschrägrasch, augenblicks- rasch zu umfassen imstande sein wird, sie, eine Stimme der Unerfasslichkeit, das Unerfassliche ausdrückend, das Unerfassliche seiend, unerreichbar der menschlichen Sprache, unerreichbar dem irdischen Sinnbild, Urbild aller Stimmen und aller Sinnbilder dank unerreichbarster Unmittelbarkeit, sie kann solch unausdenkbarer Grenzübergangigkeit bloss dann genügen, ist nur dann möglich, wenn sie selber alles Irdische übertrifft, und wäre doch wieder unmöglich, ja unausdenkbar, würde sie dem Irdischen nicht ähneln; mag sie also auch mit irdischen Stimmen, mit irdischem Wort und irdischer Sprache nichts mehr gemein haben und kaum

mehr irdisches Sinnbild sein, sie kann das Urbild, auf dessen unirdische Unmittelbarkeit sie gerichtet ist, erst dann offenbaren, wenn sie es in einer irdischen Unmittelbarkeit spiegelt: Bild an Bild gereiht, so führt im Irdischen jede Sinnbildkette zu einer irdischen Unmittelbarkeit, zu einem irdischen Geschehen, und muss trotzdem - ein äußerster Zwang für den Menschen - darüber hinausgeführt werden, muss für jede irdische Unmittelbarkeit die ihr zugehörige und doch höhere jenseits der Grenze finden, muss das irdische Geschehen über seine Diesseitigkeit hinaus zum nochmaligen Sinnbild erheben, und ob die Sinnbildkette auch immer wieder an der Grenze zu zerreißen droht, zerbrechend an der Grenze des "Überirdischen, vergehend am Widerstand der Unerreichbarkeit, für immerdar unfortsetzbar, für immerdar zerrissen, es wird die Gefahr gebannt, wird immer wieder gebannt, es wird die Sinnbildkette immer wieder geschlossen, sooft das Unerreichbare sich selber ins Erreichbare verwandelt und, immer wieder, ins Irdische herabsteigt, um sich selber zum irdischen Geschehen, zur irdischen Tat zu verdichten, zu verkleinern, zu versichtbarlichen, um kraft solcher Selbstversinnlichung selber die Grenze aufzuheben, so dass auch die Kette des Ausdrückbaren zu einem Auf- und Absteigen werden kann, und sie sich zum Kreise schliesse, zum Wahrheitskreis, zum ewigen Sinnbildkreis, wahr in jedem seiner Bilder, wahr durch das immerwährende Kreisgleichgewicht, das um die geöffnete Grenze spielt, wahr im ewigen Austausch der göttlichen und der menschlichen Tat . . ."

(GW 3: 236-237).

It is significant that the passage from which the above quotation is taken culminates in the following words: "Oh Heimkehr in die Tat, welche die Liebe ist, denn nur die dienend hilfreiche Tat, da sie den Namen gibt und die leere Schicksalsform erfüllt, ist stärker als das Schicksal." (GW 3: 238). By commitment to the service of humanity man can give a meaningful content to the otherwise purely formal and impersonal dictates of fate.

Only once a man has died, once he has passed through the gateway of death and been wholly assimilated into the higher reality is there no need for such a symbolical representation of that reality.

"Denn die durchsichtige Dämmerlicht, die zwischen dem Oben und Unten gespannt ist und, undurchdringlich für alles Irdische, dem Lied der irdischen Sehnsucht das Eindringen in die unendlichen Sphären verwehrt, so dass es an solcher Undurchdringlichkeit zum Echo wird, zum Echo der Seele, zum freilich unvollkommenen Aussen-Echo des stummen Innen-Gesichtes und noch unvollkommeneren des ersehnten Sphärengesanges, diese trennende Echowand löst sich auf und verschwindet, wenn das Wunder des Unirdischen sich vollzieht, wenn Aussen und Innen ineinander übergehen, Ich und All miteinander vereinend." (GW 3: 508)

At the same time it is only in death that Vergil, reunited with the creative source of the universe, the Word or Logos, receives full assurance of the value of human life and endeavour, despite all their limitations.

"Der ganze Sinn des unendlichen Geschehens . . . die mild-furchtbare Herrlichkeit des menschlichen Loses, gezeugt vom Worte und in der Zeugung schon des Wortes Sinn, des Wortes Trost, des Wortes Gnade, des Wortes Fürsprache, des Wortes Erlösungsstärke, des Wortes Gesetzeskraft, des Wortes Wiedergeburt, nochmals ausgedrückt und ausdrückbar in den unzulänglichen und doch allein noch zulänglichen irdischen Bildern menschlichen Tuns und Wandels, in ihnen verkündet und bewahrt und wiederholt für immerdar." (GW

3: 531)³⁴

3. DIE UNBEKANNTE GRÖSSE

Broch's second novel, Die unbekannte Grösse, is a very minor work and can be dealt with very briefly. Broch's opinion of this work, which he completed in six weeks, is clearly documented in his correspondence. A chronological study of the relevant letters suggests that he originally attached some importance to the novel, but then became increasingly critical of its literary value as the years passed.³⁵ In October 1947 he referred to it as a "Dreckroman" (BB: 486). At first he refused to consider its publication in any collected edition of his works (BB: 501), but then conceded that it might be included, but only "aus historischen Gründen" (BB: 521-footnote).

Its main relevance to this thesis lies not in any direct reference to the theory of "das Irdisch-Absolute", which is a much later development, but in its autobiographical content, which reflects the author's personal dilemma at the time of writing. This is the only one of Broch's novel/s in which such obvious autobiographical material can be found. In a commentary for the publisher, "Grundzüge des Romans Die unbekannte Grösse", Broch describes the work as a "Roman des intellektuellen Menschen, d.h. jenes Menschen, dessen Leben . . . rein auf Erkenntnis abgestellt ist" (GW 10: 168). Such a definition of the intellectual clearly applies to Broch himself.

Even the physical description of the main character, Richard Hieck, points to Broch. Hieck is described as a

tall, rather clumsy person, but this statement is qualified as follows. "Aber ungeachtet solch massiger Unbeholfenheit, ja geradezu ihr widersprechend, war der starkknochige Schädel vorn mit einem Gesicht versehen, an dessen Fettlosigkeit und Schärfe man erkennen konnte, dass es sich mit der Zeit - entsprechenden Lebenswandel vorausgesetzt - in die asketische Härte eines Antlitzes spanischer Prägnanz verwandeln würde." (GW 10: 39)

Those familiar with photographs of Broch in his later years will at once recognize him in this description. It is also interesting to note that Broch once mentioned to Dr. Brody that his Jewish ancestors had been driven out of Spain in the fifteenth century (GW 8: 52).

At one point in the book one of Hieck's academic colleagues responds sarcastically to the former's metaphysical speculations: "Da hätten Sie Dichter, aber nicht Mathematiker werden müssen." (GW 10: 67). The relevance of this to the problem experienced by Broch in his choice between a literary and scientific career is at once evident. Hieck's personal dilemma, like that of Broch in the years 1933-1935, concerns the pursuit of objective knowledge, "Erkenntnis", as a means of understanding life and providing a firm foundation on which to construct a reliable code of conduct for the individual. In "Der Zerfall der Werte" Broch had proved to his own satisfaction that the only demonstrably reliable absolute, the only unifying factor in all modern life was the purely formal one of logic. The results of this conclusion are

expressed in the two essays, "Einheit wissenschaftlicher und dichterischer Erkenntnis" (1933) and "Gedanken zum Problem der Erkenntnis in der Musik" (1934), which have already been discussed in part two of this thesis. In these essays he concedes the subjective value of intuitive knowledge, but insists that such knowledge must somehow be incorporated into the unitary, formal structure of all objective knowledge before it can be generally accepted as a basis on which to construct a new, binding ethos commensurate with the demands of modern reality.

At that time Broch could suggest nothing better than the progressive, rigorously logical extension and development of the scientific disciplines with the aim of constantly expanding the range of objective knowledge. The problem about such a solution is that it offers no qualitative, central value to direct and control the purely formal pursuit and acquisition of knowledge. Every discipline, every system of values, if developed with rigorous logic, fulfils, formally at least, an ethical purpose, in Broch's use of the word "ethical". In such a situation humanitarian considerations can be disregarded or over-ruled if shown to stand in the way of scientific progress.

In Die unbekannte Grösse we see Richard Hieck undergoing the change of heart which eventually led Broch to develop his theory of "das Irdisch-Absolute". At first Hieck has only disdain, perhaps even hatred for "das Irdische und Konkrete und Sichtbare" (GW 10: 61). He

fears, distrusts and tries to ignore anything he cannot understand in scientific terms, especially the complications of personal relationships, sexual attraction and love.

For him the study of mathematics represents "Rettung vor der Sünde" (GW 10: 91). His ideal is to reduce his entire experience of life to a coherent scientific formula.

"Das Sündige in der Welt ist das Unberechenbare. Was aus dem kausalen und gesetzlichen Zusammenhang gelöst ist, und sei es bloss ein einsam im Raume schwebender Klang, das ist sündig. Das Isolierte ist sinnlos und sündig zugleich." (GW 10: 110) He describes his goal in life as: "die ganze Welt im Spiegel der Mathematik zu erfassen" (GW 10: 125).³⁶

Gradually his own experiences force him to realize the futility of such an ambition and compel him to see that he is doing himself and others an injustice by concentrating on the acquisition of formal knowledge to the exclusion of his own humanity and that of others. His confrontation with the phenomena of love and death finally opens his eyes to his failure. He accepts that the pursuit of formal knowledge, despite its very real value, is in itself not the key to the understanding of life and is very often irrelevant to the personal problems, hopes and fear of the individual. Finally he comes to appreciate the need for personal commitment to his fellow-men in a spirit of love and service. It is important to note that Hieck, like Broch at that stage of his life, accepts the necessity of such a commitment as an intuitively perceived, self-evident truth which cannot be explained or justified

scientifically. Later, in his theory of "das Irdisch-Absolute", we see Broch attempting to prove that humanitarian considerations must be the central, qualitative value in all human thought and action.

Die unbekannte Grösse can be seen as the transitional novel between Die Schlafwandler and the later novels. Die Schlafwandler is both formally and thematically the novel of disintegration, which shows contemporary reality dissolving into the empty formalism of conflicting value-systems where human values are wholly irrelevant. In Die unbekannte Grösse is seen the start of the process of reintegration with which Broch attempted to give literary expression to his vision of the re-introduction of humanity as the absolute value in all life and thought. This applies not only to the themes, but also to the form of this and the later novels. Broch here attempts to depart from the analytic construction of Die Schlafwandler and develop a synthetic form for his novels in which literary expression and philosophical content are harmoniously united and not deliberately isolated and used contrapuntally for mutual emphasis and illumination.³⁷ In this respect Die unbekannte Grösse represents the first tentative stage in the stylistic transition from Die Schlafwandler to Der Tod des Vergil and the various versions of the Bergroman.

It must be said that Die unbekannte Grösse, a novel of only some 130 pages, is too slight a vehicle for the weight of ideas with which it is invested. The most

important themes, above all the realization of the positive value of death as a revelation of the full meaning of life (GW 10: 150-151) and of love as a form, or rather the form of knowledge (GW 10: 161), are arbitrarily imposed on the characters instead of developing convincingly out of their personal situations and developing insights. Only in the later novels, particularly in Der Tod des Vergil and the Bergroman, are these themes more convincingly presented. Nevertheless, Die unbekannte Grösse clearly indicates the subsequent development and direction of Broch's thinking.

4. DER TOD DES VERGIL

a) The Relationship of Der Tod des Vergil to the Earlier Novels.

Broch intended Der Tod des Vergil to be the last novel he wrote before giving up his literary career in order to concentrate on the epistemological, psychological and legal studies of the 1940's which eventually led to the formulation of his theory of "das Irdisch-Absolute". Thematically, structurally and linguistically this is an extremely complex novel; the complexity is intensified because so many of the insights expressed are of a highly personal and, at times, mystical nature. The one aspect of the novel I wish to examine is Vergil's progressively developing understanding and redefinition of the concept of knowledge ("Erkenntnis") in terms of human love, duty and service. It is possible to see reflected in Vergil's revelations, and often his insights are genuine revelations rather than logically formulated conclusions, the stages through which Broch's thinking passed after the writing of "Der Zerfall der Werte". Having proved, as he thought, that the only absolute in modern life could be the purely abstract, formal one of logic Broch, realizing the disastrous implications of such a conclusion, then proceeded to try scientifically to reintroduce humanity as the central, qualitative value in life. The details of this attempt have already been discussed. In Der Tod des Vergil Broch gives literary expression to some of his most

deeply held beliefs, anticipating in this essentially subjective form the theoretical writings produced after 1945, in which he tried to raise his personal convictions to the status of objective, scientifically verifiable knowledge.

The definitive concept of human knowledge expressed by Vergil before his death represents the union and culmination of two lines of thought which are first seen in Die Schlafwandler and Die unbekannte Grösse respectively. In the former novel the modern era, i.e. post-1918, is depicted as one of chaos and inhumanity, a void between the collapse of one unifying system of values and the rise of the next. Those unfortunate enough to live at such a time are described as "ein verlorenes Geschlecht" (GW 2: 449, 684), condemned to live "zwischen dem Noch-nicht und dem Nicht-mehr" (GW 2: 678). There is a suggestion, and it is no more than that, expressed by Bertrand Müller and Dr. Flurschütz, that the only hope for mankind lies in accepting the reduction of life to its simplest form, to the most basic human needs, in order gradually to reconstruct a new humanitarian civilization from the ruins of the old one (GW 2: 609, 621). This theme is not developed at length and carries little conviction against the weight of the apocalyptic reality depicted by Broch in the last chapter of the novel.

The second, at first sight seemingly unrelated theme is found in Die unbekannte Grösse. In Die Schlafwandler, "Der Zerfall der Werte" and the related essays of that

period death is seen almost entirely in a negative light. It is the most basic cause of fear although, as such, it admittedly provides the stimulus for the creation of values. Die unbekannte Grösse, written only a year after the completion of Die Schlafwandler, opens up a completely new perspective on the phenomenon of death, revealing it in a much more positive light. Unfortunately, the failings of this short work are such that these new insights into the value of death in human experience are neither convincingly presented nor explained.

Of the two relevant passages, the first is the more comprehensible. Professor Weitprecht, an aging mathematician who until recently has been wholly absorbed in his work, realizes that he may die soon. This shock opens his eyes to the fact that, despite years of scientific research and the pursuit of formal knowledge, he has completely ignored the relevance of death for human life. He explains this revelation to his pupil, Richard Hieck.

"Lassen Sie nicht ab in Ihrem Streben nach wissenschaftlicher Erkenntnis. . . auch sie ist heilig . . . doch es ist die Heiligkeit des Lebens, und der Tod wird darüber vergessen . . . hören Sie, die Heiligkeit des Todes . . . wer an der wissenschaftlichen Erkenntnis arbeitet, arbeitet mit siebzig genau so wie er mit dreissig gearbeitet hat . . und schliesslich wird er gefällt, mittendrin gefällt, aber an keinem Ende, weil er seines eigenen Todes vergessen hat . . . ein böser Mensch mit einem bösen Herzen . . . ja, ja, lieber Freund, mit einem bösen Herzen, das im Namen der Erkenntnis viel Unrecht geübt hat . . . wer alt wird, ohne

den Sinn seines Todes zu erfassen, der stirbt als schlechter Mensch . . . ohne Erkenntnis . . . auch wenn er noch so viel erkannt und gearbeitet hat . . .'" (GW 10: 151)

The meaning of this passage is clear enough: death is an integral part, an unavoidable fact of human life. To ignore death, to fail to try to understand its significance is a wilful refusal to understand the human condition in its entirety and to view it "sub specie aeternitatis". Exactly what is meant by knowledge of death is not further specified. The second relevant passage is much more obscure. Confronted with the corpse of his dead brother, Richard Hieck suddenly realizes that life and death are complementary facets of human experience and that death is the final, meaningful goal of life. If this is not true, then life is an empty and pointless game. Richard summarizes his new found knowledge as "die grosse Erkenntnis des Seins schlechthin", concluding, "dass dieses Erkennen die Liebe sei, und dass auch die Liebe nichts anderes ist als Erkennen . . . die Heiligkeit des Todes ist die Liebe: erst Tod und Leben zusammen bilden die Ganzheit des Seins, und das Gesamterkennen ruht im Tode." (GW 10: 161).

This abstruse passage in which love, death and knowledge are so closely associated receives no further explanation. The reader must accept it as an intuitive perception on the part of Hieck. Only in Der Tod des Vergil does this complex association of ideas receive any further clarification, although this lies in the practical

reactions of Vergil to similar insights rather than in any logical explanation. In Der Tod des Vergil the themes of knowledge of death and the need for a humanitarian commitment to one's fellow-men are united.³⁸

b) Vergil's Decision to burn the Aeneid.

"Das echte Opfer, welches die letzte und entscheidende Form der Erkenntnis im Irdischen sein wird." (GW 3: 424)

With these words the dying Vergil finally gives definitive expression to the new insight into the nature of knowledge which has been gradually evolving in his mind during the hours before his death. The historical reference is to the coming of Christ and his sacrificial death through which he redeemed mankind by identifying himself with it to the point of taking upon Himself all human sin and its punishment of death.³⁹ Of greater interest is the way in which Vergil attains his new insight and then seeks to put it into practice, thus setting an example for following generations and, as far as is humanly possible, symbolically anticipating the sacrifice of the coming Saviour. This development can be traced by investigating two themes in the novel: that of "der goldene Zweig" (Sir James Frazer's "Golden Bough"), and the fate of the Aeneid. Vergil's new understanding of knowledge develops around these two objects and finally crystallizes in the course of his confrontation with Augustus in the course of the third part of the novel.

Broch's Vergil, like his creator, conceives of his art as a cognitive instrument with which to extend knowledge of the human condition. When Vergil is brought back to Brundisium in the first part of the novel he is forcefully compelled to admit that his greatest work, the

Aeneid, which is still unfinished, has failed to achieve such a purpose. This admission is wrung out of him in the episode of the "Elendsgasse" (GW 3: 42-50). He is carried through the slums of the town and forced to realize that he has completely ignored the unpleasant realities of life, the physical limitations of human existence, the suffering and depravity of which man is capable. By concentrating on and glorifying the heights of human achievement he has forgotten or suppressed his own essential humanity with all its failings and limitations. He has escaped into the ivory tower of aestheticism. "Dieses immer wieder verachtete und immer wieder gelebte Leben, er hatte Missbrauch damit getrieben, er hatte es missbraucht, um sich selbst zu übersteigen, um sich über sich selbst hinauszuheben, über jede Grenze hinaus, über alle Zeitlichkeit hinaus, als gäbe es für ihn keinen Absturz, als hätte er nicht zurückzukehren in die Zeit, in die irdische Verkerkerung, zurück ins Kreatürliche, als gähnte für ihn nicht der Abgrund." (GW 3: 45-46)

It is this experience in the "Elendsgasse" which suddenly reveals to Vergil the hidden aim of his art (GW 3: 85-93). It dawns upon him that all his life he has been seeking "Todeserkenntnis" (GW 3: 88). Just as he has failed to examine and illuminate the depths as well as the heights of human experience, so he has concentrated in his art on the superficial realities of life and failed to cast any light on the function and importance of death for the individual. The next section of the novel (GW 3: 94-

104) explains the ideal goal which would be achieved if the relationship of life and death could be fully understood. Such knowledge, by definition beyond the reach of mortal man except in symbolical or visionary form, would enable him finally to understand his role in the overall plan of the Creation and formulate a definitive code of ethics to direct his actions in fulfilling this role. This ideal but unattainable goal is described as "die Erkenntniseinheit des Seins zu erfassen" (GW 3: 99). If this could be realized the result would be "Allerkenntnis" or "Weltenallerkenntnis" (GW 3: 97). In such knowledge man would have attained a state of salvation, "Erlösung" (GW 3: 84-85) or "Heil" (GW 3: 98-99), which for Broch always means freedom from the fear and insecurity inspired in man by death and the relentless passing of time.⁴⁰

Vergil's despair at his failure to achieve "Todeserkenntnis" is temporarily overcome in the next stage of his development (GW 3: 104-118). Having realized that no literal achievement of "Todeserkenntnis" or "Allerkenntnis" is possible, he draws comfort from the consideration that the coherent, unitary structure of transcendental reality is reflected in the rational functioning of the human mind and in man's inborn impulse to try to understand his world as an objective unity of experience. This progressive, systematic pursuit of knowledge is a distinguishing characteristic of humanity. "Nur aus seiner fragenden Erkenntnis heraus und in ihr

vermag er die Einheit, die Gleichzeitigkeits-Einheit der Welt und ihrer Sphären wiederherzustellen, nur im strömenden Kreislauf der Frage vollbringt er das Jetzt seiner Seele, ihre innerste irdische Notwendigkeit, ihre Erkenntnisaufgabe von Anbeginn an." (GW 3: 105-106)⁴¹

There follow three pages of verse, interspersed with prose commentary, which trace a growing optimism in Vergil's mood to the point where he feels he could and should finish the Aeneid because, however imperfect it may be, it still represents a genuine search for knowledge. He believes at this stage, "dass das um der Erkenntnis willen Getane nicht umsonst getan worden ist und dank seiner Notwendigkeit nicht umsonst gewesen sein konnte" (GW 3: 113). Thus reassured he can feel a degree of hope: "Hoffnung im Nichtvollendeten und Nichtvollendbaren, und daneben, ganz schüchtern, die Hoffnung auf Fertigstellung der "Aeneis" (GW 3: 113-114). Even with the aid of the prose commentary the three verse passages are almost impossibly abstruse, containing as they do the lyrical expression of subjective, intuitive insights rather than reasoned argument. They contain in compressed, poetic form the same beliefs which Broch soon afterwards tried to establish on a sound scientific basis in the two long essays, "Das System als Weltbewältigung" (GW 7: 111-149) and "Über syntaktische und kognitive Einheiten" (GW 7: 151-202).⁴² Basically, the verse passages assert the essential unity of all Being and try to reconcile the paradox that man, subject as he is to temporal and spatial

limitations, has a meaningful role in infinity and eternity. Endowed with the gift of reason, man reflects the divine creative power, which has ordered all potential reality in a harmonious unity, by constantly seeking to reduce his knowledge of himself and his world to an objective, systematic unity of experience. In doing this he creates earthly or empirical reality, a concrete symbol of transcendental reality. If man knows this, if, by a process of introspection, he can see that the microcosm of the mind mirrors the macrocosm of divine, ultimate reality then he can accept the grim fact that all human endeavour, all knowledge is limited and subject to constant revision, even extinction, in the process of time.

"Denn wer die erste Pforte des Schreckens hinter sich
gelassen hat,

der ist in den Vorhof der Wirklichkeit eingezogen,
da seine Erkenntnis, sich selbst entdeckend und wie zum
ersten Male

auf sich selbst gerichtet,

das Notwendige im All, das Notwendige jeglichen Geschehens
als das Notwendige der eigenen Seele zu begreifen anhebt;
denn der, dem solches widerfährt,

der ist hinausgehalten in die Einheit des Seins,

in das reine Jetzt, das dem All und dem Menschen gemeinsam
ist." (GW 3: 108)⁴³

Such a realization helps man to accept that his paradoxical situation as a temporal and finite creature in infinity and eternity is the distinguishing feature of his humanity. He realizes that his humanity expresses itself

in the attempt to reconcile that paradox. By recognizing the need for the progressive pursuit and constant revision of knowledge, i.e. the constant creation and re-creation of his reality, man shares in the basic formal principle of all Being, namely the endless cycle of creation and dissolution, form and chaos, life and death. It is regularly emphasized that he gains such an insight into the essential unity of all Being, in which he plays an integral and meaningful part, through self-knowledge, knowledge which paradoxically demands that he accept his own insignificance and limitations.

"Denn nur im Irrtum, nur durch den Irrtum,
in den er unentrinnbar hineingehalten ist,
wird der Mensch zum Suchenden,
der er ist,
der suchende Mensch;
denn der Mensch braucht die Erkenntnis der Vergeblichkeit,
er muss ihren Schrecken, den Schrecken jeden Irrtums
auf sich nehmen und, ihn erkennend, bis zur Neige
auskosten,
er muss des Schreckens inne werden,
nicht aus Selbstqual, wohl aber
weil nur in solch erkennendem Innwerden
der Schrecken zu überwinden ist,
weil nur dann es möglich wird,
durch des Schreckens hörnerne Pforte hindurch
ins Sein zu gelangen;
...

. . . derjenige, hinter dem
 die schweren Torflügel des Schreckens sich geschlossen
 haben,
 der hat den Vorhof der Wirklichkeit erreicht, und
 das nicht-erkannt Fliessende, über das er schwebend
 dahingleitet,
 das Nicht-Erkennen, es wird ihm zum Wissensgrund,
 da es das fliessende Wachstum seiner Seele ist,
 das unvollendbar Unvollendete des eigenen Selbst,
 dennoch als Einheit sich entfaltend,
 sobald das Ich seiner selbst inne wird." (GW 3: 111-112)⁴⁴

Above all, Vergil feels reassured that no human knowledge is entirely futile, and he welcomes all knowledge even if it is harmful to man. In this we can see reflected Broch's thinking in "Der Zerfall der Werte" and the associated essays. "O Zuversicht, welche weiss, dass selbst dort, wo es zum Unheil ausschlägt, der Erkenntnisgewinn des Erlebten gewachsen ist, bleibend der Erkenntniszuwachs in der Welt." (GW 3: 114)

Immediately after expressing his confidence in the cognitive value of the Aeneid Vergil undergoes a traumatic spiritual experience which leads him to revise his view and decide to burn the poem. He is first confronted with three drunks (GW 3: 118-128) who appear to him as "Abgesandte der Hölle" (GW 3: 126). It is their complete lack of humanity, their obsession with superficial material values and animal lusts, and, above all, their nihilistic laughter which horrify Vergil.

"Es war die Furchtbarkeit des Sachlichen, das sich nicht mehr an den Menschen wendet, weder an ihn, der es hier am Fenster gesehen und vernommen hatte, noch sonst an irgendeinen Menschen, gleichsam eine Sprache, die nicht mehr Brücke zwischen Menschen ist, gleichsam ein aussermenschliches Lachen, dessen Hohnbereich den sachlichen Weltbestand als solchen umfasst, und das, über jeden menschlichen Bereich hinausreichend, den Menschen nicht mehr verlacht, wohl aber mit der Blossstellung der Welt ihn einfach vernichtet; oh, so hatte es im Lachen der drei Gestalten geklungen, Entsetzen ausdrückend, Entsetzen vermittelnd." (GW 3: 126)⁴⁵

The full significance of this laughter is revealed to Vergil in what follows (GW 3: 129-145). He is forced to realize that such laughter makes a mockery of his flight into aestheticism and unmasks his failure as an artist. He has purveyed beauty, not knowledge; he sees the laughter for what it is: "das Lachen, verzweifelter Ersatz für die verlorene Erkenntniszuversicht, das Lachen als Ende für die abgebrochene Flucht in die Schönheit, das Ende des abgebrochenen Schönheitsspieles." (GW 3: 138)

Aestheticism, the conscious search for beauty is directly contrasted with the pursuit of knowledge. The latter implies a constant, progressive development, for which the insecurity caused by man's fear of the unknown, eternity and infinity provides the essential stimulus. The aesthetic perception of the world is, by nature, static and therefore false. It does not relieve human fear, but conceals it by attempting to present the world as a finite,

harmonious, formal unity and by ignoring the problems raised for man by such concepts as infinity and eternity. Beauty is "die begrenzte Unendlichkeit" (GW 3: 133) and art creates "das Unsterbliche im Raum, nicht im Menschen" (GW 3: 134). Above all else, art is inhuman and impersonal because it can treat humanity only as the material with which to play its aesthetic games. "Hart gegen menschliches Leid, weil es nicht mehr bedeutet als vergängliches Sein, nicht mehr als Wort, Gestein,

Getön oder Farbe,

benützt zur Schönheitssuche und Schönheitsentdeckung in steter Wiederholung;

und es enthüllt sich dem Menschen die Schönheit als

Grausamkeit,

als die wachsende Grausamkeit des ungezügelten Spieles, das im Sinnbild Unendlichkeitsgenuss verspricht,

erkenntnisverachtenden, geniesserischen Genuss

irdischer Schein-Unendlichkeit

und darob unbedenklich Leid und Tod zuzufügen vermag,

da es im grenzentrückten Gebiet der Schönheit geschieht."

(GW 3: 134-135)

Once nihilistic laughter destroys this aesthetic vision of the world, the horrific chaos concealed by such a vision is revealed. It is the human function as a rational creature to create reality out of such chaos by progressively reducing it to a coherent, systematic unity of experience.

At this point mention must be made of Broch's dualistic view of the philosophical concept of Nothingness

or the void of non-existence out of which creation takes place ("das Nichts"). As has already been stated, Broch's theory of creation fails to draw any clear distinction between this Nothingness and a primeval, amorphous chaos which he refers to variously as "die Vorschöpfung" or "Humus des Seins" (GW 3: 85) or "Humus des Anfangs" (GW 3: 465). The only possible differentiation which can be read out of this novel, and it is not rigorously maintained, is that "das Nichts" is a spiritual extinction or void, and "die Vorschöpfung" or "Humus des Seins" represents the dark, mysterious origins of physical life. His dualistic interpretation of the origins of life, whether spiritual or physical, is that if they are accepted, if man can respond to the creative challenge to impose order on his experience and understand life and death to the best of his ability, then those unknown, dark origins assume a positive value and provide the rich material from which man can mould his reality. Where man refuses to acknowledge the dark and frightening roots of life, then they become a source of fear for him. Metaphysically speaking, this is the reciprocal relationship of "das Nichts" and "das Sein" which Broch describes.⁴⁶ Psychologically speaking, it is the same relationship in the human psyche of the unconscious and the conscious.⁴⁷ In both cases the determining factor is the individual's ability, or inability, to come to terms with the unknown.

When Vergil's aesthetic view of the world is shattered by the drunks' laughter he is confronted with a vision of the formless chaos of life which he has

deliberately ignored or concealed. Finally his failure as an artist is given articulate expression.

"Aufgebrochen das Nirgendwo des Gelächters,
lachend aufgebrochen die Weltenumstülpung schlechthin,
als hätte es niemals jenen Eid der Schöpfung gegeben,
den Eid, mit dem Gott und Mensch sich gegenseitig
verpflichtet haben,
verpflichtet zur Erkenntnis und wirklichkeitsschaffenden
Ordnung,
verpflichtet zur Hilfe, welche die Pflicht zur Pflicht ist;
oh, es ist das Lachen des Verrates." (GW 3: 142)

Vergil believes in a mutual oath of creation binding God and man, obliging the latter to fulfil his humanity by creating on earth an empirical reality which reflects the transcendental reality of Divine Being.⁴⁸ By acquiring knowledge, by creating a harmonious empirical reality man helps his fellow-men to find peace and security and understand their role in infinity and eternity. The mission of the three drunks now dawns upon Vergil: "jene drei, die drei Torkelnden da drunten, sie waren die Zeugen des Meineides gewesen. Und sie hatten Zeugenschaft wider ihn abgelegt. Dies war ihre Notwendigkeit." (GW 3: 144).

The theme of the golden bough is introduced in the next stage of Vergil's developing awareness of his failure and guilt as artist and man (GW 3: 146-179). He admits that his ambition has been to emulate Orpheus, "Orpheus, erkoren zum Führer der Menschen" (GW 3: 148). As an artist he had wanted to help man overcome his fear of death

and the unknown. He has been forced to realize that art can, at the most, temporarily conceal such fear in aesthetic intoxication; but it can never relieve that fear by contributing to an understanding of it. That cannot be done by the aesthete in his ivory tower, but only by someone who knows and shares that fear and who fully appreciates the true function of death in life.

"Der heilsbringende Führer nämlich hat die Sprache der Schönheit abgestreift, er ist unter ihre kalte Oberfläche, unter die Oberfläche der Dichtung gelangt, er ist zu den schlichten Worten vorgedrungen, die kraft ihrer Todesnähe und Todeserkenntnis die Fähigkeit gewonnen haben, an die Versperrtheit des Nebenmenschen zu pochen, seine Angst und seine Grausamkeit zu beruhigen und ihn der echten Hilfe zugänglich zu machen, er ist vorgedrungen zu der schlichten Sprache unmittelbarer Güte, zur Sprache der unmittelbaren menschlichen Tugend, zur Sprache der Erweckung." (GW 3: 150)

This new language is not that of poetry, but that of active commitment to one's fellow-humans and identification with their needs.

Vergil then thinks again of Orpheus. He suggests that the latter descended into Hades not so much to find Eurydice as to experience death himself, be reborn and return with the gift of a new language capable of expressing that new found knowledge to all men. Broch then quotes, in translation, the famous passage from the sixth book of the Aeneid, lines 126-152, which opens with the words

"facilis descensus averno . . ." (GW 3: 151). Aeneas is there contemplating visiting the underworld. The right to enter and leave Hades is granted to a mortal only if he can present to Proserpina a golden bough torn from an eternally flourishing tree dedicated to that goddess. The passage from the Aeneid states explicitly that the bough cannot simply be broken off by anyone, but only by someone chosen by fate and who has performed the necessary sacrifice of expiation and purification, "das Sühnopfer". The due sacrifice demanded of Aeneas is that he bury the corpse of his "fidus Achates". Once he has done this he is able to break off the golden bough and thus gain access to, and exit from the underworld.⁴⁹

Vergil now draws a much more general conclusion from this passage in his poem and in doing so re-interprets the mythological descent into Hades in order to express his new insight into man's need to accept the mystery and insignificance of his own life in the face of eternity and infinity. The underworld now refers, for him, not only to the mystery and threat of death, but to all the dark, unplumbed depths of the human psyche, the fears and hopes, needs and weaknesses inherent in the human condition. Human life can be lived to the full only once all this is recognized. The first gloss Vergil offers to the passage from the Aeneid generalizes its particular significance by saying that access to the underworld is granted only to those who have fulfilled their duty to their fellow-men, as did Aeneas in burying Achates, "also vom Gott wie vom Schicksal berufen, gemeinsam ihr Wille, ist jenem die

Grenze geöffnet, dem die Heiligkeit letzter Pflichterfüllung und Hilfeleistung zusteht." (GW 3: 151).

He feels that, unlike Aeneas, he has been refused "der Zweig der Führung, der Zweig der Erkenntnis" (GW 3: 152), "der goldene Zweig der Wahrheit" (GW 3: 153) because he has failed to fulfil the basic demands of human love, duty and service. Because he has refused to share the lot common to all men he cannot plumb the depths of the human condition in order to reassure others that humanity, despite its finite and temporal limitations, has a meaningful function in the realization of the divine order on earth. A harmonious social and humanitarian order is the empirical complement on earth of the ideal unity of divine, transcendental reality. He has not shared in the creation of that order.

"Verwehrt war ihm der Abstieg, verwehrt erst recht die titanische Wiederkunft aus der Tiefe, die Wiederkunft, an der das Menschliche sich bestätigt, verwehrt war der Aufstieg zur Erneuerung des Schöpfungseides, und hatte er es stets gewusst, er wusste jetzt deutlicher denn je zuvor, dass er von der Eideshilfe des Heilbringers ausgeschlossen war, ein für allemal, weil Eideshilfe und Menschenhilfe einander bedingen und nur in ihrem Zusammenhalt die gemeinschaftstiftende, die menschheitstiftende Aufgabe des Titans sich erfüllt, ergeboren, himmelszugekehrt, weil nur in der Menschheit, weil nur in der echten Gemeinschaft, spiegelnd die Ganzheit alles Menschentums, spiegelnd die Menschheit, der erkenntnisgetragene, erkenntnistragende Kreislauf göttlicher Frage und Antwort sich vollzieht."

(GW 3: 152)

From the point in the novel where the golden bough is first mentioned knowledge, "Erkenntnis", is increasingly defined, not just as formal, scientific knowledge, but in terms of "Liebe", "Tat", "Pflicht", "Hilfe" and "Opfer". The purely formal, epistemological aspect yields progressively to a definition of knowledge which implies acceptance of the qualitative criterion of humanity, with all its limitations, as the central standard around which alone a harmonious earthly reality, the mirror of transcendental reality, can be constructed. If this is not accepted, and it implies the moral commitment of the individual to his fellow, the result is chaos, as shown in "Der Zerfall der Werte", and not a systematic unity of experience, social or otherwise.

The only expiation for his failure that Vergil can imagine is "Selbstausslöschung und Tod" (GW 3: 157), but this is not granted to him. He is subjected to a vision of primeval chaos devoid of order and meaning and ruled only by chance (GW 3: 158-165); he realizes that such a vision of the world is inevitable if death is not properly understood, but seen simply as an arbitrary end to life. Unless man's experience of death can be integrated into his understanding of life the latter must seem ridiculous and senseless. Where this is the case, death clearly assumes a negative value and Vergil feels that he himself is dead because he has not understood death, but lived an empty and superficial life, "er selber . . . abgestorben

in den Vortod der Unschöpfung, abgestorben ins Meineidige, ins Hinkende, ins Verbogene" (GW 3: 165). He has lived life at an empty, aesthetic level, failing to identify himself with his fellow-men, failing to understand and respect their fears, and treating them as mere lifeless material for his art.

"Oh, er hatte ein Leben in der Nicht-Gemeinschaft der Toten verbracht, er hatte immer nur mit Toten gelebt und desgleichen die Lebenden zu ihnen gerechnet, er hatte die Menschen immer nur als Tote gesehen, hatte sie immer nur als Bausteine zur Errichtung und Erzeugung von todeserstarrender Schönheit genommen, und es waren die Menschen ihm darum allesamt ins Unbewältigte entschwunden, in die Unerkenntnis ewiger Unerschafflichkeit." (GW 3: 168)

Again Orpheus is recalled. By virtue of his love for Eurydice he had at least penetrated into the underworld, even if his purpose in doing so is not fulfilled. Vergil has never known love in any form; he has always maintained a cool distance to other people and has thus never been able to find the golden bough which would grant him access to the underworld (GW 3: 166-167). Vergil's final realization of his failure as an artist and man is expressed in the following passage, the importance of which is emphasized by the use of italics throughout.

"Der Liebe Erinnerungsstärke hatte Orpheus den Eintritt in die Hades tiefe erzwungen, allerdings um ihm zugleich den letzten Abstieg zu verwehren, so dass er, verloren in der Unterweltlichkeit des Gedächtnisses, zur vorzeitigen Umkehr genötigt war, unkeusch noch in der Keuschheit und

zerrissen im Unheil. Er hingegen, liebe los von Anbeginn, unfähig, das liebende Gedächtnis voranzuschicken und von keiner Erinnerung geführt, er war nicht einmal in die ersten Tiefen des erzbeherrschenden Vulcanus gelangt, geschweige denn zu den Bereichen der gesetzestiftenden Väter, geschweige denn noch tiefer in die des weltgebärenden erinnerungsgebärenden, heilgebärenden Nichts, und er war in der erstarrten Leere der Oberfläche geblieben." (GW 3: 174)

Because of his lack of love, his lack of identification and involvement with mankind, he has failed to appreciate and reconcile the paradox of man's weakness and insignificance with his role in the creative process. As a punishment he must undergo "die Strafe des Erkenntnisverlustes und der Verlassenheit im Kerker des blindnotwendigen Dahindämmerns, die Verlassenheit der Nicht-Erkennnis in unerkennter Notwendigkeit" (GW 3: 176).⁵⁰

Vergil experiences a spiritual contrition in which his individual consciousness is almost completely extinguished. "Das Ich . . . hineingeschleudert in die Zerknirschung seines Selbst, geschleudert in Zerknirschung und Aber-Zerknirschung, es war gedemütigt zur Notwendigkeit, ausweglos, zur Notwendigkeit seiner Zerknirschung, hineingedemütigt in die Zerknirschung des leeren, des schieren Nicht-mehr-Bestehens; das Ich war seiner selbst verlustig geworden, war beraubt seines Menschentums, von dem nichts geblieben war, nichts als die nacktste Nacktheits-Schuld der Seele, so dass auch sie, ich-verlustig und doch unzerstörbar als Menschenseele, nun nichts mehr war als

zerknirscht leere Nacktheit . . . " (GW 3: 177)

What follows is problematical. It would seem reasonable to assume that Vergil here undergoes death in life and will recover from the experience with a genuine knowledge of death which he can communicate to others. This is not and cannot be the case. A mortal is granted knowledge of death, symbolized in the golden bough, only if he fulfils his obligations to his fellow-men. Vergil has not yet done this. Instead he is forced to experience a "Scheintod" and realize that he has lived a "Scheinleben". Both words are regularly identified with the amorphous, primeval chaos of the "Vorschöpfung".⁵¹ In this passage (GW 3: 179-197) there are drawn numerous obvious parallels between the emptiness and unreality of his "Scheintod" and the earlier description of the superficiality of his life and work (GW 3: 168-171). The suggestion is that Vergil cannot yet die properly because he has not lived properly. He realizes that up to this point he has misunderstood death, seeing it and fearing it only as the physical extinction of the human animal with no prospect of rebirth. This is the "Scheintod" he feared and tried to conceal in his work, but which he must now experience in visionary form. "Nacht für Nacht hatte er in eitler Selbsttäuschung vermeint dem Sterben zu lauschen, und doch war es bloss Abwehr des Scheintodgrauens gewesen, Abwehr der Scheintodbilder, die sich Nacht für Nacht gemeldet hatten, und von denen er nichts hatte wissen wollen, die zu sehen er abgelehnt hatte, und die trotzdem geblieben waren." (GW 3: 186-187)

Real death, death in its positive function, is the total extinction of the individual spirit and its reunion with the creative power of the universe. In order to appreciate this man must strip himself of all animal qualities, especially the desire and instinct for life, and accept that rebirth is possible only in spirit. "Scheintod" and "Scheinleben" are regularly associated with the words "Tier" and "Kreatur" in a negative connotation.⁵² Only once Vergil accepts that death, in its positive function, implies absolute spiritual extinction as a prelude to spiritual rebirth is the word "Geschöpf" applied to man, used with its associated ideas of "Schöpfung" and "schöpfen". Man can share in the creative process only when he accepts his transient role in its cyclical process. "Oh, nur dasjenige ist Geschöpf, darf Geschöpf genannt werden, nur dasjenige, das immer wieder hinabsteigt zu den Flammen der Wiedergeburt, unablässig bemüht, dass das Unbesiegte nicht neuerlich aufquelle, dass das vormütterlich Unerschaffene nicht neuerlich aufbreche zu steinerner Stummheit, oh, Geschöpf ist das Schöpfungsschaffende, das im Hinabsteigen sich selbst zum Opfer bringt, rückhaltlos und umwendungsbefreit, bar jeder Umkehrung zum Rausche, ja mehr noch, bar jeder Umkehrung zu irgendeinem Erkennen oder Wiedererkennen, abtuend jedwede kreatürliche Angst, abtuend auch den letzten kreatürlichen Wunsch, oh, wir sind bloss dann Geschöpf der Schöpfung, wenn wir das Kreatürliche gänzlich von uns abstreifen." (GW 3: 192-193)

Vergil's vision of his "Scheintod" and "Scheinleben" yields only when he decides to burn the Aeneid, to destroy

it because it has failed to illuminate the positive value of death in the cycle of creation. It must be noted that Vergil has not yet himself attained knowledge of death: at the most, he now knows what death is not. He has not yet found or broken off the golden bough which is the passport to such knowledge. The decision to burn the Aeneid is essentially self-centered, taken, as Vergil thinks, as personal atonement for his failure to achieve for himself or communicate to others any genuine knowledge of the full significance of death.⁵³ Such a sacrifice does not itself contribute to the attainment of this knowledge, nor does it help to clarify the positive, reciprocal relationship between earthly and transcendental reality.

c) "Erkenntnis" and "Liebe".

Just before he dies Vergil renounces his decision to burn the Aeneid. Instead of destroying it as a worthless piece of art which has failed in its cognitive function he gives it as a token of friendship to Caesar Augustus. It would seem that the cause of knowledge is sacrificed to the basic human needs of friendship and reassurance. This is not the case. As a direct result of presenting the poem to Augustus, Vergil is given the golden bough, thus symbolically gaining a true knowledge of death while still alive. Death reveals its full significance for man only in the light of a life lived in the service of others.

The process by which Vergil attains this new insight is seen in his progressive re-evaluation of purely formal knowledge in terms of human commitment and love. This is of course relevant to the theory of "das Irdisch-Absolute". Vergil, like Broch, rejects reliance on a purely formal, abstract concept of knowledge in favour of a qualitative definition of knowledge centered on humanity as the absolute criterion of value. Up to the point where he decides to burn the Aeneid Vergil has attained a theoretical insight into this new concept of knowledge. It is theoretical because he is aware only that he has not realized such knowledge in his own life. His first reaction is not to remedy this error, but to want to destroy the Aeneid as an act of sacrificial atonement.

Man's cognitive function as a rational creature has been defined as his duty to create a unitary, harmonious reality on earth as a concrete symbol of transcendental reality.⁵⁴ In doing this, he helps his fellow-men understand their role in eternity and infinity and thus calms their fear of death and the unknown. If such fears are suppressed rather than accepted and explained they can lead man to seek refuge and false security in materialism, mass hysteria and nihilism where individual dignity and integrity have no part to play. Vergil then begins to see knowledge less as the understanding of the purely formal, abstract relationships underlying reality and more as a positive commitment to humanity. Humanity is understood as the community of all individuals who recognize their active responsibility to each other and God, however the latter may be conceived of, progressively to realize the ideal, divine reality on earth. "Erkenntnis" becomes increasingly associated with "Liebe", "Tat", "Gemeinschaft" and "Hilfe".⁵⁵ Such knowledge implies an acceptance of the essential dualism of human nature, an awareness of the animal depths to which man can fall and of the spiritual and intellectual heights to which he can rise, although it is emphasized that man can never and should never try to sever himself from his animal origins. This knowledge demands a complete identification of the individual with his fellow-men. Standing as they do between the extremes of the purely physical and the purely spiritual world all men share the same fate, the same fears, hopes and weaknesses. Such identification is the highest

ideal of human love: "jene menschlichste aller Aufgaben, die allzeit und ausschliesslich Schicksal-auf-sich-Nehmen heisst." (GW 3: 166).⁵⁶ Sexual love is in itself not enough. This is made clear when Vergil, in his delirium, tries to close his mind to the new insights pressing in upon him by taking refuge in sexual fantasies. He is forced to realize that such a form of love will never enable him to break off the golden bough (GW 3: 324-329).

In Vergil's re-interpretation of the concept of knowledge Broch has transferred to the qualitative, anthropological plane the purely formal, epistemological criterion of knowledge. In all his epistemological writings, but probably most clearly in "Werttheoretische Bemerkungen zur Psychoanalyse", Broch sees the attainment of knowledge as the formal identification of the subject and object of cognition, the assimilation of the latter into the unitary, systematic, epistemological structure of the former. On several occasions Broch explicitly equates this formal relationship of the subject and object of cognition with the complete identification ideally existing between a lover and his loved one.⁵⁷ It is in the light of these considerations that Vergil's statement, "die Wirklichkeit ist die Liebe" (GW 3: 276), must be understood. Reality is what man can understand as a systematic unity of experience; it is what he has created out of chaos by imposing on it the formal, rational relationships of his own mind. He has thus identified himself with and assimilated his own creation, his reality.

Human love can never achieve such a perfect identification, but it can provide a valuable symbolic experience, given the limitations of empirical reality, of the ideal unity of all Being, a unity into which man enters fully only through death. Vergil expresses this knowledge in the words "Liebeswirklichkeit, Todeswirklichkeit, ein und das nämliche" (GW 3: 284).⁵⁸

It is significant that the symbolic value of human love, however imperfect, is positively affirmed in Der Tod des Vergil. In Die Schlafwandler, especially at the end of Esch, it is criticized and indeed rejected by Broch, being interpreted as an attempt to halt or at least escape from the inexorable historical processes leading to the final dissolution of values. The reason for this different interpretation can be found in the gradual development of Broch's theory of "das Irdisch-Absolute" in the years between writing the two novels. This explanation is further confirmed by another important change in Broch's thinking which is revealed by a comparison of the two works.

In Die Schlafwandler Broch suggests that no love, no new human community can evolve until the old value-system has wholly disintegrated, exposing man to the horror of existential isolation. The dominating and pessimistic note on which the novel closes is that of man lost in the void between the collapse of one value-system and the birth of another. That generation is "ein verlorenes Geschlecht" (GW 2: 469, 684) lost "zwischen dem Noch-nicht und dem Nicht-mehr" (GW 2: 678). The message at the end of Huguenau is quite unequivocal: there is no point in trying

to form a community of love and human commitment because the final crisis must run its course.

Vergil also stands on the threshold between two civilizations with their unitary system of values: the Golden Age of Roman antiquity and the Christian era. In a very obvious contrast to his first novel Broch repeatedly emphasizes the theme of "noch nicht und doch schon".⁵⁹ It is made clear that any act of humanity is valuable and relevant in itself even in the face of the relentlessly logical developments of history. Vergil's final gift of the Aeneid to Augustus and the re-making of his will in the interests of his friends and slaves are not only a last fulfilment of his humanity and a re-assertion of the values of earthly reality. They also represent a prophetic anticipation of the new Christian doctrines of love and self-sacrifice. Vergil's acts are no less relevant and they are in no way devalued because the coming era must be preceded by the total collapse of its predecessor. It should be noted that one single variation of the theme of "noch nicht und doch schon" occurs in Die Schlafwandler (GW 2: 609). Dr. Bertrand Müller, who expresses Broch's own thoughts in "Der Zerfall der Werte", has an intuitive perception of a higher, Platonic reality lying beyond the chaos of disintegrating values: "es war eine Art Schwebezustand zwischen Nochnicht-Wissen und Schon-Wissen . . ." He cannot communicate this knowledge to anyone and he fails to translate it into any positive action relevant to his own life or to that of others. Vergil

succeeds where Bertrand Müller fails.⁶⁰

Vergil's new insight into the nature of knowledge is confirmed in the five "Schicksalselegien" (GW 3: 221-227) and the conclusion which finally dawns upon him "Öffne die Augen zur Liebe!" (GW 3: 244). He responds to this imperative only when he gives up his intention of burning the Aeneid and presents it to Augustus.⁶¹ In the elegies and Vergil's response to the new perceptions gained in them we can see a condensed, poetic expression of the development of the theory of "das Irdisch-Absolute". Fate is first seen as the purely formal structure of existence, so abstract and impersonal as to be irrelevant to human needs, beyond human influence. As such it seems to the individual to be identical with chance. "Schicksal" is progressively described as "allesdurchdringende Form und kalt", "Abgrund der Form", "Leerform" and finally "Zufall" (GW 3: 221-224).

The potentially nihilistic reaction of man to his destiny can be overcome only if he recognizes his creative duty in empirical reality and actively takes upon himself his fate and that of his fellow-men, thus filling the empty form of fate with significant human content, "denn Schöpfung ist mehr als Form" (GW 3: 225). This can be done only through a positive commitment to humanity: this is the essence of knowledge and love, the fullest expression and realization of man's divine duty on earth. "Oh Heimkehr in die Tat, welche die Liebe ist, denn nur die dienend hilfreiche Tat, da sie den Namen gibt und die leere Schicksalsform erfüllt, ist stärker als das

Schicksal." (GW 3: 238)

In this novel Broch repeatedly emphasizes that the empty, impersonal form of fate loses its threat and horror for man only when the latter accepts and imposes human values on it. "Form" yields to "Inhalt".⁶² Later love, "die liebend dienende Tat", is explicitly described as "der unsichtbare Weltinhalt" (GW 3: 319).⁶³ Clearly this is a poetic and visionary expression of the theory of "das Irdisch-Absolute" with which Broch attempted to re-introduce the human factor into every formal discipline and upon which he tried to found a new, humanitarian system of political legislation. It must be added that this literary formulation is far from convincing, largely because it presents a subjective, visionary revelation and not a reasoned argument. Walter Baumann has already pointed out the disparity between the turgid metaphysical speculation of the elegies and the simple moral conclusion drawn from them. It is also evident that the elegies reflect the unresolved conflict of free will and fate which is found in "Geschichtsgesetz und Willensfreiheit".

As a result of the revelations granted to him through the "Schicksalselegien" Vergil knows where redemption lies: it is to be found in knowledge, but a knowledge defined in terms of love and human service. This insight is still on the theoretical plane; it still has to be put into practice. This finally happens when the dying Vergil is visited by Caesar Augustus.

d) The Meeting of Vergil and Augustus.

There can be little doubt that the description of Vergil's last meeting with his friend and emperor (GW 3: 333-440) is central to the whole novel. Quantitatively this is the most important single episode, occupying more than 100 pages. The critics are virtually unanimous in interpreting the meeting and the gift of the Aeneid in a positive light. The only exception I know of is Karl August Horst, who curiously, and with very little support from the text, takes a very negative view of the conversation between the two men and the final gift of the poem.⁶⁴ Broch himself referred to the scene of reconciliation between poet and emperor as "der menschliche Kern des Ganzen" (GW 8: 270).

The greater part of this episode is taken up by the argument in which Vergil attempts to defend his decision to burn the Aeneid and Augustus claims it as public property because it will, so he believes, immortalize his achievements and those of the Roman state he has created. Vergil maintains that the poem must be destroyed because it has failed in its cognitive purpose of contributing to an understanding of death and the spiritual reality beyond it. Although Vergil only gradually realizes it, he is attempting to justify an essentially self-centered decision; he is concerned only to expiate his personal failure as an artist. He has convinced himself that the poem now represents a barrier between himself and the

ultimate spiritual reality; in the destruction of the poem, his life's work, he sees a symbolical form of self-immolation through which he can gain knowledge of death in life.

"Und nun hiess es das Opfer vollziehen, nun hiess es selber mitsamt dem Gedicht das Nichts erreichen, auf dass die Todeswirklichkeit erstehe." (GW3: 359) "'Das Gedicht . . . ich muss zum Wissen gelangen . . . das Gedicht steht vor dem Wissen, es steht mir im Wege.'" (GW 3: 364)

In the argument Vergil appears as the advocate of metaphysical, spiritual reality against the demands of empirical reality. He does not seem fully aware of the implications of his words, but there is no doubt that he devalues empirical, human reality in the light of, and for the sake of transcendental reality. At the most, Vergil is prepared to acknowledge that human experience and knowledge may have a symbolical value because they can reflect the ideal unity of Platonic reality. Such a concession cannot satisfy the emperor. The conflict between the two men is best seen in their views on the state. For Vergil the Roman state, which has united the known, western world, is merely a transient, earthly symbol of transcendental reality (GW 3: 390-401). He also sees it as the basis on which a new and greater civilization with genuinely spiritual values, namely the Christian one, will develop (GW 3: 420-421). The emperor's view is understandably diametrically opposed to this. He is the representative of the empirical world and is depicted as

a somewhat disillusioned and cynical realist. For him the state is the ultimate reality: "Höchste Wirklichkeit ist der Staat." (GW 3: 409). As ruler of this state he demands that everyone and everything be duty-bound to serve it (GW 3: 401-411). His opinions are certainly extreme in this respect, but one can feel a degree of sympathy for the exasperation he expresses when constantly challenged by Vergil to acknowledge the claims of what seems to be some indefinably vague higher reality.

"'Wohin noch, Vergil! wohin noch! Dies alles führt weit übers Irdische hinaus und enthält keine irdische Aufgabe mehr. Ich jedoch, ich bin ins Irdische gestellt, und ich habe mich damit zu bescheiden.'" (GW 3: 414)

These words of Augustus reveal not only an angry frustration, but also a genuine pathos which becomes increasingly evident in Augustus's conversation throughout this episode. We see him becoming increasingly irritated and aggressive because Vergil's words touch on a raw nerve. The emperor knows he is mortal; he is only too well aware of the transience of earthly reality. For this reason he wants to create a lasting state as a monument to himself; for the same reason he wishes to preserve the Aeneid for posterity because it glorifies his achievements and those of his state.

The beliefs of the two men are irreconcilable. There is no possibility of compromise. Vergil is talking about a spiritual reality, Augustus about a material one. Nevertheless, a solution is found, not through rational

argument or persuasion, but in an act of loving friendship. Towards the end of this scene Augustus becomes increasingly angry. The human weaknesses of fear and insecurity in the face of eternity and infinity finally drive him to lose his temper with Vergil. At once, and for the first time, communication is possible between the two by a mutual recognition of each other's humanity in all its limitations. "Kein Zweifel, der Geheiligte zeterte, und er geriet immer weiter ins Zetern. Und doch war es so sonderbar gut, dass das geschah, es war so sonderbar gut, oh, so gut, dass das noch möglich sein konnte, und es war als zeigte sich im Unsichtbaren ein unsichtbar fester Boden, jener unsichtbar feste Grund, von dem aus wieder die unsichtbaren Brücken sich spannen würden, die Brücken des Menschlichen und der Menschlichkeit, verkettend das Wort mit dem Gegenwort, verschränkend den Blick mit dem Gegenblick, so dass Wort wie Blick wieder sinnerfüllt würden, die Menschheitsbrücken der Begegnung. Oh, dass er nur weiter spräche." (GW 3: 428)

In a spontaneous act of friendship Vergil offers Augustus the Aeneid, knowing why it means so much to him. Augustus's response is described as follows: "aus des Cäsars Seele löste sich nun . . . eine Sekunde der Freundschaft, eine Sekunde der Zuneigung, eine Sekunde der Liebe." (GW 3: 431). The word "Liebe" is carefully chosen here and is later repeated with reference to Vergil's gift of the poem when he says: "'In Liebe habe ich die Äneis dem Augustus zugeeignet.'" (GW 3: 456).

Love is the highest form of knowledge: it implies

a complete identification of subject and object. Vergil gives Augustus the Aeneid because he recognizes the latter's hope, fears and insecurity as being characteristically human and the same as his own, although they are differently expressed. In giving the emperor the poem Vergil does make a sacrifice of it, but not in the way he originally intended. With the gift of the Aeneid he at last puts into practice his insight that the highest form of knowledge is love and self-sacrifice. He had wanted to destroy the poem because it failed to provide knowledge of death. The paradox is that by preserving it, by sacrificing the pursuit of abstract knowledge in the interests of human friendship, Vergil attains the knowledge he sought. The harmony attained in human love symbolically anticipates the perfect union of the soul with the Divine after death. Hermann Weigand has neatly described Vergil's action in giving Augustus the Aeneid as "reversal . . . from sacrifice as renunciation to renunciation as sacrifice".⁶⁵

In Vergil's action can also be seen a variation of the theme of "noch nicht und doch schon": transcendental reality can be experienced or at least anticipated in this world. In the light of Vergil's gift and the subsequent ordering of his earthly affairs the title of this third part of the novel, "Erde - Die Erwartung", assumes its full significance. Vergil has come to realize that all earthly life can and should be an act of preparation for, and a progressively developing understanding of death as the gateway to eternity and infinity. As such the value

of earthly reality should be positively affirmed. This is clearly a complete reversal of the philosophical content of Die Schlafwandler.

The gift of the Aeneid is only the first step of Vergil's positive re-affirmation of earthly and human reality. After presenting the poem to Augustus he sets his earthly affairs in order and revises his will. He makes more generous provisions for his friends (GW 3: 459-460), sets aside a sum of money for the poor of Brundisium, the city where his intellectual and aesthetic arrogance was finally stripped from him (GW 3: 460), dictates the principles on which the Aeneid is to be edited (GW 3: 473f), and sets all his slaves free (GW 3: 480). Only once he has fulfilled these responsibilities can he die in peace: "Dem Irdischen war Genüge getan." (GW 3: 482).

All Vergil's words and thoughts in the last minutes of his life are either prompted or accompanied by comments from the slave who has been with him since he entered the palace at Brundisium. For Vergil in his delirium the slave ceases to be a concrete figure of empirical reality and becomes part of his visionary experience. The figure of the slave assumes an increasingly complex symbolical meaning for Vergil. He regularly symbolizes death and time.⁶⁶ It is the slave who speaks out against the materialistic values of Augustus's empire and prophesies the triumph of the spiritual freedom of Christianity.⁶⁷ As the prophet of Christianity he is concerned with the future (GW 3: 437). At the same time, and this is probably his most important role, he represents the claims

of human responsibility in the present, or at any time. Although, as the messenger of death, he points to a new spiritual reality, he releases Vergil from his grip long enough to allow the latter to fulfil his duty on earth before dying. "'Nicht um der Bitten der Frau, nicht um der Bitten des Knaben willen gebe ich dich frei, nicht um deiner eigenen Angst willen; ich gebe dich frei, weil du deinen irdischen Dienst zu vollenden gedenkst.'" (GW 3: 448) Thereafter he regularly reminds Vergil of the pressing need to carry out his earthly responsibilities before dying.⁶⁸ He urges Vergil to admit his weakness and failure and pray for help from the unknown Father, presumably the God of Christianity (GW 3: 467-468). Once Vergil has done this the slave again urges him to accept earthly existence to the full and not to regard it simply as a transient symbol to be sacrificed for transcendental reality (GW 3: 473).

Only once Vergil responds to this advice can he, with any genuine conviction, acknowledge that the Aeneid has any real value beyond that of the gift of friendship. He finally recognizes that the poem, despite its many deficiencies, represents a real, valid attempt on his part to understand death and man's place in eternity and infinity.⁶⁹ It is significant that this insight is gained only after the act of love in giving the poem to Augustus. This is a further reminder that the transcendental reality of the spiritual world can be understood through positive commitment to one's fellow-men. Vergil is allowed to die only when he has come to terms with his

earthly duties.

It might be argued that the figure of the slave has to carry such a weight and diversity of symbolism that it ceases to be convincing. In reply to such an objection it can be said that the various symbolical meanings assigned to the slave are all closely related and that no incongruity occurs. Furthermore, the symbolism is clearly attributed to the slave by the delirious Vergil. As such it is an expression of the latter's confused mental condition and reflects his fears and hopes.

Vergil's positive affirmation of earthly reality as a necessary pre-condition to, and complement of man's understanding of transcendental reality is much more briefly and successfully expressed in the symbol of the golden bough. As has been shown, before the meeting with Augustus Vergil had despaired of ever finding and breaking off the golden bough, an act which would symbolize that he had been granted knowledge of death in life, that he had descended into the underworld and returned to tell others of the real meaning of death. During the conversation between the two men Augustus plays constantly with a laurel leaf plucked from a wreath on the candelabra. As he becomes more and more angry and frustrated in the course of their argument he shreds these leaves, the symbol of earthly power and success, in his fingers.⁷⁰ As long as Vergil defends his decision to burn the Aeneid he despairs of ever winning "den goldenen Zweig der Erlösung" (GW 3: 422). After he has given the poem to Augustus the latter

places a new laurel twig on the poet's bed as a seal on their friendship (GW 3: 437, 439). Once Vergil has sacrificed the Aeneid to friendship and is in the process of ordering his affairs he has a delirious vision of the golden bough almost within reach but still on the far side of the river of death. "Inmitten des Grüns glänzte ein Strauch mit goldenen Blättern, fast der Hand erreichbar, obwohl man über den breiten Strom hinübergreifen musste, der unbewegt, kaum rieselnd hier vorüberzog, unaufhaltsam das fliessende Geheimnis." (GW 3: 471) Only once he has fulfilled all his responsibilities in this world does he once more notice the laurel twig lying on his bed, and it now assumes a new symbolic value. "Indes, man brauchte gar nicht hinüberzugreifen, denn bereits hier am diesseitigen Ufer, hier auf der Bettdecke, der Hand erreichbar, schimmerte es golden: der Lorbeerschössling! von Augustus, von den Göttern, vom Schicksal, von Jupiter selber hierher gelegt; golden schimmerten die Blätter." (GW 3: 479) The golden bough, and thus knowledge of death, can be won in this life through love for one's fellow-men, through an identification with the hopes, fears and limitations common to all men. That unity symbolically anticipates the ideal unity of all Being into which man enters through death.

Clearly, a parallel can be drawn between Vergil's developing insight into the positive, complementary relationship of empirical and transcendental reality and Broch's attempt to formulate his theory of "das Irdisch-

Absolute" which was intended to restore man as the central, qualitative value in reality. Like Broch, Vergil eventually rejects purely formal, abstract knowledge and comes to see humanity as the absolute qualitative criterion in life. The emphasis is very much on the affirmation of empirical reality and earthly responsibilities as the means of understanding and approaching transcendental reality. The dialectical pessimism of Die Schlafwandler which welcomed the catastrophic dissolution of values as the only hope for a re-birth of human values has yielded to a quiet optimism that man can anticipate and work for such a new value-system by a positive commitment to humanity in his own era, whenever that may be.

5. DER BERGROMAN.

a) Some Comments on the Genesis of the Novel.

Broch completed the first version of the novel early in 1936; he gave up work on the second version late that year while working on the eighth chapter; the third version, begun late in 1949, had progressed as far as the fifth chapter when Broch died in 1951.⁷¹ The publication of the critical edition of all three versions by Frank Kress and Hans Albert Maier in 1969 makes it possible to qualify some of the comments in the two most important articles dealing with the genesis of this work. These articles, by Manfred Durzak and Götz Wienold, both appeared before 1969.⁷² It should also be remembered that the third version of the novel was published separately by Suhrkamp in 1969 under the title of Demeter and that a comparative study of the first chapter of the three versions was available in Frank Kress's doctoral dissertation of 1966.⁷³

Any comment here on these articles is limited to their relevance to the development of the theory of "das Irdisch-Absolute".

Durzak suggests that the thematic emphasis in the first version is religious, in the second mythical, and in the third political. He also maintains that the last version not only contains the literary expression of Broch's political and psychological studies of the 1940's, but has a much simplified style of the type described by Broch in

1947 in the essay, "The Style of the Mythical Age" (GW 6: 249-264). It is Durzak's contention that in the first two versions of the novel Marius Ratti is depicted as a misled and self-deluded messianic figure, whereas in the final version he assumes the political and psychological characteristics of Adolf Hitler. In support of this view Durzak quotes Broch's description of the novel in his "Autobiographie als Arbeitsprogramm": "in diesem Roman habe ich versucht, das deutsche Geschehen mit all seinen magischen und mystischen Hintergründen, mit seinen massenwahnartigen Trieben, mit seiner 'nüchternen Blindheit und nüchternen Berauschtigkeit' in seinen Wurzeln aufzudecken." (GW 9: 46).

The following objections can be made to Durzak's theory. The words which he quotes were written in the early 1940's and can refer only to the existing versions, the first two, of the novel. Contrary to Durzak's suggestion, they indicate that the early versions of the novel must have been written as an explicit criticism and analysis of the rise of Nazism. It is now possible to confirm this by comparing the texts of the first two versions. The first version seems to have assumed the role of a rough, working draft for the second. The second version introduces numerous lengthy and detailed passages which expand on Marius's psychological condition and, above all, his irrational appeal to a mass audience. There seem to be obvious parallels to Hitler's demagogic talents here.⁷⁴

Broch's later "Massenwahntheorie" (1939-1941) contains many passages which are directly relevant to Marius and the tactics he uses to win over the villagers in the first two versions of the work, but especially in the second. This is particularly the case where Broch analyses the psychology of the madman as the outsider who attempts to break into and control an existing social order.⁷⁵ Such passages are particularly interesting when compared with the changes in the description of Marius which Broch made from the first to the second version. In the "Massenwahntheorie" Broch also examines the psychology of the pursuer and the pursued in pogroms (GW 9: 190f). We find here a detailed analysis of the way in which Marius stirs up hatred against Wetchy in the Bergroman. The second version of the novel devotes considerably more detail and attention to the Wetchy episodes than the first.⁷⁷

All these facts would seem to indicate that the second version of the novel anticipates Broch's detailed scientific research in politics and psychology or at least its systematic formulation in the "Massenwahntheorie". Durzak argues that this research is reflected only in the last version of the novel, but there is no textual evidence in the existing fragment of that version to support such a view. Durzak is certainly correct to emphasize the stylistic differences between the second and third versions. A comparison of the texts reveals that the third version is generally much more compact and has a more concise sentence-structure. There are more finite verbs and less

present participles. Abstract nouns, especially verbal and adjectival nouns are reduced in number. The expansive and complex passages of natural description and associated mythical speculation are also greatly reduced, and there is less meditation and speculative commentary from the narrator.

Wienold suggests, correctly in my opinion, that the second version was conceived of as an analysis of Nazism. In support of his view he uses the same quotation from "Autobiographie als Arbeitsprogramm" as does Durzak to confirm his different theory. Wienold, however, correctly relates these words to the earlier version of the novel, to which they must refer. He further disagrees with Durzak when he says that Broch intended the third version of the novel as a general examination of the phenomenon of mass-hysteria, whereas the second dealt with Nazism in particular. This is certainly more tenable than Durzak's view, since there seems little point in writing an analysis of Nazism some five years after the end of the war. Again it can only be said that there is no textual evidence in the third version to confirm Wienold's suggestion.

Both Durzak and Wienold published their articles before the three versions were all available in their entirety. In general they support their arguments with external evidence, such as letters, or reasoned speculation. The most important external evidence is provided by two summaries of the novel written by Broch which are now in the Broch Archive of Yale University. They were published for the first time in Wienold's article and are now avail-

able in the fourth volume of the critical edition of Kress and Maier. The difference in the interpretations of the genesis of the three versions of the novel advanced by Durzak and Wienold is accounted for almost entirely by the different datings they suggest for these summaries. It is not within the scope of this thesis to make a more detailed examination of the genesis of the three versions of the novel, but it can be said that Durzak's dating of the summaries seems the more probable. Unlike Wienold, who relies on speculation about Broch's intentions with each version, Durzak works from the more reliable, concrete evidence of the type-script and the type and format of paper used. For further details the reader is referred to the articles in question.

The reason for this criticism of the views of Durzak and Wienold has been to make clear that Broch's political and psychological studies, which play such an important part in the development of the political application of the theory of "das Irdisch-Absolute", can be seen reflected, even if only in embryonic form, in the second version of the Bergroman in 1936.⁷⁸

b) The Bergroman as a Novel of Transition.

For the purpose of tracing the development of the theory of "das Irdisch-Absolute" in Broch's novels the third version of the Bergroman may be ignored because, when compared with the first two, this brief fragment reveals stylistic rather than thematic differences. Broch completed only slightly more than four chapters, and if he intended to make important thematic changes they are not evident in the existing fragment.

We can therefore concentrate exclusively on the first two, and especially on the second version. In as far as the novels reflect the development of the theory of "das Irdisch-Absolute" it can be shown that the Bergroman of 1936 represents a stage of transition. In it are expressed ideas already contained in Die unbekannte Grösse and the concluding section of Esch. Broch later expressed these ideas much more clearly and forcefully in Der Tod des Vergil and Die Schuldlosen. Der Tod des Vergil has been discussed before the Bergroman partly because of the complicated genesis of the latter, but also because many of the more vaguely expressed ideas in it which are relevant to "das Irdisch-Absolute" can be more clearly understood if referred back to Der Tod des Vergil.

At the outset, Broch's reasons for abandoning work on the Bergroman should be remembered. One of the most important of these was his desire to make a direct, practical contribution to preserving humanitarian values in the face of the threat of Nazism. He gave up work on

the novel to produce his "Völkerbundtheorie" (1936-1937) and his "Theorie der Demokratie" (1939-1940).⁷⁹ It was precisely this desire for a personal commitment to human values which provided such an important stimulus in his work to the development of the theory of "das Irdisch-Absolute".

A similar impulse is to be seen in the life and work of the doctor who narrates the events of the Bergroman. Because he feels his work in medical research is too impersonal and abstract he gives it up to become a village doctor who is directly and personally involved in helping his fellow-men. This is present even in the first version of the novel, but the second lays much greater emphasis on the doctor's decision. The "Vorwort" to both versions discusses the doctor's reasons for changing his job, but in the second these words are added.

"Dort war das Unendliche für immer und ewig der unerreichbare Zielpunkt, hier ist es in sich beschlossen, eingesenkt in jedes Einzelelement, eingesenkt in jede Handreichung, die in dem Dienste der Ordnung vollzogen wird; und war es dort das Erkennen gewesen, das den Eintritt in die Ordnung gewährleistet hatte, so wird hier Tun und Leben, Mitleben und Mithelfen gefordert; es ist eine Ordnung, die das Wissen der Seele und deren Unendlichkeit spiegelt."

(Bergroman II: 4-5)⁸⁰

Just as the doctor abandons the endless search for knowledge, without ever denying its ultimate value, in order to become more involved in the immediate problems of

humanity, so Broch progressively turned away from his reliance on the transcendental Absolute of the Logos, which guarantees the systematic unity of all formal knowledge, to the earthly Absolute of man as the central value which should impose a limiting, qualitative factor on the pursuit of knowledge. Walter Baumann has suggested that the doctor represents a positive advance on the figure of Bertrand in Die Schlafwandler. The latter, whether as Eduard v. Bertrand or Dr. Bertrand Müller, is able to give a philosophical analysis of the crisis of western civilization, but he is so paralysed by his knowledge that he cannot or will not make the slightest endeavour to help others in that crisis.⁸¹

To Baumann's comments it may be added that in the narrator of the Bergroman we can see a complement to Richard Hieck of Die unbekannte Größe. The latter comes to accept human values without comprehending them fully and remains dedicated to the pursuit of scientific knowledge. The doctor in the Bergroman follows the opposite path, committing himself to the active, if limited furtherance of human values at the expense of abstract knowledge. In view of what we know of Broch's personal decisions in developing his theory of "das Irdisch-Absolute" there seem to be grounds for regarding the doctor's position less as a complement to that of Hieck's and more as an advance upon it. Finally as to this point, it can be said that the doctor anticipates the insights of the dying Vergil, who comes to understand love and human

service as the highest form of knowledge.

As has already been shown, love assumes for Vergil the value of "Erkenntnis". This is the word regularly used by Broch for objective, formally valid knowledge as distinct from subjective, intuitive knowledge which Broch normally describes as "Wissen". It can be shown that in the Bergroman love and the acknowledgment of the calls of friendship and moral responsibility are generally subsumed under the rubric of "Wissen". The change in terminology from the Bergroman to the later Der Tod des Vergil gains a particular relevance when seen in the context and chronology of the development of the theory of "das Irdisch-Absolute". In the mid-1930's Broch believed that humanitarian values should be the central consideration in every field of life and thought. At that time that was a personal conviction, a subjective view ("Wissen"). The purpose of his political and psychological and mathematical studies of the 1940's was to "prove" this belief, set it on a scientific foundation and thus raise it to the status of "Erkenntnis", since only in this way would it command any general support and recognition. Der Tod des Vergil was finally published in 1945, only two or three years before Broch formulated the definitive epistemological basis of his theory of "das Irdisch-Absolute" in "Über syntaktische und kognitive Einheiten".

In the Bergroman "Wissen" has two complementary meanings. It implies an intuitive awareness of the ideal unity of all Being, a belief that the finite and temporal

world is an integral and significant part of an infinite and eternal reality.⁸² The complement to this is the conviction that man can understand that higher reality only through affirmation of, and commitment to human existence and earthly reality in all its limitations. In order to understand transcendental reality one should look not beyond oneself, but into oneself. These facets of Broch's concept of "Wissen" are united in the two most important themes of the novel, "das Wissen des Herzens" and "die Mitte des Seins".

There is evidence to suggest that Broch intended to add considerable emphasis to these themes in the second version of the work. Bergroman II introduces five new passages relevant to "das Wissen des Herzens". Of these, two refer to the intuitive perception of the ideal unity of all Being (pp. 246, 249). Two others emphasize that man must look into himself and attempt to realize his own humanity to the full in order to be able to understand and accept the seemingly paradoxical function of his temporal and finite condition within that unity (pp. 387, 397).

In this respect the Bergroman takes up and expands on the conclusions of Esch at the end of the second part of Die Schlafwandler. The doctor and, to a lesser extent, Mutter Gisson have the same perspective of life as Esch comes to rely on, a perspective explicitly rejected by the dialectical pessimism of "Der Zerfall der Werte" and the conclusions drawn from Huguenau. Some qualification about Mutter Gisson's attitude is necessary because, although actively committed to helping her fellow-men wherever and

whenever possible, she believes in a regular cyclical development of life between catastrophe and peaceful harmony. She refuses to try to halt what she sees as inevitable, notably the growth of Marius's influence over the villagers.⁸³ Nevertheless her behaviour represents an advance on Bertrand's impotent pessimism in Die Schlafwandler and anticipates the important theme of "noch nicht und doch schon" in Der Tod des Vergil. Frank Trommler suggests briefly that in many respects the Bergroman expands on Esch's insights that man is the central value in life and that he creates on earth a concrete, empirical reality which reflects the ideal, formal unity of all Being which is guaranteed by the transcendental Absolute of the Logos.⁸⁴ The relevance of all these considerations to the development of "das Irdisch-Absolute" is at once obvious.

The conviction that humanity and humanitarian considerations must be the central, qualitative value in life appears even more clearly in the theme of "die Mitte des Seins". This does not occur in the existing eight chapters of Bergroman II, but it plays such an important part in the first version and is so closely related to "das Wissen des Herzens" that there is good reason to believe that Broch would have expanded on those passages if he had not given up work on the novel before reaching them. In all of them the anthropocentric perspective is again very evident.

"Nur in der Mitte unseres Seins ist das Wissen, ist das Wissen um das, was der Mensch braucht, um Mensch zu

sein, ist das Wissen um seine Humanität und seine Kultur,
 . . . in der Mitte unseres Seins, nur in seiner Mitte,
 nicht im dunklen Rausche seiner Grenzen, weder im Rausche
 des Urgründigen, noch im Rausche des Technischen, sondern
 im Sein seiner selbst wohnt das Göttliche in uns."

(Bergroman I: 337-338)

"Die Zwiesprache der Lebenden ist kein geringeres
 Wunder als das der Toten, und die Mitte unseres Lebens und
 unseres Wissens ist die Schlichtheit, in der allein das
 Aufatmen des Herzens ist, seine Zwiesprache und seine
 Wahrheit, beschlossen das Unendliche in einem einzigen
 Atemzug des Endlichen." (Bergroman I: 366)

"Hohe Erde, in der das Echo klingt, spiegelnder
 Garten, der die Mitte des Seins umschliesst! Suchte nicht
 auch ich den Quell des eigenen Echos, da ich nach dem
 Blick fahndete, der aus mir hinausdringt, das Seiende
 umfassend, mich zu ihm hintragend? . . . Nimmer können
 wir weiter gelangen, als zu jener schwebenden hohen Mitte,
 in der das Erfassende und das Erfasste sich einen, Quell
 des Echos und Aber-Echos, das die Erkenntnis ist, göttlich
 und irdisch zugleich, das Jenseitige im Diesseitigen
 öffnend: dies ist die Wohnstatt der Heiligen, die ihr
 menschliches Leben leben und doch dem Göttlichen zugewandt
 sind -, wohin auch immer ihr Blick fällt, da ist ihnen
 die Erde hoch und erhaben, wohin immer sie horchen, da
 erklingt ihnen der Spiegelgesang des Echos, denn durch das
 Nahe hindurch die Ferne sehend, ist ihr Leben zur liebenden
 Erkenntnis und damit zur Heiligkeit geworden, im
 Unzulänglichen schamhaft und demutsvoll das Unsterbliche

enthüllend und verhüllend, und je tiefer sie hinabtauchen in die Einsamkeit ihres Selbst, je höher sie emporschweben zu den Höhen des Unbenennbaren - und wer vermag dann noch zu sagen, wo das Oben, wo das Unten ist! - desto schwebender, strahlender, heiterer wird ihnen die irdische Wohnstatt der Mitte, erfüllt von der Sicherheit der Horizonte." (Bergroman I: 379-380)

All the ideas which are so vaguely contained in the two concepts of "das Wissen des Herzens" and "die Mitte des Seins" are developed in greater detail in the process of revelation by which Vergil comes to understand love as the highest form of knowledge.

In the Bergroman and even more so in Der Tod des Vergil love in its widest sense, which includes that of complete identification with, and commitment to humanity, is shown to be central to life. This was not the case in Die Schlafwandler; Esch's attempt to build a new and better life on such a foundation is rejected explicitly and implicitly by Broch, explicitly in the letters already discussed and implicitly in "Der Zerfall der Werte" and the philosophical speculations of Bertrand in Pasenow and Esch. There love is shown to be a phenomenon possible only on the very periphery of human experience. It can occur only in the extremes of the human condition when existential fear and isolation force the individual to seek the comfort and reassurance of a fellow-creature suffering in the same way.

The first detailed statement of Broch's re-evaluation of love as the central experience of life is found in his

description of the passionate but tragically brief affair between the doctor in the Bergroman and a professional colleague, Barbara. The importance of love is also mentioned in Die unbekannte Grösse, but only briefly and vaguely because Richard Hieck cannot analyse or understand its significance for him very clearly. Such an analysis falls to the lot of the doctor in the Bergroman. The first version of the novel contains the Barbara episode, but it is considerably expanded in the second version.⁸⁵

In Bergroman II Broch clearly intended to emphasize the importance of the memory of that love for the doctor more strongly. He introduces several new passages which anticipate the doctor's eventual account of this part of his life. These integrate that particular part of the narration more satisfactorily into the whole novel and help to stress the lasting influence of that love in the doctor's own positive affirmation of life.⁸⁶ Thematically, the description of the doctor's love for Barbara points forward to similar passages in Der Tod des Vergil, which have already been discussed, where human love is seen as the symbolical fulfilment in empirical reality of the ideal spiritual union which man can achieve with God or the Absolute of the Logos only through death. In both novels the emphasis is that a practical commitment to humanity is the only way in which man can start to understand the relevance of that Absolute for his earthly life.

"Von ihr (Barbara) kam die Sicherheit des 'Du bist' und die jenes ahnenden Wissens, das die Erreichung des Ichs und

seiner Einheit nicht mehr in unendlichen Fernen, sondern in erlebbarer Nähe vor sich sieht, weil das Du sich ihm enthüllt hat: lauschend dem Echo des Du, das eigene hörend, wird der Mensch zum Gleichnis des Menschen, vermag er sich selber aufzugeben und in das grosse Gleichnis der Natur heimzukehren, versinkend im Sein, im All, im lebendigen Sterben." (Bergroman II: 503)

Both versions of the novel also contain the definition of love which plays such an important part in Der Tod des Vergil: love is described as "ein Schicksal-auf-uns-nehmen" (Bergroman II: 456) and "Schicksal-auf-sich-nehmen" (Bergroman I: 201).

In conclusion to this chapter the reader is referred to a passage from Bergroman II: 519 which has already been quoted at the end of the chapter on Esch.⁸⁷ In that passage the doctor describes how he tried to forget the pain caused by Barbara's death by immersing himself in the daily round of work. There is the suggestion that the fulfilment of moral responsibilities rather than simply personal, sexual love is the means through which man can come to understand his role in infinity and eternity. Once again Broch appeals for a positive affirmation of life as the necessary foundation for such knowledge. In this can be seen the essence of the theory of "das Irdisch-Absolute". Man, not an impersonal abstract, transcendental Absolute must be the central value in life: that Absolute does exist, but it can only be approached and partially realized on earth through man.

6. DIE SCHULDLOSEN

Soon after the publication of Die Schuldlosen Broch referred to it in a letter as "der so merkwürdig zusammengewürfelte Roman" (GW 8: 406). In the "Entstehungsbericht" published with the novel he confesses: "Die Schuldlosen sind auf etwas abenteuerliche Art entstanden." (GW 5: 359). The complicated genesis of this novel, the last to be published before Broch's death, is described in admirable detail by Richard Thieberger and Manfred Durzak.⁸⁸ As in the study of the other novels, so too with Die Schuldlosen, reference is made here only to those aspects relevant to the question of the theory of "das Irdisch-Absolute".

Die Schuldlosen consists of eleven Novellen written over a period of thirty-one years from 1918 to 1949. They are set within a lyrical framework, entitled "Stimmen", which, like six of the Novellen, was written in 1949. These later Novellen and the "Stimmen" are of particular importance because they clearly reflect Broch's interest at that time in the possibilities of formulating a theory of politics and a new humanitarian ethos based on the concept of "das Irdisch-Absolute". His two most important theoretical writings on this subject, "Politik: Ein Kondensat" and "Trotzdem: Humane Politik", were written in the period 1949-1950. In her dissertation on Die Schuldlosen Gerda Utermöhlen has pointed out that the thoughts expressed in these two studies are very evident in "Stimmen 1933" and the Novelle, "Steinerner Gast".⁸⁹

The table of contents in the novel suggests that

"Steinerne Gast" was first conceived of, "im Hauptthema", in 1941. Like so much else in that table of contents this is misleading. The only possible source for such a suggestion is a letter written by Broch in 1951 (GW 8: 418). There he says that the first, visionary inspiration for the figure of the old bee-keeper came to him in 1941 and that he gave it concrete literary expression in a poem. The poem in question is almost certainly that now published under the title of "Der Urgefährte" (GW 1: 163). A comparison of it with the Novelle reveals certain parallels, notably the wintery setting and the concept of the mysterious companion as a guide through death. In the Novelle, however, a new and dominating emphasis is introduced with Andreas's long, detailed confession of his moral guilt in failing to accept his political and human responsibilities. Here the influence of Broch's research on the theory of "das Irdisch-Absolute" can be seen. Thieberger and Durzak both correctly show how the earlier Novellen were altered in order to accommodate the new, central theme of the whole novel, namely that of the need for individual moral responsibility and human commitment, regardless of how futile that might seem in a world devoid of any generally recognized values.⁹⁰

When referring to Die Schuldlosen Broch regularly emphasized that his purpose in writing the novel was to exemplify the possible range of human reaction to a new, higher plane of reality. Replying to criticism of the

novel by Karl August Horst, Broch talks of a "neue Realitätsaufdeckung" and "Realitätsahnungen" (GW 8: 418). In two summaries of the novel written by Broch for his publisher and published for the first time in Dürzak's article the same claim is repeated with almost monotonous insistence.⁹¹ There he states that Andreas's confession and suicide reveal "der Keim eines neuen Realitätsbewusstseins" and that precisely this is "letztes Ziel der Romankunst Hermann Brochs" (p. 390). Lebrecht Endeguth, the old bee-keeper who realizes the complementary roles of life and death in the cycle of existence and who knows that earthly reality represents only a small, if significant and integral part of a higher, transcendental reality, is described as "der geisthafte Träger einer neuen Welteinsicht" (p. 391). Referring to Andreas's confession and suicide, Broch writes: "er scheidet in der Gnade einer neuen Realitätseinsicht." (p.392). The purpose of the novel is described as "einerseits die Schilderung einer ganzen Epoche, andererseits die Aufzeigung (zumindest andeutungsweise) der in ihr schlummernden Zukunftsmöglichkeiten" (p.397).

We know from the above mentioned letter to Karl August Horst that when Broch re-read the original Novellen from 1918 and 1933 before beginning work on the definitive version of the novel he was not satisfied with them. He felt that something new, something more relevant had to be added to justify their second publication. In that letter he continues as follows. "Und das konnte bloss geschehen, wenn etwas wirklich Neues hinzutrat, um sie

allesamt in sich aufzunehmen. Da fiel mir auf, dass die 'Leichte Enttäuschung' ein allerdings höchst unzureichender Versuch zur Gestaltung des Erlebnisses absoluter Leere gewesen ist. Das war der Ansatzpunkt, und ich stellte daher diese Novelle in den Mittelpunkt des Buches, das Vakuum, die leere Zeit als Zentrum eines Geschehenssystems."

(GW 8: 418)⁹² This quotation and Broch's own emphasis in it suggest that in Die Schuldlosen "Eine leichte Enttäuschung", in its revised form, contains a new or at least more clearly presented analysis of man's reaction to the void of the dissolution of values which is not present in the original. It is precisely the individual's reaction to a world without coherent purpose and lacking any generally binding values which Broch chose to develop as the central theme of the new novel.

According to Broch, man's first encounter with the new reality involves "das Erlebnis absoluter Leere". This is man's situation in a world where the progressive dissolution of values has run its full course. All conventional criteria of behaviour and thought have lost any claim to absolute validity. All things are relative; the individual can no longer find security and peace of mind by relying on some universally recognized ethical code. The very structure of normal daily reality, the basic concepts of time and space have been called in question by developments in physics, especially by Einstein's theory of relativity. Broch describes Andreas's final insight before his death as follows: "er beginnt zu

ahnen, dass der Mensch in eine neue Welt gesetzt ist, in eine, für die sogar die alten Grundschemen von Raum und Zeit nicht mehr gelten, so dass ein neues Realitätsbewusstsein im Werden ist." (p. 396).

All such comments made by Broch about the novel suggest that he consistently saw this new reality in a positive light, showing it as the characteristic situation to which modern man must reconcile himself if he is to realize his full human potential. Such a view is entirely in keeping with the necessary relationship between ethics and epistemology postulated by Broch in his theory of values: any advance in knowledge, any extension of experience, any destruction of outdated modes of thought and conduct is to be welcomed because the new found freedom will allow man progressively to formulate a code of ethics commensurate with the demands of his new reality. Such a theory led Broch, a victim of his own inexorable logic, to conclude in the last chapter of Die Schlafwandler that revolution and all its concomitant inhumanity were ethically and epistemologically necessary within his cyclical interpretation of history.

A study of references to the new reality within Die Schuldlosen reveals an ambivalence in Broch's evaluation of it which scarcely reflects the enthusiastic affirmation expressed in his letters and commentaries. It can be shown that his doubts as to the positive value of this new realm of human experience occur in those parts of the novel written in 1949. These doubts are clearly influenced by

his research on the theory of the "das Irdisch-Absolute".

The new reality with which the individual must come to terms is regularly described through the visionary, mystical revelations of the old bee-keeper and Andreas. These descriptions are reminiscent of many similar passages in all of the earlier novels. The essence of this new reality, as thus revealed, is that it transcends the empirical boundaries of time, space and three-dimensional reality, harmoniously embracing within its multi-dimensional unity the whole cycle of creation. Broch sees this cycle flowing constantly between the poles of timelessness ("Zeitlosigkeit") and eternity ("Ewigkeit"), Non-Being ("Nicht-Sein") and Being ("Sein"), Nothingness ("Nichts") and infinity ("Unendlichkeit"), concepts so absolutely opposed to each other that they meet and become identical in the mystical "coincidentia oppositorum".⁹³ Subject as he is to the finite and temporal limitations of empirical reality, man finds such concepts terrifying and incomprehensible.

Seen in simpler, human terms, the only way man can reconcile himself to the new reality is to recognize the limitations of his finite existence, acknowledge that his reality is merely an integral part of a higher, ideal unity of all Being, and accept that death has a natural, positive function within the ceaseless flux of the creative process. If man can do this his life assumes a new significance even in a world seemingly devoid of absolute values. Two

quotations from the above references will suffice to illustrate this. Broch describes the old bee-keeper as "eingebettet in die Verwobenheit von Leben und Tod, die in seinen Schlummer drang", and then continues as follows. "Und öffnete er inmitten des Nachtdunkels oder im ersten Vormorgen das wiedererwachende Staunen seiner Seele, hinaufspähend zum schwebenden Firmament, hinablauschend zur ruhenden Erde, so wurde er selber zum schwebenden und ruhenden Erspüren der Ganzheit, er selber Ganzheit, welche die Ganzheit der Welt erfüllt und von ihr erfüllt wird: das Gestein unter ihm und das Gebein in ihm wurden eins mit dem kühlen Leuchten der Sterne, einvermählt in dieses, einvermählt in die Lebensbereitschaft des toten Stoffes, während die Vielfalt des Lebenden ringsum, nicht minder aber auch die seiner eigenen lebenden Person, seines eigenen lebenden Fleisches, seines eigenen lebenden Herzens mitsamt seinem Pulsschlag die Bereitschaft zur Rückkehr ins Unbelebte offenbarte, und dieser unendlich gespannte Austausch zwischen den Polen des Belebten und Unbelebten enthüllte sich als das Unmittelbare schlechthin, als das innerste Gezeite der Ganzheit, als die unmittelbare Heiligkeit der Dauer, die aus dem unendlichen Wechsel von Tod und Leben hervorgeht, als die Heiligkeit der unmittelbaren Ferne, die den Menschen aufnimmt, soferne er sich rückhaltlos unterwirft. Er aber hatte sich unterworfen, und sein Erwachen war Wissen um die heilige Ferne, in der er sich befand." (GW 5: 126-127)⁹⁴

At a later point in the novel Andreas is overwhelmed

by the following revelation.

"Oh, unvorstellbar ist schon das Wegsterben des Ichs aus der verbleibenden Welt, unvorstellbarer jedoch das Nicht-Sein als solches, das totale Nicht-Sein, das auch das der Vorstellung miteinschliesst, das Sein der Nicht-Dimensionalität, in der letztlich das der unendlich vielen Dimensionen aufgeht, und wer bis zu solch äusserstem Vorstellungsrand vordringt, dem ist es für diesen Augenblick, allerdings bloss für diesen einen Augenblick gelungen, nicht-seiend zu werden, für diesen einen Augenblick den Tod zu überwinden. Das ist die Todesüberwindung des Sterbenden, dem die Gnade eines vollbewussten Lebens zuteil geworden war und nun die eines vollbewussten Sterbens zuteil wird." (GW 5: 250-251)⁹⁵

Andreas, regularly described as "entscheidungs-schüchtern" and "schicksalsgläubig",⁹⁶ has occasional visionary glimpses of the higher reality and the new harmony and unity of experience which it offers. He does not, however, have the strength of character to accept the full implications of this new situation. Acceptance of this new plane of reality demands that the individual acknowledge that the conventional facade of familiar reality with all its moribund values and criteria of thought and behaviour has finally collapsed. The individual now stands in an exposed position of complete existential isolation and can no longer retire into the comfortable, deceptive security of existing systems of values. He is thrown back upon himself; he must reconcile himself to his own transient, finite nature and

yet seek within himself, as the only source left to him, some reliable principle on which to establish a new social and moral order commensurate with a new reality in which all things seem relative.

On at least three occasions Andreas suppresses or ignores the otherwise attractive vision of the new reality because he is afraid to acknowledge the responsibility it would demand of him. He realizes that the new reality has to some extent already dawned upon his generation.

"'Noch nicht und doch schon", sagte etwas in A.: er fühlte die Auflösung der Welt ins Vieldimensionale, und er fühlte durchaus, dass er selber, dass sein eigenes Sein davon mitbetroffen war: indes, da dem Vorgang kaum etwas Abnormales oder gar Gespenstisches anhaftete, vielmehr die Menschen - erstaunlich genug - unverändert in Fleisch und Blut belassen wurden, und auch sein eigenes Lebensgefühl keinerlei unmittelbare Veränderung oder Beeinträchtigung erfuhr, so schien man kaum verpflichtet, der Erscheinung gewahr zu werden, obwohl gerade die ungespenstige Natürlichkeit, mit der sie auftrat, ihre tiefere Gespenstigkeit enthielt." (GW 5: 240-241)⁹⁷

It can be argued that up to this point, even in the Novellen of 1949, Broch still sees the new reality in a positive light. Die Schuldlosen seems simply to present an extension of the philosophical content of Die Schlafwandler, namely that the dissolution of values reveals a higher, ideal unity of all reality in which human life plays an integral part. For better or worse man

must come to terms with this new reality which is inevitably dawning upon him. By refusing this challenge Andreas is clinging for security to an outdated, closed system of values. This is confirmed in one of the earlier Novellen, "Verlorener Sohn". There Andreas has a vision of the new reality, but instead of accepting its implications he tries to give concrete expression to the vision of its harmonious unity by integrating himself into the baroness's family.⁹⁸ Here he is distorting the vision of the new reality, because, by assuming the role of the son and seeking shelter in an established matriarchal order, he is abdicating personal responsibility and trying to find a false security in empirical reality. He is guilty of Romanticism, defined by Broch in Pasenow as what happens, "wenn Irdisches zu Absolutem erhoben wird" (GW 2: 19). The symbol is taken for the reality.

In one respect, however, Andreas welcomes the distractions afforded him by his revelations of the new reality, and it is significant that this particular aspect is introduced only in 1949, in "Erkaufte Mutter". Andreas has become casually and irresponsibly involved with a young, innocent girl of a social status inferior to his own, wholly failing to realize that the girl, Melitta, has become deeply attached to him. For a time he vacillates between fulfilling his responsibilities to her or consolidating his position in the affections of the baroness. Finally his indifference leads indirectly to Melitta's death.⁹⁹ Of particular relevance here is a

passage where Andreas explicitly states, somewhat guiltily, that he had welcomed his utopian visions and transcendental speculation as a means of forgetting Melitta. He is sitting in a crowded station-restaurant after leaving the baroness's garden-party where he has had a number of such visionary revelations.

"Und fast war es ihm, als wollte er die Degradation, die er, berechtigt oder unberechtigt, in der Kumpanei fühlte, das Mädchen entgelten lassen, indem er, auf dieses die Degradierungsgefühle ausdehnend, sich in der Baronin und Hildegards feinem Haus wenigstens tagsüber solch simpler Liebe nicht zu erinnern wünschte und tatsächlich auch just die feine Teegesellschaft zum Anlass genommen hatte, um zur Legitimierung der Vergessenswünsche alles innere und äussere Sein so gründlich ins Nicht-Dimensionale und Viel-Dimensionale aufzulösen, dass jegliche Erinnerung daraus verschwinden musste." (GW 5: 253-254)

In these words there is a very strong suggestion that experience of the new reality can also be a pretext for the individual to ignore the immediate human problems and responsibilities of empirical reality.¹⁰⁰

What is no more than a suggestion in the above passage becomes an unequivocal statement in Andreas's confession before his suicide. This too occurs in one of the Novellen written in 1949, "Steinerner Gast" (GW 5: 327-335). Andreas confesses that his guilt is that of indifference to his own essential humanity and consequently to that of everyone else: "Ur-Gleichgültigkeit ist es, nämlich die gegen das eigene Menschtum; die Gleichgültig-

keit vor dem Leid des Nebenmenschen aber ist eine Folge hiervon." (GW 5: 328). His explanation of how this has come about is very similar to the final analysis of the dissolution of values in Die Schlafwandler. In a world where all existing values have collapsed and the currently accepted view of reality is losing its validity the individual feels terrified and isolated. He cannot cope with this new experience because he has no binding or reliable standards of thought or behaviour to fall back on. He seems at the mercy of an impersonal development beyond his control and can only withdraw into a selfish, protective indifference.

"Unsere Aufgabe ist zu gross, und darum wappnen wir uns in blinder Gleichgültigkeit. Die Zersprengungskraft unseres Ichs ist uns zu gross. Uneindämmbar in Folgerichtigkeit und furchtbarer Logik hat es eine Welt geschaffen, deren Vielfalt uns undurchschaubar geworden ist, sie gleichfalls uneindämmbar in ihren entfesselten Kräften. Die Folgerichtigkeit unserer eigenen Zersprengungsleistung hat uns gelehrt, wie unentrinnbar das Seinsgeschehen ist, und wir haben daran gelernt, dass wir es achselzuckend geschehen lassen müssen; ja selbst vor dem Morden, das im Gestrüpp der Undurchschaubarkeit allenthalben statthat, schliessen wir die Augen und lassen es geschehen." (GW 5: 330)

The result is that the individual flees all personal responsibility and seeks any sort of security even if, as in Andreas's case, it is only the false, deceptive security of the baroness's family. This offers no permanent solution. That can be found only by accepting the dawning

new reality and somehow attempting to relate it to the basic human condition. It is here that Broch's theory of "das Irdisch-Absolute" reveals itself in Die Schuldlosen, a theory not evident in the conclusions of Die Schlafwandler.

In Andreas's confession Broch suggests that man can come to terms with the new reality only by acknowledging it, accepting that he cannot yet fully understand it and rejecting any utopian dreams or transcendental speculation about it. He must then turn in upon himself, direct his attention to the current human situation and concentrate on developing and preserving man's essential humanity. We do not know what man ideally could or should be; we may not know the ideal good to be sought after; but we know from practical experience what man should not be, and we can see and reject the obvious evils apparent in the current situation. Where the new reality is breaking in upon current, familiar reality, where traditional values and standards are losing their validity man can still seek progressively to eliminate inhumanity, defined by Broch as slavery and murder, and thus gradually approach the ideal human condition as human freedom approximates ever more closely to the unattainable ideal of divine or absolute freedom. This can be done only by concentrating on the immediate human problems, by practising an active moral commitment to man in his given situation. This primary concern must not be sacrificed to vague utopian dreams or futile speculation about the new reality to come.

No matter how misapplied or wasted such an undertaking may seem, it is grounded on the only absolute value left to man in his present situation. It is an earthly Absolute in the two meanings discussed by Broch in "Politik: Ein Kondensat" and "Trotzdem: Humane Politik": murder and slavery can be shown to be the lowest pole of the human condition, and, scientifically speaking, man is the necessary and only reliable standard, the earthly Absolute, against which such an evaluation can be made and empirically tested.

Clearly Broch is appealing for a direct, practical commitment to humanity at the expense of vague, distracting theorizing about some impossibly distant utopia. The new reality loses its threatening aspect for man only when approached from affirmation of the human situation in empirical reality. All of this is summarized in the central passage of Andreas's confession.

"Das Gute ist selbstverständlich, aber es ist diffus, und nur im Dreidimensionalen gewinnt es Form, nur hier ist es, war es Befolgung des Befehls, der als absolut-göttlicher Verantwortungsauftrag das menschliche Tun zum Unendlichen hingewendet hat; dahingegen wird das Gute seiner richtunggebenden Kraft verlustig, ja ist seiner bereits verlustig gegangen, da der Mensch selber ins Grenzenlose versetzt worden ist, denn in der Dimensionsvielfalt gibt es überhaupt keine Zielpunkte mehr, so dass die absolute Richtung nicht mehr durch ein Hinwenden, sondern nur noch durch ein Abwenden gehalten werden kann, also nicht mehr

durch eine Hinwendung zum Guten, sondern nur noch durch eine Abwendung vom irdisch Bösen, kurzum durch die Bekämpfung des Tierischen und Untertierischen, das daran ist, sein Höchstmass, seine wahrhaft konkrete Absolutheit zu erreichen. Konkrete Kampfansage an das apokalyptische Hier und Jetzt des Untiers, das ist der neue Verantwortungsaufwurf, dessen Absolutgeltung wir anzuerkennen haben, anerkennend den Befehl zur aktiven Auflehnung gegen das Böse, und solcherart ebenso fern dem dumm-verlogenen Gut-Sein des unbedingten Pazifismus wie der dumm-ehrlichen Kampflust, die zugunsten künftiger Generationen und ihrer Traumlandschaft das Blutvergiessen bejaht und fördert und eben hiedurch schon selber tierhaft handelt, ist uns, fern von dieser wie von jener utopischen Grossartigkeit, die Pflicht zur schlichten Anständigkeit auferlegt worden, zu einer Anständigkeit des unmittelbaren Augenblicks, weil es immer nur auf die Reinigung des jeweiligen Weltaugenblicks ankommt, wenn Gut und Böse aus ihrer heillosen und unheilträchtigen Vermischung wieder entmischt werden sollen. Nichts kann uns dieser höchst militanten Anständigkeitspflicht entheben, nicht einmal die Aussichtslosigkeit ihres Beginnens, vielmehr wird jeder Verstoss gegen sie, und sei er noch so gut begründet, eine Manifestation unserer Gleichgültigkeit und ist durch keinerlei Guttat wettzumachen." (GW 5: 333-334)

The influence of the theory of "das Irdisch-Absolute" is also to be seen in the "Stimmen", which like the Novellen already discussed, were written in 1949. In

"Stimmen 1923" we read: "Nächstenhilfe ist gut, Mord ist schlecht, die einfachste Absolutheit." (GW 5: 73). This is followed by an appeal for "schlichter Anstand".¹⁰¹

Similarly, the "Prophetengedicht", as Broch referred to it (BB: 523), in "Stimmen 1933", in its appeal that man should look for the Absolute within himself, clearly reflects ideas expressed in the theoretical writings on "das Irdisch-Absolute".¹⁰²

The conclusions of Die Schuldlosen invite comparison with those of Die Schlafwandler. Any discrepancy between what are basically analyses of the same situation can be attributed to the influence on Broch's thinking of his research on the theory of "das Irdisch-Absolute" which lay between the writing of the two novels.

In Die Schlafwandler revolution is welcomed as a historical necessity, an ethical act which finally and violently sweeps away the debris of a moribund system of values and prepares the ground for the development of a new, unitary system of values: "Revolution . . . Tat der Selbstaufhebung und der Selbsterneuerung, letzte und grösste ethische Tat des zerfallenden, erste des neuen Wertsystems, Augenblick der radikal geschichtsbildenden Zeitaufhebung im Pathos des absoluten Nullpunktes!" (GW 2: 685). Any inhumanity or suffering caused by revolution must be accepted as the price of progress. Here the opposite view obtains to that later expressed in Die Schuldlosen. In the earlier novel humanitarian considerations are considered of secondary importance to

the attainment of some vaguely understood, distant utopia. Twice in the later novel the ethical conception of revolution as a necessary instrument in historical development is explicitly and strongly rejected. On both of these occasions the futility and inhumanity of revolution is criticized. In these passages humanity and not ethical progress, as Broch originally understood it, is the highest value.¹⁰³

It is at once evident that the behaviour advocated by Andreas in his confession and so clearly approved of by Broch, namely a direct moral commitment to the immediate needs of humanity, is precisely that for which Broch criticizes Esch in Die Schlafwandler. At the end of Esch the eponymous hero, like Andreas, has a vision of the new reality which is both attractive and disturbing. Esch's reaction is that which Andreas confesses his own should have been. Esch accepts the existence of the new reality, acknowledges the transient nature of human life as an integral part of it and, in his love for Mutter Hentjen, tries to understand, as far as possible in the human context, the ideal unity of that reality. By accepting his own limitations, by probing the depths of his own humanity and thus understanding the needs, hopes and fears of others he can identify with another fellow-being and at least approach a better understanding of the new reality and the ideal unity of all Being.

In Huguenau, too, Esch reveals a dogged moral commitment to his fellow-men, sullenly convinced of the need to stand by Major v. Pasenow in his difficulties, to

help the inmates of the military hospital and to provide a home for Marguerite. By this time his previous vision has faded and he is wallowing in religious sectarianism. Nevertheless, he can still speak the following words with complete sincerity even although his thinking is clouded by religious fantasies: "auf das neue Leben kommt es an . . . auf die Anständigkeit." (GW 2: 507). As has been shown already, Broch's letters and commentaries written when he was working on Die Schlafwandler show that he condemned Esch's behaviour as a reactionary morality which obstructed the ethical course of the progressive revelation of the new reality. Broch criticizes Esch for acting morally correctly but ethically wrongly.

The views expressed in Die Schuldlosen confirm a development in Broch's thinking which has already been discussed in this thesis in another context and which is associated with the formulation of the theory of "das Irdisch-Absolute", namely the gradual abandonment of his epistemological conception of ethics in favour of a more conventional interpretation of morality. In the later writings particularly, the words "ethisch" and "moralisch" are frequently used synonymously in a way foreign to the earlier works. Such a development is further confirmed by a number of Broch's comments on Die Schuldlosen which suggest that he was more concerned with the immediate humanitarian problems raised by the dissolution of values than by the potential utopia revealed by that crisis.

In the "Entstehungsbericht" Broch repeatedly uses "ethisch" and "moralisch" without differentiating between

them. He claims that the novel must present the fullest possible range of human experience "bis hinauf zu den moralischen und metaphysischen" (GW 5: 360). Such a statement, which places moral and metaphysical experience on the same plane, is inconceivable in the writings of the early 1930's. There metaphysical experience and particularly the perception of the higher plane of reality are subsumed under the epistemological conception of ethics, while morality is pejoratively associated with the limitations imposed on man by dogmatic social and religious conventions. At one point in the "Entstehungsbericht" Broch writes: "Politische Gleichgültigkeit nämlich ist ethischer Gleichgültigkeit und damit im letzten ethischer Perversion recht nahe verwandt. Kurzum die politisch Schuldlosen befinden sich zumeist bereits ziemlich tief im Bereich ethischer Schuld." (GW 5: 361). Soon after this, in the space of one paragraph, he refers to "moralische Schuldhaftigkeit" and "ethische Schuld" without distinguishing between them in any way (GW 5: 364). What seems to be little more than a question of semantic pedantry helps to illuminate the change in Broch's interest from speculation about a new utopian reality, to be realized at great human cost, to a more practical commitment to the immediate needs of humanity.

This change of perspective is clearly seen in Broch's comments on Lebrecht Endeguth, the old bee-keeper, whose very name is relevant to the point in question. Broch makes clear that Endeguth, despite his mythical qualities

and mystic communion with the higher plane beyond empirical reality, is a real person, a character of flesh and blood who is firmly rooted in earthly reality.¹⁰⁴

The importance of Endeguth in the final plan of the novel is emphasized by Broch in one of his publisher's commentaries, where he states explicitly that the old bee-keeper is a new figure introduced during work on the novel in 1949 (p. 397). On several occasions he states that Endeguth's message, his appeal for practical involvement in life, is convincing only because he speaks from practical experience, from personal knowledge of the problems of life. In the letter to Karl August Horst in which he talks of "das Erlebnis absoluter Leere" in the novel, Broch goes on to refer to this experience as "das moralische Zentrum" of the book. This is presumably because such an experience forces the individual to accept his existential responsibilities. Broch adds, however, that without the figure of Endeguth this point could not have been made: "Erst durch ihn - weil er eben 'Person' ist - konnte der Vorstoss ins Moralische gelingen." (GW 8: 418).¹⁰⁵

Two passages from the commentaries published by Durzak confirm Broch's view of Endeguth's role in the novel. In the first commentary Endeguth is described as follows. "Er ist uralt, und gerade kraft dieses mythischen, dieses zeitlosen Alters wird er zum Träger des Neuen, zum geisthaften Träger einer neuen Welteinsicht, welche berufen sein mag, die terroristische Menschheitsepoche zu überwinden und an ihre Stelle wieder die der ewigen Absolutheit

des moralischen Gebotes zu setzen." (p.391) In the second commentary exactly the same point is again made. Endeguth is said to represent the spirit of the new era. "Dieser . . . repräsentiert den Geist einer neuen Welteinsicht, religiös, aber nicht kultisch, aber auch nicht eigentlich pantheistisch, sondern eher agnostisch und ebendarum zur alt-ewigen Absolutheit des Moralischen zurückkehrend." (p. 394)¹⁰⁶

In both cases the emphasis is on a new reality. As has been shown, Broch regularly defines morality as a series of negative commandments of the "thou shalt not" variety. Until he began to formulate his theory of "das Irdisch-Absolute" he compared this unfavourably with his original conception of ethics which ideally should dictate how everyone should behave. After evolving his theory of "das Irdisch-Absolute" he regularly insisted that the new reality could only be progressively realized through a practical commitment to the advancement of humanity, namely by progressively eliminating what is evil in the currently obtaining human situation rather than by sacrificing humanity for the sake of some ideal which is necessarily unknown and beyond definition. In the light of this change in his thinking the prohibitions of morality assumed a new positive value for Broch. Human salvation must be sought and found in earthly, not in transcendental reality, in this world and not in the next. Endeguth's words to Andreas just before the latter's suicide confirm this. "Wäre ich ein Geist und nicht wie du Fleisch und Blut, ich wäre nicht fähig, dir Botschaft und Hilfe zu bringen;

das Wort wird im Diesseitigen, wird im irdischen Raum getragen, von irdischem Mund gesprochen, von irdischem Ohr gehört.'" (GW 5: 336)

A number of critics have already suggested, implicitly or explicitly, that Die Schuldlosen reflects a revision of the original theory of values, as expressed in Die Schlafwandler, which postulated as a historical and ethical necessity the complete destruction of the current system of values and the sacrifice of all humanitarian considerations as the prelude to the dawning of a new utopia.

Liselotte v. Borcke suggests an unusual interpretation of the frequently recurring symbol of the triangle in Die Schuldlosen, particularly as it occurs with reference to the three-sided clockface in the centre of the triangular garden in front of the baroness's house or to the position of the hands of the clock at eleven minutes past five.¹⁰⁷ According to her, one function of this symbol is to emphasize the unavoidable limitations of the three-dimensional, temporal world in which man lives; his responsibilities lie there and not in some vaguely perceived, higher plane of multi-dimensional reality.¹⁰⁸

Eric Herd maintains that Andreas fails in his moral responsibilities because he is distracted from human problems which he encounters by the lure of that same higher reality.¹⁰⁹ Such an interpretation does not take account of the fact that this reality can and does assume a positive value if seen in the correct perspective, from

a position of affirmation of earthly reality.

Heinz Politzer asserts that Broch's last novel goes beyond all his previous ones by re-introducing an unequivocal appeal for firm moral values.¹¹⁰

Only Gerda Utermöhlen, in her dissertation on Die Schuldlosen, advances the view that the change in perspective seen there may be directly related to the political and legislative theories inspired by research into "das Irdisch-Absolute". She also suggests that the aesthetic of this novel is radically different from that of the earlier novels. In the previous novels Broch concentrated on their epistemological, ethical function, namely to reveal the potential new reality which is disclosed by the dissolution of values. In Die Schuldlosen this ethical concern, as Broch understood it, yields to the moral one of exemplifying how man should meet that crisis in his own life.¹¹¹

Erich Kahler, in his "Rede über Hermann Broch", refers to Broch's final realization that for man there can be no escape into some ideal, transcendental reality. Man is a creature of this earth and must fulfil his duties there. Kahler's words could well apply to Andreas's final insight in Die Schuldlosen: "es gibt für den Menschen kein Entrinnen in ein Jenseits integraler Reinheit."¹¹²

In conclusion, some comment must be made about Andreas's suicide. Broch repeatedly states that Andreas dies in a state of grace.¹¹³ By this we must presumably understand that Andreas has finally realized the moral

responsibility of the individual to his fellow-men at a time when a moribund system of values is disintegrating and exposing him to the challenge of a new, higher plane of reality. Andreas's suicide seems to be the complete negation of his new found knowledge. He preaches direct, moral commitment to humanity and then fails to accept the implications of this for himself. Instead of facing up to those responsibilities he escapes through death into the ideal unity of transcendental reality. His suicide seems a futile, even selfish gesture.

Broch seems to have been aware of such a possible criticism. In the "Entstehungsbericht" he refers to a central problem of all art and, more particularly, of this novel. "Was soll also ein solcher Roman? Die Frage rührt an ein wesentlichstes Problem der Kunst, an ihr Sozialproblem." (GW 5: 363) He goes on to argue that art cannot and should not attempt to convert people to any point of view, social, moral or religious; it can have only exemplary value.

"So wenig das Kunstwerk zu bekehren oder in irgend einem konkreten Fall Schuldeinsicht zu erwecken vermag, der Läuterungsprozess selber gehört trotzdem dem kunstwerklichen Bereich an; ihn zu exemplifizieren ist dem Kunstwerk möglich . . . und durch diese Fähigkeit zur Darstellung und (was noch mehr ist) zur Vermittlung von Läuterung gelangt die Kunst zu ihrer bis ins Metaphysische reichenden sozialen Bedeutung." (GW 5: 364)¹¹⁴

In the commentaries on the novel Broch also

emphasizes that he wished to exemplify an act of purification and expiation.¹¹⁵

All of these comments still leave open the question of why he chose to have Andreas commit suicide. It would seem that the novel could better fulfil the social function demanded of it by Broch if Andreas were shown to accept the moral responsibilities implicit in his new vision of the world instead of avoiding them through suicide. The novel would still have the exemplary function postulated by Broch, but the behaviour exemplified would be socially much more relevant. Andreas's death reveals a resignation not in keeping with his vision of the need for human commitment and moral responsibility demanded of man by the new reality. His death compares unfavourably with that of Vergil in Der Tod des Vergil. Like Andreas, Vergil has a vision of the new reality, but resists death until he has fulfilled all his obligations in this life. Mutter Gisson, in the Bergroman, also shares the same vision as Vergil and Andreas, but, like the former, she dies only after a life lived in the service of her fellow-men.

Willi Weismann, who first published Die Schuldlosen, cast doubts on the motivation of Andreas's guilt and confession in the context of the novel, and his criticism could be just as well applied to Andreas's suicide itself.¹¹⁶ Both Gerda Utermöhlen and Robert Mandelkow are critical of Andreas's confession and suicide. They suggest that the confession is far from convincing and scarcely motivated by Andreas's character as revealed in

the novel up to that point.¹¹⁷ As a result, the confession seems to be a didactic conclusion grafted arbitrarily onto the end of the novel, and as such it is reminiscent of the unconvincingly optimistic ending of Die Schlafwandler. It is certainly true that Andreas's confession would carry much more weight if it led him to put into practice the new morality revealed to him. Eric Herd specifically questions the value of Andreas's expiation in making life more meaningful for himself or anyone else.¹¹⁸

The curious disparity between the reassurance and hope expressed in the confession and the resignation revealed by the suicide reflects Broch's own dilemma in the closing years of his life. Like Andreas, Broch believed that he had found an answer to the problems raised by the dissolution of values. This he formulated in his theory of politics which, in turn, was scientifically founded, as he believed, on the newly discovered concept of "das Irdisch-Absolute". Broch was convinced that his theory was demonstrably valid, but he despaired of ever seeing his theories generally recognized and put into practice. In the first part of this thesis it has been shown that Broch finally gave up any hope of making a practical and practicable contribution to the improvement of the human condition in his life-time. The resignation and pessimism which mark the last two or three years of his life are revealed in his decision to forsake the practical problems of politics and mass-psychology for the more

abstract realms of mathematics and epistemology. This frustrated resignation may well explain the curious dissonances in Die Schuldlosen discussed above.

This study of the development in Broch's writings of the theory of "das Irdisch-Absolute" enables us to see in Broch's work a paradigm of the dilemma of the artist and intellectual, torn as he is between thought and action, theory and practice, in the troubled history of Western Europe in the first half of the twentieth century.

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2. Christa Sammons has compiled a bibliography of all the material in the Broch archive at Yale University. This is of particular importance because it refers to so much unpublished material. Christa Sammons, 'Hermann Broch Archive. Yale University Library', Modern Austrian Literature, 5(1972), 18-69.
3. Paul Michael Lützeler has compiled a useful bibliography of Broch's political writings, published and unpublished, in Hermann Broch. Völkerbund-Resolution, edited by P.M. Lützeler (Salzburg, 1973), pp.102-105. Useful though it is and despite Lützeler's claims, this bibliography is not exhaustive.

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2. Hermann Broch. Bergroman. Kritische Ausgabe in vier Bänden, edited by Frank Kress and Hans Albert Maier (Frankfurt/M, 1969). This edition is referred to by volume and page number, e.g. Bergroman III: 456.
3. Hermann Broch. Daniel Brody. Briefwechsel 1930-1951, edited by Bertold Hack and Marietta Kleiss (Frankfurt/M, 1971). This is referred to by the number of the individual letters, e.g. BB: 321.
4. "Trotzdem: Humane Politik", Die Neue Rundschau, 61(1950), 1-31. This is referred to by NR and the relevant page number.

Abbreviations.

- DVJS - Deutsche Vierteljahrsschrift für Literaturwissenschaft und Geistesgeschichte.
- EG - Etudes Germaniques.
- GLL - German Life and Letters.
- GR - Germanic Review.
- LuK - Literatur und Kritik.
- MLQ - Modern Language Quarterly.
- NDH - Neue Deutsche Hefte.
- NR - Die Neue Rundschau.
- PMLA - Publications of the Modern Language Association of America.
- TLS - Times Literary Supplement.
- ZfdPh - Zeitschrift für deutsche Philologie.

NOTESPART I

1. Paul Michael Lützeler cites evidence from contemporary personal documents of Broch's, such as his "Studienbücher", to suggest that Broch's professed disillusionment with his early studies is not fully justified. Lützeler maintains that Broch's comments in "Autobiographie als Arbeitsprogramm", which was written c. 1942, are retrospectively coloured by later developments in Broch's life. See Paul Michael Lützeler, Hermann Broch. Ethik und Politik (Munich, 1973), pp. 33-34.
2. This is only a very general description of how Broch envisages the loss of the absolute value-system of the Middle Ages. A more detailed and critical examination follows in Part II.
3. Another brief autobiographical sketch is contained in a letter of December 1931 to Willa Muir, GW 10: 329-330.
4. See Jonas and Schwarz, Nos. 60.24, 65.10, 66.10, 66.16, 67.09, 67.10, 70.11, and also the first part of the above mentioned book by Lützeler.
5. Recently published material reveals that this period in Broch's life of practical work in industry and politics was not as devoid of more intellectual pursuits as critics once assumed. Under No. 77 in her bibliography of the Broch archive at Yale University Christa Sammons lists a collection of reading and lecture notes

from Vienna university for the years 1915-1921.

6. Wolfgang Rothe, 'Der junge Broch', NDH, 77(1960), 780-797 (p.796).
7. See the Jonas and Schwarz bibliography for the years in question. Christa Sammons, under No. 95, lists the titles of thirty-eight reviews or articles written by Broch in the period 1919-1930. Of these thirty-six were written 1919-1921.
8. See also GW 8: 85, 322.
9. See note 7.
10. The poem appeared in Der Brenner, 3(1913), 136. The story appeared in Summa, 2(1918), 151-159.
11. Manfred Durzak, 'Ein Frühwerk Hermann Brochs', NDH, 13(1966), 10-18 (pp. 10-11).
12. See also GW 8: 13: "Der Bereich des Dichterischen wird ja durch die rationale Wissenschaft immer mehr eingeschränkt."
13. Broch's view of the cognitive or epistemological function of art is discussed by Manfred Durzak in his article, 'Hermann Brochs Auffassung des Lyrischen', PMLA, 82(1967), 206-216. For a general discussion of this role of art see Dorothy Walsh, 'The Cognitive Content of Art', The Philosophical Review, 52(1943), 433-451.
14. See also GW 8: 103 where, in a letter written in 1934, the following words appear. "Befriedigt Dichtung heute überhaupt noch ein soziales Bedürfnis? . . . Antwort: Ja."

15. See the relevant sections in the Jonas and Schwarz bibliography for details of the published work. Reference to the unpublished material can be found in the archive bibliography compiled by Christa Sammons. The original versions of the five short stories, which belong to the "Tierkreiserzählungen", have recently been published in a collected edition by Paul Michael Lützeler, Hermann Broch. Barbara und andere Novellen, edited by Paul Michael Lützeler, (Frankfurt/M, 1973). A general survey of Broch's literary work in the years 1928-1936 can be found in Manfred Durzak, Hermann Broch (Stuttgart, 1967), pp. 25-47. Durzak also discusses the two plays, the tragedy and the comedy respectively, in his 'Epilog des Wertzerfalls', GR, 41(1966), 218-242, and 'Epitaph auf einen Industriellen', LuK, 7(1966), 21-28.
16. An article by Robert Neumann, who knew Broch at the time of his arrest, suggests that in later years Broch considerably over-emphasized the traumatic effect of his detention. Neumann writes: "Als er recht direkt aus der Haft - drei Wochen nicht ganz - nach England kam, sah er's noch anders. Da erzählte er mir, seine Ausseer Kerkermeister seien alte Bekannte gewesen, wir hatten ja damals jeden Sommer in der Gegend verbracht, und die seien höchst verlegen gewesen über seine Inhaftierung." (Die Zeit, 28 October 1966, p.22).
17. See "Bemerkungen zum Tod des Vergil" (GW 6: 265-275) and also GW 8: 172, 181-182; GW 10: 365, 377, 379.

18. GW 8: 216, 280.
19. GW 8: 172, 246, 281-282.
20. GW 8: 246, 280; GW 10: 379.
21. GW 8: 246, 281; GW 10: 379.
22. In her memoirs, Private Collection (New York, 1965), Jean Starr Untermeyer devotes a long chapter, 'Midwife to a Masterpiece', to describing her experiences working with Broch on the translation.
23. GW 8: 216-217, 247, 281-282; GW 10: 379.
24. Broch was well aware of this compromise. In a letter of November 1947 to Egon Vietta he three times refers to the novel as "ein Zwitter". (GW 8: 280-283).
My purpose has been to outline the personal conflicts underlying the writing and publication of this novel. For a more detailed analysis of the origins of the novel reference should be made to Manfred Durzak, 'Hermann Brochs Vergil-Roman und seine Vorstufen', Literaturwissenschaftliches Jahrbuch, 9(1968), 285-317.
25. For detailed studies of the origins of Die Schuldlosen see Jonas and Schwarz, Nos. 57.07, 62.36, 65.26, 69.06, 69.06a. See also Lützelers 'Nachwort' to his edition, Hermann Broch. Barbara und andere Novellen, pp. 336f. Broch's own comments can be found in the "Entstehungsbericht", which is published with the novel, and in his correspondence. The index at the end of GW 10 gives the references to the novel contained in the correspondence in the Collected Works. The relevant

letters in Hermann Broch und Daniel Brody. Briefwechsel 1930-1951 are Nos. 505-507, 510-513, 515, 518-525, 535.

26. Stössinger's edition, of which even the title is an arbitrary choice, is of no value for research purposes. Frank Kress and Hans Albert Maier published a critical edition of all three versions of the novel in 1969, accompanying these three volumes with a fourth containing variant readings and a critical apparatus. This is the only reliable edition for research purposes. For details see the bibliography of this thesis.
27. The references to the novel in the correspondence of the Collected Works can be found in the index of GW 10. The Broch-Brody Briefwechsel contains a large number of direct and indirect references to the novel. They serve largely to emphasize Broch's own doubts and confusion about this work. The relevant letters are Nos. 220, 277, 286, 327, 360, 370, 372, 376, 382, 385, 391, 395, 399, 401, 403-405, 407, 411, 429, 430, 438, 447, 451, 460, 496-498, 500, 501, 513, 514, 529, 538, 539, 543.
28. Up to the time of writing two diverging interpretations of the genesis of the novel have been advocated by Manfred Durzak and Gbtz Wienold. See Jonas and Schwarz Nos. 67.16 and 68.29.
29. Kress and Maier discuss the question of the choice of title in vol. 4 of their edition, pp. 15-17.

30. The ivory tower, the symbol of irresponsible, aesthetic isolation recurs frequently in Broch's writings. See GW 8: 131, 216, 248; BB: 45, 441, 492 - footnote. It is also to be found in the "Schloss" symbol in Die Schlafwandler and Die Schuldlosen. Walter Baumann argues with some cogency that the tower in which the dying Vergil spends his last hours in Der Tod des Vergil represents the ivory tower of aestheticism which the poet must renounce before he can understand the full significance of his life and death. Walter Baumann, 'The Idea of Fate in Hermann Broch's Tod des Vergil', MLQ, 29(1968), 196-206, (p.201).
31. The full text of the resolution Broch planned to submit to the League of Nations was published by Paul Michael Lützeler in 1973, Hermann Broch. Völkerbund-Resolution (Salzburg, 1973). This edition also contains an earlier draft of the resolution, Broch's own commentary on it and some relevant correspondence.
32. See Jonas and Schwarz, B 29. This essay is now contained in GW 7: 83-89. Hannah Arendt's editorial note which suggests that the essay had not been previously published is wrong.
33. The essay is now contained in GW 7: 61-81; Broch discusses his "Völkerbundtheorie" in GW 9: 46-51. Broch had published a number of short articles on political theory before 1936, but it was not until after 1936 that he approached the matter systematically, with special reference to the problems of mass

psychology and with a view to seeing his theories put into practice. See Lützeler's bibliography, op. cit., pp. 102-105.

34. It is indicative of Broch's personal situation that he repeatedly discusses the role of the intellectual in his generation. See GW 8: 207-208, 375-376; GW 9: 302-309; GW 10: 276-277.

35. See also GW 8: 182, 188, 340.

36. For further evidence of this unity of Broch's work see also GW 8: 210, 248, 265, 300, 384, 386, 394.

37. My emphasis.

38. My emphasis. See also GW 8: 282, 337, 403, 418.

NOTESPART II

1. My emphasis.
2. My emphasis.
3. See Jonas and Schwarz, Nos. B 91 and B 113. Both quotations come from contexts in which Broch analyses the epistemological consequences of the Renaissance and discusses their influence on modern thinking. This makes the difference in his conclusions all the more striking.
4. Traces of this unfortunate trend can be found in articles which are too numerous to mention individually. Four major works which are guilty of this fault are: Thomas Koebner, Hermann Broch (Berne and Munich, 1965); Hermann Krapoth, Dichtung und Philosophie. Eine Studie zum Werk Hermann Brochs (Bonn, 1971); Ernestine Schlant, Die Philosophie Hermann Brochs (Berne and Munich, 1971); Paul Michael Lützeler, Hermann Broch. Ethik und Politik (Munich, 1973).

The dates of the above books are so recent because it is only in the last ten years that full-length book publications have started to appear in any numbers, but the above books reflect the earliest trends in criticism of Broch's theoretical writings on philosophy and politics.

An honourable exception must be made of Erich Kahler's

Die Philosophie von Hermann Broch (Tübingen, 1962).

In this first detailed exposition of Broch's philosophy Kahler does not hesitate to point out some of the inherent contradictions, even dangerous implications in Broch's thinking.

5. Karl Menges, Kritische Studien zur Wertphilosophie Hermann Brochs (Tübingen, 1970).

Heinz D. Osterle, 'Hermann Broch: Die Schlafwandler. Kritik der zentralen Metapher', DVJS, 44(1970), 229-268.

Heinz D. Osterle, 'Hermann Broch. Die Schlafwandler: Revolution and Apocalypse', PMLA, 86(1971), 946-958.

Timothy Casey, 'Questioning Broch's Der Versucher', DVJS 47(1973), 467-507.

Menges' book is by far the most rigorous, and destructive, criticism yet made of Broch's philosophy. Its real value lies in the attention it draws to the numerous weaknesses and contradictions in Broch's philosophical system.

6. 1932 was the date of publication of the third volume of Die Schlafwandler, in which "Der Zerfall der Werte" appears.
7. Ernestine Schlant suggests that this study was written in 1942, basing her assertion on knowledge of unpublished material from the Broch archive, about which she then fails to give any further details, op. cit., p. 187, note 1. Her reluctance or failure, to be more precise, is all the more surprising since she

quotes passages from other unpublished material elsewhere in her book.

8. These five works, which are central to this thesis, are published as follows.

"Der Zerfall der Werte" (GW 2: 400-403, 417-419, 425-427, 442-444, 450-455, 474-477, 510-517, 554-559, 592-598, 661-687).

"Werttheoretische Bemerkungen zur Psychoanalyse" (GW 7: 61-81).

"Über syntaktische und kognitive Einheiten" (GW 7: 151-202).

"Politik: Ein Kondensat" (GW 7: 203-255).

"Trotzdem: Humane Politik" NR, 61(1950), 1-31.

9. The most important of these studies are listed by Jonas and Schwarz, see Nos. 57.04, 64.31, 66.08, 66.26, 68.23.

More recent contributions are Hartmut Reinhardt's book, Erweiterter Naturalismus (Cologne and Vienna, 1972) and the second part of Lützeler's Hermann Broch. Ethik und Politik.

10. References to studies of Broch's earliest philosophical writings, which are not discussed in this thesis can be found in Jonas and Schwarz, Nos. 60.06, 60.24, 67.10, 68.09, 70.11.

11. Broch makes frequent references to his view that the "Ich" unites within itself the two functions of thought and existence which are contained in the Cartesian formula. The main references are listed here: GW 2: 443, 593, 662, 681; GW 6: 209, 318-319; GW 7: 47-48,

67-71, 93, 113-114, 263; GW 10: 281, 297-299.

12. The detailed analysis of this conflict is found in "Werttheoretische Bemerkungen zur Psychoanalyse". It does not form part of "Der Zerfall der Werte".
13. Paragraph 36 of "Prolegomena", Kants Werke, edited by the Royal Prussian Academy, 9 vols (Berlin, 1902-1923), IV, 319-320. Kant's emphasis.
14. Broch regularly differentiates between "Erkenntnis" and "Wissen". Only the former earns the accolade of being designated as objective knowledge which is logically valid, formally correct. "Wissen" always refers to intuitive perception, irrational or visionary insights which, however valuable to the individual, cannot be shown to be objectively valid.
15. My emphasis.
16. The implications of such a view for Broch's aesthetic theory do not fall within the compass of this thesis. Broch discusses them in "Das Böse im Wertsystem der Kunst" (GW 6: 311-350), "Einige Bemerkungen zum Problem des Kitsches" (GW 6: 295-309), and "Das Weltbild des Romans" (GW 6: 211-238).
See also Manfred Durzak, 'Der Kitsch - Seine verschiedenen Aspekte', Der Deutschunterricht, 19(1967), 93-120.
17. Wiedergeburt der Liebe, edited by Frank Thiess, (Berlin, 1931), pp. 361-380. The essay is now reprinted in GW 7: 45-60.

18. Broch's epistemology and ultimately even his political theory are founded on an analysis of the history of Western European civilization. From this relatively narrow basis he formulates general theories of epistemology and politics which he claims to be applicable to all men everywhere. This would seem to be a weakness in his position. It can probably be argued that much oriental thought, philosophy and history has little in common with its Western counterparts and that generalizations should not be made from the latter to the former.

19. See also GW 2: 475 and GW 6: 324-326.

20. Because of Broch's frequently repeated views on the Middle Ages a number of critics have erroneously placed him in the tradition of German Romanticism, comparing him especially to Novalis. Such an interpretation is advocated by the following critics.

J-J Anstett, 'Le romantisme de Hermann Broch', EG, 11(1956), 224-239 (p. 226).

Peter Hasubek, 'Geschichtstheorie und Erzählkunst. Bemerkungen zu K. Gutzkow und Hermann Broch', EG, 22(1967), 517-537 (pp. 536-537).

Karl August Horst, Kritischer Führer durch die deutsche Literatur der Gegenwart (Munich, 1962), p.111.

Heinz D. Osterle, 'Hermann Broch: Die Schlafwandler. Kritik der zentralen Metapher', DVJS, 44(1970), 229-268 (p. 266).

Wolfgang Rothe, 'Der junge Broch', NDH, 7(1960), 780-

797 (p. 791).

Frank Trommler, Roman und Wirklichkeit (Stuttgart, 1966), p. 103.

What all such critics overlook is the fact that for Broch the Middle Ages represented the ideal model for an absolute value-system. He has no emotional attachment to the Middle Ages and never appeals for a return to them. His thinking is most emphatically directed towards the future. Indeed he regularly criticizes the German Romantics, as in GW 6: 296, 301 and GW 8: 236, 345.

A more accurate discussion of Broch's relationship to Romanticism is offered by the following.

Jean Boyer, Hermann Broch et le problème de la solitude (Paris, 1954), p.59.

Manfred Durzak, 'Apokalypse oder Utopie? Bemerkungen zu Hermann Brochs Schlafwandlern', EG, 24(1969), 16-35 (p. 19).

Wulf D. Hund, 'Zerfall der Werte 1-10. Über den erkenntnistheoretischen Ansatz bei Hermann Broch', LuK, 4(1969), 400-410 (pp. 406-407).

Leo Kreutzer, Erkenntnistheorie und Prophetie (Tübingen, 1966), pp. 50-54.

Paul Michael Lützel, 'Die Kulturkritik des jungen Broch', DVJS, 44(1970), 208-228 (pp. 213-214).

It is interesting to note that Broch's analysis of the decline of the Middle Ages displays close parallels to that of a famous professional historian, Johann

Huizinga, in the latter's book, The Waning of the Middle Ages (first English edition, London, 1937).

These similarities are particularly evident in Huizinga's discussion of medieval religion and symbolism, chapters 14-17. As yet there is no evidence that Broch read Huizinga's book, although it seems likely.

21. Broch frequently analyses the Reformation and Renaissance in this light. See GW 2: 510-517, 544-549, 676; GW 6: 316; GW 7: 54-56; GW 10: 290.

22. Karl Menges, op. cit., pp.102-109, subjects this theory of Broch's to a rigorously destructive criticism, which is largely justified. What matters, however, is not whether Broch's theory is correct, but that he believed it to be correct.

23. My emphasis.

24. Two exceptions can be made here.

Walter Baumann, 'Hermann Broch und die Lyrik', Colloquia Germanica, 1(1967), 174-205 (p. 186).

Erich Kahler, op. cit., pp. 2, 5, 16, 38, 76f.

25. See also GW 8: 387, 389.

26. See also GW 9: 68-69, 155, 174, 189.

Similarly, one of Broch's aims was to show that death need not be feared because it is not the dreadful extinction envisaged by most men, but is merely a normal human experience within a higher reality of which human life is only one limited aspect. This is a conviction which an individual may believe and

finally experience, but it is not open to proof.

Broch regularly admitted this: GW 8: 186, 193, 230.

27. The full list of references to the Logos in the Collected Works is given below in chronological order of occurrence.

GW 7: 49-60; GW 2: 450-451, 595-598, 677, 683, 687;
GW 7: 89; GW 7: 91-101; GW 10: 293-301; GW 6: 204;
GW 7: 106-108; GW 9: 241-246; GW 6: 239-245; GW 7:
200-202; GW 6: 252-253; GW 6: 283-293; GW 7: 218.

28. See GW 2: 598, 677; GW 10: 276, 293, 294, 297.

29. For this identification, see GW 2: 450, 451, 596, 683;
GW 6: 204; GW 7: 53, 54, 94, 200.

30. Karl Menges, *op. cit.*, p.41, correctly draws critical attention to Broch's dubious reliance on tautologous arguments.

31. Kant, *op. cit.*, pp. 241-244.

32. My emphasis. See also GW 2: 401, 596, 598; GW 7: 48.
Under the fourth reference can be found a very revealing summary of Broch's view of the way the individual rationalizes his own situation: "Trivialst ausgedrückt: in seiner kontrollosen Autonomie ist die jeweilige Welt für das Ich stets die relativ beste." Clearly there is no question of a qualitative criterion here, merely the formal one of reason. Here too is the explanation of the latter part of the last passage quoted in the text from "Gedanken zum Problem der Erkenntnis in der Musik".

33. See GW 6: 235, 243-246, 322; GW 7: 122, 126, 194-195.
34. Quoted by Hannah Arendt from Broch's unpublished "Entwurf für eine Theorie massenwahnhafter Erscheinungen" (GW 6: 20).
35. See especially GW 6: 333-334, 339-341 and also GW 2: 671 and GW 6: 213-214.
36. Paul Michael Lützeler, Ethik und Politik, p. 83, has suggested that Broch's distinction between "ethics" and "morality" may be traced back to a distinction made by Kant between the formal nature of ethics as the expression of a rational free will and the qualitative nature of moral judgments derived from practical experience. See Kant's preamble to his "Grundlegung zur Metaphysik der Sitten", op. cit., pp. 387-392. A reading of Kant's argument does not confirm Lützeler's suggestion. Nowhere does Kant take such a critical, even derogatory, view of morality as Broch does in the early writings.
37. See GW 8: 84-85, 140; GW 10: 323, 336.
38. In a letter written in October 1931 to the English translators of the novel, Edwin and Willa Muir, Broch referred specifically to the ninth chapter of "Der Zerfall der Werte" as evidence of the optimistic conclusion of the whole novel (GW 10: 335-336).
39. Egon Vietta criticizes the novel for precisely this failure in his article, 'Hermann Broch', NK, 45(1934), 575-585 (p. 583).

40. The date of this letter, July 1930, makes it clear that these words were written before Broch started the definitive version of Huguenau, but, as all the other evidence confirms, they are obviously no less relevant to the final version. The complex genesis of Die Schlafwandler and especially of Huguenau is discussed at length by Manfred Durzak and Theodore Ziolkowski. See Jones and Schwarz, Nos. 64.31, 67.15, 69.05.
41. A review in Times Literary Supplement of Broch's works criticizes Die Schlafwandler, with characteristically English pragmatism, for having been too obviously written to conform to a preconceived theory. TLS 29 March 1963, p. 210. In another letter to Willa Muir Broch himself reveals, perhaps unwittingly, the extent to which he was a victim of his own theories. Willa Muir had warned him not to expect too much acclaim from the British public when the translation of Die Schlafwandler appeared in Britain. Broch replies that he is aware of the limited appeal of his novel and concludes humorously: "Und im Grunde darf es gar nicht anders sein, - es würde sonst meiner Geschichtsphilosophie widersprechen, und da will ich lieber, dass die Schlafwandler unverstanden blieben, als dass meine Theorie ins Wanken käme!!" (GW 10: 320). As is so often the case, the ironical or humorous statement of a view often unintentionally reveals more than it conceals.
42. Again it must be stressed that this letter describes

the original version of the novel, but Broch's own analysis of his novel is equally relevant to the final version of the book. This is confirmed by the description here of the main characters, a description which could equally well have been written for the characters in the definitive version of the novel.

43. Detailed studies of the influence of mysticism on Broch's thought and language can be found in E.W. Wolfram's unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, 'Der Stil Hermann Brochs: Eine Untersuchung zum Tod des Vergil' (Freiburg, Switzerland, 1958), and in Walter Somm's book, Hermann Broch. Geist, Prophetie und Mystik (Freiburg, Switzerland, 1965).

44. Leo Kreutzer, Erkenntnistheorie und Prophetie, pp. 173-193.

Manfred Durzak, loc. cit.

Kreutzer's basic argument is that the Gbdicke episode in Huguenau, with its account of Gbdicke's miraculous recovery from being buried alive and his subsequent efforts to rebuild his life and understanding of reality from the simplest possible foundation, symbolically presents Broch's hope of how a new humanitarian ethos might grow out of the chaos of the Great War. To this one can only reply that this episode may symbolize hope, however weak, but there is not the comfort of logical certainty which Broch postulates in his theory.

Kreutzer's interpretation is taken up and developed by Durzak, in the article already mentioned, and also by Hartmut Reinhardt, Erweiterter Naturalismus pp. 158-185.

Reinhardt adds a further refinement to the argument by admitting (p. 158f.) that any possible conclusions to be logically drawn from the Huguenau action are negative and pessimistic, but he then qualifies this somewhat confusingly, by concluding that the contrapuntal structure of all the other episodes in the novel justify the final statement of optimism in the novel (p. 185).

Optimistic interpretations of Die Schlafwandler are also advanced by the following critics.

Gisela Brude-Firnau, 'Die 9. Episode der Geschichte des Heilsarmee Mädchens', in Materialen zu Hermann Brochs Die Schlafwandler, edited by Gisela Brude-Firnau, (Frankfurt/M, 1972), pp. 180-195.

Karl August Horst, 'Methodisch konstruiert. Über das Romanwerk Hermann Brochs', Merkur, 5(1951), 389-395 (p. 394).

Paul Konrad Kurz, 'Hermann Brochs Schlafwandler-Trilogie als zeitkritischer Erlösungsroman', Stimmen der Zeit, 91(1966), 25-45 (p. 43).

Paul Michael Lützeler, op. cit., p. 82f.

Leslie Miller, 'Hermann Broch's Die Schlafwandler. A Critical Study in the Light of his Letters, Exposes and an Unpublished Manuscript Version of the Novel' (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Berkeley University, 1964).

Ernestine Schlant, 'Hermann Broch, The Unity of his Thought in Essay and Novel' (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Emory University, 1965), p. 152.

45. These two articles can be found respectively in DVJS,

44(1970), 229-268, and in PMLA, 86(1971), 946-958.

Other critics who comment on the inconsistency between the theory of the dissolution of values and the optimistic ending of the novel are noted below.

Helmut Arntzen, 'Hermann Broch. Die Schlafwandler', in Der moderne deutsche Roman (Heidelberg, 1962), 58-75 (p. 75).

Timm Collmann, Zeit und Geschichte in Hermann Brochs Roman Der Tod des Vergil (Bonn, 1967), p. 2.

Manfred Durzak, 'Die Wandlung des Huguenau-Bildes in Hermann Brochs Schlafwandlern', Wirkendes Wort, 17(1967), 41-47 (p. 47).

Karl Robert Mandelkow, Hermann Brochs Romantrilogie Die Schlafwandler (Heidelberg, 1962), p. 135.

Hermann Pongs, Romanschaffen im Umbruch der Zeit, fourth edition, (Tübingen, 1963), p. 58.

Hartmut Steinecke, Hermann Broch und der polyhistorische Roman (Bonn, 1968), pp.145-147.

Frank Trommler, op. cit., pp. 115, 130.

46. Broch envisaged a cyclical movement in scientific methodology and ontological speculation between the extremes of Platonic Idealism and Positivism. The most important point for this thesis is the fact that he believed this cycle, and consequently the concomittant developments in culture and civilization, to be logically inevitable. This conviction is restated on numerous occasions. See also GW 2: 510-512, 663, 678, 681, 683, 685; GW 6: 312, 323; GW 10: 294-295, 303, 317.

47. GW 9: 44, 100; BB: 434.
48. GW 7: 271; GW 9: 93-99; GW 10: 299-300.
49. Wolfgang Rothe, 'Hermann Broch als politischer Denker', Zeitschrift für Politik, 5(1958), 329-341 (p. 333).
50. See GW 6: 263; GW 8: 173, 188, 238; GW 9: 92.
51. GW 9: 237-312. In the above mentioned article Rothe gives a general but accurate account of Broch's political writings as then known. Ernestine Schlant also gives a general, if uncritical presentation of Broch's political writings and other related studies in her book, Die Philosophie Hermann Brochs, pp. 108-180.
52. GW 9: 97, 132. This pendulum theory is also mentioned in "Trotzdem: Humane Politik", NR, 61(1950), 1-31 (p. 3).
53. See GW 9: 93-94 and GW 10: 299-300.

In Der Tod des Vergil Vergil realizes that the Golden Age of the classical period is coming to an end and he has a prophetic vision of a new culture to come. The symbolism used by Broch in the novel leaves no doubt that Vergil foresees Christianity as the unifying power behind the new European civilization.

It is now generally accepted that Broch envisaged a 2000-year cycle. See John White, 'Broch, Virgil, and the Cycle of History', GR, 41(1966), 103-110; Theodore Ziolkowski, Hermann Broch (New York, 1964), p. 6; Fritz Martini, Das Wagnis der Sprache (Stuttgart, 1954), p. 425.

54. These essays are all contained in the Collected Works. The references are respectively: GW 7: 45-60; GW 10: 276-282; GW 6: 211-238, 311-350; GW 10: 288-310.
55. GW 7: 83-89, 91-101.
56. See GW 8: 136, 148, 155, 156, 171-172.
57. Hermann Broch, 'Ethik', Der Brenner, 4(1914), 684-690 (p. 687).
58. These references are in chronological order from essays written in the period 1914-1936.
59. This essay also reveals one of the most frequently recurring weaknesses in Broch's system of philosophy, namely his reliance on tautological argument. He regularly describes the rational function in man in the Kantian terms of "das autonome Ich". Despite this assertion of the autonomy of human reason Broch repeatedly insists that the absolutely invariable logical structures of reason are derived from and guaranteed by the Logos. The starting point of his argument in this essay is the Cartesian "cogito" or "ich denke". He analyses this statement into two components: "das Ich denkt sich selber", and "das Ich denkt sein Denken". This leads him to the conclusion "das Ich denkt etwas". From this Broch deduces that the thinking subject can distinguish between itself and something external to it and concludes as follows.
"Von hier aus lässt sich weiter deduktiv erschliessen
'Das Ich unterscheidet im Etwas verschiedene Denkinhalte, darunter das Ich und ein Non-Ich'. Mit andern Worten: obwohl das Denken dem Ich unlösbar angehört,

unterscheidet es sich vom Ich-Subjekt, gehört also einem Non-Ich zugleich an.

Soweit das Denken dem Non-Ich angehört (also Denkinhalt des Denkens ist), präsentiert es sich dem Ich, als sei es ihm 'aufgezwungen' worden. Folgt also schon aus der Autonomie des Ich: 'Das Ich kann nicht anders denken, als es denkt', so wird dieses 'Nicht-anders-denken-Können' nun unter präziserer Beleuchtung zu einem 'Zwang', der vom Non-Ich auf das Ich ausgeübt wird, als ein ihm auferlegtes 'Gesetz' (mag auch dieses als ein solches erst nach mancherlei anderen Erfahrungen erkannt werden), und eben solcher Zwang rechtfertigt es, den Begriff der 'Wahrheit' anzuwenden." (GW 7: 67-68)

Apart from the dubious nature of such a tautologous argument, it is hard to see how Broch can really believe that he has demonstrated "die Autonomie des Ich" when he explicitly states that the "Ich" or subject of cognition is compelled to think rationally by some external force. The compulsion is clearly that applied by the transcendental Absolute of the Logos.

60. All are contained in the Collected Works. The references are respectively, GW 9: 77-236; GW 7: 257-282; GW 9: 239-312; GW 9: 315-360.

The "Preliminary Table of Contents" is in English because it was written in America for submission to Princeton University when Broch applied for a Rockefeller scholarship to carry on his research there.

61. Manfred Durzak, Hermann Broch (Stuttgart, 1967), p. 59.
62. Lützel, Hermann Broch. Völkerbund-Resolution
(Salzburg, 1973), p. 105.
Durzak, op. cit., p. 59.
63. GW 9: 97, 108, 140-143, 144, 151, 177.
64. GW 9: 68-69, 155, 174, 180, 189.
65. GW 8: 174, 179, 189, 199, 216, 222, 223, 246, 248.
66. GW 9: 155, 156, 168, 175, 185, 235.
67. The importance of the somewhat glibly stated assumptions
and qualifications in the latter half of this quotation
need hardly be emphasized.
68. My emphasis.
69. My emphasis.
70. My emphasis.
71. See also the use of these words in GW 8: 141 and GW 10:
367.
72. Broch's emphasis.
73. In a letter written in 1947 Broch comments on the
writer's task, as he sees it, of heightening his public's
perception of the world it lives in. This is an
ethical responsibility, which he then deliberately
contrasts, somewhat critically, with the writer's active
involvement in political and moral questions. Despite
this, he comes to the following conclusion about the
creative writer's ethical responsibility to heighten
his readers' response to reality. "Es ist eine

Sisyphusarbeit, darüber sind wir uns wohl einig und klar, aber sie hat etwas Tröstliches an sich: nicht das Tragen und Befördern des Steins ist das Wesentliche, nein, der Akt des Aufnehmens ist das Wesentliche - hat man den Stein nur wirklich erst auf die Schultern gehoben, so ist ein Stück Wirklichkeit, ein Stück Moralität geschehen." (GW 8: 268)

The first emphasis is Broch's, the second mine.

74. To my knowledge little reasoned comment has been made on the problematical relationship in Broch's work of ethics and morality as he understood them. The majority of critics, especially in discussions of the novels, accept Broch's definition of ethics without considering the difficulties of its practical application in the real world. A smaller number of critics have mentioned the problem, even fewer have attempted to discuss it in any detail.

Helmut Arntzen, op. cit., pp. 73-75, is highly critical of the definition and exemplification of ethics in "Der Zerfall der Werte" and Die Schlafwandler.

Walter Baumann, 'The Idea of Fate in Hermann Broch's Der Tod Des Vergil', MLQ, 29(1968), 196-206 (p. 205), emphasizes the disparity between Vergil's metaphysical (ethical) speculation and the practical (moral) conclusions he draws from this. The close personal identification between Broch and Vergil is of particular relevance here.

James Hardin, 'The Theme of Salvation in the Novels of Hermann Broch', PMLA, 85(1970), 219-227, outlines a

development in Broch's novels away from a formal, abstract conception of ethics to a more humanitarian, active one. He does not, however, explicitly discuss Broch's use of the words "ethisch" and "moralisch"; he merely equates the two. Erich Kahler, op. cit., pp. 42, 58, also emphasizes Broch's increasing interest over the years in the need for a practical humanitarian morality and immediate intervention in human affairs. Hermann Krapoth, op. cit., pp. 120-121 apologetically mentions the difficulties raised by Broch's highly personal interpretation of ethics but fails to discuss the question any further.

Hartmut Reinhardt, op. cit., p. 101-- note 3, also comments on the distinction Broch makes between ethics and morality without pursuing the question further.

Ernestine Schlant, Die Philosophie Hermann Brochs, pp. 38-39, admits the problems raised by Broch's definition of ethics in Die Schlafwandler but also takes the matter no further.

Hartmut Steinecke, op. cit., p. 30, comments on and accepts Broch's differentiation between ethics and morality, but he clearly does not consider the practical implications of this.

Gerda Utermöhlen, 'Hermann Brochs Novellenzyklus Die Schuldlosen', (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Heidelberg, 1965), pp. 14-21, 36, 139-145, suggests that the Novellen comprising this novel, which were written over a long period of years (1918-1949), reveal and confirm a change in Broch's thought from his original conception of

ethics to a more practical view of active, humanitarian morality.

75. GW 9: 233-235, 315f., 342f.
76. References to this research can be found in GW 8: 288, 291, 294, 296, 328.
77. See the editor's notes to letters No. 186 and 193 in GW 8: 451.
78. On similar grounds I question the date of 1946 which Binde suggests for the essay, "Zur politischen Situation unserer Zeit". This study contains specific references to "das Irdisch-Absolute" which could not have been written before 1948. The analysis of totalitarianism, democracy and the need for a new, humanitarian, legal system is very similar to Broch's discussion of these themes in "Politik" and "Trotzdem". It is certain that "Zur politischen Situation unserer Zeit" was written in 1948 at the very earliest because Broch refers to the independence of India (1947) and the accession of the nationalist government in South Africa (1948) as past events (GW 9: 389, 428). It is even possible that it was written as late as 1950. This date is mentioned once (GW 9: 391), although the context suggests Broch selected that date as the nearest round figure to the time of writing. He also talks of anti-communist trials in the United States at which the accused were charged with "Unamerican Activities" (GW 9: 422). This must be a reference to the McCarthy pogrom.

79. Broch's theory of intuition is developed in length in the essay, "Das System als Weltbewältigung" (GW 7: 111-149). His interest in this question is evident even in the early 1930's, especially in the essays, "Logik einer zerfallenden Welt" (GW 7: 45-60), "Einheit wissenschaftlicher und dichterischer Erkenntnis in der Musik" (GW 7: 91-101). As the following quotation from the last of these essays shows, his ideas at that time were very vague. "Das erkennende Wissen, dieses Vor-Wissen, das zugleich Über-Wissen ist, Vor-Erkenntnis und zugleich Über-Erkenntnis, unfassbar und doch all-überall, wird in seiner Unfassbarkeit dem Menschen als Gefühl habhaft: nur als Gefühl, und eben als Gefühl jedem Einzelnen das Wertvollste seines Lebens. Es ist das Gefühl, mit dem der wahrhaft dem Leben zugekehrte Mensch die Einzeler-scheinung begreift und mit dem er von der Welt ergriffen wird, es ist das Gefühl, mit dem er unablässig den Bogen vom Einzelphänomen zur Totalität der Welt und zu der seines eigenen Seins zu spannen befähigt ist." (GW 7: 95)

In the later essays, "Über syntaktische und kognitive Einheiten" and "Das System als Weltbewältigung", we see Broch's attempts to establish his theory of intuition on a scientific basis. Karl Menges, op. cit., pp. 83-120, subjects this theory to a very rigorous criticism.

For a general study of the problems of intuitive reasoning, see G.H. von Wright, The Logical Problem of

Induction, second edition, (Oxford, 1957).

80. It does not lie within the scope of this thesis to discuss the mathematical details of Broch's theory. He envisages two types of problem in any cognitive system, "eine Plus-Unbekannte" and "eine Minus-Bekannte". The former represents a new unknown factor which can be logically integrated into the existing system; the latter is a problem which cannot be so resolved and thus reveals deficiencies within the system and leads to its complete revision. In her exposition of Broch's philosophy Ernestine Schlant repeatedly misquotes "Minus-Unbekannte" for "Minus-Bekannte", op. cit., pp. 74-78. This renders Broch's argument and her presentation totally incomprehensible.
81. My emphasis. Again, typically, Broch yields uncritically ^{to} his own flow of thought. At the start of this quotation he is discussing the linguistic device and convention of personification, but he then proceeds as if it were not simply a metaphor but an ontological postulate.
82. Broch's interest in the theory of relativity is evident throughout most of his theoretical writings from an early date. See GW 2: 476, 597; GW 6: 197, 227, 318-320; GW 7: 131-133, 180-181, 192-193, 202, 215-217, 247-248. References can be found also in his correspondence. See GW 8: 15, 22, 57, 106, 350, 356, 369.
- Paul Michael Lützeler, Hermann Broch. Ethik und

Politik, p. 148 - note 55, has pointed out that the views formulated by Broch on the unavoidable error factor caused by the observer in the field of observation are not based, as Broch wrongly supposed, on Einstein's theory but on theories of Heisenberg. Broch's application of the theory of relativity to his own literary work and especially to Die Schlafwandler is discussed by Leo Kreutzer, op. cit., pp. 15-48, and Richard Brinkmann, 'Romanform und Werttheorie bei Hermann Broch: Strukturprobleme moderner Dichtung', DVJS, 31(1957), 169-197. Theodore Ziolkowski deals more generally with the same question in 'Hermann Broch and Relativity in Fiction', Wisconsin Studies, 8(1967), 365-376.

For the non-specialist there is a very useful and entertainingly written introduction to the theory of relativity by James A. Coleman, Relativity for the Layman (New York, 1954, and also available as a Pelican book).

83. Karl Menges, op. cit., pp. 102-109.

84. The occasions when he mentions the "ideale Person" occur in GW 7: 215-219 and 247-248. The validity of the first of these arguments in which the concept is used is very much open to question.

85. As always in Broch's writings, scientific validity implies that a theory can be shown to be logically sound and confirmed by empirical evidence. Any such theory is thus removed from the realm of subjective

belief and elevated to the plane of objective knowledge.

86. Broch's argument can be found at the given references:
GW 8: 210, 354-355, 386, 387, 389, 393-394, 403; GW 9:
402, 405-406, 410, 411f.; "Trotzdem", NR, p. 13f.

It must be mentioned that Broch was equally critical of the capitalist exploitation of the individual. But, as he saw no threat from a general, scientifically presented ideology of capitalism, he regarded Marxism as the greater danger to humanity.

87. See also GW 9: 383 where the following passage occurs.

"Gerechtigkeit ist ein transzendentaler Begriff, und wenn es auch der Hunger ist, der den Proletarier die Forderung nach Gerechtigkeit erheben lässt, er wird sie auch dann erheben, wenn ihre Erfüllung ihm nur sehr wenig Nahrung verschafft. Dagegen wird er umso lieber für sie kämpfen, wenn er in ihrem Namen seine sadistischen Triebe befriedigen darf: der Ruf nach Gerechtigkeit ist ein immanenter Bestandteil alles Menschlichen, und das sadistische Bedürfnis ist es gleichfalls, nämlich als Bedürfnis zum Herabsinken ins Untermenschliche; aber beides ist nicht auf den Proletarier beschränkt."

88. See "Trotzdem", NR, pp. 2-7; "Politik" (GW 7: 210-215) and "Zur politischen Situation unserer Zeit" (GW 9: 392f.).

89. Broch's emphasis.

90. See also GW 7: 222: "Die Abstraktions-Tendenz des

Rechtes verwandelt den Menschen fiktiv in eine Sache."

91. Mentioned also by Hannah Arendt (GW 6: 19-20) and Ernestine Schlant, *op. cit.*, p. 152.
92. The argument (GW 7: 204-209) with which Broch claims to prove that man is created in God's image and thus inherits the divine gift of reason, from the autonomy of which he then in turn derives the terrifying concept of absolute freedom, is one of the clearest examples of Broch's habit of confusing logical reasoning and metaphysical speculation. The basic problem, which he never openly acknowledges, is that he is trying to provide logical proof for what is essentially a matter of belief.

A basic premise in Broch's argument is that all men are born free and equal and that a desire for the greatest possible degree of freedom is a characteristic of man. In this desire for freedom he sees a reflection of the divine nature of God or the Logos. In this argument Broch first sees God or the Logos as an ideal anthropomorphic projection of man's own rational faculty, whereas in most of the writings before this he has described that power of reason as a derivative of the Logos. Here he states that man, as it were, creates God in his own image and not vice versa. His explanation proceeds, initially at least, logically enough from the autonomy of reason, but then degenerates into subjective speculation about the myth of Paradise or the Golden Age of Innocence.

"Der Mensch mag die Gottes-Existenz leugnen, aber niemals dass seine eigene deren Ebenbild ist. Seitdem es ihm dämmernd aufgegangen ist, dass etwas Absolutes in ihm wirkt, die Logik seines Denkens, die ihm auferlegt ist, das Bewusstsein seines Ichs, das Bewusstsein des in seinem Gedächtnis geordneten zeitlichen Ablaufes, das Bewusstsein des Nichts und des Unendlichen, beides unbegreiflich, dennoch von stärkster denkerischer Existenz, hat er die Existenzquelle hiezu in etwas verlegt, das über ihm lebt, und das er mit dem Namen Gottes, freilich ohne ihn aussprechen zu dürfen, zu bezeichnen wagte. Und ^szeitdem dies erstmalig geschehen war, wusste er, dass die Ebenbildhaftigkeit eine Verpflichtung darstellt, der er nicht gewachsen ist. Der Mythos vom goldenen Zeitalter der Mythos vom verlorenen Paradies, das wiederzugewinnen es gilt, läuft bis zur Aufklärung, läuft bis zu Rousseau und Marx, und es ist der Mythos des schlechten Gewissens; der Mensch weiss, wie schlecht er sich benommen hat und vor allem wie grundschlecht die von ihm geführte Politik gewesen ist." (GW 7: 204-205)

The dubious logical justification for this proof of God's existence is to be found in "Über syntaktische und kognitive Einheiten", where Broch states: "der Gott, der das Ebenbild des Menschen ist, verdoppelt diesen nicht, sondern ist etwas anderes, ist es sogar, etwas paradox ausgedrückt, schon vermöge seiner Nicht-Existenz, d.h. vermöge der logischen Operationen, denen es gegeben ist, im Nicht-Existenten Setzungen

vorzunehmen." (GW 7: 158).

In simpler terms, Broch is saying that man has a vague intuition of certain absolute ideals which he constantly fails to realize and cannot realize because he does not know how they can be expressed in the human context of empirical reality. Ideally man should be the perfect image of the God of his own creation, a God so perfect and absolute that he cannot be understood or defined in human terms. Broch concludes that in the realm of politics we cannot say definitely and positively what man should be or should do. In empirical reality a humanitarian system of politics can be formulated only on the knowledge of what man should not be if he is to remain human. "Kurzum, ohne zu wissen, was der Mensch sein sollte, lässt sich kaum über Politik sprechen, aber konkret lässt sich erst darüber sprechen, wenn man weiss, was der Mensch nicht sein soll, nicht sein darf." (GW 7: 205)

According to Broch the distinguishing characteristic of the human species is the desire for absolute freedom, a desire inherited from God or the Logos and experienced through the autonomy of reason. In the first long quotation above Broch suggests that God is a creation and projection of the human mind and represents man's attempt to rationalize his experience of the autonomy of reason. Soon after this he quotes the biblical words about man being created in God's image and suggests that this is a similar rationalization. "Als vor dreitausend Jahren der all-umfassende Satz

'Gott schuf den Menschen nach seinem Ebenbilde' gedacht und niedergeschrieben wurde, da war für den ungeheueren Geist, der dies tat, die Entwicklung zur absoluten Einsamkeit des Ichs bereits vollendet, denn dieser Satz, der die gesamte idealistische Philosophie des Abendlandes von Plato bis zu Descartes und bis zu Kant vorwegnahm, ist eben in der Autonomie des Bewusstseins begründet, in der Autonomie eines Denkens, das über sein eigenes strenggebundenes Sein erstaunt und zugleich auch weiss, dass es in seiner unbrechbaren Abgeschlossenheit bestimmt ist, alles Sein in sich aufzunehmen: das Gefäss der Welt, ihr schöpferischer Spiegel, ohne den sie dem Menschen nicht vorhanden wäre, die Erkenntnis, in der die Welt immer wieder zum ersten Mal entsteht." (GW 7: 208)

In the very next sentence Broch proceeds to discuss the phenomenon of freedom as if God really had created man in His own image. He fails to realize that he is regarding as fact what he previously expressly stated to be metaphysical speculation based on a desire to rationalize man's experience of the autonomy of the conscious self. "Indem Gott den Menschen in seinem Ebenbild erschaffen hat, lässt er ihn die Weltenschöpfung unaufhörlich wiederholen, hat er der Erkenntnis diese Schöpfungspflicht für ewig aufgetragen, vereinigt er des Menschen Erkenntnis mit seiner eigenen: und der Mensch, der solcherart in seiner Erkenntnis Gott wiedererkannt hat, demütig sich selber als das Geschöpf des Schöpfers erkennend, erkennt damit auch

die fürchterliche Pflicht zur Freiheit, die er mit seinem Schöpfer teilt. Kein Zweifel, mit der Formulierung der Ebenbildhaftigkeit wurde der Prometheus-Gedanke in einer Weise zu Ende gedacht, zu der die griechische Mythologie niemals fähig war."

(GW 7: 208)

This tautological argument, based on highly speculative premises, enables Broch to conclude that man's desire for absolute freedom, and the associated problems which such a desire must create in the political and social context, are inherited from God through the experience of the autonomy of reason. "Es ist ein ungeheurer und ungeheuerlicher Gedanke, denn er bringt das Feuer der unbeschränkt göttlichen Freiheit ins Irdische, fürchterlich folgerichtig und hart wie der alttestamentarische Gottesgedanke selber. Und mit dieser Folgerichtigkeit wird dem Menschen prometheisch etwas gegeben, was kein Tier besitzt, das Streben nach absoluter Ungebundenheit, so dass er über die geschaffene Natur und ihre Ordnungen hinausgehoben wird, obwohl er mit seinem Körper ihnen unentrinnbar verhaftet bleibt, und obwohl sie ausschliesslich kraft seiner Erkenntnis manifest sind: ungezähmt ist das Feuer in der irdischen Natur, ist Vulkan und Blitz, ist immer ihr Widersacher, und ungezähmt ist die Freiheit in der Menschenseele, ist Vulkan und Blitz, so dass er, des Feuers Hüter, immer wieder daran verbrennt, sein Fluch, dennoch seine Gnade. Kein Naturrecht kann solchen Gnadenfluch verbürgen, nur das göttliche Recht

war hiezu imstande." (GW 7: 208)

The above confused argument has been quoted in detail because it is so important for Broch's political application of the theory of "das Irdisch-Absolute". He believed that this argument proved that the desire for absolute freedom is the distinguishing characteristic of man. This was necessary because his legislative theory is based on the fact, as he saw it, that to deprive man of all freedom is, literally, to dehumanize him and reduce him to the level of an inanimate object.

It is interesting to note that this highly dubious argument does not recur in "Trotzdem", which was written for publication, and that in the earlier "Zur politischen Situation unserer Zeit" Broch describes the assumption that all men are born free and equal as "eine zwar plausible, dennoch mystische Annahme, zu deren Stützung man sich noch wahrlich am besten auf ein Gottesrecht berief" (GW 9: 392). The argument in "Politik" is obviously Broch's attempt to lend scientific weight to his "mystische Annahme".

93. See also GW 7: 231; GW 8: 356; GW 9: 409; NR: 11, 18-19.

94. Ernestine Schlant discusses the complications of Broch's view of slavery in greater detail, op. cit., pp. 151-154. Again it must be recognized that Broch's thinking at this stage was still coloured by still vivid memories of the Nazi concentration camps and current

developments in Russia.

95. My emphasis.

96. Such an anomaly can be avoided only if the death penalty is abolished. Broch never discusses the problems raised by extremely long prison sentences, even in the most humanitarian conditions. The normal duration of life puts a practical limit on the length of prison sentences.

97. The first two emphases are mine, the third Broch's. This statement, which demonstrates the need for a qualitative humanitarian standard in legislation, is central to the political application of the theory of "das Irdisch-Absolute". Variants of it can also be found in GW 8: 330 and GW 9: 410.

98. See also GW 8: 333, 335, 340, 393, 395, 413, and BB: 537. Discussion and criticism of the practical complications of Broch's political theories can be found in Wolfgang Rothe, 'Hermann Broch als politischer Denker', Zeitschrift für Politik, 5(1958), 329-341; Karl Menges, op. cit., pp. 129-178; Ernestine Schlant, op. cit., pp. 163-178; and in the special edition of Literatur und Kritik, 6/54-55(1971), which is devoted entirely to Broch with the emphasis on his political writings.

A number of critics have commented on the futility and even naivety of Broch's belief that he, a poet and amateur political theorist, could ever convert anyone to his theory of humanity. Günter Blöcker, Die neuen

Wirklichkeiten (Munich, 1968), p. 259., writes as follows. "Brochs 'Metapolitik' ist die kaum nachprüfbare Illusion eines Mannes, der sich seiner eigentlichen Bestimmung entzogen hat. . . Ein zentraler Seins-Wert kann nicht gelehrt oder gepredigt, er kann nur erlebt und das heisst: durch Erschütterung vermittelt werden."

The following words appear in an article by Harry Pross, 'Hermann Broch oder das Irdisch-Absolute', Deutsche Rundschau, 86(1960), 237-244 (p. 237). "Die Massenpsychologie also wird es schon aus diesen äusseren Gründen nicht leicht haben. Wann hätten Wissenschaftler Rat von einem Dichter angenommen, wann Politiker Ansichten eines Theoretikers akzeptiert, sofern er nicht die Gewalt predigte?"

99. See also GW 7: 205, 209, 212, 232, 240, 245, 249;
GW 8: 356; GW 9: 424; NR: 13, 30.
100. See GW 2: 671; GW 6: 213-214, 333-334, 339-341.
101. Broch's emphasis.
102. Compare the use of "moralisch" (NR: 12-13) and "ethisch" (NR: 18).
103. See also NR: 14.
104. Kant, Die Kritik der reinen Vernunft, Kants Werke, edited by the Royal Prussian Academy, 9 vols (Berlin, 1902-1923), III, 12.
105. Interesting confirmation of the importance attributed by Broch to the principles of the theory of relativity

in his own theory of "das Irdisch-Absolute" can be found in Arnold Toynbee's book, Man's Concern with Death (London, 1968), pp. 179-180. There Toynbee also suggests that the theory of relativity represents a break from past historical developments because, to a certain degree at least, it restores man as the central creative power in his own universe. Man, as the "ideal observer", is necessary to the understanding of his own reality. No matter how relative such reality may be, it is at least relative to man. A similar point is also made by Erich Heller in The Disinherited Mind (Cambridge, 1952), pp. 9-26, especially pp. 20-22.

106. A similar statement can be found in "Zur politischen Situation unserer Zeit" (GW 9: 365-366).
107. Some letters written late in his life would seem to confirm that Broch was not fully aware of the extent to which his research on "das Irdisch-Absolute" implied a revision of the views expressed in "Der Zerfall der Werte". In a number of letters written to the publisher, Kurt Wolff, in June and July 1946, Broch discussed the possibility of having Die Schlafwandler re-printed in the United States. In this correspondence he repeatedly states that the philosophy of history expounded and exemplified in the novel is undoubtedly correct. Kurt Wolff. Briefwechsel eines Verlegers, edited by Bernhard Zeller and Ellen Otten, (Frankfurt/M, 1966), pp. 463-465.

Broch makes a similar claim to Wilhelm Emrich in April

1951 (GW 8: 413).

This all suggests that even at that late stage Broch still adhered to the original, essentially pessimistic ethical credo at a time when he had in fact already been working for years to establish a practically viable humanitarian morality which implied a radical revision of the earlier theories.

108. ^{ROBERT A.} Hermann Kann, 'Hermann Broch und die Geschichtsphilosophie', Historica. Studien zum geschichtlichen Denken und Forschen, edited by Hugo Hantsch, Eric Vogelin and Franco Valsecchi, (Vienna, 1965), 37-50. Quoted from the reprint in Hermann Broch. Perspektiven der Forschung, edited by Manfred Durzak, (Munich, 1972), p. 395.
109. Harald Binde, 'Das Ziel im Unendlichen' in Hermann Broch. Die Heimkehr, edited by Harald Binde, (Frankfurt/M., 1962), 7-24 (p. 10). Binde has distorted and re-arranged a quotation from Broch's essay, "Die mythische Erbschaft der Dichtung" (GW 6: 243), an essay which has absolutely no relevance to the question of "das Irdisch-Absolute".
110. Helmut Arntzen, op. cit., p. 69.
111. Timothy Casey, 'Questioning Broch's Der Versucher', DVJS, 47(1973), 467-507 (p. 506).
112. loc. cit. p. 244.
113. Manfred Durzak, Hermann Broch. Der Dichter und seine Zeit (Stuttgart, 1968), p. 132. This same, too

narrow interpretation of "das Irdisch-Absolute" is made by Beate Loos in her book, Mythos Zeit und Tod (Frankfurt/M, 1971), p. 144.

114. GW 6: 5-42, especially p. 32f.

115. Erich Kahler, op. cit., p. 20-38, 44-57.

Wolfgang Rothe, loc. cit.

Ernestine Schlant, 'Hermann Broch. The Unity of his Thought in Essays and Novels' (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Emory University, 1965), pp. 73-82.

Ernestine Schlant, Die Philosophie Hermann Brochs, pp. 82-90, 146-163.

Joseph Strelka, Kafka, Musil, Broch und die Entwicklung des modernen Romans (Vienna, 1959), 65-101, especially p. 91f.

116. Heimito von Doderer, Tangenten (Munich, 1964), p. 398.

NOTES

PART III

1. Walter Baumann, 'Hermann Broch und die Lyrik',
Colloquia Germanica, 1(1967), 174-205 (p. 185).
2. The critics who mention it briefly are listed below.
Timm Collmann, Zeit und Geschichte in Hermann Brochs Roman Der Tod des Vergil (Bonn, 1967), p.2.
Karl August Horst, Kritischer Führer durch die deutsche Literatur der Gegenwart (Munich, 1962).
pp. 384-385.
Thomas Koebner, Hermann Broch (Munich, 1965), p. 43.
Ernestine Schlant, 'Hermann Broch. The Unity of his Thought in Essay and Novel' (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Emory University, 1965), p. 195.
Hartmut Steinecke, Hermann Broch und der polyhistorische Roman, (Bonn, 1968), pp. 156-157.
Frank Trommler, Roman und Wirklichkeit (Stuttgart, 1966), p. 115.
3. In Pasenow and Esch Eduard v. Bertrand's analysis of the dissolution of values and especially of the resultant alienation of human relationships can be found in GW 2: 100-106, 141-147, 319-326. His words are also quoted by others, as in GW 2: 282-283, 349-351. Dr. Bertrand Müller, the narrator of the "Geschichte des Heilsarmee Mädchens" and the writer of "Der Zerfall der Werte", is Eduard v. Bertrand's successor in spirit, although not in body. A comment

of Broch's in a summary of the novel makes it clear that the two Bertrand figures are not physically identical. This summary was first published by Theodore Ziolkowski in his article, 'Zur Entstehung und Struktur von Hermann Brochs Schlafwandlern', DVJS, 38(1964), 40-49. It is now reprinted in full in the notes to BB: 14. Despite such an explicit statement of Broch's intention, critics are divided about the identification of the two Bertrand figures, although it must be stated that, with the notable exception of Dorrit Cohn, who lists Ziolkowski's article in her bibliography, most critics who identify the two figures did not have the relevant summary of the novel at their disposal at the time of writing. Nevertheless, their arguments deliberately and arbitrarily ignore the explicit statement in Esch that Eduard v. Bertrand commits suicide. He cannot, therefore, appear in Huguenau.

The following critics identify Eduard v. Bertrand and Dr. Bertrand Müller.

Dorrit Cohn, The Sleepwalkers. Elucidations of Hermann Broch's Trilogy (The Hague and Paris, 1966), pp. 61-102.

Karl Robert Mandelkow, Hermann Brochs Romantrilogie Die Schlafwandler (Heidelberg, 1962), p. 151.

Felix Stössinger, Deutsche Literatur im zwanzigsten Jahrhundert, edited by Hermann Friedmann and Otto Mann, fourth edition, 2 vols (Heidelberg, 1961), II, p. 217.

Gerda Utermöhlen, 'Hermann Brochs Novellenzyklus Die Schuldlosen' (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Heidelberg University, 1965), p. 34.

The following critics argue against the identification of the two figures.

Leo Kreutzer, Erkenntnistheorie und Prophetie (Tübingen, 1966), pp. 145-149, 152f.

Paul Konrad Kurz, 'Hermann Brochs Schlafwandler-Trilogie als zeitkritischer Erlösungsroman', Stimmen der Zeit, 91(1966), 25-45 (pp. 29, 41).

Manfred Lange, 'Die Liebe in Hermann Brochs Romanen' (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Tübingen University, 1966), p. 33.

Paul Michael Lützeler, Hermann Broch. Ethik und Politik (Munich, 1973), p. 76.

Hermann Pongs, Romanschaffen im Umbruch der Zeit, fourth edition (Tübingen, 1963), p. 58.

Hartmut Reinhardt, Erweiterter Naturalismus (Cologne and Vienna, 1972), p. 200.

Hartmut Steinecke, op. cit., p. 140f.

Theodore Ziolkowski, loc. cit., p. 51.

4. For references to Bertrand as a doctor see GW 2: 66, 83, 98, 119, 130, 142, 322.

Dorrit Cohn has made a detailed study of Bertrand's role in the trilogy as a whole, op. cit., pp. 61-102.

See also J.J. White, 'The Identity and Function of Bertrand in Hermann Broch's Die Schlafwandler', GLL,

24(1970-1971), 135-144.

5. Mandelkow, op. cit., pp. 123-129.
6. Cohn, op. cit., pp. 80-89.
7. Heinz D. Osterle, 'Hermann Broch. Die Schlafwandler. Kritik der zentralen Metapher', DVJS, 44(1970), 229-268 (p. 252).
8. Schlant, op. cit., pp. 137-138, 141-143.
9. Helmut Arntzen, Der moderne deutsche Roman (Heidelberg, 1962), pp. 70-72.
10. Kreutzer, op. cit., pp. 143-152.

The problem of whether Bertrand can be seen as Broch's mouthpiece in the novel is the centre of some controversy. Broch once ironically rejected any such intended identification, but the obvious humour of his comment might permit the reader to doubt the seriousness of the opinion expressed (GW 10: 332). He also writes elsewhere that he dislikes the technique of using a character in a book for such a purpose (GW 8: 321). Despite such comments the fact remains that throughout the novel it is the Bertrand figure who presents and explains Broch's theory of values and all its implications. Steinecke's view that Bertrand reflects Broch's ideas but not his committed way of life is one attempt to solve the question, op. cit., pp. 79-80, 142. Kreutzer rejects completely any possible identification of Broch and Bertrand, op. cit., p. 162. Nevertheless, a large number of critics see

Bertrand as his creator's mouthpiece or suggest that Bertrand's dilemma of correct but impotent analysis of the current crisis directly reflects the conflict Broch himself felt between his pessimistic interpretation of history and the need to undertake something practical to help his fellow-men in their difficulties. The following critics suggest some sort of identification between Broch and Bertrand.

Cohn, op. cit., pp. 88, 95.

Koebner, op. cit., pp. 37-39.

Kurz, loc. cit., p. 35.

Lange, op. cit., p. 55.

Lützeler, op. cit., p. 75.

Mandelkow, op. cit., p. 151f.

Pongs, op. cit., p. 58f.

11. Steinecke, op. cit., pp. 115-127.

12. A few other critics also take a positive view of Esch's final position in the second part of the trilogy, although they all mention the point only very briefly. So far Steinecke's interpretation, limited though it is, is the most detailed attempt to show the positive value of Esch's final decision. See also the critics listed below.

Jean Boyer, Hermann Broch et le problème de la solitude (Paris, 1954), pp. 37, 59.

Walter Jens, Statt einer Literaturgeschichte, fifth edition (Pfullingen, 1962), pp. 188-189, 192, 196.

Thomas Koebner, 'Die mythische Dimension in Hermann

Brochs Romantrilogie Die Schlafwandler' (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Munich University, 1967), pp. 78, 81.

Paul Konrad Kurz, loc. cit., pp. 28, 33, 40.

Manfred Lange, op. cit., pp. 32, 33, 120, 130.

Manfred Sera, Utopie und Parodie bei Musil, Broch und Th. Mann (Bonn, 1969), pp. 96-97, 120, 130.

Frank Trommler, op. cit., p. 109.

13. See GW 2: 102, 105, 283, 292, 349-351.

14. These passages refer to the Huguenau figure of the first version of the novel of that name. In the final version of the novel the optimistic prophecy is carried not so much by Huguenau as by the sub-plots of Hanna Wendling, Ludwig Gbädicke and Heilsmarie. Nevertheless, even in the definitive version Huguenau is shown to be vaguely aware of "die platonische Freiheit" and its possible consequences (GW 2: 677-681).

15. This summary is reprinted in the footnote to BB: 14.

16. Steinecke, op. cit., 103-155.

17. The ironic grimace and the movement of the hands are characteristic of Bertrand in the first two novels in the trilogy. See GW 2: 21, 55, 111, 323, 324, 325.

18. To my knowledge Lützeler is the only critic to comment in any detail on the importance of Martin Geyring in the novel, op. cit., pp. 116-121.

19. Steinecke, op. cit., p. 123.

20. Kreutzer, op. cit., pp. 150-151.

21. Kreutzer, op. cit., p. 151.

See also Reinhardt, op. cit., pp. 130-131, where Esch's marriage to Mutter Hentjen is criticized as a form of sectarian Romanticism.

22. Kreutzer, loc. cit.

23. Lange, op. cit., pp. 32-33.

Sera, op. cit., pp. 106-114.

24. For Bertrand's views on love as expressed by himself or by others who have adopted his ideas, see GW 2: 101-106, 283, 292, 349-351.

25. For a discussion of the concept of salvation in Broch's novels see James Hardin, 'The Theme of Salvation in the Novels of Hermann Broch', PMLA, 85(1970), 219-227.

26. The symbolic significance of America and its association with Bertrand and the idea of freedom are developed at some length throughout the novel. See GW 2: 27, 200-201, 223, 233, 239-242, 274, 288, 291-292, 295, 304, 307, 312, 323, 338.

27. Steinecke, op. cit., pp. 126-127.

28. My emphasis.

29. A different emphasis is evident in Lützeler's interpretation of this passage, op. cit., p. 124. He compares Esch unfavourably with Geyring, saying paradoxically that the former is too distant in his utopian dreams from the concrete problems of daily reality and that as a result he finally sinks back

into his old ways. This scarcely does justice to Esch and seems to ignore most of the content of the last four pages of the novel. One could even argue that Esch, despite his many faults, has a breadth of vision far beyond that of Geyring, a lack of vision which may largely stultify the latter's work by involving him too deeply in the immediate problems and preventing him from looking at all to the future.

30. In both of these quotations the emphasis is mine. See also GW 2: 685-686.
31. My emphasis. See also Bergroman II: 462 where the rhythm of work is described as "irdisch geformtes Leben, Gleichnis irdischer Ewigkeit".
32. The passages quoted are the best representative samples chosen from the Bergroman to illustrate the point in question. Variations of this same theme occur repeatedly throughout the novel.
33. See also GW 3: 104-118, 153-154, 168.
34. The first emphasis is Broch's, the second mine.
35. The letters in question are BB: 283, 304, 344, 356, 379, 486, and also those in GW 8: 135 and GW 10: 354, 360.
36. See also GW 10: 45-46, 68, 76.
37. Broch discusses this point in BB: 377-379.
38. Walter Hinderer's unpublished dissertation, 'Die Todeserkenntnis in Hermann Brochs Tod des Vergil'

(Munich, 1961), is the best study yet available of the problematical concept of "Todeserkenntnis". It helped me greatly to clarify my own thoughts on the subject, even where they disagree with Hinderer's. Another useful study of the same theme can be found in Beate Loos, Mythos Zeit und Tod (Frankfurt/M, 1971), pp. 142-182. One of the best general introductions to the meaning of the novel is Aniela Jaffé's article, 'Hermann Broch. Der Tod des Vergil. Ein Beitrag zum Problem der Individuation' in Studien zur analytischen Psychologie C.G. Jungs, II, (Zürich, 1955), 288-343. This is now reprinted in Hermann Broch. Perspektiven der Forschung, edited by Manfred Durzak (Munich, 1972), pp. 135-176. Any references will be made to this edition.

39. The prophetic tone of Vergil's words is emphasized by his next speech: "'Den Menschen zur Liebe, der Menschheit zur Liebe wird der Heilbringer sich selber zur Erkenntnistat machen, zur Tat, die er dem All entgegenwirft, auf dass aus solch höchstem Wirklichkeitsbild dienender Hilfe sich aufs neue die Schöpfung entfalte.'" (GW 3: 424).

In his novel Broch uses the medieval legend that Vergil foretold the advent of Christianity in his fourth Eclogue. References to the coming of Christianity, with particular emphasis on a self-sacrificing Saviour and the symbolism of the Virgin and child, recur with increasing frequency towards the end of the novel. See GW 3: 238-239, 240-241, 291, 297-298, 311, 371,

395, 413, 419, 424, 455, 523, 531f.

The Christian doctrines themselves are of no direct interest to Broch. He wants to depict Vergil as a visionary at the end of an era who prophesies the eventual rise of a new ethos and civilization based on human love and self-sacrifice. Christianity simply provides the historical model for this.

40. For a further discussion of the complementary functions of life and death in the context of transcendental reality see GW 3: 353, 358.

In this novel as in all the others, it is an unquestioned premise that there is an ultimate, Platonic reality in which man has a part to play and the full significance of which is revealed to him only in death. Broch's "proof" of the existence of this reality is contained in "Über syntaktische und kognitive Einheiten" (GW 7: 151-202).

41. Broch's emphasis. Here, as so often, Broch uses "Seele" in a very loose way, seemingly identifying mind and soul, intellect and spirit.
42. In his literary work Broch attributes a special cognitive function to the lyric, seeing in it the only suitable vehicle for the deepest personal feelings and irrational intuitive insights. This view of the lyric is summarized in the two lines which introduce the first verse passage in the "Geschichte des Heilsarmeemädchens in Berlin" in Die Schlafwandler. There he writes: "Gar manches lässt sich bloss in Versen

sagen,/ so sinnlos scheint es dem, der bloss in Prosa spricht." (GW 2: 411). For a more detailed study of the lyric in Broch's work see Walter Baumann, 'Hermann Broch und die Lyrik', loc. cit., and Manfred Durzak, 'Brochs Auffassung des Lyrischen', PMLA, 82(1967), 206-216.

43. "Die Pforte des Schreckens" is first mentioned on p. 102 when Vergil suddenly realizes with horror that he may never finish the Aeneid and that his whole life's work has been futile, vain and transient.
44. It must be said that Broch's thinking on the Creation and the creative process is contradictory. Throughout the novel explicit statement and the frequent use of ring symbolism suggest that the Creation is in a constant state of flux between the polar extremes of perfect formal unity and chaos, Being and Nothingness (das Sein - das Nichts). Even the two suggestions of creation out of nothing and creation out of chaos are hardly consistent. At the same time Broch seems to envisage the Creation as a stable, but abstract structure of potential reality which is progressively given concrete expression in empirical reality by man.
45. For a detailed discussion of the role of laughter in Broch's work see Dorrit Cohn, 'Laughter at the Nadir. On a Theme in Hermann Broch's Novels', Monatshefte, 61(1969), 113-121.
46. References to the positive and negative value of "das Nichts" can be found respectively in GW 3: 174, 294-

295, 394 and GW 3: 100, 171, 186-187, 224-225, 368-369.

47. For a detailed psychological analysis of this central theme of the novel see Aniela Jaffé, loc. cit., pp. 139-140.
48. In Vergil's belief, which is expressed in religious metaphors, we can see clearly mirrored the epistemological theories formulated in more scientific terms by Broch in "Über syntaktische und kognitive Einheiten" and "Das System als Weltbewältigung".
49. Strangely, Hinderer completely mis-reads this passage in his discussion of the golden bough, op. cit., pp. 139-141. He says that the bough is given as a symbol of knowledge of death to the mortal who enters and successfully returns from Hades. The exact opposite is the case: the bough must be won in this world as a guarantee that the mortal will be allowed to return from the underworld with his knowledge of death.
50. Broch's emphasis.
51. "Scheintod" occurs in GW 3: 179, 181, 185, 186-187, 189, 190, 191. "Scheinleben" is mentioned in GW 3: 179, 181, 191, 193.
52. GW 3: 179, 186, 189-190.
53. Walter Baumann has drawn attention to the fact that in "Geschichtsgesetz und Willensfreiheit" (GW 9: 283-284) Broch contradicts his analysis of Vergil's motives

in the novel by stating that Vergil wanted to burn the Aeneid because of its Promethean nature, its cognitive content. Baumann, 'The Idea of Fate in Hermann Broch's Tod des Vergil', MLQ, 29(1968), 196-206 (p. 201).

54. See GW 3: 97-98, 108-109, 114, 116, 142, 144.

55. See GW 3: 146, 152, 156, 158, 166-167, 168.

56. The key phrase of "Schicksal-auf-sich-Nehmen" recurs in a number of variations. See also GW 3: 168, 231, 232, 238, 283.

57. GW 6: 155; GW 7: 59, 235-236.

58. See also GW 3: 413 where we find the words "die todesaufhebende Erkenntnis der Liebe".

Similarly, when Vergil despairs of human knowledge ever rising above the limits of empirical reality in order to reveal the ideal harmony of transcendental reality, he realizes that love is the highest form of knowledge open to man. Identification with a loved one affords a vision of the ideal unity in which the individual is perfectly at one with all Being and from which perspective life and death can be seen as complementary functions of human existence. This important role of love is expressed in the following quotations. "Immerzu durchbricht Liebe die eigene Grenze." (GW 3: 382-383) ". . . die verkündigende Stimme der Liebe, in der Tod und Leben sich eint." (GW 3: 452)

59. GW 3: 218, 219, 234, 238, 239-240, 249, 296, 368-369, 456, 500.
60. Some critics have already suggested, correctly I think, that Der Tod des Vergil represents a positive philosophical advance on the views expressed in Die Schlafwandler. Hannah Arendt specifically mentions the change from "nicht mehr und noch nicht" to "noch nicht und doch schon" in her article, 'Hermann Broch und der moderne Roman', Der Monat, 1(1949), 147-151. Walter Jens even identifies Vergil's vision of a higher reality and his subsequent actions with Esch's visions at Badenweiler and his final return to Mutter Hentjen, op. cit., pp. 188-189, 192-196.
- See also Michel Habart, 'Hermann Broch et les rançons de la création poétique', Critique, 10(1954), 310-322.
61. Walter Baumann has already discussed the function of these elegies in the novel, but he mentions only briefly their possible relevance to the theory of "das Irdisch-Absolute". Baumann, 'The Idea of Fate in Hermann Broch's Tod des Vergil', loc. cit., p. 205.
62. GW 3: 154, 234, 238.
63. My emphasis.
64. Horst, op. cit., pp. 393-394.
65. Hermann Weigand, 'Broch's Death of Virgil - Program Notes', PMLA, 62(1947), 525-554 (p. 530).
- Similar interpretations are also offered by the following critics.

Maurice Blanchot, 'Hermann Broch: La Mort de Virgile', La Nouvelle Revue Francaise, 6(1955), 747-759 (p. 751).

Albert Fuchs, 'Der Tod des Vergil' in Der deutsche Roman, edited by Benno v. Wiese, 2 vols (Düsseldorf, 1963), II, 326-360 (pp. 342-343).

Dietrich Meinert, Die Darstellung der Dimensionen menschlicher Existenz (Berne and Munich, 1962), p. 26.

Frank Trommler, op. cit., p. 124.

66. GW 3: 355, 373, 420, 437, 444-447, 448, 465, 466, 470, 477.

67. GW 3: 401, 405, 406, 413.

68. GW 3: 455, 469, 472.

69. GW 3: 477-478, 479-482.

70. GW 3: 354, 357, 427.

71. For further details see the first part of this thesis.

72. Manfred Durzak, 'Zur Entstehungsgeschichte und zu den verschiedenen Fassungen von Hermann Brochs Nachlassroman', ZfdPh, 86(1967), 594-627.

Götz Wienold, 'Hermann Brochs Bergroman und seine Fassungen: Formprobleme der Überarbeitung', DVJS, 42(1968), 773-804.

73. Frank Kress, 'Kritische Ausgabe des Vorwortes und des 1. Kapitels der drei Originalfassungen von Hermann Brochs Bergroman nebst Herkunftsnachweis des 1953 gedruckten Textes' (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, University of Connecticut, 1966).

74. cf.	<u>Bergroman I</u>	and	<u>Bergroman II</u>
pp.	27-29		39-41
	43-45		63-66
	52		89
	141-142		316-322
	164-165		371-373

75. GW 9: 78, 85f., 100-104.

76. cf.	<u>Bergroman I</u>	and	<u>Bergroman II</u>
pp.	52		101-102
	61-62		111
	88		164-166
	140		300-311
	141-142		316-322
	162-163		366-370
	170		392-394

77. cf.	<u>Bergroman I</u>	and	<u>Bergroman II</u>
pp	20		27-29
	47		67-73
	50		88
	--		189-190
	--		266-267
	140		314-315
	162-163		361-365
	216-217		487

78. In the next section of this chapter the second version of the novel is used for the source of reference as far as possible, i.e. the first eight chapters. For subsequent chapters the first version is used.

79. See GW 9: 46, 52.

For further details of Broch's rejection of his literary career in the mid-1930's, see part I of this thesis.

80. Bergroman II introduces another new emphasis on the doctor's decision in chapter 5, pp. 272-273, and also expands on an original passage in the eighth chapter, cf. Bergroman I: 233 and Bergroman II: 515-516.

81. Baumann, loc. cit., p. 182.

82. See Bergroman II: 2, 376, 439, 477-478, 502-503, and Bergroman I: 424-425, 427.

83. See Bergroman II: 391-392, 460, and Bergroman I: 170, 202-203, 280-281, 296-297, 205, 367-368.

84. Trommler, op. cit., p. 115.

85. cf. Bergroman I: 216-235 and Bergroman II: 488-518.

86. Bergroman II: 250, 281, 283-284, 325.

87. Quoted on p. 228. of part III of this manuscript.

88. Richard Thieberger, 'Hermann Brochs Novellenroman und seine Vorgeschichte', DVJS, 36(1962), 562-582.

Manfred Durzak, 'Die Entstehungsgeschichte von Hermann Brochs Die Schuldlosen', Euphorion, 63(1969), 371-405.

This article contains two summaries of the novel written by Broch for his publisher and not published before.

89. Utermöhlen, op. cit., pp. 8, 139-145, 191, 216.

90. Thieberger, loc. cit., p. 573f.

Durzak, loc. cit., p. 368f.

The original versions of the Novellen are now readily available for comparison in Hermann Broch. Barbara und andere Novellen, edited by P.M. Lützeler (Frankfurt/M, 1973).

91. Durzak, loc. cit., pp. 388-398.

Unless otherwise stated all subsequent page references in the text are from this article.

92. Broch's emphasis.

93. Some of the most important references to this cycle, where these polar complements are specifically mentioned are given below.

GW 5: 127, 236-237, 239-240, 249-251, 253-254, 275-276, 310, 328-329, 337-338.

94. Broch's emphasis.

95. Broch's emphasis.

96. GW 5: 129-130, 190, 273, 309, 322.

97. See also GW 5: 236-237, 251, 254-255.

98. GW 5: 106, 108-109.

cf. also Andreas's words of confession: "Unser Getanes lähmt unser Tun, hat uns zur Unterwerfung gebracht und zu tief verschreckten Fatalisten degradiert, so dass wir zur Mutter zurückflüchten, heim zur einzigen Beziehung, die ungespenstig und eindeutig bleibt in der unerklärlichen Vielfalt, gleichsam als wäre das Haus der Mutter eine Insel der Dreidimension-

alität im Unendlichen und jenseits jeglicher Aufgabe."

(GW 5: 330-331).

My emphasis.

99. Andreas's indecisive, selfish behaviour towards Melitta can be traced through the following passages.
GW 5: 255, 261, 263-268.
100. cf. also GW 5: 310 where a similar point is again made.
101. As Broch grew older, so the appeal for common decency ("Anständigkeit") recurred with increasing frequency in his work. See GW 8: 129, 267, 318, 333; GW 9: 155, 156, 168, 175, 185, 235, 365, 423; and NR: 25, 31.
102. cf. GW 5: 299-302 and GW 7: 158, 204-205.
103. GW 5: 297-298, 330-331.
104. Whether the reader finds the portrayal of this character convincing is another matter.
105. My emphasis.
106. My emphasis. The two phrases in each quotation are chosen because they are relevant to the change in Broch's thinking from "ethisch" to "moralisch". In the early writings a new insight into reality would certainly be designated as ethical, but for that very reason it would be dissociated from any concept of morality.
107. GW 5: 78f., 237, 338.
108. Liselotte v. Borcke, 'Das Romanwerk Hermann Brochs' (unpublished Ph. D. dissertation, Bonn, 1956), p. 104.

109. Hermann Broch. Short Stories, edited by Eric Herd
(London, 1966), p. 25.
110. Heinz Politzer, 'Jenseits von Joyce und Kafka', NR,
63(1952), 152-159 (p. 158).
111. Utermöhlen, op. cit., pp. 7-8, 14-21, 36, 139-145,
153, 158, 161-162, 192-198, 216.
112. Erich Kahler, 'Rede über Hermann Broch', NR, 63(1952),
232-242 (p. 239).
113. Durzak, loc. cit., pp. 392, 394, 396.
114. There seems to be a clear parallel to Schiller's
words in Über das Pathetische: "Es ist bloss die
vorgestellte Möglichkeit eines absolut freien Willens,
wodurch die wirkliche Ausübung desselben unserm
ästhetischen Sinn gefällt."
115. Durzak, loc. cit., pp. 390, 396.
116. Daniel Brody comments on Weismann's criticisms in a
letter to Broch dated 2 January 1950 (BB: 524).
117. Utermöhlen, op. cit., pp. 164, 192-198.
Mandelkow, op. cit., pp. 31-32.
118. Herd, op. cit., p. 17.